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AN

AUTHENTICK HISTORY

OF THE

LATE WAR

BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN,

WITH A FULL

ACCOUNT OF EVERY BATTLE

BY SEA AND LAND; THE DEFECTION OF GENERAL HULL, HIS TRIAL AND SENTENCE; THE MASSACRE AT THE RIVER RAISIN; THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CITY OF WASHINGTON; THE TREATY OF PEACE IN 1815.

To which will be Added,

THE WAR WITH ALGIERS,

AND THE TREATY OF PEACE;

The Treaties of Peace with the various Tribes of North American Indians, and the

UNITED STATES' ARMY REGISTER,

AND PEACE ESTABLISHMENT.

BY PARIS M. DAVIS,
LATE OF THE ARMY.

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW-YORK, ss.

BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the twenty-fifth day of March, in the fifty-second year of the Independence of the United States of America, A. D. 1828, PARIS M. DAVIS, of the said District, hath deposited in this Office the title of a Book, the right whereof he claims as Author, in the words following, to wit: "An Authentick History of the Late War between the United States and Great Britain, with a full account of every Battle by sea and land; the defection of General Hull, his trial and sentence; the Massacre at the River Rasin; the Destruction of the city of Washington; the Treaty of Peace in 1815. To which will be added, the War with Algiers, and the Treaty of Peace; the Treaties of Peace with the various tribes of North American Indians; and the United States' Army Register and Peace Establishment. By Paris M. Davis, late of the Army."

In conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States, entitled "An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the time therein mentioned;" and also, to the act entitled "An act supplementary to an act entitled 'An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned,' and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of Designing, Engraving, and Etching historical and other prints."

R. R. LANSING,
Clerk of the Northern District of New-York.

YALE 1853

TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE GREAT AMERICAN REPUBLICK.

GALLANT COUNTRYMEN,

With that frankness, which in your profession is a most distinguishing characteristick, I offer this Volume without apology; and assure you, that every means has been used for the purpose of conveying to the publick a faithful account of every particular circumstance which took place during the late eventful contest with Great Britain and her dependencies, and the United States and their territories. To you, Gentlemen, and all others who have patronised this publication, I would observe, that without entering into the diplomatick controversy of the two Governments, I shall commence this History by inserting the Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

With admiration for your gallant achievements, and thankfulness for your patronage,

I am your obedient servant,

PARIS M. DAVIS.

AN

AUTHENTICK HISTORY &c

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the Message of the President of the United States, of the 1st of June, 1812,

REPORT:

THAT after the experience which the United States have had of the great injustice of the British Government towards them, exemplified by so many acts of violence and oppression, it will be more difficult to justify to the impartial world their patient forbearance, than the measures to which it has become necessary to resort, to avenge the wrongs and vindicate the rights and honour of the nation. Your Committee are happy to observe, on a dispassionate review of the conduct of the United States, that they see in it no cause for censure.

If a long forbearance under injuries, ought ever to be considered a virtue in any nation, it is one which peculiarly becomes the United States. No people ever had stronger motives to cherish peace; none have ever cherished it with greater sincerity and zeal.

But the period has now arrived, when the United States must support their character and station among the nations of the earth, or submit to the most shameful degradation. Forbearance has ceased to be a virtue. War on the one side, and peace on the other, is a situation as ruinous as it is disgraceful. The mad ambition, the lust of power, and commercial avarice of Great Britain, arrogating to herself the complete dominion of

the ocean, and exercising over it an unbounded and lawless tyranny, have left to neutral nations an alternative only, between the base surrender of their rights, and a manly vindication of them. Happily for the United States, their destiny, under the aid of Heaven, is in their own hands. The crisis is formidable only by their love of peace. As soon as it becomes a duty to relinquish that situation, danger disappears. They have suffered no wrongs, they have received no insults, however great, for which they cannot obtain redress.

More than seven years have elapsed since the commencement of this system of hostile aggression by the British Government, on the rights and interests of the United States. The manner of its commencement was not less hostile, than the spirit with which it has been prosecuted. The United States have invariably done every thing in their power to preserve the relations of friendship with Great Britain. Of this disposition, they gave a distinguished proof at the moment when they were made the victims of an opposite policy. The wrongs of the last war had not been forgotten at the commencement of the present one. They warned us of dangers, against which it was sought to provide. As early as the year 1804, the Minister of the United States at London, was instructed to invite the British Government to enter into a negotiation on all the points on which a collision might arise between the two countries in the course of the war, and to propose to it an arrangement of their claims on fair and reasonable conditions. The invitation was accepted. A negotiation had commenced and was depending, and nothing had occurred to excite a doubt that it would not terminate to the satisfaction of both parties. It was at this time, and under these circumstances, that an attack was made, by surprise, on an important branch of the American commerce, which effected every part of the United States, and involved many of their citizens in ruin.

The commerce on which this attack was so unexpectedly made, was between the United States and the colonies of France, Spain, and other enemies of Great Britain. A commerce just in itself; sanctioned by the

example of Great Britain, in regard to the trade with her own colonies; sanctioned by a solemn act between the two Governments in the last war, and sanctioned by the practice of the British Government in the present war, more than two years having then elapsed without any interference with it.

The injustice of this attack could only be equalled by the absurdity of the pretext alledged for it. It was pretended by the British Government, that in case of war, her enemy had no right to modify its colonial regulations, so as to mitigate the calamities of war, to the inhabitants of its colonies. This pretension, peculiar to Great Britain, is utterly incompatible with the rights of sovereignty in every independent state. If we recur to the well-established and universally admitted law of nations, we shall find no sanction to it in that venerable code. The sovereignty of every state is co-extensive with its dominions, and cannot be abrogated or curtailed in its rights, as to any part, except by conquest. Neutral nations have a right to trade to every port of either belligerant, which is not legally blockaded, and in all articles which are not contraband of war. Such is the absurdity of this pretension, that your Committee are aware, especially after the able manner in which it has been heretofore refuted and exposed, that they would offer an insult to the understanding of the House, if they enlarged on it; and if any thing could add to the high sense of the injustice of the British Government in the transaction, it would be the contrast which her conduct exhibits in regard to this trade, and in regard to a similar trade, by neutrals with her own colonies. It is known to the world, that Great Britain regulates her own trade in war and in peace, at home and in her colonies, as she finds for her interest; that in war she relaxes the restraints of her colonial system in favour of the colonies, and that it never was suggested that she had not a right to do it; or that a neutral, in taking advantage of the relaxation, violated a belligerant right of her enemy. But with Great Britain, every thing is lawful. It is only in a trade with her enemies, that the United States can do wrong. With them all trade is unlawful.

In the year 1793, an attack was made by the British Government on the same branch of our neutral trade, which had nearly involved the two countries in a war. The difference, however, was amicably accommodated. The pretension was withdrawn, and reparation made to the United States for the losses which they had suffered by it. It was fair to infer, from that arrangement, that the commerce was deemed by the British Government lawful, and that it would not be again disturbed.

Had the British Government been resolved to contest this trade with neutrals, it was due to the character of the British nation, that the decision should be made known to the Government of the United States. The existence of a negotiation which had been invited by our Government, for the purpose of preventing differences by an amicable arrangement of their respective pretensions, gave a strong claim to the notification, while it afforded the fairest opportunity for it. But a very different policy animated the then cabinet of England. The liberal confidence and friendly overtures of the United States were taken advantage of to ensnare them. Steady to its purpose, and inflexibly hostile to this country, the British Government calmly looked forward to the moment when it might give the most deadly wound to our interests. A trade, just in itself, which was secured by so many strong and sacred pledges, was considered safe. Our citizens, with their usual industry and enterprise, had embarked in it a vast proportion of their shipping, and of their capital, which were at sea, under no other protection than the law of nations, and the confidence which they reposed in the justice and friendship of the British nation. At this period, the unexpected blow was given. Many of our vessels were seized, carried into port, and condemned by a tribunal which, while it professes to respect the law of nations, obeys the mandates of its own government. Hundreds of other vessels were driven from the ocean, and the trade itself, in a great measure, suppressed. The effect produced by this attack on the lawful commerce of the United States, was such as might have been expected from a virtuous, independent, and highly injured

people. But one sentiment pervaded the whole American nation. No local interests were regarded; no sordid motives felt. Without looking to the parts which suffered most, the invasion of our rights was considered a common cause, and from one extremity of our Union to the other, was heard the voice of an united people, calling on their Government to avenge their wrongs, and vindicate the rights and honour of the country.

From this period, the British Government has gone on in a continued encroachment on the rights and interests of the United States, disregarding in its course, in many instances, obligations which have heretofore been held sacred by civilized nations.

In May 1806, the whole coast of the continent, from the Elbe to Brest, inclusive, was declared to be in a state of blockade. By this act, the well-established principles of the law of nations; principles which have served for ages as guides, and fixed the boundary between the rights of billigerants and neutrals, were violated. By the law of nations, as recognised by Great Britain herself, no blockade is lawful, unless it be sustained by the application of an adequate force, and that an adequate force was applied to this blockade, in its full extent, will not be pretended. Whether Great Britain was able to maintain legally so extensive a blockade, considering the war in which she is engaged, requiring such extensive naval operations, is a question which it is not necessary at this time to examine. It is sufficient to be known, that such force was not applied, and this is evident from the terms of the blockade itself, by which, comparatively, an inconsiderable portion of the coast only was declared to be in a state of strict and rigorous blockade. The objection to the measure is not diminished by that circumstance. If the force was not applied, the blockade was unlawful, from whatever cause the failure might proceed. The belligerant who institutes the blockade, cannot absolve itself from the obligation to apply the force under any pretext whatever. For a belligerant to relax a blockade which it could not maintain, it would be a refinement in injustice, not less insulting to the understanding than repugnant to the law

of nations. To claim merit from the mitigation of an evil, which the party had not the power, or found it inconvenient to inflict, would be a new mode of encroaching on neutral rights. Your Committee think it just to remark, that this act of the British Government does not appear to have been adopted in the sense in which it has been since construed. On consideration of all the circumstances attending the measure, and particularly the character of the distinguished statesman who announced it, we are persuaded that it was conceived in a spirit of conciliation, and intended to lead to an accommodation of all differences between the United States and Great Britain. His death disappointed that hope, and the act has since become subservient to other purposes. It has been made by his successor, a pretext for that vast system of usurpation which has so long oppressed and harrassed our commerce.

The next act of the British Government which claims our attention, is the Order of Council of January 7, 1807, by which neutral powers are prohibited trading from one port to another of France or her allies, or any other country with which Great Britain might not freely trade. By this order, the pretension of England, heretofore claimed by every other power, to prohibit neutrals disposing of parts of their cargoes at different ports of the same enemy, is revived, and with vast accumulation of injury. Every enemy, however great the number or distance from each other, is considered one, and the like trade even with powers at peace with England, who from motives of policy had excluded or restrained her commerce, was also prohibited. In this act the British Government evidently disclaimed all regard for neutral rights. Aware that the measures authorized by it could find no pretext in any belligerant right, none was urged. To prohibit the sale of our produce consisting of innocent articles, at any port of a belligerant not blockaded, to consider every belligerant as one, and subject neutrals to the same restraints with all, as if there was but one, were bold encroachments. But to restrain, or in any manner interfere with our commerce with neutral nations with whom she had no justifiable cause of war,

for the sole reason that they restrained or excluded from their ports her commerce, was utterly incompatible with the pacifick relation subsisting between the two countries.

We proceed to bring into view the British Order in Council, of November 11th, 1807, which superseded every other order, and consummated that system of hostility on the commerce of the United States, which has been since so steadily pursued. By this order, all France and her allies, and every other country at war with Great Britain, or with which she was not at war, from which the British flag was excluded, and all the colonies of her enemies were subjected to the same restrictions as if they were actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner, and all trade in articles the produce and manufacture of the said countries and colonies, and the vessels engaged in it were subjected to capture and condemnation as lawful prizes. To this order certain exceptions were made, which we forbear to notice, because they were not adopted from a regard to neutral rights, but were dictated by policy to promote the commerce of England, and so far as they related to neutral powers, were said to emanate from the clemency of the British Government.

It would be superfluous in your Committee to state, that by this order the British Government declared direct and positive war against the United States. The dominion of the ocean was completely usurped by it, all commerce forbidden, and every flag driven from it, or subjected to capture and condemnation, which did not subserve the policy of the British Government by paying it a tribute and sailing under its sanction. From this period the United States have incurred the heaviest losses and most mortifying humiliations. They have borne the calamities of war without retorting them on its authors.

So far your Committee has presented to the view of the House, the aggressions which have been committed under the authority of the British Government, on the commerce of the United States. We will now proceed to other wrongs, which have been still more severely

felt. Among these is the impressment of our seamen, a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has been a party, since our revolution. Your Committee cannot convey in adequate terms, the deep sense which they entertain of the injustice and oppression of this proceeding. Under the pretext of impressing British seamen, our fellow citizens are seized in British ports, on the high seas, and in every other quarter to which the British power extends, are taken on board British men of war, and compelled to serve there as British subjects. In this mode our citizens are wantonly snatched from their country and their families, deprived of their liberty, and doomed to an ignominious and slavish bondage, compelled to fight the battles of a foreign country, and often perish in them. Our flag has given them no protection; it has been unceasingly violated, and our vessels exposed to danger by the loss of the men taken from them. Your Committee need not remark that while the practice is continued, it is impossible for the United States to consider themselves an independent nation. Every new case is a new proof of their degradation. Its continuance is the more unjustifiable, because the United States have repeatedly proposed to the British Government an arrangement which would secure to it the control of its own people. An exemption of the citizens of the United States from this degrading oppression, and their flag from violation, is all they have sought.

This lawless waste of our trade, and equally unlawful impressment of our seamen, have been much aggravated by the insults and indignities attending them. Under the pretext of blockading the harbours of France and her allies, British squadrons have been stationed on our own coast, to watch and annoy our own trade. To give effect to the blockade of European ports, the ports and harbours of the United States have been blockaded. In executing these orders of the British Government, or in obeying the spirit which was known to animate it, the commanders of these squadrons have encroached on our jurisdiction, seized our vessels, and

carried into effect impressments within our limits, and done other acts of great injustice, violence, and oppression. The United States have seen, with mingled indignation and surprize, that these acts, instead of procuring to the perpetrators the punishment due to unauthorized crimes, have not failed to recommend them to the favour of their Government.

Whether the British Government has contributed by active measures to excite against us the hostility of the savage tribes on our frontiers, your Committee are not disposed to occupy much time in investigating. Certain indications of general notoriety may supply the place of authentick documents; though these have not been wanting to establish the fact in some instances. It is known that symptoms of British hostility towards the United States, have never failed to produce corresponding symptoms among those tribes. It is also well known, that on all such occasions, abundant supplies of the ordinary munitions of war have been offered by the agents of British commercial companies, and even from British garrisons, wherewith they were enabled to commence that system of savage warfare on our frontiers, which has been at all times indiscriminate in its effect, on all ages, sexes, and conditions, and so revolting to humanity.

Your Committee would be much gratified if they could close here the details of British wrongs; but it is their duty to recite another act of still greater malignity than any of those which have been already brought to your view. The attempt to dismember our Union, and overthrow our excellent Constitution by a secret mission, the object of which was to foment discontents and excite insurrection against the constituted authorities and laws of the nation, as lately disclosed by the agent employed in it, affords full proof that there is no bound to the hostility of the British Government towards the United States—no act, however unjustifiable, which it would not commit to accomplish their ruin. This attempt excites the greater horrour, from the consideration that it was made while the United States and Great Britain were at peace, and an amicable negocia-

tion was depending between them for the accommodation of their differences, through publick ministers regularly authorized for the purpose.

The United States have beheld with unexampled forbearance, this continued series of hostile encroachments on their rights and interests, in the hope that yielding to the force of friendly remonstrances, often repeated, the British Government might adopt a more just policy towards them; but that hope no longer exists. They have also weighed impartially the reasons which have been urged by the British Government in vindication of these encroachments, and found in them neither justification nor apology.

The British Government has alleged in vindication of the Orders in Council, that they were resorted to as a retaliation on France, for similar aggressions committed by her on our neutral trade with British dominions. But how has this plea been supported? The dates of British and French aggressions are well known to the world. Their origin and progress have been marked with too wide and destructive a waste of the property of our fellow citizens, to have been forgotten. The decree of Berlin, of November 21st, 1806, was the first aggression of France in the present war. Eighteen months had been elapsed after the attack made by Great Britain on our neutral trade with the colonies of France and her allies, and six months from the date of the proclamation of May, 1806. Even on the 7th of January, 1807, the date of the first British Order in Council, so short a term had elapsed after the Berlin Decree, that it was hardly possible that the intelligence of it should have reached the United States. A retaliation which is to produce its effect by operating on a neutral power, ought not to be resorted to till the neutral had justified it by culpable acquiescence in the unlawful act of the other belligerant. It ought to be delayed until after sufficient time had been allowed to the neutral to remonstrate against the measure complained of, to receive an answer and to act on it, which has not been done in the present instance; and when the order of November 11th was issued, it is well known

that a Minister of France had declared to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, that it was not intended that the Decree of Berlin should apply to the United States. It is equally well known that no American vessel had then been condemned under it, or seizure been made with which the British Government was acquainted. The facts prove incontestibly, that the measures of France, however unjustifiable in themselves, were nothing more than a pretext to those of England. And of the insufficiency of that pretext, ample proof has already been afforded by the British Government itself, and in the most impressive form. Although it was declared that the Orders in Council were retaliatory on France for her Decrees, it was also declared and in the orders themselves, that owing to the superiority of the British navy, by which the fleets of France and her allies were confined within their own ports, the French Decrees were considered only as empty threats.

It is no justification of the wrongs of one power, that the like were committed by another; nor ought the fact, if true, to have been urged by either, as it could afford no proof of its love of justice, of its magnanimity, or even of its courage. It is more worthy the Government of a great nation, to relieve than to assail the injured. Nor can the repetition of wrongs by another power, repair the violated rights or wounded honour of the injured party. An utter inability alone to resist, would justify a quiet surrender of our rights, and degrading submission to the will of others. To that condition the United States are not reduced, nor do they fear it. That they ever consented to discuss with either power the misconduct of the other, is a proof of their love of peace, of their moderation, and of the hope which they still indulged, that friendly appeals to just and generous sentiments would not be made to them in vain. But the motive was mistaken, if their forbearance was imputed, either to the want of a just sensibility to their wrongs, or of a determination, if suitable redress was not obtained, to resent them. The time has now arrived when this system of reasoning must cease;

it would be insulting to repeat it; it would be degrading to hear it. The United States must act as an independent nation, and assert their *rights* and avenge their *wrongs*, according to their own estimate of them, with the party who commits them, holding it responsible for its own misdeeds, unmitigated by those of another.

For the difference made between Great Britain and France, by the application of the non-importation act against England only, the motive has been already too often explained, and is too well known to require farther illustration. In the commercial restrictions to which the United States resorted as an evidence of their sensibility, and a mild retaliation of their wrongs, they invariably placed both powers on the same footing, holding out to each in respect to itself, the same accommodation, in case it accepted the condition offered; and in respect to the other, the same restraint, if it refused. Had the British Government confirmed the arrangement which was entered into by the British Minister in 1809, and France maintained her Decrees, with France would the United States have had to resist, with the firmness belonging to their character, the continued violation of their rights. The Committee do not hesitate to declare, that France has greatly injured the United States, and that satisfactory reparation has not yet been made for many of those injuries. But, that is a concern which the United States will look to and settle for themselves. The high character of the American people, is a sufficient pledge to the world, that they will not fail to settle it, on conditions which they have a right to claim.

More recently the true policy of the British Government towards the United States has been completely unfolded. It has been publickly declared by those in power, that the Orders in Council should not be repealed until the French Government had revoked all its internal restraints on the British commerce, and that the trade of the United States with France and her allies, should be prohibited until Great Britain was also allowed to trade with them. By this declaration it appears, that to satisfy the pretensions of the British Government, the United States must joinGreatBritain in the war withFrance, and

prosecute the war, until France should be subdued; for without her subjugation, it were in vain to presume on such a concession. The hostility of the British Government to these States, has been still farther disclosed. It has been made manifest that the United States are considered by it as the commercial rival of Great Britain, and that their prosperity and growth are incompatible with her welfare. When all these circumstances are taken into consideration, it is impossible for your Committee to doubt the motives which have governed the British Ministry in all its measures towards the United States since the year 1805. Equally is it impossible to doubt, longer, the course which the United States ought to pursue towards Great Britain.

From this view of the multiplied wrongs of the British Government since the commencement of the present war, it must be evident to the *impartial world*, that the contest which is now forced on the United States, is radically a contest for their sovereignty and independence. Your Committee will not enlarge on any of the injuries, however great, which have had a transitory effect. They wish to call the attention of the House to those of a permanent nature only, which intrench so deeply in our most important rights, and wound so extensively and vitally our best interests, as could not fail to deprive the United States of the principal advantages of their revolution, if submitted to. The control of our commerce by Great Britain, in regulating it at pleasure and expelling it almost from the ocean; the oppressive manner in which these regulations have been carried into effect, by seizing and confiscating such of our vessels with their cargoes, as were said to have violated her edicts, often without previous warning of their danger; the impressment of our citizens from on board our own vessels, on the high seas, and elsewhere; and holding them in bondage until it suited the convenience of their oppressors to deliver them up, are encroachments of that high and dangerous tendency which could not fail to produce that pernicious effect, nor would those be the only consequences that would result from it. The British Government might, for a while, be

satisfied with the ascendency thus gained over us, but its pretensions would soon increase. The proof, which so complete and disgraceful a submission to its authority would afford of our degeneracy, could not fail to inspire confidence that there was no limit to which its usurpations and our degradation might not be carried.

Your Committee, believing that the free-born sons of America are worthy to enjoy the liberty which their fathers purchased at the price of so much blood and treasure; and seeing, in the measures adopted by Great Britain, a course commenced and persisted in, which might lead to a loss of national character and independence, feel no hesitation in advising resistance by force, in which the Americans of the present day will *prove* to the *enemy* and to the world, that we have not only inherited that liberty which our fathers gave us, but also the WILL and POWER to maintain it. Relying on the patriotism of the nation, and confidently trusting that the Lord of Hosts will go with us to battle in a righteous cause, and crown our efforts with success—your Committee recommend an immediate appeal to ARMS!

The Report was, after two ineffectual motions to have the doors opened, ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. Calhoun, from the same Committee, on leave given, presented a bill, declaring war between Great Britain and her dependencies, and the United States and their territories. This bill was warmly opposed and debated for two days; when the question being taken, shall the said bill pass? It was resolved in the affirmative.

The Yeas and Nays were as follows:

YEAS.

New-Hampshire. Dinsmoor, Hall, and Harper—3.

Massachusetts. Seaver, Carr, Green, Richardson, Turner, and Widgery—6.

Rhode-Island. None.

Vermont. Fisk, Shaw, and Strong—3.

Connecticut. None.

New-York. Pond, Avery, and Sage—3.

New-Jersey. Condit and Morgan—2.

Pennsylvania. Seybert, Anderson, Brown, Roberts, Findley, Smilie, Lyle, Whitehill, Bard, Davis, Lefever, Hyneman, Piper, Lacock, Crawford, and Smith—16.

Delaware. None.

Maryland. Kent, Little, M'Kim, Ringgold, Brown, and Archer—6.

Virginia. Nelson, Gholson, Goodwyn, Newton, Taliaferro, Dawson, Basset, Smith, Hawes, Roane, M'Koy, Pleasants, Clopton, and Burwell—14.

North-Carolina. Alston, Blackledge, Macon, King, Cochran, and Pickens—6.

South-Carolina. Williams, Cheves, Lowndes, Butler, Calhoun, Earle, Winn, and Moore—8.

Georgia. Troup, Bibb, and Hall—3.

Kentucky. Johnson, Desha, New, M'Kee, and Ormsby—5.

Tennessee. Rhea, Grundy, and Sevier—3.

Ohio. Morrow—1.

NAYS.

New-Hampshire. Bartlett and Sullivan—2.

Massachusetts. Quincy, Reed, Taggart, Ely, Brigham, White, Tallman, and Wheaton—8.

Rhode-Island. Potter and Jackson—2.

Vermont. Chittenden—1.

Connecticut. Sturges, Davenport, Mosely, Champton, Tallmadge, Pitkin, and Law—7.

New-York. Bleecker, Emot, Cooke, Fitch, Gold, Sammons, Stow, Tracy, Van Cortlandt, Mitchill, and Metcalf—11.

New-Jersey. Boyd, Hufty, Maxwell, and Newbold—4.

Pennsylvania. Milnor and Rodman—2.

Delaware. Ridgely—1.

Maryland. Key, Goldsborough, and Stewart—3.

Virginia. Randolph, Lewis, Baker, Breckenridge, and Wilson—5.

North-Carolina. Pearson, M'Bryde, and Stanford—3.

South-Carolina. None.

Georgia. None.

Kentucky. None.
Tennessee. None.
Ohio. None.

Yeas	79
Nays	49
Majority for War	30

On the 5th of June, a confidential Message was received by the Senate, from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Macon and Mr. Findley, two of their members—Mr. Macon, chairman:

"Mr. President—The House of Representatives have passed a bill, entitled 'An act declaring war between Great Britain and her dependencies, and the United States and their territories;' in which they ask the concurrence of the Senate; and request that the bill be considered confidentially." And they withdrew.

The bill, from the House of Representatives, was before the Senate, from day to day, until the 17th June. It underwent a very enlarged discussion, met with much and violent opposition, but finally passed that body on the latter day; there appearing for its passage, 19; against it, 13.

The act was passed into a law on the 18th, in the following words:

AN ACT

Declaring War between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories.

BE it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That WAR be, and the same is hereby declared to exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories; and that the President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed vessels of the United States, commissions or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such

form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States, against the vessels, goods, and effects, of the Government of the same United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the subjects thereof.

June 18, 1812.

APPROVED, JAMES MADISON.

On the following day (19th June) war was declared, by Proclamation, the injunction of secrecy being previously removed in both Houses of Congress.

A peace of nearly thirty years, during which the Americans attended but little to improvements in the arts of war, rendered them apparently a very unequal match for a nation whose armies and navies were more numerous than they had been at any former period. The best friends of America feared much for the fate of the little American navy. It was also supposed that our undisciplined armies must experience several defeats from the well trained regulars of England; but, those who knew any thing of the revolutionary war, felt no doubt as to what would be the event of the present. The wonderful exploits and happy issue that remains to be recorded, will show that even the warmest enthusiasts did not probably anticipate renown and glory such as was in store for Americans.

The publick prints, on both sides, were warm in their denunciations of their respective opponents, and threats of what would and could be performed. The following are given as specimens.

From the London Courier.

"America knows not that the vigour of the British empire increases with the necessity of exerting it; that our elasticity rises with the pressure upon us; that difficulties only make us more firm and undaunted; that dangers only give us the additional means of overcoming them. It is in such a state of affairs, in such a great crisis, that a nation like Great Britain becomes greater. We are now the only bulwark of liberty in the world; placed, a little spot, a speck almost on the ocean, between the old and the new world, we are contending with both; with one arm we are beating the armies of the

master of the continent of Europe ; and with the other, *we shall smite his Prefect, on the Continent of America.*"

From the New-York Morning Post.

"With a stone and a sling only, America commenced the war of Independence. Without arms, without clothing, without money, and without credit, we took the field ; relying upon stout hearts, and the assistance of God, for the success of a righteous cause. The event has proved, that with such reliances, a nation has nothing to fear. Our country has again thrown itself upon the protection of the Lord of Hosts ; we need but prove faithful to him and to ourselves. Victory will again crown our efforts, and peace and plenty reward us for our toils. Who, that is truly an American, will despair of the success of his country ; who will dare to believe we can be otherwise than CONQUERORS ? We had imagined this impossible, except with the agents of the enemy ; yet, in a crisis so important, not only to us, but to posterity, we have found that the spirit of treason has dared to stalk abroad, even at noonday, among us. Is the enemy so strong in the camp, so confident of support, as to hazard a fearless defiance ? We are, it is true, proud to exist in a land of freedom ; but when men threaten us with giving the assistance of their pens to the cause of our adversaries, who will hesitate to say that such freedom becomes traitorous ?"

The state of the regular army was, at this time, such as scarcely to deserve the name. The militia, with the exception of a few uniform companies in the cities, consisted of a yeomanry and others accustomed to parade for a few hours each year, some with bad arms, others, without any. The preparation for war on the land was confined to an expedition under the command of General Hull, of which notice will be taken in the proper place.

On the 7th July, an order was issued from the Department of State of the United States, requiring all British subjects to register their names, ages, places of residence, persons composing their families, &c at the office of the Marshal of the United States, for the district in which such subjects resided. This order was followed

by others directing alien enemies, who were engaged in foreign commerce, to remove from the vicinity of the sea or tide water. The information constantly conveyed to the enemy, from the ports and harbours of the United States, was supposed to render such a measure necessary. It would be much to the houour of the citizens, if this treasonable intercourse with the enemy were confined to aliens; subsequent information, obtained at the Navy Department of the United States, has sufficiently proved that several profligate citizens have also held communications with, and supplied the wants of the enemy.

A cartel ship arrived in July, at Boston, from Halifax, and delivered on board the United States' frigate Chesapeake, three seamen, formerly taken out of that frigate, by the British frigate Leopard.

It will be recollected that the Leopard attacked the Chesapeake in time of peace, while the latter was unsuspicious of an attack, and unprepared for defence. The Chesapeake was fired into, boarded, and these men taken by force from her.

Remonstrance on the part of the United States, was made to the British Government, and redress demanded for this wanton breach of the laws of nations. The British Government disavowed any agency in the act; but yet promoted the commander of the Leopard, not to the yard arm of a ship, but to the command of a 74. The restoration of these men had been, for some time, promised by the British Government; it was pleasing to see it effected so soon after the declaration of war. Whether the war had any influence in this transaction, must be matter of conjecture, in which the reader will exercise his own opinion.

This is not the only instance in which war produced a change to those Americans who were impressed and confined on board British men of war. Several of them, having declined serving against their country, were sent to prison as prisoners of war, and became entitled to be liberated by exchange. This mode of treating them, after their character as American citizens was acknowledged, was certainly unjust; they should have been

fully released, not having been taken in time of war, or in arms, they were entitled to rank as non-combatants.

On the 12th July, Mr. Foster, the late British Minister, and Mr. Barclay, late Consul, departed from the United States, at New-York, on board the British flag of truce, Colibri. These gentlemen were much esteemed for their private amiable qualities.

The first British victory over the American flag, happened on the 20th of July. On this day, the United States' schooner Nautilus, Lieutenant Crane, fell in with a fleet of the enemy, and was captured, after a chase of eight hours. No honour was lost by the Americans on this occasion; the vast disparity of force, rendered resistance as imprudent, as it would be unavailing. The brave commander's sword was returned by the British officer, Commodore Brooke, as an acknowledgment of the skill and bravery with which he endeavoured to save his ship. Lieutenant Crane, and his crew, were afterwards honourably acquitted, by a court of inquiry, of all censure in the loss of the Nautilus.

On the 17th of this same month, the frigate Constitution, Captain Hull, chased a British frigate into a British fleet, and was chased in turn, on the following morning by the enemy, consisting of a ship of the line, four frigates, a brig, and a schooner. The chase continued sixty hours. The Constitution arrived safe in Boston. The great address, by which Captain Hull saved his ship, drew forth the admiration of the enemy, and the applause of his countrymen.

It was the wish of the Americans, as they also endeavoured in a former war, to induce the Indians to be neutral. Humanity and civilization plead in favour of a principle which would not add savage barbarity to the other evils of war; but unfortunately, the policy of a "magnanimous" enemy was different. The Americans soon learned that the enemy had leagued himself with the ruthless savage of the wilderness; the known warfare of the tomahawk and scalping knife, was to act in concert with the modern invention of rockets; in short, all means within the power of the enemy were to be combined against the people of the United States.

The first act in which the *allied* Indians and British *signalized* themselves, was in the taking of the fort of Michilimackinack, on the 17th of July, 1812. The garrison, consisting of 57 effective men, including officers, was commanded by Lieutenant Hanks, of the artillery. The first notice he received of the declaration of war, was in the form of a summons, to surrender the fort and island to his Britanick majesty's forces. The enemy, contemplating a state of war, had been for some time preparing an expedition for the attack of Michilimackinack. The place of rendezvous, was St. Joseph's, a British garrison, distant from Michilimackinack, about forty-five miles. So prepared were the British, that they were enabled to embark the next day, after being apprised of the declaration of war. Lieutenant Hanks having received information on the 16th, of the hostile attitude of the Indians, sent Captain Daurman, of the militia, to watch the motion of the Indians; he embarked about sun-set, and met the British forces within ten or fifteen miles of the island, by whom he was made prisoner. Every possible preparation was made by the garrison to resist an attack, if such should be attempted; but the appearance of a powerful enemy, with artillery, scaling-ladders, &c. induced Lieutenant Hanks to submit to terms of capitulation, by which the fort was surrendered to the British forces, commanded by Captain Roberts. The American garrison was made prisoners, and sent to the United States, not to serve until regularly exchanged.

The British force consisted, of regular troops, 46; Canadian militia, 260; Indians, 715. Total, 1,021.

The probability of an approaching war had determined the United States' Government to adopt some measures necessarily preparatory to that event.

On the 19th March, 1812, Major James R. Mullany, of the infantry, was directed by the Secretary of War, Dr. Eustice, to proceed to Philadelphia, and ascertain the state of forwardness in which the clothing for the new troops was. This was executed, and report made accordingly. On or about the 12th April, orders were received at New-York, to commence the recruiting ser-

vice. By this time the United States were divided into military districts, and Major Mullany appointed to the command of the Western district, New-York. With his noted zeal and activity, he arrived at Geneva, on the 20th April, 1812, and located there, with necessary instructions, a valuable officer, Captain Mydert M. Dox. In a few days, the officers assigned to this district, were supplied with funds and instructions, and martial musick gave awful warning of what was likely to follow. The difficulties that ignorance and treacherous opposition excited, are no way interesting at present. Manly exertion, good judgement, and a righteous cause, surmounted every scheme of faction, and soared successfully over every species of prejudice. Citizens most noted for acrimonious sarcasms towards the measures necessarily adopted at that period, soon buried their mistaken apprehensions in the national good, and were among the most active in aiding the efforts of the officers of the army.

On the 26th of May, a circular order was transmitted to the following officers, having for its object the concentration of the recruits of the Western district, at Canandaigua, to organize them for the field, viz:

Captain Dox, Infantry, Geneva.
Captain M'Keon, 3d Regt. Artillery, Canandaigua.
Captain David Scott, Infantry, Batavia.
Captain R. H. Morris, Infantry, Cayuga.
1st Lieutenant, William Clark, Infantry, Auburn.
1st Lieutenant, John M. O'Connor, 3d Reg. Artillery, Buffalo.
1st Lieutenant, Samuel Chipman, Infantry, Bath.
2d Lieutenant, W. Martin, Infantry, Lima.
2d Lieutenant, Henry Whiting, Infantry, Buffalo.

By Order—J. R. Mullany, Maj. Comdg.
Signed, J. H. Rees, Lt. 3d Artillery, Ajt.

The official news of the declaration of war, reached Major Mullany on the 27th June, 1812, one day later than the express with it to the British, passed Canandaigua, the head-quarters of the district. The man employed on this occasion, by the friends of England, was a citizen of Albany, well known by several real patri-

otick men, residing in the western country, on whom he imposed. He stated that he was conveying, express, the news of the declaration of war, to Fort Niagara, in consequence of which stratagem, he succeeded in obtaining every facility that money and horses could give him; and thus did the British receive the news one day before it was known at Canandaigua, from whence may be dated the fall of Michilimackinack, and a train of other disasters on the frontiers. Having delivered the despatches at Queenstown, he returned immediately. He met General Peter B. Porter at Batavia, who questioned him on the report then general, of such an express having passed, but he very adroitly escaped, and was again interrogated on his arrival at Canandaigua, by Major Mullany, who was closely watching his return. He soon discovered him, and placed him under guard, after reading to him the 57th article of the articles of war. His deposition was taken before a master in chancery, and forwarded to Governour Tompkins, the same night, whom it reached in thirty hours; distance, 208 miles. The gentlemen who employed the despatch were taken prisoners, and held to bail, and evidence given the Governour, that, although the despatches did communicate the vote of Congress, declaring war, still the communication was *simply mercantile.*

At this time the settlers on the Niagara frontier became much alarmed; they were daily threatened with a visit from the Indians, and their houses no longer offered them safety or protection. Several settlements had been abandoned, and nothing was heard along the frontier, in imagination at least, but the hostile yell of the relentless savage.

The following letter (not hitherto published) was, on this occasion, directed to Major Mullany:

Black Rock, June 28, 1812.

Sir—There is every reason to believe that the British meditate an attack on Fort Niagara, and that it may be attempted within twenty-four hours from this time. If they once pass the river, it is impossible to say how far they may proceed. Under these very urgent circum-

stances, I despatch an express, to request that you will immediately march the men under your command, to our assistance. Although you may not have received orders authorising you to comply with this request, I am persuaded the occasion will justify you, as your men can be of no possible use at Canandaigua, or any other place along the south shore of the Lake, and are undoubtedly intended, ultimately, for this place. Bring with you all the arms and ammunition in the Canandaigua arsenal.

In great haste, yours respectfully,
PETER B. PORTER, Q. M. G.
Of the State of New-York.

MAJOR MULLANY, Comm'g at Canandaigua.

Major Mullany, in consequence of the receipt of this letter, marched with his command for the protection of the Niagara frontier.

Another evidently material precaution, was the stationing a competent force in the Michigan Territory, for the protection of the inhabitants against the incursion of the enemy, as well as for the purpose of acting offensively, if such should be deemed prudent. General Hull had been at the seat of Government in the Spring previous to the declaration of war, where he made arrangements for conducting a force to Detroit. He accordingly proceeded to Dayton, on the Mad river, one of the waters of the great Miami, 60 miles by land, and about 75 miles by water, from its mouth. Here Governour Meigs, of the State of Ohio, surrendered to the General the command of 1500 volunteers, who had been raised for this purpose, and were commanded by Colonels M'Arthur, Cass, and Findlay, by the election of the volunteers.

On the 27th May, General Hull pitched his tent in camp Meigs; when, the troops being formed in a hollow square, the flag of the United States was unfurled, on which occasion, a short but animated and impressive address, was delivered by Colonel Cass.

On the 1st June, the 4th United States' regiment, commanded by Colonel Miller, joined General Hull,

when he resumed his march, and reached the rapids of the Miami about the last of June, having then under his command about 2500 men.

From Dayton to Detroit, a distance of more than 150 miles, the army had to cut a road through the wilderness; the land was soft or swampy, and the labour of bringing on carriages and artillery, excessive. The Indians showed little disposition to obstruct the passage of the troops. Governour Meigs proceeded with the army as far as the Urbanna, where he held a council with some Indian Chiefs, when it was agreed that peace should be maintained between them and the United States. The General put on board a vessel, the baggage and hospital stores of the army, with an officer and 30 men, with directions to sail for Detroit. The British having been apprized of the declaration of war, captured the vessel at Fort Malden, mouth of Detroit river; and thus the army suffered a serious loss.

On the evening of the 12th July, General Hull crossed the river Detroit, which divides the United States' Territory of Michigan from the British Province of Upper Canada, and fixed his head-quarters at the town of Sandwich, about two miles within the British Province. From this place, he published a Proclamation, of which the following is a copy:

BY WILLIAM HULL,

Brigadier General and Commander of the North Western Army of the United States:

A PROCLAMATION.

INHABITANTS OF CANADA:

After thirty years of peace and prosperity, the United States have been driven to arms. The injuries and aggressions, the insults and indignities of Great Britain, have once more left them no alternative but manly resistance, or unconditional submission. The army under my command has invaded your country; the standard of the Union now waves over the territory of Canada. To the peaceable unoffending inhabitants, it brings neither danger nor difficulty. I come to find enemies, not to make them. I come to protect, not to injure you.

Separated by an immense ocean, and an extensive wilderness, from Great Britain, you have no participation in her councils, no interest in her conduct. You have felt her tyranny, you have seen her injustice; but I do not ask you to avenge the one, or to redress the other. The United States are sufficiently powerful to afford every security consistent with their rights and your expectations. I tender you the invaluable blessing of civil, political, and religious liberty, and their necessary result, individual and general prosperity; that liberty which gave decision to our councils, and energy to our conduct, in a struggle for independence, which conducted us safely and triumphantly through the stormy period of the revolution; the liberty which has raised us to an elevated rank among the nations of the world; and which afforded us a greater measure of peace and security, of wealth and improvement, than ever fell to the lot of any people. In the name of my country, and the authority of government, I promise you protection to your persons, property, and rights; remain at your homes; pursue your peaceful and customary avocations; raise not your hands against your brethren. Many of your fathers fought for the freedom and independence we now enjoy. Being children, therefore, of the same family with us, and heirs of the same heritage, the arrival of an army of friends must be hailed by you with a cordial welcome. You will be emancipated from tyranny and oppression, and restored to the dignified station of freedom. Had I any doubt of eventual success, I might ask your assistance; but I do not. I come prepared for every contingency; I have a force which will break down all opposition, and that force is but the van-guard of a much greater. If, contrary to your own interests and the just expectations of my country, you should take part in the approaching contest, you will be considered and treated as enemies; and the horrours and calamities of war will stalk before you. If the barbarous and savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and the savages are let loose to murder our citizens, and butcher our women and children, this war will be a war of extermination. The first stroke of the

tomahawk; the first attempt with the scalping-knife, will be the signal of one indiscriminate scene of desolation. No white man, found fighting by the side of an Indian, will be taken prisoner; instant death will be his lot. If the dictates of reason, duty, justice, and humanity, cannot prevent the employment of a force which respects no rights, and knows no wrong, it will be prevented by a severe and relentless system of retaliation. I doubt not your courage and firmness; I will not doubt your attachment to liberty. If you tender your services voluntarily, they will be accepted readily. The United States offer you peace, liberty, and security. Your choice lies between these and war, slavery, and destruction. Choose, then; but choose wisely; and may He who knows the justice of our cause, and who holds in his hand the fate of nations, guide you to a result the most compatible with your rights and interests, your peace and happiness.

By the General,

A. P. HULL,

Captain of the 13th United States' Regiment of Infantry, and Aid-de-Camp. Head-quarters, Sandwich, July 12, 1812. WILLIAM HULL.

This Proclamation was well calculated to inspire confidence, and secure the friendship of the Canadians. The American troops were in high spirits, anxious to be led against the enemy's post at Fort Malden. The British force, consisting of regulars, militia, and Indians, was inferiour to the Americans, as appeared by the official communication of the British General, Brock, to his government. The moment seemed favourable to strike an important—perhaps a decisive blow. The Indians, except a few of whom had joined the British, remained neutral, watching with their usual sagacity, until they could discover on what side victory was likely to perch; nearly all the Canadian militia had deserted; Colonel M'Arthur was detached with 150 men to the river Thames, where he captured a considerable quantity of ammunition, arms, and blankets. Some hundreds of merino sheep were captured by another detachment.

On the 15th July, Colonel Cass, with about 300 men, reconnoitered the enemy's posts. The Colonel ascended the river Aux Canards, to a ford, where he crossed, and descending on the south side, attacked and repeatedly drove a party of the enemy's regulars, which was stationed at a bridge five miles above Amherstburgh, the enemy having formed and returned three times: night put an end to the pursuit. The Americans returned the following day to camp, without interruption. Frequent skirmishing was kept up between other detachments of the American army, and the enemy, in the neighbourhood of Fort Malden. The time of attacking Fort Malden was determined on at a council of field officers, and preparations made for advancing to the attack, when, by an unexpected order, the plan of attack was abandoned, and Canada evacuated on the 8th August, shamefully leaving to their fate, the Canadians who had joined the American standard.

This gave time to the enemy to be re-inforced, and it soon was rumoured in the American camp, that the commanding officer intended to surrender his army, in the event of an attack by the enemy. This seemed so unaccountable, at a time when superiority of force was on the American side, that the officers had resolved, in the event of the rumour being well founded, to divest the General of his command. The execution of this plan was prevented by the absence of two commanding officers of regiments, who were ordered on detachments. The British being re-enforced by about 400 men, and the Indians becoming more decided, General Brock advanced, and took a position opposite to Detroit, where, without interruption, he established a small battery.

On the 15th August, the town of Detroit was summoned to surrender, which being refused, a firing began from the British batteries, which was returned by the Americans, and continued, with little effect, until night. At day-light, on the 16th, the firing re-commenced on both sides, the enemy commenced the landing of troops below Detroit, which being soon effected, they marched in close column of platoons, twelve in front, toward the fort of Detroit.

Against this body of troops, not a shot was fired, although it advanced in a situation within the range of the American cannon. When the British reached within one hundred yards of the American line, orders were given by General Hull for the troops to retreat to the fort; and soon after, the fort was surrendered, and the American army became prisoners of war.

By a proclamation immediately issued by the British commander, General Brock, it appears that General Hull had also surrendered the Territory of Michigan.

This was a severe and unexpected blow against the Americans. It gave rise to a Court Martial on the conduct of General Hull, which will be noticed in its proper place; it, in a great degree, destroyed the confidence the Canadians had in the government and arms of the United States; it determined the Indians to take part with the enemy; and led not only to a prolongation of the war, but to many, or perhaps all of those savage acts of murder, in which the Indians were subsequently engaged, against the citizens of the United States.

General Hull, in his official account, states, that at the time the enemy advanced against Detroit, he could not bring into the field more than 600 men; that the regular force of the enemy, then advancing, was much more than that number, and twice that number of Indians.

An official letter from Colonel Cass, who had a command under General Hull, put the business in quite a different light, concluding with the following paragraph:

"I was informed by General Hull, the morning after the capitulation, that the British forces consisted of 1800 regulars; and that he surrendered to prevent the effusion of human blood. That he magnified their regular force nearly five fold, there can be no doubt. Whether the philanthropick reason assigned by him is a sufficient justification for surrendering a fortified town, an army, and a territory, is for the Government to determine. Confident I am, that had the courage and conduct of the General been equal to the spirit and zeal of the troops, the event would have been as brilliant and successful, as it now is disastrous and dishonourable."

The British official account is positive as to the inferiority of the enemy's force.

The following extract from the official report of Sir George Prevost, will show how weak the garrison of Amherstburgh, or Malden was, at the time when General Hull passed into Canada, having then under his command nearly 2500 men.

"The garrison of Amherstburgh consisted (at the time when General Hull passed into Canada) of a subaltern's detachment of the royal artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Troughton; of a detachment of 300 men, of the 41st regiment, under the command of Captain Muir; and of about as many of the militia; the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel St. George, inspecting field officer of militia in the district."

A few days before the surrender of Detroit, Major Van Horn, of Colonel Findley's regiment of Ohio volunteers, was detached with about 200 men, to proceed to the river Raisin, to re-enforce Captain Brush, who, with a company of Ohio volunteers, were escorting provisions for the army. At Brownstown, a large party of Indians formed an ambuscade, and the Major's detachment received a heavy fire at a few yards from the enemy. The whole detachment retreated in great disorder, and could not, by any exertion of Major Van Horn, be rallied. On this occasion, there were 7 officers and 19 privates killed, besides a considerable number wounded.

Before the return of Major Van Horn, another detachment consisting of 600 men, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, was ordered to proceed to the river Raisin, to open the communication to the river, and protect the provisions, which were under the escort of Captain Brush. Lieutenant-Colonel Miller marched from Detroit on the 8th August; and on the 9th, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the van guard, commanded by Captain Snelling, of the 4th U. S. regiment, was fired upon by an extensive line of Indians and British, at the lower part of Maguago, about fourteen miles from Detroit. Captain Snelling maintained his ground in a

most gallant manner, under a very heavy fire, until the arrival of the main body, under Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, when a general attack was made on the enemy, who was compelled to retreat before the Americans. The route continued until fatigue, and the approach of night, rendered it necessary to desist from farther pursuit.

A short time previous to the surrender of Detroit, a provisional agreement was entered into by General Dearborn, and Colonel Baynes, the British Ajutant-General, that neither party should act offensively before the decision of the American Government should be taken on the subject. This suspension of hostilities, was grounded on a letter from Sir George Prevost, Governour of Lower Canada, to General Dearborn, suggesting the probability of a general suspension of hostilities, in consequence of a proposed suspension or repeal of the British Orders in Council, of which Mr. Foster, late Minister to the United States, had received advices on his arrival at Halifax. Whether Governour Prevost seriously believed all which he represented, or that the suspension of hostilities, which did not include the operations of Detroit, was intended to favour the British army in that quarter, cannot now be determined; it, however, enabled the British to re-enforce General Brock, and probably contributed to the fall of Detroit. The American Government, viewing the British proposition as coming in an indirect manner, offering no satisfactory security for its observance, and adhering with little variation to their former pretences, did not hesitate to disagree to the proposal. The armistice terminated on the 8th September.

The disgraceful surrender of Detroit was, in some degree, to be compensated for, by the bravery of American seamen, which will be noticed in its proper place, under the head of Naval Actions.

Governour Prevost, of Lower Canada, issued a proclamation on the 19th September, by which all citizens of the United States are ordered to quit Canada by the 15th of October; till which time they may depart with their moveable property, by permission of three of the council.

Soon after the declaration of war, troops began to assemble at Greenbush, on the Hudson, directly opposite to Albany. From this depot, detachments were marched to different points of the frontier.

A considerable force having been assembled in the neighbourhood of Niagara river, under the command of Major-General Stephen Van Rensselaer, with the view, as was generally understood, of effecting a descent upon the British province of Upper Canada; a strong and impatient desire was discovered among the troops, to try their strength against the enemy. This gradually rose to such a height, that resistance to it seemed scarcely, if at all, possible; patriotism was passing the limits of subordination. "This (says the General in his official communication to General Dearborn) was expressed to me through various channels, in the shape of an *alternative;* that they must have orders to *act;* or, at all hazards, they would *go home.*"

Impelled by this consideration, the General made dispositions for the intended attack on the British post at the heights of Queenstown. Some information gained from a person who was engaged to pass over to Canada, and who returned safe, seemed to warrant an attack, which, besides the immediate object, might have a controlling effect upon the movements at Detroit, where it was understood the British General, Brock, had gone, with all the force he could spare from the Niagara frontier.

An intention to transport troops across the river, on the morning of the 11th October, was frustrated through means of a boatman, selected for his skill and steadiness; but who, going ahead in the extreme darkness, passed the intended place far up the river, and there fastened his boat to the shore, and abandoned the detachment. In this front boat, nearly every oar belonging to all the boats, were deposited. The expedition was given up, and the detachment returned to camp.

This circumstance, so far from damping the ardour of the troops, seemed to give additional force to the desire of encountering the enemy. A second attempt was determined on.

A detachment from the 13th regiment, consisting of about 300 men under the command of Colonel Chrystie, and about 300 militia, commanded by Colonel Van Rensselaer, received orders from the General to cross the Niagara River on the morning of the 13th instant, which was in part effected before day, under a very heavy and destructive fire of grape and musket shot from the British.

In crossing the river, three boats with troops, one of which contained Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie, were carried by the rapid current of the river far below the point of landing; and as soon as Colonel Chrystie's boat touched the shore, the only guide to the ground left the Colonel.

In consequence of this disaster, not more than 200 men at first effected a landing. Those few, however, marched on under a heavy fire, and formed a line on the front of the battery, where they were sheltered by a bank, upon the summit of which there was a battery, which had proved very destructive to officers and men. From the fire of this battery, and that of a house on their right flank, Colonel Van Rensselaer was wounded, and likewise Captain Armstrong, Captain Lawrence, Captain Wool, and Lieutenant Lent; killed, Lieutenant Valleau and Ensign Morris, all of the 13th.

Colonel Van Rensselaer's wounds were severe; a ball passed through his right thigh, entering just below the hip bone; another shot passed through the same thigh a little below; a third, through the calf of his leg; and a fourth contused his heel. Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie did not arrive until some time after this, and was wounded in his hand, in passing the river. Colonel Van Rensselaer was still able to stand; and, with great presence of mind, ordered his men to proceed and storm the fort.

Sixty determined men, led by Captain Ogilvie, seconded by Captain Wool, though wounded, and Lieutenant Kearney, Lieutenant Carr, Lieutenant Hugginan, and Lieutenant Sammons, Ensign Reeve of the 13th, Lieutenant Randolph, and Lieutenant Gansevoort, circuitously mounted the heights, gave three cheers, and

immediately charged; and, after the third charge, gained complete possession, which they kept about ten hours. Among those sixty, were ten of the militia. During the time they had possession of the heights, they received some re-enforcement. Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie effected his landing, and a body of militia, amounting in the whole, to about 500. Colonel Scott superseded Captain Ogilvie in the command; soon after which, the British received a re-enforcement from Forts George and Chippeway, amounting to about 1100, including Indians. The Indians were soon repulsed and driven to the wood.

Captain Ogilvie, of the 13th regiment, who led the detachment that succeeded in taking the redoubt upon the heights, was much exposed while at the top of the precipice; he resolutely continued brandishing his sword as a signal to his men to advance. The exertions of Captain Wool, in urging on his men, after he was wounded, were spirited and conspicuous.

After this, both parties were considerably re-enforced, and the conflict became severe and general; the enemy was compelled to retreat at every point of attack, and the route was followed up with great spirit by the Americans.

Re-enforcements continued to arrive under Captain Gibson, of the artillery; Captains Mackesney and Lawrence, of the infantry; and Colonels Mead, Allen, and Stranahan, of the militia. A little before 2 o'clock in the afternoon, General Wadsworth, Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie, and Major Mullany* passed over. The enemy,

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* This statement is given from the best account that could be procured. The Compiler has Colonel Mullany's authority in saying, that this was the fifth time he passed over during the engagement. From an official report of Colonel Mullany to General Van Rensselaer, dated 5th January 1813, the original of which is in the office of the War Department, but which has not been published, the following extract is given:

"I cannot in justice close this communication, without expressing my astonishment at the omission of its (Colonel Mullany's detachment) arduous, its desperate duties in your official detail of that day; although indifferent as to myself, satisfied I will yet have justice done, when the scenes of that enterprise are better known. Many of my officers merited

at this moment, received a re-enforcement of several hundred Indians from Chippeway, and commenced a furious attack, but were promptly met and routed by the rifle and bayonet. Victory seemed complete.

The General observing a hesitation in the embarkation of troops, passed over to accellerate their movements. Could the details of this day be here closed, all would be honour—all would be glory, to the American character. But it must be recorded—alas! it cannot be concealed, that no persuasion of the General, or of Lieutenant-Colonel Bloom, who, although wounded, rode through the camp; nor of Judge Peck, who also exerted himself on this occasion, could influence the remaining troops to pass into the boats. A large re-enforcement from Fort George, soon afterwards was seen coming up the river; this re-enforcement obliqued to the right from the road, and formed a junction with the Indians in the rear of the heights.

The superiority in numbers of the British and their Indian allies, induced the American officers to hold a consultation, at which they were disposed to dispute the ground they held; but a note was received from General Van Rensselaer, informing them he could afford them no assistance, and that he would cover their retreat at the battery at Fort Grey, and furnish boats to re-cross the river; and finding by Colonel Stranahan that the militia would no longer act, a retreat was resolved upon. They retreated in good order, without the loss of a man, to the margin of the river; but, to their extreme mortification, not a boat was there to receive them, nor did any arrive. After remaining in this extremely painful situation about a quarter of an hour, this little band surrendered to about five times their number.

Previous to this, however, a column of British regulars advanced, commanded by General Brock. The

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a full share of publick notice; and, from my knowledge of you, Sir, to a want of correct information, I ascribe the cause of complaint."

General Van Rensselaer, in reply to Colonel Mullany, dated Albany, January 23, 1813, acknowledges and regrets the omission in his official detail, in which the services of the Colonel and his command were omitted.

British General's horse was killed by a private of the name of Wilklow, who was enlisted in Orange county; shortly after which the General himself fell, within pistol shot of the American troops.

The enemy consisted of a part of the 49th regiment, who, with General Brock, had signalized themselves in Egypt; and from their valour, were called the invincibles. Before this, they had never been known to give an inch of ground; and acknowledged, after the surrender, they had never fought with such brave men. They treated their prisoners with tenderness and respect, and allowed them as much merit as brave men could desire. The number of American troops killed, amounted to not more than 60; and about 100 were wounded. The number of prisoners, including the wounded, amounted to about 700.

But the victorious enemy, though generous and tender to those who, by the fortune of war, had fallen into their power, imposed no restraint upon their Indian allies from stripping and scalping the dying and the slain that remained upon the field of battle. Captain Ogilvie himself saw the lifeless body of Ensign Morris stripped even of its shirt; and the skull of one who had been wounded, was seen cloven by a tomahawk.

The General, in his official despatches, bears evidence to the bravery and good conduct of all engaged; noticing, in particular, General Wadsworth; Colonels Van Rensselaer and Scott; Lieutenant-Colonels Chrystie, Fenwick, Bloom, Allen, Stranahan, and Mead; Majors Spencer, Mosely, and Lush; Captain Gibson, Lieutenant Smith, and Ensign Grosvener.

Major General Van Rensselaer resigned the command of the army, on the Niagara frontier, to Brigadier General Smyth, on the 14th October.

On the 10th November, General Smyth published a Proclamation from his camp near Buffalo. As this document became the subject of much comment, it is given here in full. It was in the following words:

TO THE MEN OF NEW-YORK:

For many years you have seen your country oppressed with numerous wrongs. Your Government, although

above all others devoted to peace, have been forced to draw the sword, and rely for redress of injuries on the valour of the American people.

That valour has been conspicuous. But the nation has been unfortunate in the selection of some of those who directed it. One army has been disgracefully surrendered and lost. Another has been sacrificed by a precipitate attempt to pass it over at the strongest point of the enemy's lines, with most incompetent means. The cause of these miscarriages is apparent. The Commanders were popular men, "destitute alike of theory and experience" in the art of war.

In a few days, the troops under my command, will plant the American standard in Canada. They are men accustomed to obedience, silence, and steadiness. They will conquer, or they will die.

Will you stand with your arms folded, and look on this interesting struggle? Are you not related to the men who fought at Bennington and Saratoga? Has the race degenerated? Or have you, under the baneful influence of contending factions, forgot your country? Must I turn from you, and ask men of the Six Nations to support the Government of the United States? Shall I imitate the officers of the British king, and suffer our ungathered laurels to be tarnished by ruthless deeds? Shame! where is thy blush? No. Where I command, the vanquished and the peaceful man, the child, the maid, and the matron, shall be secure from wrong. If we conquer, we will "conquer but to save."

Men of New-York! The present is the hour of renown. Have you not a wish for fame? Would you not choose in future times to be named as *one of those*, who, imitating the heroes whom Montgomery led, have, in spite of the seasons, visited the tomb of the Chief, and conquered the country where he lies? Yes. You desire your share of fame. Then seize the present moment. If you do not, you will regret it; and say, "the valiant have bled in vain; the friends of my country fell, and I was not there."

Advance, then, to our aid. I will wait for you a few days. I cannot give you the day of my departure. But

come on. Come in companies, half companies, pairs, or singly. I will organize you for a short tour. Ride to this place, if the distance is far, and send back your horses. But remember, that every man who accompanies us, places himself under my command, and shall submit to the salutary restraints of discipline.

ALEX. SMYTH,
Briga. General.

Camp, near Buffalo, Nov. 10, 1812.

This proclamation had the effect of bringing to the frontier a very considerable number of volunteers, men who lived the hardy life of farmers, were accustomed to the woods, knew well the use of the rifle, and feared Indians as little as they did Englishmen.

On the 17th November, General Smyth issued a publick address to his soldiers, preparatory to an immediately intended entrance into the enemy's territory. The sentiments contained in this address are noble, humane, and soldierly. From such a general and such an army, the publick expected a very successful campaign.

On the morning of the 21st November, 1812, a heavy cannonade was opened upon the garrison of Fort Niagara, from all the batteries in the neighbourhood of Fort George, consisting of five detached batteries; two mounting twenty-four pounders, one mounting a nine, and two mortar batteries. The firing continued thirteen hours; some buildings were set on fire by the hot shot from the enemy, but extinguished without doing material injury.

The garrison at Niagara, in return, opened a tremendous and well directed fire with hot shot. The town of Newark was several times in flames, as also the centre building in Fort George. Captain M'Kean commanded a twelve pounder in the S. E. block-house, and distinguished himself by his usual gallantry and skill. Captain Jacks, of the 7th regiment of militia-artillery, commanded a six pounder on the N. block-house, and together with a part of his own company, though placed in a situation most exposed to the fire of the enemy, maintained their position like veterans. Lieutenant Rees of the artillery, had command of an eighteen

pounder on the S. E. battery, until ten o'clock, when he received a wound, which compelled him to resign the command to Captain Leonard, of the artillery. Lieutenant Wendell, of the third artillery, commanded an eighteen and a four pounder on the W. battery. Dr. Hooper, of the militia, commanded a six pounder on the mess-house; Lieutenants Gansevoort and Harris had the command of the salt-battery at Youngstown, mounting one eighteen and a four pounder. These several posts were maintained with resolution, judgement, and great effect. Lieutenant Colonel Gray commanded the artillery, and gave the most satisfactory proof of his zeal and science. Major Armstead of the corps of engineers, was indefatigable in extending his exertions to all parts of the garrison. Lieutenant Colonel George McFeely commanded the fort. The American loss consisted of four killed, and seven wounded.

The hopes which General Smyth had raised by his proclamation were not to be realized. Twice the troops embarked, and as often disembarked. Publick opinion, hitherto on the side of General Smyth, now began to veer. His courage as well as his patriotism was questioned; censure was followed by insult and menace. The project of invasion was finally abandoned. The volunteers were dismissed, and the army ordered into winter quarters. Thus ended the operations, for this season, of the army *of the centre*.

General Smyth justified himself on the grounds that he had directions not to pass over with less than three thousand men; that he could not prevail on more than one thousand five hundred men to embark; and that an attack on the enemy under such circumstances, was contrary to the opinion of a council of his officers. "My orders (says the general, in reply to a committee from the patriotick citizens of the western counties of New-York) were to pass into Canada with three thousand men *at once*. On the first day of embarkation not more than one thousand four hundred men were embarked; of whom four hundred, that is, half of the regular infantry, were exhausted with fatigue and want of rest. On the second embarkation, only one thousand five hundred men were

embarked, and these were to have put off immediately, and to have descended the river to a point where re-enforcements were not to be expected. On both days, many of the regular troops were men in bad health who could not have stood one day's march; who, although they were on the sick report, were turned out by their ardent officers."

This reply was dated 3d December. On the 8th of the same month, General Peter B. Porter gave notice in the Buffalo Gazette, that he would soon publish a "*true* account of some of the most prominent transactions of those days." In this notice General Porter ascribes the failure of the expedition to the *cowardice* of General Smyth.

General Smyth must remain convicted, in the eyes of the world, of falsehood and cowardice, if he continued passive under such charges. Modern chivalry pointed out the course which must be pursued. General Smyth sent a challenge to General Porter, which the latter accepted.

The parties passed over to Grand Island, on the 13th December; a shot was exchanged, in an intrepid manner, but without effect; when, on the suggestion of General Smyth's second, a mutual explanation and reconciliation took place, and the parties separated.

General Porter, on the following day, delivered the promised statement of transactions to the editor of the Buffalo Gazette, in which paper it accordingly appeared.

The statement is plain and satisfactory; and divested of that asperity, which was probably intended to accompany it.

In this statement, it is represented, that on the 27th November, there were collected in the neigbourhood of Niagara, 4500 effective men; that the vessels collected for the purpose, were sufficient for the transportation of 3550 men; that the number of men actually embarked were estimated to consist of between 2000 and 2600; that about 2000 more men were paraded on shore, seemingly ready to cross; that several boats of sufficient capacity to carry about 1000 men were still lying unoccu-

pied; and that the enemy, estimated at about 500 men, were drawn up in a line, at about half a mile from the river.

As a proof of what could be effected, had the men been permitted to pass over, General Porter states the bravery and success with which a detachment which crossed over by direction of General Smyth, accomplished its mission; having completely routed the enemy, spiked his cannon, and taken several prisoners. "Out of twelve naval officers, who embarked in this enterprise, nine of them, (says General Porter,) with more than half their men, were killed or wounded"

General Smyth, in a letter to the editors of the National Intelligencer, dated 23d January, 1813, refutes the statement of General Porter.

"I affirm, (says General Smyth) that on the 27th November, there were collected in the neighbourhood of Black Rock, not more than 3500 *effective* men, non-commissioned officers, and privates, of every corps under my command; not more than 1500 of those were liable to be ordered to cross the Niagara, according to opinions generally received. On the 21st, there were 1050 good troops embarked, and also as many irregular volunteers as occupied five boats, estimated at 150. On the morning of the 1st December, the number of men armed with muskets, who were at the Navy-Yard, embarked or not embarked, did not exceed 2000 men."

In this refutation, General Smyth insinuates that General Porter, acting as contractor to the army, was not prepared to supply the necessary rations, having on the 30th November, only thirty-five barrels of flour on hand, "not two pounds of flour to each man." "The hostility of General Porter to myself, (says General Smyth) grew out of the *contract*."

While the expeditions thus progressed from ill-design, to its unavoidable consequence, unsuccessful termination, the minor expeditions did honour to the officers who commanded, and the few men who were engaged in them. Among these, the following must not be omitted.

The Brigs Adams and Caledonia, which were sur-

rendered to the enemy by General Hull, at Detroit, having arrived and anchored under the British Fort Erie, on the 8th October, 1812, Captain Elliot, of the navy, who had arrived at Black Rock the same day, with a body of sailors from New-York, determined on an attempt to regain them. Having made the necessary dispositions, he advanced at 1 o'clock in the morning of the 9th October, having under his command, 100 men in two boats, including thirty volunteers from the army, with Captain Towson, and Lieutenant Roache, of the artillery; at 3 o'clock he was along side the vessels; in ten minutes they were under way, and the prisoners secured. An unfavourable wind obliged them to run down the river, by the forts, under a heavy fire of round, grape, and cannister shot, from a number of pieces of heavy ordnance and flying artillery; and he was compelled to anchor about forty yards from one of their batteries; the Caledonia being got into a safe position, a fire was returned from the guns of the Adams, as long as ammunition lasted. It being found impossible longer to withstand the fire of the enemy, which would probably sink the vessel in a short time, he was compelled to cut the cable, and drift down the river, out of reach of the batteries, but remained still exposed to the flying artillery; having thus dropped astern for about ten minutes, and being deserted by the pilot, he was brought up on the shore of Squaw Island. From this place he sent the prisoners on shore with much difficulty; and, having himself passed from the brig to the shore, he soon discovered that about forty soldiers had crossed in a boat, from the British side, and boarded the brig; but they were soon compelled to abandon her, with the loss of nearly all their men. During the whole of the morning, both sides of the river kept up alternately a continual fire on the brig, and so much injured her, that it was impossible to have floated her; she was of course destroyed.

A patrole was stationed on the shore, to co-operate in case of emergency; it was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, of the artillery, having under him Major Mullany, of the infantry, as a volunteer; Major Cuyler,

Aid to General Hall; and J. Bankhead, Brigade Major to General Smyth's brigade. As Majors Mullany and Cuyler were riding close together, the former received an order from Colonel Scott to proceed to the Navy-Yard, to direct two boats to be manned, and sent to the assistance of the captured vessels; he had but just sprang ahead, in execution of this order, when a round shot from the enemy, which passed through the fore-sail of the Adams, struck, and instantly killed Major Cuyler, and thus deprived the service of a brave and useful officer.

Major Young, of the Troy Militia, commandant of a detachment stationed at French Mills, on St. Regis river, having received information that a party of the enemy had arrived at the village of St. Regis, and that more were shortly expected, formed a resolution to take them out before they were re-enforced. For this purpose he marched a detachment at 11 o'clock, on the night of the 21st October, crossed the river at Gray's Mills, about three, and at five in the morning, arrived within half a mile of the village, unexpected by the enemy. Here the Major made such a judicious disposition of his men that the enemy were entirely surrounded, and after a few discharges, surrendered themselves prisoners, with the loss of five killed. The result of this affair was the capture of forty prisoners, with their arms, equipments, &c.; one stand of colours, and two batteaux, without a man of our party being hurt. They got safe back to camp at 11 o'clock in the morning. The prisoners were sent off to Plattsburgh. Major Young has had the honour of taking the first standard from the enemy in the present war.

The movements of the enemy, during these times, were not to them equally honourable or important.

The village of Ogdensburgh, on the St. Lawrence, was bombarded on the 2d October, 1812, for three hours, from Prescott, opposite; between twenty and thirty twelve and nine pound shot were picked up in the gardens and streets, but no damage was done. The firing was brought on by the attempt of a party of Americans to take some Canadian boats, but they did not succeed.

The garrison at Ogdensburgh consisted of 500 men, under General Brown, from Jefferson county.

The Sunday following, the British prepared 40 boats, with from ten to sixteen armed men in each, and six pieces of artillery, with which they advanced to storm the town. When arrived within a short distance, our troops opened a warm fire upon them, and the contest continued about two hours, when the British, having two of their boats so knocked to pieces as to oblige them to be abandoned, and one taken, on board of which were six men, fled precipitately to Prescott. No damage was sustained on our side.

From the judicious arrangements made by Colonel Benedict, Captain Forsyth, Captain Griffin, Major Dimock, Adjutant Hotchkiss, Captain Hubbard, Captain Benedict, Captain M'Nit, and others of the troops under their command, as directed by General Brown, had the enemy attempted a landing, an immense slaughter must have ensued. No person could have been more attentive than General Brown, through the whole action. Praise is also due to his field, staff, and commissioned officers.

By this action the British were taught, that four hundred Yankees will not decline a combat, when attacked by one thousand of their troops. Colonels Lethbridge and Breckenridge, led the British in person.

Although a patriotick support of the war was the distinguishing feature of the publick sentiment, yet there was a strange apathy too prevalent, which tended not a little to render its early stage unpropitious to the country. Something was necessary to awaken the unroused loyalty of the people. Victory might have that effect; perhaps defeat was a more powerful agent. The defeat and surrender of General Hull, so much disappointed the expectations excited by the General's Proclamation, that it is impossible to depict the first effect. The mortification of disappointment, added to the serious loss of a fine army, threw a temporary gloom over the citizens. This soon gave way to resentment, and a determination to wipe off the "foul stain." The spirit of the nation rose, and that of '76 seemed to return.

This sentiment, which pervaded a great proportion of the nation, was most powerful in the western country. All felt the necessity of immediate action; Kentucky and Ohio may be said to have broken loose; an army was ready, as if by magick, prepared to avenge the late disgrace. A leader was wanting; all eyes looked, with a common impulse, towards the hero of Tippacanoe; the united voice of the people called on the Governour to dispense with all formalities; and WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON, was appointed a Major-General, with directions to take command of the north-western army. This appointment was confirmed by the President of the United States.

The exposed situation of the north-western frontier, after the surrender of Hull, required the utmost exertions for its protection. It was not possible entirely to avert the impending danger.

The Indians had already commenced their savage warfare, by an attack on Fort Dearborn, and the massacre of its garrison. Fort Dearborn, Chicago, was but a weak garrison, consisting of about fifty men; there were also in it, a few women and children. A large body of Indians having menaced the fort, it was agreed in a council which was held with the faithless tribes, that the garrison should be spared on condition of surrendering the place without resistance. They marched out on the 15th September; and, when about a mile from the fort, were fired upon and murdered, with the exception of about ten or twelve, who escaped.

Fort Belview (Madison) on the Mississippi, was attacked on the 4th September, by the Indians, with all the desperation that a want of real courage could inspire; the attack was renewed daily until the 8th, when the Indians, after suffering very severely, withdrew, leaving the brave garrison safe. One soldier, who was out of the fort when the attack commenced, was massacred; no lives were lost in the fort, and only one man wounded.

About 11 o'clock in the evening of the 4th September, Fort Harrison, in the Indiana Territory, was attacked by a vast number of Indians. The garrison was

weak, and the most of them, including its intrepid commander, Captain Z. Taylor, either sick or convalescent. The attack was continued, in a most furious manner, until about sun-rise the following morning, when the savages retired, driving away or shooting all the cattle they could find.

Several expeditions were formed against the Indians, for the protection of the inhabitants, and keeping open the necessary communications. Colonel Russell, with a small detachment of the United States' rangers, proceeded to the head of the Peori Lake, where he destroyed the celebrated Pimertain's town. General Hopkins, with about 1200 troops, left Fort Harrison on the 11th December, and succeeded in destroying several villages along the Wabash; a party of sixty-two that left the camp in search of a man who was missing, fell in with a large force of horse and foot Indians; this party suffered a defeat, with a loss of sixteen; making, with the missing man, seventeen. General Tupper defeated a numerous body of British and Indians, near the Rapids of the Miami; the difficulty of crossing the river, and want of provisions, obliged the expedition to return, having lost four killed, and one being wounded. Colonel Campbell, with 600 men, attacked one of the Massissinewa towns, on the 17th and 18th December, and defeated the Indians, after a most desperate conflict; the American loss was eight killed, and twenty-three wounded; the Indian town was burned. Colonel John B. Campbell, on the 17th November, attacked the savages at a town on the Massissinewa, which he burned, as well as three other towns farther down the river, killing several, and taking thirty-seven prisoners; on the morning of the 11th December, his camp was attacked by about 300 Indians, who were defeated, after an engagement of about three quarters of an hour. The loss of the Americans in these affairs, was nine killed, and about thirty-five or forty wounded; about forty of the Indians were killed. The Indians also suffered a defeat from Colonel Williams, commanding the Tennessee troops.

These actions were well calculated to inspire the

Indians with a proper respect for the Americans; and, if followed up with continued success, would tend to estrange the savage enemy from his British ally; but a sad reverse soon occurred.

A detachment, under the command of General Winchester, being attacked on the 22d January, 1813, at Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, by a greatly superiour force of Indians and British, aided by several pieces of artillery, suffered a defeat. The Americans lost no honour on this occasion; they defended themselves, and fought with desperation, even beyond the time when prudence and honour would have sanctioned a surrender. General Winchester, being himself a prisoner, agreed to a surrender of the troops under his command, on condition that they should be protected against the savages, and allowed to retain their private property and side arms. Thirty-five officers, and 490 non-commissioned officers and privates, were made prisoners; the number of killed was considerable.

The prisoners who were in health, were marched to Malden; the wounded were, contrary to the terms of capitulation, left at the mercy of the Indians. On the morning of the 23d, such of the wounded as were unable to travel, were tomahawked and scalped.

The following is a copy of the report of a Committee of Congress, on this subject:

"The massacre of the 23d January, after the capitulation, was perpetrated without any exertion on their part to prevent it; indeed, it is apparent, from all the circumstances, that if the British officers did not connive at their destruction, they were criminally indifferent about the fate of the wounded prisoners. But what marks more strongly the degradation of the character of the British soldiers, is the refusal of the last offices of humanity to the bodies of the dead. The bodies of our countrymen were exposed to every indignity, and became food for brutes, in the sight of men who affect a sacred regard to the dictates of honour and religion. Low indeed is the character of that army, which is reduced to the confession, that their savage auxiliaries will

not permit them to perform the rights of sepulture to the slain. The Committee have not been able to discover even the expression of detestation, which such conduct must inspire, from the military or civil authority on the Canadian frontier, unless such detestation is to be presumed from the choice of an Indian trophy, as an ornament for the Legislative Hall of Upper Canada."

At a meeting of the officers who survived the battle of Frenchtown, held at Erie, Pennsylvania, the 20th February, 1813, the following statement and resolutions were agreed to:

"Whereas it is deemed necessary that our fellow citizens should be informed of the late perfidious and brutal acts of the British Government, performed by their officers, at the battle of Frenchtown.

"*Resolved*, That the following statement of the conduct of the British officers, be published to our countrymen:

"That when General Winchester was taken prisoner, on the 22d January, 1813, and brought before Colonel Proctor,* the British commander, he directed the commanding officer of the Americans, Major Madison, to surrender. Major Madison refused so to do, unless those who surrendered should be free from savage massacre; this was agreed to; and the British officers pledged themselves to have a sufficient force with the wounded, to protect them; and that they should be conveyed to Malden the next morning. They likewise promised to return to the officers their arms at Malden.

"Captain N. G. F. Hart, inspector to the north-western army, being among the wounded, it was proposed by his friends, that they should carry him with them; this they were prevented from doing, by Captain Elliot, a native American who had taken a commission in the British army, and an old acquaintance of Captain Hart's, who promised Captain H. his special protection; to

* This same Proctor, more worthy the name of a *beast* than a soldier, refused even the permission of burying the dead, and numbers of them had their hearts torn out by the Indians, and their bodies actually devoured by the hogs.

convey him in his own sleigh to Malden that evening, and informing him that he should be welcome to remain at his house there, until he should recover.

"These were the *promises* of the British. Let our countrymen and the world see how they were *fulfilled.*

"At the break of day next morning, the savages were suffered to commit every depredation upon our wounded, which they pleased. *An indiscriminate slaughter took place of all who were unable to walk; many were tomahawked, and many were burned alive in the houses.* Among the unfortunate thus murdered, it is with regret and sorrow we have to name Captains Hart and Hickman.

"The arms of the officers, as promised, were never returned. Every species of private property remaining in the tents, belonging to both officers and soldiers, were plundered by the savages.

"*Resolved*, That in consideration of the high respect we hold to the memories of both officers and soldiers, who were thus cruelly murdered, by permission of the British commander, Proctor, and his subalterns, and those who gloriously fell in the field, defending the only free government on earth, that each of us wear black crape on our hats, and left arm, for the space of ninety days.

"*Resolved*, That a similar procedure, testifying their respect for those who were murdered and fell on that day, be recommended to our brother officers and soldiers, who survived it.

"SAMUEL WILLIAMS, President.

"JOHN BECKLEY, Secretary."

General Harrison was at Fort Meigs the 20th April, 1813, and gave directions to prepare to defend the place against an attack, which he apprehended, from the movements of the enemy. Fortifications were accordingly carried on with great diligence, and every means used to animate the men to defend the post. On the 26th and 27th, the reconnoitering parties of the enemy appeared on the opposite shore, but soon retired. The Indians were sent across the river during the night of

the 28th, and were placed so as to surround the garrison. The siege commenced in form, on the 29th; and firing was kept up during this and the following day, by the enemy, whose works were considerably impeded and injured by the firing from the fort. By the first of May, the works of the fort were so far completed, as to enable the besieged to give the enemy a very warm reception, silencing one of their guns several times. During the 2d and 3d, the fire on both sides continued very brisk.

On the 4th, General Clay reached Fort Winchester, with upwards of 100 men, for the relief of the American garrison. On the 5th, a part of General Clay's men arrived, and instructions were sent to him by General Harrison, directing him how to act, in his advance towards the fort.

Great zeal, and undaunted courage, are true characteristicks of the American soldiers; to these qualities, the Kentuckian adds a wonderful contempt of danger. On this occasion, the enemy received much benefit from that cool caution which enabled him to draw the uncalculating soldier into defiles, and within the reach of his ambuscade. Colonel Dudley, who was charged with despatches for General Clay, received the command of a detachment of Clay's men, landed on the opposite side of the river, with a view to attack the enemy's batteries; he behaved with great courage, but pursued the enemy until he was drawn into an ambush, where the greater number of his men were destroyed by numbers vastly superiour; many of those who surrendered, were afterwards tomahawked and scalped by the savages. Colonel Dudley was among the killed. General Clay, who continued in command of the remainder of his detachment, having landed near the fort, permitted the men to pursue the enemy into the woods, and was saved from a fate similar to that of the heroick and unfortunate Dudley, by the prudence and foresight of General Harrison, who sent out a party to support Clay, and defend his retreat. The Indians took advantage of the opportunity this afforded them, to attack the boats, which General Clay left unguarded; the sick men in the boats were butchered, and the baggage carried off.

The bravery of the American troops during these conflicts, was remarkably brilliant. Frequent charges were made, under direction of Colonel Miller, Major Alexander, Captains Croghan, Neving, Bendford, and Longham. Every battery on the American side of the river was successfully carried.

The enemy, after this, thought only of retreating, which he effected in great hurry on the 9th. An exchange of prisoners was previously effected.

The American loss, during thirteen days the enemy were before the fort, amounted to 81 killed, and 180 wounded, exclusive of the loss of Dudley's detachment, which exceeded 200 in killed and missing.

The enemy's loss must have been much greater, as his number of men far exceeded that of the Americans. The enemy was frequently defeated by detachments not more than a third of his number.

Colonel Miller, with 350 men, made a sallie, in which he defeated the enemy, consisting of 200 regulars, 150 militia, and 500 Indians. Captain Sebre's company of Kentucky militia, maintained its ground against four times its number, until rescued from unavoidable destruction, by the bravery of Lieutenant Gwynne, of the 19th regiment, and a part of Captain Elliot's company.

From the best account, the besiegers consisted of 560 regulars, 800 militia, and more than 2000 Indians.

BATTLE OF LITTLE YORK, UPPER CANADA.

THE troops at Sackett's Harbour were embarked on board of Commodore Chauncey's fleet, which, according to morning returns of the 22d April, amounted to 1780 fit for duty, including officers. But owing to a head wind, did not leave the Harbour until the 24th. On the morning of the 27th the fleet arrived off York, and at 8 o'clock commenced landing the troops about three miles west of the town, and one and a quarter from the enemy's batteries.

It was the intention of General Dearborn to have landed at a clear field, (the site of the old French fort Tarento) but was prevented by the unfavourable state of the wind. They were, therefore, obliged to land in a wood which was filled with 800 of the enemy; and consisted of regulars, militia, and Indians, under the immediate command of General Sheaffe. Our riflemen, under Major Forsyth, first landed, under a heavy fire from Indians and other troops. He was supported as promptly as possible with other troops; but the contest was sharp and severe for nearly half an hour. We give the principal incidents of that day, in the words of the commanding general.

"The enemy was repulsed by a far less number than their own, and as soon as General Pike landed with 7 or 800 men, and the remainder of the troops were pushing for the shore, the enemy retreated to their works; and as soon as the whole of the troops had landed and formed on the clear ground intended for the first landing, they advanced through a thick wood to the open ground near the enemy's works, and after carrying one battery by assault, were moving on in columns towards the main works; when the head of the column was within about sixty rods of the enemy, a tremendous explosion occurred from a large magazine prepared for the purpose, which discharged such immense quantities of stone as to pro-

duce a most unfortunate effect on our troops. I have not yet been able to collect the returns of our killed and wounded, but our loss by the explosion must, I fear, exceed one hundred ; and among them I have to lament the loss of the brave and excellent officer, Brigadier General Pike, who received such a contusion from a large stone as terminated his valuable life within a few hours. His loss will be severely felt. Previous to the explosion the enemy had retired into the town, excepting a party of regular troops, which did not retire early enough to avoid the shock ; it is said that upwards of forty of them were destroyed. General Sheaffe moved off with the regular troops and left directions with the commanding officer of the militia to make the best terms he could. In the mean time, all farther resistance on the part of the enemy ceased, and the outlines of a capitulation were agreed on. As soon as I was informed of General Pike's being wounded, I went on shore. I had been induced to confide the immediate command of the troops in action to General Pike, from a conviction that he fully expected it, and would be much mortified at being deprived of the honour, which he highly appreciated. Every movement was under my view. Our troops behaved with great firmness, and deserve much applause ; especially those who were first engaged, under circumstances that would have tried the firmness of veterans. Our loss in the action in the morning and in carrying the first battery, was not great, probably about fifty killed and wounded. Among them were a full proportion of officers ; and although the enemy had a decided advantage in point of numbers and position at the commencement, their loss was greater than ours, particularly in officers.

" It was with the greatest exertion that the small vessels of the fleet could work into the harbour against a gale of wind directly ahead ; but as soon as they got in contact with the batteries, a tremendous cannonade commenced from twenty-four and thirty-two pounders, and was kept up without intermission under a heavy fire from two batteries until the enemy's batteries were carried or blown up in the explosion, which undoubtedly had a powerful effect on the enemy. I am under the great-

est obligation to Commodore Chauncey for his able and indefatigable exertions in every possible manner that could give facility and effect to the expedition. He is equally estimable for deliberate sound judgement, bravery and industry. The government could not have made a more fortunate selection for the important trust he holds. Unfortunately, the enemy's armed ship the "Prince Regent," left this place for Kingston four days before we arrived. A large ship on the stocks, and nearly planked up, with a large store of naval stores, were set on fire by the enemy soon after the explosion of the magazine. There are no vessels fit for use in the harbour. A considerable quantity of military stores and provisions remained. We shall not possess the means of transporting the prisoners from this place, and must of course leave them on parole. I hope we shall so far complete the necessary measures at this place in the course of the day, as to be able to sail to-morrow for Niagara; by which route I send this by a small vessel, with notice to General Lewis of our approach.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

"H. DEARBORN.

"Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, Secretary of War."

In a subsequent letter to the Secretary of War, General Dearborn says: "You will observe that our loss was very small excepting that produced by the explosion. As nearly as I have been able to ascertain, the loss of the enemy amounted from ninety to one hundred killed, two hundred wounded, and upwards of three hundred prisoners. I have not been able to ascertain precisely the number of the militia put upon their parole. I presume that it could not be less than five hundred. There was an immense depot of naval and military stores. York was the principal depot for Niagara and Detroit; and notwithstanding the immense amount which was destroyed by them, we found more than we could bring off. General Sheaffe's baggage and papers fell into my hands. These papers are a valuable acquisition: I have not had time for a full examination of them. A scalp* was found

* The fact that a human Scalp was actually found suspended over the Speaker's chair in the government house, is fully corroborated by the sub-

in the executive and legislative chamber, suspended near the Speaker's chair, in company with the mace and other emblems of royalty. I intend sending it to you with a correct account of the facts relative to the place and situation in which it was found.

"With great respect, &c.

"H. DEARBORN."

Great praise is due to General Dearborn for the secrecy and military management with which he conducted the enterprise. The enemy had been induced to believe that Kingston was the point of attack; every stratagem was resorted to, in order to create this impression.

The explosion which proved fatal to the brave General Pike was tremendous; such was the shock that it deafened and amazed every one within reach of the devastating shower of stones which instantly succeeded it. Nevertheless, after he had received his mortal wound, he encouraged his men to push on. They gave three cheers, and advanced to the charge, overcame all before them at the point of the bayonet. General Pike was removed from the battle and conveyed on board the Madison, where the British colours were sent to him; they were folded up and placed under his head, upon which he said —"*I die contented:*" he then laid his hand on his breast and immediately expired.

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joined letter of Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy. The scalp was stretched on a hoop of six inches diameter and deeply pointed; and from the length and fineness of the hair, was presumed to have been taken from the head of a woman.

United States' Ship Madison,
Sackett's Harbour, 4th June, 1813.

SIR—I have the honour to present you, by the hands of Lieutenant Dudley, the British standard taken at York on the 27th of April last, accompanied by the mace, over which was hung a *human scalp.*

These articles were taken from the Parliament House by one of my officers, and presented to me. The scalp I caused to be presented to General Dearborn; who, I believe, still has it in his possession. I also send, by the same gentleman, one of the British flags taken at Fort George on the 27th of May.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully sir, your most obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Honourable William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

An unusual number of officers, for the force engaged, were killed and wounded Fourteen American Lieutenants were killed or wounded. Captain Stephen Moore, who led the Baltimore volunteers, lost a leg. Lieutenant Baptiste Irvine * received a bayonet in the shoulder, when in the act of stepping out of a boat the moment it touched the shore.

In the harbour was found the British armed schooner Duke of Gloucester, of fourteen guns, in ordinary; which was taken to Sackett's Harbour and repaired.

After the death of General Pike, the command (on shore) devolved on Colonel Pierce.

The following order was issued by General Pike the morning our troops sailed from Sackett's Harbour.

BRIGADE ORDER.

Sackett's Harbour, April 25, 1813.

When the debarkation shall take place on the enemy's shore, Major Forsyth's light troops formed in four platoons, shall be first landed. They will advance a small distance from the shore, and form the chain to cover the landing of the troops. They will not fire, unless they discover the approach of a body of the enemy; but will make *prisoners of all persons* who may be passing, and send them to the general. They will be followed by the regimental platoons of the first brigade, with two pieces of Brooks' artillery; one on the right and one on the left flank, covered by their musketry, and the small detachments of riflemen of the 15th and 16th infantry. Then will be landed the three platoons of the reserve of the first brigade, under Major Swan. Then Major Eustis, with his train of artillery, covered by his own musketry. Then Colonel M'Clure's volunteers, in four platoons, followed by the 21st regiment, in six platoons. When the troops shall move in column, either to meet the enemy or take a position, it will be in the following order, viz: 1st, Forsyth's riflemen, with proper front and flank

* Formerly conductor of the Baltimore Whig, and subsequently one of the editors of the New-York Columbian He is by birth an Irishman—in sentiment an American, and a political writer of the first order.

guards; the regiments of the first brigade, with their pieces; then three platoons of reserve; Major Eustis' train of artillery; volunteer corps; 21st regiment: each corps sending out proper flank guards. When the enemy shall be discovered in front, the riflemen will form the chain, and maintain their ground, until they have the signal (the preparative) or receive orders to retire; at which they will retreat with the greatest velocity, and form equally on the two flanks of the regiments of the first brigade, and then renew their fire. The three reserve platoons of this line will form under the orders of Major Swan, one hundred yards in the rear of the colours, ready to support any part which may show an unsteady countenance. Major Eustis and his train will form in the rear of this reserve, ready to act where circumstances may dictate.

The second line will be composed of the 21st infantry in six platoons, flanked by Colonel M'Clure's volunteers, equally divided as light troops. The whole under the orders of Colonel Ripley.

It is expected that every corps will be mindful of the honour of the American arms, and the disgraces which have recently tarnished our arms; and endeavour, by a cool and determined discharge of their duty, to support the one, and wipe off the other. The riflemen in front will maintain their ground at all hazards, until ordered to retire, as will every corps of the army. With an assurance of being duly supported, should the commanding General find it prudent to withdraw the front line, he will give orders to retire by the heads of platoons, covered by the riflemen; and the second line will advance by the heads of platoons, pass the intervals, and form the line; call in the light troops, and renew the action. But the General may find it proper to bring up the second line on one or both flanks, to charge in columns, or perform a variety of manœuvres which it would be impossible to foresee. But as a general rule, whatever may be the directions of line at the commencement of the action, the corps will form as before directed. If they advance in line, it may be in parallel eschelons

of platoons, or otherwise, as the ground or circumstances may dictate.

No man will load until ordered, except the light troops in front, until within a small distance of the enemy, and then charge bayonets, and thus letting the enemy see that we can meet them with their own weapons. Any man firing, or quitting his post without orders, must be put to instant death, as an example may be necessary. Platoon officers will pay the greatest attention to the coolness and aim of their men in the fire; their regularity and dressing in the charge. The field officers will watch over the conduct of the whole. Courage and bravery in the field, do not more distinguish the soldier than humanity after victory; and whatever examples the savage allies of our enemies may have given us, the General confidently hopes, that the blood of an unresisting or yielding enemy will never stain the weapons of the soldiers of his column.

The unoffending citizens of Canada are many of them our own countrymen, and the poor Canadians have been forced into the war. Their property, therefore, must be held sacred; and any soldier who shall so far neglect the honour of his profession as to be guilty of plundering the inhabitants, shall, if convicted, be punished with *death*. But the commanding General assures the troops, that should they capture a large quantity of publick stores, he will use his best endeavours to procure them a reward from his Government.

This order shall be read at the head of each corps and every field officer shall carry a copy, in order that he may at any moment refer to it, and give explanations to his subordinates.

All those found in arms in the enemy's country, shall be treated as enemies; but those who are peaceably following the pursuits of their various vocations, as friends, and their property respected.

By order of the Brigadier General,

Z. M. PIKE.

After the capture of York, General Dearborn disembarked the army at Niagara, to afford the troops an op-

portunity for recovering their health and spirits, which had become much depressed by the crowded and confined situation in which they had been placed on board the fleet.

The army remained inactive twenty-five days. General Dearborn was seriously indisposed. In the meanwhile preparations were in readiness for making a blow, and considerable re-enforcements had arrived.

BATTLE OF FORT GEORGE.

ON the 27th of May, at one o'clock in the morning, the whole army embarked on Lake Ontario, three miles east from Fort Niagara. It was arranged in six divisions of boats; the first contained the advanced guard under Colonel Scott; this was followed by Colonel Porter with the field train, the brigades of Boyd, Winder, and Chandler, and a reserve under Colonel Macomb.

Commodore Chauncey favoured the descent by the fire of his small schooners. Captain Perry volunteered his services to conduct the divisions.

"At nine in the morning, Colonel Scott effected his landing in good order, under a heavy discharge of musketry and artillery, about a mile and a quarter from the village of Newark, and the same distance west of the mouth of the Niagara. He formed his line on the beach of the lake, covered by a bank twelve or fifteen feet in height, which served as a parapet against the enemy's fire. This bank was to be scaled, against the enemy, who had now drawn up his whole force, 1500 strong, immediately on its brow. They were soon driven from their ground by the fire of the schooners and a brisk and vigorous charge; but rallied, and took a second position behind a ravine, at a little distance. An action of about twenty minutes ensued; it was short and desperate, and ended in the total rout of the enemy at every point. Scott's and Forsyth's commands, supported by Boyd's* and Winder's brigades, sustained the brunt of the action."†

"Our batteries succeeded in rendering Fort George

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*During the last five minutes, General Boyd landed in the advance guard, and a part of his brigade participated in the action.

†This sentence is from the official letter of General Lewis.

intenible; and when the enemy had been beaten from his position, and found it necessary to re-enter it, after firing a few guns, and setting fire to the magazine,* which soon exploded, moved off rapidly by different routes. Our light troops pursued them several miles. The troops having been under arms from one o'clock in the morning, were too much exhausted for any farther pursuit. The behaviour of our troops, both officers and men, entitles them to the highest praise; and the difference in our loss with that of the enemy, when we consider the advantages his positions afforded him, is astonishing. We had seventeen killed, and forty-five wounded. The enemy had ninety killed, and one hundred and sixty wounded, of the regular troops. We have taken one hundred prisoners, exclusive of the wounded. Colonel Meyers of the 49th, was wounded and taken prisoner. Of ours, only one commissioned officer was killed, Lieutenant Hobart, of the light artillery."†

Another, and subsequent statement, makes the total British loss 107 killed, and 264 prisoners; 175 of whom were wounded.

So precipitate was the flight, that they abandoned all the cannon and stores in the fort, and left the field of battle covered with arms. The enemy were closely pressed at a distance of five miles up the river, until Scott and Miller were recalled from the pursuit by order of General Lewis.

General Dearborn speaks of the conduct of the officers and men, in terms of the warmest approbation. "The animating example set by Colonel Scott and General Boyd, deserves particular mention. I am greatly indebted to Colonel Porter, of the light artillery;

*But one of the magazines blew up. At the moment of the explosion, the advance under Colonel Scott, was within eighty paces of the fort. The front gate was instantly forced by our men. Scott was the first to enter, and took with his own hands, the British flag, yet waving over the works At the same time Captains Hindman and Stockton snatched away the matches which had been applied by the retreating garrison to the other magazines.

†See General Dearborn's official despatch.

to Major Armistead of the 3d regiment of artillery, and Lieutenant Totten of the engineer troops, for their judicious and skilful execution in demolishing the enemy's batteries." Captain Roach and Lieutenant Swearingen, both of the 23d; Captain Arrowsmith of the 6th; Major King of the 15th; and Captain Steel of the 16th, were the only officers wounded.

Commodore Chauncey contributed, by the judicious disposition of his schooners, his full share to the success of the attack. Mr. Trant, in the Julia, and Mr. Mix, in the Growler, were directed to take a position in the mouth of the river, and silence a battery near the light house, which, from its position, commanded the shore where our troops were to land. Mr. Stevens, in the Ontario, took a position north of the light house, enfiladed the battery, and crossed the fire of the Julia and Growler. Lieutenant Brown, in the Governour Tompkins, was ordered to take a station near the Two Mile Creek, where the enemy had a battery with a heavy gun. Lieutenant Pettigrew, in the Conquest, took a position so as to rake the same battery. Lieutenant M'Pherson, in the Hamilton; Lieutenant Smith, in the Asp; and Mr. Osgood, in the Scourge, covered the landing of the troops. All the vessels anchored within musket shot of the shore; and in ten minutes after they opened upon the batteries, they were completely silenced and abandoned. Captain Perry was present at every point where he could be useful, exposed to showers of musketry.* Commodore Chauncey had himself prepared about 400 seamen, with whom he calculated to land, if the enemy had made a stand.

In the brigade order of the 28th May, applause is bestowed on Colonel Miller for "the steadiness with which he supported the advance party;" on Major King who "continued to lead his regiment through the severity of the contest long after having received a painful and debilitating wound;" and on the "intrepid conduct of Captain Grafton and Lieutenant Whiting."

* See Commodore Chauncey's official report, May 28, 1813.

The Irish volunteers under Colonel M'Clure from New-York, and the 16th regiment under Colonel Pierce, are honourably mentioned.

The battle of Fort George may be justly ranked among the most brilliant feats of arms during the war. The modesty, or indifference to popular applause, of General Dearborn, prevented him from speaking with sufficient eclat of this masterly achievement. The trophies of the victory were splendid ; more than forty pieces of cannon, besides small arms, ammunition, and provisions to an immense amount.

The morning after the action, General Lewis' division consisting of Chandler and Winder's brigades, the light artillery, dragoons, light infantry, and riflemen, were ordered to march in pursuit of the enemy, by way of Queenstown. The Commander-in-Chief had entertained a belief that the enemy, after receiving reenforcements from Chippeway, Erie, and Kingston, and calling in the neighbouring militia, would make a stand at the Beaver Dam, where they had a considerable deposite of provisions, but he was disappointed. The enemy suddenly decamped, and continued his retreat on to Burlington heights. General Dearborn upon hearing of this movement, recalled General Lewis with a part of his force, for the purpose of attempting to cut off the enemy's retreat at York, by the aid of Commodore Chauncey's fleet. Unfavourable winds prevented the execution of this measure. Generals Chandler and Winder continued in pursuit of the enemy, who halted about fifty miles from Fort George.

On the 29th, Lieutenant-Colonel Preston, with about 600 men crossed from Buffalo and took possession of Fort Erie and its dependencies. The enemy spiked the guns of the Fort and batteries, blew up the magazines and retreated at his approach.

ATTACK ON SACKETT'S HARBOUR.

ON the 29th of May, Sackett's Harbour, garrisoned by 495 regular troops (by morning returns) principally dragoons, under Lieutenant-Colonel Backus; the regiment of Albany volunteers under Lieutenant-Colonel Mills; and the neighbouring militia, the whole under the orders of Brigadier General Jacob Brown, was attacked by 1000 regulars and 300 Indians under the immediate command of Sir George Prevost.

Fortunately, General Brown was apprized of the intentions of the enemy on the 28th, and had made suitable preparations to receive them. Anticipating the point of descent, General Brown placed the militia and Albany volunteers, amounting to 500 men, near the water's edge on the peninsula usually called Horse Island. "Lieutenant-Colonel Backus, with the regulars, formed the second line; the care of Fort Tompkins was committed to the regular artillerists; and that of the Navy Point, to Lieutenant Chauncey." In case the militia and volunteers were driven from their position, Lieutenant-Colonel Backus was ordered to advance and meet the head of the enemy's column, while General Brown was to rally and fall on its flanks. If unable then to resist the enemy's attack, our troops were to throw themselves into the forts and defend themselves to the last extremity, in which case Lieutenant Chauncey was to destroy the stores and retire.

Such, in short, was the plan of defence. A little before sunrise the enemy were seen in thirty-eight large boats making for the shore under cover of their gun boats. General Brown gave orders for his men to reserve the fire until the near approach of the enemy should enable every shot to hit its object. The fire was too soon, but not without effect. Yet the aspect of danger was too terrible for militia, unaccustomed to the

musick of balls, to withstand. They fled without giving a second fire. General Brown and Lieutenant-Colonel Mills made every possible exertion to rally their men, but in vain. The intrepid Mills received at the same instant a canister and musket ball through his body, and fell dead on the first line of defence. Lieutenant-Colonel Backus, with the regular troops, according to previous arrangement, met the advancing column, and with greatly inferiour numbers, caused it to faulter; and finally, with the aid of about 100 militia and volunteers, who rallied under General Brown and Captain M'Nitt, succeeded in checking its progress and defeating its intentions. The enemy repulsed, retreated under the fire of his ships. After having re-embarked, they sent a flag to General Brown, requesting attention to the wounded.

The total loss of the Americans in killed, wounded, and missing, was 158. Lieutenant-Colonel Backus, to whose undaunted bravery General Brown chiefly ascribes the success of the day, was mortally wounded near the close of the action.

The British loss in killed and wounded remaining on the ground, exceeded ours; besides, many were killed and wounded in their boats by the militia and volunteers, while effecting a landing; a number were also carried off the field by the enemy, previous to his retreat. Among the British officers killed, was Adjutant General Gray, Colonel Moody, and Major Edwards.

Lieutenant Chauncey being falsely told that the battle was lost, unfortunately set fire to the navy barracks and stores, by which means a heavy publick loss was unnecessarily sustained. General Brown's official report of this affair pays a becoming homage to the noble conduct of Colonels Mills and Backus, Major Swan and Captain M'Nitt.

The chief object of the enemy seems to have been the destruction of the Pike, then on the stocks, and the stores in depot; in which he failed, at the same time sustaining a disgraceful discomfiture.

On the 5th of June, Commodore Chauncey sailed from Fort Niagara for Sackett's Harbour, having on

board Colonel M'Comb and 200 men. At this period, the British squadron under Sir James Lucas Yeo, was decidedly superiour in point of guns and tonnage. The command of the lake gave the enemy peculiar advantages. Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley with his regiment was also ordered to the defence of Sackett's Harbour. He was directed to land at Oswego.

The indisposition of General Dearborn continued. The inhabitants in the vicinity of Fort George came in great numbers and received their paroles. A large majority of them were friendly to the United States, and fixed in their hatred against the Government of Great Britain. The Mohawk Indians were principally quiet for fear of losing their valuable tract of land on Grand River.*

* See General Dearborn's official letter of June 8, 1813.

AFFAIR OF STONY CREEK.

IN the afternoon of the 5th of June, the advanced guard of Chandler's force, consisting of the light infantry under Captains Hindman and Nicholas, a part of the rifle corps under Captain Lyttle, and a detachment of the 2d dragoons under Captain Selden, arrived at Stony Creek, and commenced a sharp skirmish with an enemy's picket, 100 strong, under Colonel Williams, of the 49th regiment. He retreated, and our men pursued till about sun set, when they returned to their proper position in the line of march. The main body, in the meanwhile, had reached the creek, behind which they took a position for the night. The light infantry and part of the rifle corps on the right of the 25th regiment, formed the right wing. The artillery under Captains Towson and Leonard, the centre; the 5th, 16th, 23d, and some riflemen, the left wing; and the cavalry in the rear. A strong picket guard was posted some distance in front. Also strong flank and rear guards, in such manner as to surround the whole encampment with sentinels. The whole number of our troops at this point, did not exceed 1000 men. A detachment of 300 men of the 13th and 14th regiments, were encamped upon the beach of the lake, about three miles distant, to protect the boats expected from Fort George. Our men lay upon their arms, without covering. The night was very dark; but fires were kindled which enabled the enemy to see some parts of our line. General Chandler's account of the action which ensued, is in the following words:

"About an hour before daylight, on the morning of the 6th, the alarm was given. I was instantly up; and the 25th, which lay near me, was almost as instantly formed, as well as the 5th and 23d, which was on the left, under the immediate eye of General Winder. Owing to the neglect of the front picket, or some other cause, the British officers say that they were not hailed, or any alarm given, until they were within three

hundred yards of our line. The extreme darkness prevented us from seeing or knowing at what point they intended to attack us, until an attack was made on our right. A well directed fire was opened upon them from the 25th, and from nearly the whole line. After a few minutes I heard several muskets in our rear, in the direction of the rear guard, and then expected that the enemy had gained our rear by some path unknown to me, and were about to attack us in our rear. I instantly ordered Colonel Milton, with the 5th, to form in our rear near the woods, to meet such circumstances as might take place, knowing that I could call him to any other point, if necessary, at any moment. I had observed that the artillery was not covered, and directed General Winder to cause the 23d to be formed so far to the right, that their right should cover the artillery. At this moment I heard a new burst of fire from the enemy's left on our right, and not able to see any thing which took place, I set out full speed towards the right, to take measures to prevent my right flank from being turned, which I expected was the object of the enemy. I had proceeded but a few yards, before my horse fell under me, by which fall I received a serious injury. Here was a time when I have no recollection of what passed, but I presume it was not long. As soon as I recovered, I recollected what my object was, and made my way to the right, and gave Major Smith such directions as I thought proper, to prevent his right from being turned by surprise. I was then returning towards the centre, and when near the artillery, heard men, who, by their noise, appeared to be in confusion, it being the point at which I expected the 23d to be formed. I expected it was that regiment. I approached them, and as soon as I was near enough, I saw a body of men, who I thought to be the 23d, in rear of the artillery, broken. I hobbled in amongst them, and began to rally them, and directed them to form, but soon found my mistake; it was the British 49th, who had pushed forward to the head of their column, and gained the rear of the artillery. I was immediately disarmed and conveyed down the column to its rear. It was not yet day, and the extreme darkness of the night,

to which was added the smoke of the fire, put it totally out of our power to see the situation of the enemy. This was all that saved their columns from sure and total destruction, of which some of their officers were aware. After seeing the situation of the columns as I passed, I did hope and expect that General Winder, on the first dawn of light, would see their situation, and bring Colonel Milton with the 5th (who I had still kept in reserve until I could have day-light to examine their situation) to attack this column, which I am sure he would have done to advantage ; but, to my mortification, I soon learned that he had fallen into the same mistake with myself; and by endeavouring to learn what was taking place in the centre, he was also taken, as well as Major Van De Venter. To the extreme darkness of the night, the enemy's knowledge of his intended point of attack, and our not knowing at what point to expect him, must be attributed his partial success, and not to a want of strength or bravery in our troops, who, generally, behaved remarkably well under all the circumstances ; and however unfortunate the event, as it relates to myself, I only ask that all circumstances may be taken into consideration, in making up your opinion upon the conduct of General Winder and myself in this affair, which I am sure you will do, and I flatter myself you will see no cause of censure."

Colonel James Burn, of the 2d light dragoons, in a letter to General Dearborn, furnishes some additional and interesting particulars. "In a few minutes the fire became general along the whole line, and was nobly returned by the artillery of the centre, commanded by Captain Towson and Lieutenant Leonard, and again by the troops of the left wing, viz. the 5th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Milton; the 23d, commanded by Major Armstrong, and the 16th. The fire continued with little intermission for one hour, during which time the enemy attempted, by frequent charges, to break our line ; but without effect, being obliged to give way by the well directed fire of our brave troops.

"The 13th and 14th regiments, which had been detached the preceding evening, were active in making

prisoners, and advancing with much order to the field in hope of sharing with the gallant 5th and 25th, 23d and light troops, the glory of another combat. But the unfortunate capture of Brigadier Generals Chandler and Winder, who were taken in the action unknown to any part of the army, and hurried into the enemy's lines, prevented the future operations from being carried into effect with the promptitude which would assuredly have taken place, had either of those officers been present to command.

"You will be surprised to find our loss so small. That of the enemy exceeds ours much; they lost in killed, about sixty, many wounded, and upwards of seventy prisoners, all regulars, and principally of the 49th regiment. Several of their officers were killed, wounded, and missing. A flag was sent by Colonel Harvey, asking permission to make inquiries for them; also to be allowed to send a surgeon to attend their own wounded, which I readily granted. On the return of day light, I found the command of the army had devolved on me; and being at a loss what steps to pursue in the unpleasant dilemma occasioned by the capture of our Generals, finding the ammunition of many of the troops nearly expended, I had recourse to a council of the field officers present, of whom a majority coincided in opinion with me, that we ought to retire to our former position at the Forty Mile Creek, where we could be supplied with ammunition and provisions, and either advance or remain until farther orders.

"Every aid was afforded by the staff. The Assistant Adjutant General, Major Johnson, and Brigade Majors Jones and Wartenby, exerted themselves in rendering all the assistance in their power.

"The army on this occasion has proved its firmness and bravery, by keeping its position in a night attack, in which the yells of the Indians mingled with the roaring of cannon and musketry, were calculated to intimidate. The enemy charged repeatedly, and so dark was the night that our army could not distinguish friend from foe; in one of those, they succeeded in carrying off a six pounder, a howitzer, and a caissoon,

to the great mortification of our brave artillery. I presume it was on that occasion, also, that we lost our Generals, who were distinctly heard encouraging our men to fight. The squadron of dragoons remained formed and steady at their post, but could not act on account of the darkness of the night, and the thickness of the adjacent woods. Much credit is due to the troops generally; but too much praise cannot be said of the conduct of the 5th and 25th regiments."

On the 6th of June, General Dearborn ordered General Lewis to proceed to the advanced army for the purpose of directing its operations. He found it on the 7th, about ten miles in the rear of the ground on which it had been attacked on the night of the 5th, with its right flank on the lake, and its left on the Forty Mile Creek, which skirts a perpendicular mountain of considerable height. At six in the evening, the British fleet hove in sight. The troops lay all night on their arms. At day light the enemy appeared abreast of the encampment about a mile from shore. At six, they towed in a large schooner which opened a fire on our boats. Archer's and Towson's companies, with five pieces of artillery, were ordered to the bank of the lake to give them a suitable reception. Captain Totten in thirty minutes constructed a temporary furnace for heating shot. Her fire was returned with effect and interest, which soon compelled her to retire. A party of savages appeared on the brow of the mountain; they were, however, soon dispersed by Lieutenant Eldridge, who gained the summit of the mountain with a party of volunteers.

In the meanwhile, an officer was sent to General Lewis with a flag of truce from Sir J. L. Yeo, advising him that, "as he was invested by savages in his rear, a fleet in his front, and a powerful army on his flank, it was his duty to surrender his army." General Lewis very properly answered the noble knight that his "message was too ridiculous to merit a reply."

Orders having been received for the army to retire to Fort George, the troops and boats were put in motion for that purpose. Fourteen boats were taken by the enemy. The Indians and incorporated militia hung on the flanks

and rear of our army throughout the march, and picked up some stragglers."

On the 10th, General Dearborn, in consequence of continued indisposition, resigned the command of the army to General Lewis. At this time the sick were so numerous that the effective force of the army was materially reduced. Several officers resigned in disgust; and the prospect of the campaign, a few weeks before so brilliant, was now obscured and cheerless.

The British Colonels Bishop and Warren, with about 400 men, availing themselves of the absence of the United States' troops from Fort Erie,* crossed over to Black Rock, burnt the sailors' barracks, dismounted and spiked three twelve pounders, and sent off four cannon and a quantity of whiskey and salt. While the enemy were busied in securing their booty, General P. B. Porter, who had left Black Rock for Buffalo, on the appearance of the enemy, assembled a body of volunteers, a few regulars and about forty Indians, returned with his motley force, and by a wise disposition and a vigorous attack, succeeded after an action of twenty minutes in routing the invaders. They returned in confusion to their boats. Our men crowded upon their heels, and with good aim had each several fair shots. Eight of the British were killed on the shore, and sixteen made prisoners. Colonel Bishop was mortally wounded. The last boat off, lost nearly every man on board. The enemy acknowledged a loss of 104 killed. We had but three killed, and five wounded. The Indians behaved admirably well in the action, and showed no disposition to scalp the dead enemy. After the British killed were collected and covered with boughs preparatory to interment, the Indians approached the spot and evinced their contempt with a gentle but disdainful kick of the foot.

On the evening of the 25th of June, a detachment of 570 men, infantry, artillery, riflemen, and cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Boerstler, was ordered to march by the way of Queenstown to the Beaver Dams, distant about fifteen miles from Fort George, for the pur-

* Lieutenant-Colonel Preston, soon after taking possession, was ordered to join General Dearborn at Fort George.

pose of dispersing a body of the enemy collected there. When within about two miles of the Beaver Dams, our detachment fell into an ambuscade, but soon drove the enemy some distance into the woods, and then retired to a clear field and sent an express to General Dearborn for a re-enforcement. Lieutenant-Colonel Boerstler assured the General that he would defend himself until re-enforced. A re-enforcement of 300 men marched immediately under Colonel Chrystie; but on arriving at Queenstown, Colonel Chrystie received authentick information that Lieutenant-Colonel Boerstler, with his command, had surrendered to the enemy. Colonel Boerstler's statement of this disastrous affair differs materially from the British account. He states that he defended himself until his ammunition was nearly exhausted, and that he was summoned by superiour numbers. The enemy ascribe their success to the presence of mind of Lieutenant Fitz Gibbon, who, on reconnoitering Boerstler's position and finding him too numerous to oppose with his small force, sent a summons for him to surrender in the name of Major De Haren. A court martial has honourably acquitted Lieutenant-Colonel Boerstler, and have pronounced an opinion that he conducted on that occasion, in a "brave, prudent, and officer-like manner." Military men will nevertheless reiterate the inquiry of General Dearborn, "why it should have been deemed proper to remain several hours in a position surrounded with woods without risking a decisive action, or effecting a retreat, remains to be accounted for; as well as the project of waiting for a re-enforcement from a distance of fifteen or sixteen miles."*

The British account of this affair does not admit that they had any killed. The American detachment lost about 25 killed, besides wounded.

Shortly after the loss of this detachment, General Dearborn received orders to *retire*† from the command

* See General Dearborn's letter to the Secretary of War, June 25, 1813.

† A warm and respectful address was presented to the General on the eve of his departure from Fort George, which fully evinced the regret of the army at the order. It was signed by all the principal officers. He replied, that "Obedience was the first duty of a soldier."

of the 9th military district. General Lewis having previously gone to Sackett's Harbour for the purpose of menacing Kingston, the command of the army at Fort George devolved on General Boyd. Commodore Chauncey arrived at Sackett's Harbour the day after the repulse of the enemy in their attempt on that post. General Boyd was instructed to act on the defensive,* while Chauncey remained in port; which continued from the beginning of June, to the latter end of July.

On the 30th of July the Secretary of War wrote to General Boyd as follows:

"The restriction put upon you with regard to the enemy, was but commensurate with their command of the lake. So long as they had wings, and you only had feet; so long as they could be transported, supplied, and re-enforced, by water at will, common sense, as well as military principles, put you on the *defensive*. These circumstances changed, the reason of the rule changes with them; and it now becomes your business, in concert with the fleet, to harrass and destroy the enemy, wherever you can find him. Of the competency of your force there can be no doubt, provided your estimate of him be but tolerably correct. Again: if, as you say, you can beat him, do it without delay; and remember, that if you beat, you must destroy him. There is no excuse for a General who permits a beaten enemy to escape and rally. These remarks grow out of some recent events in your quarter, and require no explanation. It is the President's wish that you should com-

* The loss of the command of the lake in June, 1813, must be ascribed, in a great measure, to the inactivity of our troops at Fort George. On the 20th of June, General Dearborn wrote from Fort George, "that the enemy will endeavour to keep up such a force at or near the head of the lake, as to prevent any part of our force in this quarter from joining or proceeding to Sackett's Harbour, for the purpose of attacking Kingston; and such is the state of the roads in this flat country, in consequence of continued rains, as to render any operations against the enemy extremely difficult without the aid of the fleet for the transportation of provisions, ammunition, and other necessary supplies. The whole of these embarrassments have resulted from a temporary loss of the command of the lake. The enemy has availed himself of the advantage, and forwarded re-enforcements and supplies."

municate fully and freely with Brigadier General Williams. It is only by this kind of intercourse that the efforts of all can be united in promoting the publick good."

Soon after the capture of Boerstler's detachment, the enemy, emboldened by the supineness which reigned in the American camp, approached within a few miles of Fort George, and frequently showed themselves at the out posts. A mixed force of British and Indians attacked two of our pickets on the 8th of July. A small detachment of thirty-nine men was immediately ordered to the support of the pickets. The bravery of Lieutenant Eldridge carried him too far. He penetrated into the woods where the British and Indians were laying in ambush in far superiour numbers. His men were mostly soon cut to pieces; no mercy was shown to the wounded. They were horribly mutilated, scalped, their hearts taken out, and otherwise disfigured. The gallant Eldridge was among the killed. It is said that British officers were, on this occasion, painted like the Indians, with streaks of *red* and *green* around their eyes!

The enemy again attacked the pickets on the 17th. After a contest of one hour, occasionally severe, they were dispersed. They exhibited a force of 200, besides Indians. The American loss was trifling—only three or four being killed, and a few wounded. The loss of the British was comparatively great. Both parties fought with unusual ardour. Captain Birdsall's riflemen were nearest the enemy in pursuit; and had many fine shots. Captain Towson was wounded in the hand while voluntarily bearing Colonel Scott's orders.

About this time Major Cyrenus Chapin, who had been made prisoner at the Beaver Dams, at the time of Boerstler's surrender, arrived at Fort George with two boats, sixteen British, and twenty-eight American prisoners; the former of whom were taken in the following daring manner. At Burlington Heights, Major Chapin and twenty-eight of his men were ordered to Kingston in charge of a guard of sixteen British soldiers in two boats. When arrived off York, in the afternoon of the

first day, the Major gave a concerted signal for his men to rise and take the boats; which was instantly and successfully attempted. A British officer in one of the boats attempted to draw his sword; Major Chapin seized him by the neck and threw him on his back; two of the British soldiers drew their bayonets upon the Major, who seizing both at the same instant, threw them on top of the officer, and held all down together. In the meanwhile his men had succeeded in disarming the guard. Major Chapin then changed the direction of the boats, and arrived safe at Fort George, after rowing hard all night.

A few days before this adventure, a scouting party was sent out from Fort George in quest of Captain Ball, an active and cruel commander of Indians in the British service. When they arrived at the Six Mile Creek, Sergeant James Rouse and two dragoons volunteered to go to a house where they suspected that Ball was concealed. They arrived at the house about nine o'clock in the evening, within half a mile of a British picket. Having entered the house, they were told that Ball was not within. Sergeant Rouse, however, fired his pistol through a door that he could not break open, upon which Ball opened it, and surrendered himself and guard, eight in number, prisoners. They were placed on horses, and carried eighteen miles through the enemy's country to Fort George.

After this handsome partizan affair, Rouse was taken prisoner; and complaining to General Vincent of the ill treatment he met with from the Indians, was by him threatened to be sent to Quebec and hanged. Being put in prison, he escaped at the hazard of his life. He and one other American took to the woods, and avoiding the settlements, without arms or food, finally reached the shore of Lake Erie, below Point Abino. Here they seized a British sentinel, with whose aid they crossed the lake and arrived at Buffalo much exhausted.

Commodore Chauncey being re-enforced by the new ship Pike, sailed from Sackett's Harbour, and arrived off Niagara on the evening of the 27th of July, where he received on board his fleet, Colonel Scott, with 250 in-

fantry, and a company of artillery under Captain Crane for the purpose of surprising the British at Burlington Heights, where it was understood that they had a considerable deposite of provisions and stores. The fleet sailed for the head of the lake, but being retarded by light or contrary winds, did not come to anchorage before the evening of the 29th, when they found the enemy re-enforced and too strongly entrenched for the force under Colonel Scott to hazard an attack. Commodore Chauncey therefore weighed and stood for York, where Colonel Scott landed his troops without opposition, and found several hundred barrels of flour and provisions in the publick store houses, five pieces of cannon, eleven boats, and a quantity of shot, shells, and other stores, all of which were either destroyed or brought away; except a part of the flour, which was generously distributed among the poor of the place.

After the return of the fleet to Niagara, another expedition was immediately concerted. One thousand men were to embark on board the fleet, under the command of Brigadier General Williams, and to land at the head of the lake. The army at Fort George, under General Boyd, was to move in two columns against the enemy's front, while General Williams assailed his rear and cut off his retreat. But at the very moment when the troops were to have embarked, the enemy's fleet hove in sight. Commodore Chauncey weighed anchor and offered battle. Sir J. L. Yeo having the weather gage, kept at a respectful distance. On the night of the 9th August, Commodore Chauncey lost two schooners in a gale; and on the succeeding night the Growler and Julia fell into the hands of the enemy. Shortly after these disasters, Commodore Chauncey left the head of the lake, which necessarily kept the army at Fort George on the defensive, and prevented the expedition against the enemy's forces at Burlington Heights. Sir J. L. Yeo went into Kingston, and Commodore Chauncey to Sackett's Harbour.

A body of volunteers, militia, and Indians, having arrived at Fort George, and being impatient to see the enemy, a plan was concerted to cut off one of the British

pickets. Accordingly, on the morning of the 17th of August, about 300 volunteers and Indians, under the command of Major Chapin, supported by 200 regulars, were detached to effect this object. A heavy rain prevented the surprise and capture of the picket; but a smart skirmish ensued, which terminated much to the advantage of our detachment. Our Indians captured twelve of the British Indians, and four whites; two of our Indians were killed, and five wounded. The Indians conducted with great zeal and activity.* Several of their noted chiefs were engaged; among whom was the Father's Brother, Red Jacket, and Henry O'Bail, (Cornplanter's son) who was educated at Philadelphia. Brigadier General Porter and Major Chapin were very active on this occasion.

At day break on the morning of the 24th, the enemy considerably re-enforced from Kingston, attacked all the pickets, which retired, pursued by his advanced guards. A skirmish ensued in the village of Newark. A Captain of the 49th, and several privates were taken. The British left fifteen killed on the ground. It was the opinion of General Boyd that they brought their whole force into the field for the purpose of a general attack; but desisted, on ascertaining the strength of his position.

On the 20th of August, General Wilkinson arrived at Sackett's Harbour to take command of the central army. The hopes, expectations, and good wishes of the nation followed him. His revolutionary services, his achievements under the daring Wayne, and the celerity and secrecy with which he captured the Spanish fort Charlotte at Mobile, inspired general confidence. "The reduction of Kingston by a direct attack or an indirect movement, embraced the primary object of his instructions."†

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*An Indian of the Seneca tribe, while in Canada, entered a house, and observing an elegant Parasol, *made it his own*. After his return home, he was seen strutting through the streets of Buffalo with it properly interposed between the rays of the sun and his tawny brow!

† See minutes of a council of war, holden at Sackett's Harbour, August 26, 1813, and published in the publick papers in May, 1814.

His means were ample; at least the number of troops at his disposal were superiour to those of the enemy. Besides, the latter had a long line of defence, assailable almost at every point from Montreal to Fort Erie, which necessarily distracted his attention; harassed and weakened his forces, and gave decided advantages to the invader.

General Boyd was enclosed on the land sides of his defences at Fort George, by De Rottenburgh's army of inferiour numbers. The question of naval superiority on Lake Ontario remained undecided.

General Wilkinson on his arrival at Sackett's Harbour called a council of war, at which were present Generals Lewis, Brown, Swartwout, and Commodore Chauncey, of whom he requested their sentiments on the following points, viz:

1st. To wait in our present positions, a combat between the rival squadrons for the supremacy on the lake.

2d. To assemble a sufficient force at Fort George, to cut up the enemy in that quarter; then to descend to this place, call the division from Champlain, incorporate the whole, and make a direct attack on Kingston.

3d. To concentrate all the troops on the lake in this vicinity, order the division on Champlain to feint upon Montreal, or carry a real attack against it should circumstances warrant; and then with the troops assembled here, to reduce Kingston, and proceed against Montreal should the season permit; or

4th. To rendezvous the whole of the troops on the Lake in this vicinity; and in co-operation with our squadron, to make a bold feint at Kingston; slip down the St. Lawrence, lock up the enemy in our rear to starve and surrender, or oblige him to follow us without artillery, baggage, or provisions, eventually to lay down his arms; to sweep the St. Lawrence of armed craft, and in concert with the division under Major-General Hampton, to take possession of Montreal.

After duly considering the foregoing propositions, they decided,

1st. It is not necessary to await the result of a conflict between the hostile squadrons; as the operation of

the army in the event of the adoption of either of these propositions, will not depend on a co-operation with the fleet, farther than to secure the passage of the troops into the St. Lawrence.

2d. The second proposition is rejected, because the object appears to be a partial one, so far as relates to the proposed operation against the division in the vicinity of Fort George. The loss of time also would probably render it too late to carry an attack against Kingston this campaign.

3d. This proposition is also considered a partial operation, and one for which the force on this Lake might possibly prove inadequate.

4th. The fourth and last meets the approbation of the council. The object appears feasible; and, if accomplished, the upper country must fall of course; for it is incapable of subsisting the enemy's force for any length of time, and the possession of Montreal will certainly destroy the line of communication between the upper and lower provinces. The feint on Kingston is reserved for future consideration.

Sir J. L. Yeo sailed from Kingston for the head of the lake, about the 22d of August. Chauncey followed him on the 30th. General Wilkinson reached Fort George on the 5th of September. The same day the Secretary of War arrived at Sackett's Harbour.

There were at this period, 4500 regulars, and 1000 militia under General Hampton, at Burlington, Vermont. This corps crossed Lake Champlain and advanced to Odletown early in September. On the 25th it marched to Chateaugay, to hold itself in readiness to act in concert with the central division. In the mean time, Colonel Clark was directed by General Hampton, to amuse the enemy and divert his attention by a partisan warfare.

Two thousand militia were ordered to assemble at Champion, twenty-five miles north-east of Sackett's Harbour.

General Lewis commanded at Sackett's Harbour; his force amounted to about 2000 men.

The army at Fort George was about 5000 strong.

Re-enforcements of regulars, detached militia, and volunteers, were on their way to different points of the frontiers.

Sir J. L. Yeo made his appearance off Niagara on the 3d of September. Chauncey at this time occupied the Harbour. It was not till the 7th, that the Commodore was favoured with a breeze to stand towards the British fleet. For twenty-four hours the two fleets continued to manœuvre within a short distance of each other, without firing a shot. The British uniformly on the retreat, and the Americans in pursuit. Adverse winds, or a mutual disinclination to engage, prevented their coming to blows. On the 17th, Chauncey found himself off Sackett's Harbour, having lost track of Sir James. He, however, continued in search of his wily antagonist till the 27th, when he closed with him between Niagara and York. The wind blew a gale from the south-east. Commodore Chauncey, in the Pike, sustained successfully the brunt of the action. Having shot away the mizzen and main top masts of Sir James' own ship, the latter as usual escaped to the head of the lake, and anchored close in shore. Chauncey pursued as far as he thought prudent on account of the gale, which threw a prodigious sea on shore. He could readily have taken a brig and schooner, which struck as he passed them; but having his eyes fixed on heavier game, he lost the whole. Yet this action appeared to decide the dominion of the lake for the remainder of the year. Chauncey in this engagement had five killed, and about twenty wounded. Sir James' ship was much cut up. This action of itself is sufficient to establish a reputation of bravery for Commodore Chauncey.

About the 20th of September, General Wilkinson received a proposition from General P. B. Porter, Cyrenus Chapin, and Joseph M'Clure, requesting, in case of the withdrawal of the regular troops from Fort George, permission to raise by the first of October, a volunteer force of from 1000 to 1200 men, exclusive of Indians, to be furnished with four pieces of field artillery, arms, ammunition, provisions, and pay, while in actual service.

At a council of war holden on the 29th of September,

at which were present all the general and field officers then at Fort George, General Wilkinson proposed,

1st. Shall this post (Fort George) be strengthened and garrisoned for defence against the British division in its vicinity? Or

2dly. Shall the place be razed and abandoned?

The council, with the exception of one voice, answered the first question in the negative, and the second in the affirmative.

However, the General was instructed to close with P. B. Porter's propositions, and leave a sufficient number of regulars for the garrison of Fort George and Niagara; in all, about eight hundred effectives under Colonel Scott.

The embarkation of the troops commenced on the 26th; but owing to unfavourable winds, it was not until the 30th that it was completed, when the flotilla of batteaux containing the central army, left Fort George for the St. Lawrence. General Wilkinson was detained by necessary arrangements till the 2d of October, when he embarked and arrived at Sackett's Harbour on the 4th of October. "He immediately visited the Secretary of War, in company with Generals Lewis and Brown, and in the presence of these officers remonstrated freely and warmly against making an attack on Kingston; urging the propriety of passing that post and of going directly to Montreal.

"The Secretary of War differed from General Wilkinson in opinion; but thought his objections worthy of consideration, and proposed a meeting on the day following for that purpose.

"The meeting took place accordingly, when General Wilkinson presented the paper marked No. 1. That marked No. 2, was presented by the Secretary, and the opinion with which it closes was adopted as that which should regulate the movements of the army."

OPINIONS OF GENERAL WILKINSON.

NO. 1.

Reasons for attacking Kingston *anteriour* to a descent upon Montreal.

1st. We shall capture a garrison of 800 or 1000, and demolish a strong hold of the enemy.

2d. We shall destroy his naval depot and magazines of every species.

3d. We shall by this operation diminish his force, destroy his resources, and place the division at the head of the lake, under De Rottenburgh, in great difficulty and distress: and

4th. We shall destroy every naval resource, and of consequence prevent the building, equipping, and even repairing a single vessel.

Against this attack, it may be urged,

1st. That the reduction of the place may cost more time than we can calculate on.

2d. It may encumber us with wounded and sick: and

3d. It is possible the British squadron may as heretofore, elude Commodore Chauncey, and find us before Kingston, or overtake us on the St. Lawrence.

In the first place, from the lateness of the season, the loss of a few days may expose us to the autumnal rains, and jeopardize the chief object of the campaign. In the second place, our own force will be diminished, and our movements retarded: and

In the third place, the chief object of the campaign, *the capture of Montreal*, will be utterly defeated; and our own army subjected to great difficulties, losses, and perils. Submitted to the honourable, the Secretary of War.

JA. WILKINSON.

OPINIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

NO. 2.

1st. The Niagara division will probably arrive here in a day or two.

2d. The weather is yet good, and the lake navigable by scows and boats.

3d. The enemy's main force is in the neighbourhood of Fort George, and his fleet at the head of the lake.

4th. The garrison at Kingston does not exceed 800 or 1000 men.

5th. If we effect a landing at M'Pherson's farm, on the eastern side of Kingston, a point may be seized, which will command the town, the forts, and the harbour; and within seven hours after the landing is effected, a sufficient battery may be erected and in operation.

6th. Nine and twelve pounders will be sufficient for burning block houses, &c. and may be dragged by men.

7th. The time necessary to reduce the place will not exceed a single day, and of course will not materially interfere, on that account, with our object below.

8th. The loss we may sustain can only be conjectured. Judging from that at Fort George, when the enemy were more numerous, it will be inconsiderable.

9th. The advantages of taking Kingston are two: you sever the enemy's line of communication, and you expel him from his only secure harbour.

The premises assumed under the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th heads, may change, and our conclusions with them. The only safe decision, therefore, is, that if the British fleet shall not escape Commodore Chauncey and get into Kingston harbour; if the garrison of that place be not largely re-enforced, and if the weather be such as will allow us to navigate the lake securely, Kingston shall be our first object; otherwise, we shall go directly to Montreal.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL WILKINSON AND THE SECRETARY OF WAR.*

ON the 18th of October, General Wilkinson wrote to General Armstrong as follows:

"The diminution of our force by disease and various casualties, and more especially, the uncertainty of the period of our movement against Montreal, render it necessary, in my judgement, that you should revoke the order of march you have given to Major General Hampton; and that he should be directed to march for Morrisville, as rapidly as may be consistent with the health of his troops. This proposition is founded on the presumption, that we make the reduction of Kingston and the conquests of the upper provinces, the first objects of our operations."

War Department, October 19, 1813.

SIR—I received your letter of yesterday, and should have answered it more promptly, but that business of the south and west required my immediate attention.

When on the 4th instant you returned from Fort George, we had the prospect of a speedy concentration of our forces at this point; the Niagara division had sailed on the 30th ult. the enemy's principal force occupied a cantonment between Lakes Erie and Ontario; his fleet was at the head of the lake, and his garrison at Kingston reduced to seven or eight hundred men. Under these circumstances, it was no doubt wise to decide

* It is an undoubted fact, that the personal animosity of Hampton against Wilkinson, together with the perverseness of the former and treachery of Armstrong, was the whole cause of the failure of the campaign of 1813; and the writer, with others of his fellow officers, believes that Hull, Hampton, and Armstrong, ought to be ranked together as the betrayers of their country and the murderers of their fellow soldiers of whom they had command. I envy them not their British gold, nor that hell-like conscience of which they must on reflection be in possession of.

as we did, that our first attack should be carried against that place; but do these circumstances any longer exist? The expected concentration is but now effected, (18th October) a re-enforcement of 1500 men has been thrown into Kingston; the British fleet has got into port there, and our force, from disease and other casualties, is according to your statement, diminished and diminishing. To reinstate and augment this, it is now proposed to order General Hampton from his present position at Chateaugay, to Morrisville, on the St. Lawrence. These places are distant upwards of one hundred miles. A march of such length, at this season of the year, and in the present condition of the roads, loaded as he is with a train of artillery, with the means of subsistence, and with tents and baggage, cannot be performed under fifteen days, to which must be added the time necessary for giving the order, for making the arrangements preliminary to such a movement, and for making also the subsequent one for Morrisville to the mouth of the Gaunanoqui river; all of which would probably protract the moment of junction till the 15th of November.

Admonished as we are by the storms which have assailed us for ten days past, and which have not yet ceased, I cannot but think that a period so late, would of itself be fatal to the project.

Other circumstances lead to the same conclusion. Beginning our operations from the mouth of the Gaunanoqui river, we shall have a march of twenty-four miles to Kingston, and through a country covered with woods, destitute of inhabitants, and pervious only by two roads; which, without any interruption from the enemy, are represented as nearly impassable at present. This movement (unlike that originally projected)* cannot be made without the aid of horses, and a less number of these than six hundred,† including the 2d regiment of dragoons, is, I understand, deemed insufficient.

* A descent at M'Pherson's farm, two miles and a half below Kingston.
† Forage for this number was required by the General.

Now these must be fed, and their provender drawn from this place, as the country between Gravelly Point and Putneyville, affords none, and interposes a swampy desert which shuts us out from the supplies of Rossie and Rayville, &c. An important question arises here, can the necessary forage be obtained from this neighbourhood? The Quarter Master General says "it cannot; that it must be carted from Lowville, forty miles distant, and transported hence by water." These facts, on your plan, menace our operations against Kingston with a delay which would probably surround us with all the embarrassments of a Canadian winter, and extinguish every hope of grasping the other, the safer, and the greater object below. I call it the safer and greater object, because—

At Montreal, you find the weaker place, and the smaller force to encounter. At Montreal, you meet a fresh, unexhausted, efficient re-enforcement of 4000 men. At Montreal, you approach your own resources, and establish between you and them an easy and expeditious intercourse. At Montreal, you occupy a point which must be gained in carrying your attacks home to the purpose of the war; and which, if seized now, will save one campaign. At Montreal, you hold a position which completely severs the enemy's line of operations; which shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence against him; and which, while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all above itself.

These, General, are the thoughts which present themselves, on your proposition, and which I understand as abandoning, for this campaign, the proposed attack on Montreal. I am entirely disposed to listen to all that can be said on the other side of the question; but at present, the reasons assigned, leave me no doubt of the policy of pursuing, promptly and firmly,* the plan already indicated; and which, besides the approbation

* This refers to the preceding plan, approved by the President on the 23d July, and communicated to General Wilkinson on the 5th of August.

of the President, has received the sanction of a council of war. I am, very respectfully,

Sir, your most obedient servant,
JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General Wilkinson.

H. Q. Sackett's Harbour, October 19, 1813.

DEAR SIR—I was about to embark for Grenadier Island, when I received your letter of this morning, which I will endeavour to answer; my very feeble condition and the want of time for reflection, disqualify me from doing full justice to my opinions.

You will recollect that in my letter of the 6th of August, I proposed to take Kingston, as preliminary to an attack on Montreal; you offered a different opinion in your letter of the 8th, and on my arrival here, I submitted the alternative to a council of war, which decided in favour of your plan, to leave Kingston untouched, and proceed directly against Montreal; but ulteriour considerations and information, have induced me to adhere to my original plan.

Permit me, previous to the discussion of the grounds of my opinion, to submit a few incidental remarks.

It is extremely doubtful what may be the present force of the enemy at Kingston, and very uncertain how much our own force may have been diminished by diseases, and the casualties attending our movements.

From the retreat of Proctor before General Harrison, and the information received from Colonel Scott, I think it probable that De Rottenburgh, with the effectives of his division, has gone to re-enforce Proctor, and that the troops which have descended to Kingston consisted only of the sick of that division.

My idea of recalling General Hampton to re-enforce us, was produced by an alarm with respect to the insufficiency of our force, which I found spreading; and the direction which I suggested was founded on your own proposition* of the 13th instant, at which time I under-

* What is here called a *proposition* was but a question, whether the march could be performed in six days? General W. answered in the negative, and advised that General Hampton should be ordered to go on to Cognawaga.

stood you to offer the opinion, that the march from Hampton's encampment to Morrisville might be accomplished in six days; and my own opinion is, that by disembarrassing himself of his artillery and its attirail, perhaps he might be able to make the march in that time, or a few days more.

My reasons for preferring the attack on Kingston to that of Montreal, are these:

By the reduction of that place, we conquer a province not only of great importance to the enemy, but a valuable acquisition to ourselves; we capture or destroy four thousand of his best troops; we put an end to the Indian war; and by the destruction of his naval force, establish our command of the lake, and permit a respectable part of our naval force to be employed elsewhere.

On the contrary, leave Kingston, its garrison, and the British squadron in our rear, and proceed to Montreal, none of those important objects will be gained. The enemy will remain in undisturbed possession of the province, at liberty to exercise his enterprises against this frontier at discretion; for it is a fact, however opinions may vary, the resources of the province are adequate to the subsistence of his army. His naval superiority on the lake, will be re-established by the opening of the spring; the Indian depredations may be encouraged and continued; or should he prefer it, he may, on the opening of the campaign, leaving Sir James Yeo triumphant on the lake, with a suitable garrison for the protection of Kingston, descend the St. Lawrence with his main force and fall upon our rear, while we shall be engaged in front, admitting we succeed in establishing ourselves at Montreal.

Having passed Kingston, the fortifications at Prescott may present such an obstacle to our farther progress, as to compel us to land and reduce it by force; an operation which may consume more time than can be spared at this advanced season. I speak conjecturally; but should we surmount every obstacle in descending the river, we shall advance upon Montreal ignorant of the force arrayed against us; and in case of misfortune, having no retreat, the army must surrender at discretion.

I will barely add, that as the winter commences at Montreal by the 20th of November, should we be delayed on the route by any untoward incidents, our embarrassments and perils will be greatly multiplied.

I offer these results of my frail judgement with a conscientious regard to the publick good. I am bigoted to no project, and therefore am willing to yield my own judgement to that of others.

Personal considerations would make me prefer a visit to Montreal to the attack of Kingston; but before I abandon this attack, which by my instructions I am ordered to make, it is necessary to my justification, that you should by the authority of the President, direct the operation of the army under my command, particularly against Montreal. With my earnest wishes for the successful issue of whatever may be undertaken, I am, dear sir, with much respect and esteem, truly yours.

JA. WILKINSON.

The Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

N. B. All the objections which apply to the landing below Kingston, may be obviated by landing above it. My sole motive for suggesting the idea of landing below, was to prevent the garrison's escape. If there be a deficiency of forage on our part, it is the fault of the Quarter Master General, who was instructed as early as August, to lay in a supply of 12,000 bushels for the subsistence of the cavalry. JA. WILKINSON.

Hon. J. Armstrong, Secretary of War.

War Department, October 20, 1813.

SIR—I received your letter of yesterday, by Major Lee. You appear to have written it under an impression that your instruction of August last, made a direct attack upon Kingston unavoidable. A copy of these instructions is before me, and in the last paragraph of them we find a summary of their substance. It is as follows: "After this exposition, it is unnecessary to add, that in conducting the present campaign, you will make Kingston your principal object, and that you will choose, as circumstances may indicate, between a direct and indirect attack upon that post." Both modes of

attack are slightly detailed in these orders, and a preference given to the latter, but without at all infringing your right of choice, or in any degree lessening your responsibility. Nor am I now at liberty to change the ground of these instructions, since the only effect of this would be, to substitute my opinion for yours. The former has not however been withheld; it has been given freely and fully, and is yet unshaken by any consideration presented to my mind.

As we are now about to part, it may be proper that I should subjoin to what I have said in favour of a movement on Montreal, a short statement of my objections to a direct attack on Kingston.

1st. If its garrison consists of four thousand of the best troops of the enemy, as you suggest, your attack will fail.

2d. If your attack fails, your retreat is impracticable.

3d. Your descent must necessarily be made above or below the town, on the water's edge, and within a short distance of your object. If made below the town, your fleet cannot cover it: if made above the town, it must be done in presence of the enemy, and within stroke of his fleet, and that he will think the object sufficient to justify the risk, cannot be doubted. Besides, an approach on this side, however successful, leaves to the enemy the means of escaping.

4th. The experiment already made of the lake navigation, is not encouraging. Though pressed by no other enemy than the weather, the army has not been able to reach Grenadier Island, but in broken order and with considerable loss. On your plan, they have eighteen other miles to go on the open lake, and much of this distance under the eye of the British fleet. Is it probable that our scows will be able to navigate this remaining distance, at a season and under circumstances so unfavourable, in better order or with less loss?

These are the best thoughts I can offer, and it only remains to add to them my best wishes for your army and for yourself. JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General Wilkinson.

The progress of the army from Fort George and Sackett's Harbour to Grenadier Island, was greatly retarded by unfavourable weather, and it was not till the last of October that the rear divisions joined the main body. The British fleet had not dared to show itself since the 28th of September.

GENERAL WILKINSON'S JOURNAL.

October 21st. Boisterous weather; left Sackett's Harbour; at night arrived off Grenadier Island.

October 22d. Called for a return of the troops on the island; found a large body to be still in the rear, wrecked or stranded; returned in quest of them, and to order from the harbour a supply of winter clothing and shoes for the troops on the island, who were nearly destitute; observed at night, on our way up, many fires on different points of the coast; wind so high could not call at them; reached the harbour at midnight.

October 23d. Orders given for the shipment of the clothing; many stragglers picked up and embarked for Grenadier Island; Colonel Coles arrived with two hundred men of the 12th regiment, and sailed for the same place; the Growler equipped, manned, furnished with a skipper, and sent to Oswego for Colonels Randolph and Scott (who were expected at that place) and as many men as she could carry. We sailed for Grenadier Island; arrived about eight o'clock at night off the island; weather blustering, with frequent rain. All this time the General's illness continued without abatement.

October 24th. Hard rains with heavy gales. Still at anchor off the island.

October 25th. The General landed; and measures were immediately taken to seize every pause of the prevailing storms to slip the flotilla into the St. Lawrence by small detachments. In these deceitful momentary calms we found it impossible to traverse in safety the arm of the lake to Gravelly Point, though distant only nine miles. In the several attempts made, many boats were driven ashore, and much provision and clothing lost. French Creek, nearly opposite the point where the ene-

my expected we should land to attack Kingston, was made the general rendezvous of the troops, and Brigadier General Brown ordered on to take the chief command. The expedition of the Growler was so far successful, that on the 31st, Colonel Randolph, after a perilous voyage, reached Grenadier Island with 230 men of the 20th regiment. On the 2d November Commodore Chauncey, by concert, entered the St. Lawrence, fell down nearly to French Creek, and took a position to command the north and south channels. In the evening of the first of November, our vigilant enemy having observed, even amid the storms, our movement and position at French Creek, attacked the detachment at that place under General Brown, about sun set, with a squadron of two brigs and two schooners, with many boats loaded with infantry for landing, should their cannonade make a sufficient impression. Very soon Captain M'Pherson of the light artillery, erected a battery of three eighteen pounders,and returned their fire with such spirit and effect, that they fell down to a harbour below, beyond its range. Next morning the attack was renewed and repelled, and one of the brigs was with great difficulty towed off by the squadron, which put into Kingston channel behind Grand Island. We lost two killed, and four wounded. The enemy were supposed to have suffered severely, from the evident disabled state of their brig, and the deliberate and well directed fire of the gallant Captain M'Pherson.

November 3d. The rear of the army, with the General more and more sick, sailed for the general rendezvous, where the chief part arrived in the evening. The General was carried on shore and lodged in a tent, his malady increasing in violence.

November 4th. This day was devoted to final arrangements for the sailing of the flotilla. Weather moderating.

November 5th. Charming day. The flotilla got under way, and without accident fell down and landed early in the night below Morrisville. The General suspecting he would be followed by the enemy, as in the morning his course had been discovered by three of their

look-out gun boats and a gig, and knowing that two of their armed schooners could jeopardize his movement, gave orders for the flotilla to pass Prescott, then seven miles below him, in the course of the night. But some confusion occurred arising from the novelty of the movement, and the order was countermanded.

November 6th. This morning the health of the General appeared better; he ordered the flotilla to descend to a point within three miles of Prescott; and the day being fine, got into his gig and proceeded to reconnoiter the place. In the mean time the powder and fixed ammunition were debarked and placed in carts, to be transported by land, under cover of the night, beyond the enemy's batteries. As soon as the General returned, orders were issued for the debarkation of every man (except so many as were necessary to navigate the boats) who were directed to march under cover of the night, to save useless exposure to the enemy's cannon, to a bay two miles below Prescott; and arrangements were made at the same time for the passage of the flotilla by that place, the superintendancy of which devolved upon Brigadier General Brown, the general officer of the day. About 8 o'clock P. M. we had a heavy fog, that it was believed we could pass the British fortress unobserved, and orders were accordingly given for the army to march, and the flotilla to get under way. The General, in his gig, proceeded ahead, followed by his passage boat and family; but a sudden change of the atmosphere exposed his passage boat to the garrison of the enemy, and near fifty twenty-four pound shot were fired at her without effect, while the column on land, discovered by the gleam of their arms, were assailed with shot and shells without injury. General Brown, on hearing the firing, judiciously halted the flotilla until the moon had set, when it got in motion, but was perceived by the enemy, who opened upon it, and continued their fire from front to rear, for the space of three hours; and yet, out of more than three hundred boats, not one was touched; and only one man was killed, and two were wounded; and before ten next morning, the whole of the flotilla, except two vessels, reached the place of rendezvous.

About noon this day, Colonel King, Adjutant General of the army of General Hampton, arrived, and waited on the Commander-in-Chief, whom he informed that he had been to Sackett's Harbour with a despatch from General Hampton to the Secretary of War; that he had no communication written or verbal, from Major General Hampton to him (the Commander-in-Chief,) but that not finding the Secretary of War at Sackett's Harbour, he had thought proper, on his return, to call for any communication he[Gen. Wilkinson]might have to make to Gen. Hampton. The General had intended, in the course of this day to send an express to Gen. Hampton, with an order to him to form a junction of his division with the corps descending the St. Lawrence, and availed himself of the opportunity, presented by Colonel King, to send the order.

November 7th. The General having been exposed to the open air all last night, in consequence, found himself ill. In passing Prescott, two of our largest vessels loaded with provisions, artillery, and ordnance stores, either through cowardice or treachery, had been run into the river near Ogdensburgh, and opposite Prescott. The enemy kept up so constant a cannonade on them, that we found it difficult, and lost half a day, to get them out. We perceived the militia in arms at Johnson, directly opposite us, and several pieces of field artillery in motion. Understanding that the coast below was lined with posts of musketry and artillery at every narrow pass of the river, Colonel Macomb was detached about one o'clock with the elite corps of about 1200 men, to remove these obstructions, and the General got under way about half past three o'clock. Four or five miles below, we entered the first rapids of the river, and soon after passing them, two pieces of light artillery which had not been observed by Colonel Macomb, opened a sharp fire upon the General's passage boat, but without any farther effect than cutting away some of the rigging. Lieutenant-Colonel Eustis, with a party of our light gun barges, came within shot of the pieces of the enemy, and a cannonade ensued without injury on either side. In the mean time Major Forsyth, who was in the rear

of the elite of Colonel Macomb, landed his riflemen, advanced upon the enemy's guns, and had his fire drawn by a couple of videts, posted in his route, on which their pieces were precipitately carried off. The General came to at dusk, about six miles below the town of Hamilton, where he received a report from Colonel Macomb, who had routed a party at a block house about two miles below, and captured an officer.

November 8th. This morning the flotilla fell down to a contraction of the river at a point called White-house, where the dragoons were assembled to be crossed. Brigadier General Brown was ordered this morning to re-enforce Colonel Macomb with his brigade, and to take the command; and the whole day and following night were devoted to transporting the dragoons. About noon this day, we received advice that two armed schooners, and a body of the enemy in batteaux, estimated at 1000 or 1500 men, had descended the river from Kingston and landed at Prescott; that they had immediately sent a flag across the river to Ogdensburgh and demanded the delivery of all publick property there, under the penalty of burning the town. Not long after, information was received that the enemy had re-embarked at Prescott in their batteaux, and were following us with seven gun boats.

November 9th. This morning very early, the enemy menaced our rear, and a slight skirmish took place between our riflemen and a party of their militia and Indians, in which we had one man killed, and the enemy were driven back. The cavalry, with four pieces of light artillery, under the command of Captain M'Pherson, were attached to the command of Brigadier General Brown, and he was ordered to march to clear the coast below us as far as a point near the head of the "longue saut." The rapidity of the current obliged us to halt the flotilla several hours, to enable General Brown to make good his march in time to cover our movement. During this period, the enemy frequently threatened our rear, but never indicated an intention to make a serious attack. About three o'clock P. M. the flotilla got under way and came to, about five o'clock, at the yellow

house, having floated near eleven miles in two hours, where we encamped for the night.

November 10th. This morning the following order was issued:

MORNING GENERAL ORDERS.

Head Quarters, Tuttle's Bay, Nov. 10, 1813.

General Brown will prosecute his march with the troops yesterday under his command, excepting two pieces of artillery and the 2d dragoons, who with all the well men of the other brigades, except a sufficient number to navigate the boats, are to march under the orders of Brigadier General Boyd. This precaution is enjoined by regard to the safety of the men in passing the longue saut; and as this rapid is long and dangerous, the General earnestly requests the commanding officers of regiments and corps to examine the boats and see them properly fitted, in order to avoid accidents as much as possible. Brigadier General Boyd will take the necessary precaution to prevent the enemy who hangs on our rear from making an advantageous attack; and if attacked, is to turn about and beat them. The boats are to resume the station assigned them in the original order respecting the flotilla; and for this, commanding officers of regiments and brigades will be held responsible. The movement of yesterday, was a reproach to the service. The flotilla will come to to-day at Barnharts, near Crab Island, and two guns from the front, will be the signal for landing. In case of an attack in force beyond all expectation, the corps under Brigadier Generals Boyd and Brown are to co-operate with each other promptly and with decision. The general officer of the day will strictly attend and see that the flotilla puts off and moves in the prescribed order, and will arrest any officer who presumes to deviate therefrom.

Brigadier General Brown marched, and about noon was engaged by a party of the enemy near a block-house on the saut, erected to harrass our flotilla in its descent. About the same time the enemy were observed

to be advancing on our rear, and their galley and gun boats hove in sight, approached our flotilla then at shore and began to cannonade it. The slender structure of our gun barges made it impossible for them to resist the long 24 pounder of the enemy's galley; this obliged the General to order two 18 pounders to be run on shore and formed in battery, a single shot from which gave such an alarm to the enemy's vessels that they retired up the river accompanied by their troops. But these slight operations so far wasted the day that our pilots were afraid to enter the saut (a continued rapid of eight miles) with the flotilla; we therefore fell down within two or three miles of the head of it, and came to for the night. By this time the General had become so extremely ill as to be unable to set up, and was confined to his bed in a small birth under the quarter deck of his passage boat.

November 11th. Having heard the firing of the cannon yesterday between General Brown and the enemy, being unapprised of the result, it became necessary that we should hear from him before we committed ourselves to the saut, which allows no retreat, no landing, no turning to the right or left but where the impetuosity of the current impels. About 10 or 11 o'clock, A. M. the Commander-in-Chief received advices from General Brown that he had forced the enemy to retire before him, and had arrived near the foot of the saut. Orders were immediately given for the flotilla to prepare to sail, and for General Boyd and his command to commence their march, when some firing took place from the gun boats, and a report was brought to the Commander-in Chief that the enemy was advancing in column; on this, he ordered General Boyd to attack them, and the flotilla was directed not to leave the shore. But the report was soon after contradicted. A variety of reports respecting their movements and counter-movements, were after this successively brought before the General, which impressed him with the conviction that the enemy had determined to attack his rear as soon as the flotilla should put off and the troops commence their march; he resolved to anticipate them. He therefore sent Colo-

nel Swift of the engineers, with instructions to Brigadier General Boyd, who had been directed by the order of the preceding day to take command of the detachment on shore, to form that detachment into three columns, to advance upon the enemy, to endeavour to out flank them, and to take their artillery. Soon after this, the action commenced; and for the numbers engaged, was extremely warm and bloody for upwards of two hours, during which time, in open space and fair combat, the raw undisciplined troops of the United States, braved, and frequently drove the best troops of the British army. Descriptions of battles have become too subservient to the gratification of personal vanity and the acquisition of popular applause; yet every man who has taken part in a great action, must know that there is nothing more difficult than to do justice to the merits of a battle in all its parts, where it is hard to find two officers, unless fighting side by side, who agree in opinion as to the propriety of measures, and the conduct of men. The fortunes of this day were various; sometimes one line, sometimes the other, giving way. Unfortunately, during the shiftings of the action, by the death of Lieutenant Smith, a young officer of the highest promise, the enemy got possession of a field piece, the only trophy they obtained. It is difficult to speak of the precise numbers engaged on either side, because the detachment under General Boyd consisted of an indefinite number of his own, Covington's, and Swartwout's brigades, ordered from on board the boats to lighten them, and to save the hazard of the men's lives in descending the saut. Neither Covington nor Swartwout were obliged to have taken part in the action, with this detachment; yet they both entered the field, taking command of that part of it which belonged to their respective brigades, where they exhibited the same courageous conduct which distinguished General Boyd on the field; and to the great loss of the service, Brigadier General Covington received a mortal wound when encouraging and leading on his detachment. The numbers engaged on our side could not have exceeded sixteen or seventeen hundred men, while those of the enemy are reckoned, by spec-

tators, at from one to two thousand; but it is probable did not exceed 1500, consisting, as we are informed, of detachments of the 49th, 84th, and 104th, the voltigeurs, and Glengarian regiments.

With respect to the courage displayed by our officers, it would be useless to enter into details, since they all manifested in their respective stations equal intrepidity. The names of the meritorious dead and wounded will be recorded in another place. The firing ceased by common consent, about 4 o'clock P. M.; our troops were formed in battalia in front of the enemy, who were also in line, and they separated; the enemy to their camp, and we to our boats. The troops being much exhausted, it was considered most convenient that they should embark, and that the dragoons with the artillery should proceed by land. The embarkation took place without the smallest molestation from the enemy, and the flotilla made a harbour near the head of the saut, on the opposite shore. The views of the American and British commanders were on this occasion precisely opposite. The first being bound by the instructions of his Government and the most solemn obligations of duty to precipitate his descent of the St. Lawrence by every practicable means; and the last, by duties equally imperious to retard, and if possible to prevent such descent. If, then, he found himself victorious on this day, it was certainly in his power to have effected one or the other object; and as he made no attempt to effect either, it follows incontestibly that he had no fair ground on which to claim a victory.

November 12th. The flotilla sailed early this morning, and passed down the saut without discovering either the boats or troops of the enemy, and arrived in the course of the forenoon at Barnharts, where the commanding General received a letter from Major General Hampton, by the hands of Colonel Atkinson, his inspector general, which blasted all his hopes and destroyed every prospect of the campaign. A council of war was called upon the receipt of this communication, which was submitted to their consideration, whereupon the council determined that the conduct of Major General

Hampton, in refusing to join his division to the troops descending the St. Lawrence to carry an attack against Montreal, rendered it expedient to leave the left bank of the St. Lawrence, and to remove the troops to French Mills, on Salmon river; and on the 13th of November this recommendation was accordingly carried into effect; ample time having been given to the enemy to have tried a second action, if they had dared to run the hazard.

Council of War, holden this 12th day of November, 1813, near Cornwall, in Upper Canada.

Present—Major General Lewis, President. Brigadier Generals Boyd, Brown, Swartwout, Porter; Colonel Macomb, commanding Elite of the Army; Colonel Swift, Chief Engineer Army of U. S.; Colonel Walbach, Adjutant General.

Major General Wilkinson, Commander-in-Chief of the army destined for the attack of Montreal, submitted the correspondence between General Hampton and himself—Whereupon he proposes for their consideration and opinion, the following questions:

Question 1st. Major General Hampton having declined to form a junction of his division, consisting of about 4000 men, with the corps under the immediate command of Major General Wilkinson, for the attack of the said city of Montreal: Shall the troops now present, which, after the losses incident to the movement from Sackett's Harbour and the action of yesterday, cannot be estimated at more than 6000 men, proceed to the said attack? Or,

Question 2d. In case this force should be deemed insufficient to carry the said attack into successful execution—What is the alternative in the judgement of the council to be adopted?

The council named in the preceding document, met agreeably to order; the two questions were submitted by Major General Lewis. On the first question, the council are unanimously of opinion that in consequence of the statements made by the Commander-in-Chief, the attack upon Montreal should be abandoned for the present season.

On the second question, the council are unanimously of opinion that the army now near Cornwall should be immediately crossed to the American shore for taking up winter quarters. The French Mills afford, in the opinion of the council, an eligible situation for winter quarters.

[Signed] J. B. WALBACH, Adjutant General.
J. G. SWIFT, Col. Chief Engineers.
ALEX. MACOMB, Col. com'g the Elite [of the Army.
M. PORTER, R. SWARTWOUT, JAC. BROWN, JNO. P. BOYD, } Brig. Generals.
MORGAN LEWIS, President.

A true copy from the original,
C. J. NOURSE, Capt. and A. D. C.

GENERAL BOYD'S ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE AT CHRYSTLER'S FIELD.

H. Q. 3d mil'y district, N. Y. April 29, 1815.

The Hon. SECRETARY AT WAR:

SIR—In justice to myself and the troops I had the honour to lead at the battle of Chrystler's Field, I deem it proper, even at this late hour, to report an impartial statement of that event.

The publick has misapprehended my situation and made me undeservedly responsible for events that occurred under the Commander-in-Chief, and my reputation may perhaps have suffered for disasters which could not be attributable to me.

At the commencement of the campaign, while preparing to leave Fort George, even at Sackett's Harbour, and down to the moment of leaving Grenadier Island, I was kept in ignorance of the pending expedition, and of the mode in which it was to be effected. Afterwards, while descending the St. Lawrence, the frequent indisposition of the two Generals often threw the command on me, without the possession of any of those facts relative to the object of our movements or the situation and strength of the enemy, so important for the execution of my duties.

On the 9th inst. General Brown, the elite corps, and the dragoons (who had joined us and crossed over) moved by land on the Canada shore; the residue of the army embarked and proceeded by water: the whole rendezvoused at Chrystler's Field at 2 o'clock. Late at night, without having had any direction of the order of landing, or any knowledge of the relative situation of the troops, a verbal order from the Commander-in-Chief suddenly informed me, that in consequence of the extreme ill health of himself and General Lewis, both being confined to their boats, the command on shore devolved on me; and that the enemy's gun boats and a body of troops

by land were approaching our rear. Arrangements were immediately made for their reception.

Early next morning (10th) conformably to the Commander-in-Chief's order, General Brown was detached with a strong portion of the army and directed to pursue his course down the river to dislodge some militia, supposed to be intercepting the route to Cornwall. It was my decided opinion, that the army should not be detached. I did not express this to General Wilkinson, for my counsel was seldom or never required.

The rear guard, consisting of parts of the 1st, 2d, and 4th brigades, a squadron of dragoons, and two pieces of artillery under the command of Brigadier General Boyd, destined to cover the flotilla, was directed to follow as soon as the boats should put off—"should the enemy hang on the rear, advance, beat him back." Nothing was left to the discretion of General Boyd. General Wilkinson's health was such as to confine him to his cabin, and I had not seen him for several days. Yet, ambitious to be first in the service of his country, he tenaciously held the command.

The column had taken up the line of march and proceeded about two miles, when Colonel Bissell, of the 5th regiment, was detached from the 1st brigade, and ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to re-embark and disperse a party of the enemy, supposed to have made a lodgement on one of the islands. Ere this could be executed, a videt from Captain Selden from the rear, reported a column of 1500 of the enemy approaching in that direction. The detachment was immediately brought to the right about, marched up the river and formed in line of battle.

General Lewis landed and came to the field, viewed our position, gave some directions, and returned to his boat. I pushed forward with Captain Selden's dragoons to reconnoiter the enemy; he opened his artillery; our line advanced, skirmished, and the enemy retired. After a long, harrassing, and stormy day, the troops were directed by an order from General Lewis, to return and take post for the night (which was inclemently stormy) so as to cover the flotilla. Late in the evening I waited

on General Wilkinson, on board his boat, to report the events of the day; to receive orders for the night, and to ascertain who commanded. The General was so indisposed that I was not permitted to see him, and was directed to call on General Lewis, whose boat I boarded and received orders to defend my position and the flotilla. Early the next morning (11th) General Lewis sent an aid ordering us to move down the river. The troops were put in motion—the Commander-in-Chief arrested their march. At 10 o'clock the enemy's gun boats turned a point and commenced a cannonade on our boats without any effect on either side. During the fore part of the day a variety of verbal orders were received, but countermanded before executed, occasioned as I understood, by the want of information from General Brown. At 12 o'clock, impatient for some decisive or discretionary orders, the troops having been nearly forty-eight hours under arms, exposed to incessant rains, I rode to the bank of the river, requested and obtained a specifick order, written by pencil, "that the flotilla would put off in twenty minutes; four pieces of artillery would be landed to re-enforce the rear guard which would follow the boats; should the enemy harrass the rear, turn and beat him back." While expecting the signal for moving, report from the rear announced the approach of the enemy in the woods which intersected the fields, and were flanking our right. General Swartwout was ordered to disperse them, General Covington to support him. Swartwout dashed into the woods and drove the advance back to the main body; here he was joined by Covington. The enemy had judiciously chosen his ground among deep ravines of an extensive plain beyond the woods, and discharged a heavy and destructive fire on our advance columns. No opposition could check the invincible ardour of our troops. By resolute and repeated charges, the enemy were driven more than a mile, disputing every inch of ground. Colonel Coles, with a detachment of Boyd's brigade came up, and was immediately directed to turn the enemy's left flank, which was promptly executed, amidst a shower of musketry and Shrapnell shells. Two pieces of artillery under

Captain Irvine now arrived in the field, which had been delayed by a circuitous route; the four other pieces which were landed, reached the field soon after, and had their effect. The squadron of dragoons under Major Woodford, were early in the field, but the nature of the ground did not admit of successful charges. The enemy had now been driven under the protection of their gun boats, which supported their right, and enfiladed by their numerous and heavy artillery, the field in front; their left rested on the woods, obliquely to the rear supported by light artillery, Indians, and incorporated militia. Many of our troops beginning to break, and I vainly endeavouring to rally them, it became necessary for the whole to fall back, and re-form out of the range of the enemy's floating batteries, which was executed without inducing him to move from his strong position. At this time a re-enforcement of 300 men under Colonel Upham, came into the field, whose activity while engaged evinced the benefit that might have been derived from their more early assistance. After the troops were reformed, I received orders to return to the ground near the boats, and to embark. A valuable part of the flotilla and the two principal artillery officers had descended the river and joined General Brown, at Cornwall, during the action, and many of the remaining boats were already in the stream. Had an early and sufficient re-enforcement come into the field, as was expected, the result of this day would have been very different. It is evident, throughout, that the Commander-in-Chief acted with a misapprehension of the force and designs of the enemy; when the action began, it is probable he considered his strength inferiour to ours, else he would not have retained in inactivity so large a force in the boats.

The strength of the enemy, according to the calculation of the principal officer engaged, could not have been less than 2500 men, seven pieces of artillery, and nine gun boats, manned from the fleet; the British prisoners state their strength at 2100. Our force, exclusive of artillery and dragoons, amounted to not more than 1200 men. Though the result of this battle was not so deci-

sive as I could have wished, and as the first part of it promised, yet when it is recollected that the troops had been exposed for four days to incessant fatigue and inclement storms, from which they had no shelter, that we carried into the field so small a force, that the action commenced unexpectedly and without artillery, and was sustained with a cool determined valour never surpassed, for more than three hours, and that the enemy were superiour in numbers and position, it is hoped that this affair may be justly considered as having added new glory to the American arms. The field was crimsoned with the blood of 339 killed and wounded, whose deaths or scars will immortalize this day. The names of the officers whose bravery and activity characterized this conflict, were reported to the Commander-in-Chief. The praise, however, which was so parsimoniously bestowed on this occasion, but ill accords with their deserts. In the account of the enemy, who reported our numbers 7000 men, a greater compliment is implied than could be found in the despatches of the Commander-in-Chief.

I would not here again give an useless exhibition of the valour and skill which was displayed by many individuals and corps on this important day. The time for reward has passed by; those who fell, must sleep in oblivion; and those who survive, conceal their scars, which are seen only with indifference. But I cannot forbear from making one more struggle to rescue the character of this army from unmerited aspersion. If it be not entitled to the praise of its country, let it not meet with undeserved neglect, but receive the common rewards of justice.

With much consideration and respect,
I have the honour to be,
Sir, your obedient servant,
JOHN P. BOYD, Brig. Gen. commanding.

Official Statement of the Commissioned Officers Killed and Wounded.

KILLED—Lieutenants William W. Smith, of the light artillery; David Hunter, of the 12th regiment

infantry; Edward Olmstead, of the 16th regiment infantry.

WOUNDED—Brig. Gen. Leonard Covington, mortally; Major Talbot Chambers, Assistant Adjutant General, slightly; Major Darby Noon, Aid-de-Camp to Brigadier General Swartwout, slightly; Colonel James P. Preston, of the 23d regiment infantry, severely, his right thigh fractured; Major William Cummings, 8th do., severely; Captain Edmund Foster, 9th do., slightly; Captain David S. Townsend, 9th do., severely—taken prisoner; Captain Mordecai Myres, 13th do., severely; Captain John Campbell, 13th do., slightly; Captain John B. Murdoch, 25th do., slightly; Lieutenant William S. Heaton, 11th do., severely; Lieutenant John Williams, 13th do., slightly; Lieutenant John Lynch, 14th do., severely—taken prisoner; Lieutenant Peter Pelham, 21st do., severely—taken prisoner; Lieutenant James D. Brown, 25th do., slightly; Lieutenant Archibald C. Crary, 25th do., severely, in the skirmish the day before the action.

MOVEMENTS OF THE DIVISION UNDER THE COMMAND OF HAMPTON, ON THE CHAMPLAIN FRONTIER.

THE army of General Hampton assembled at Burlington. It was composed for the most part, of new recruits. The General concentrated his forces at Cumberland Head, about the middle of September. From this point he dropped down the lake and took post at Chazy, on the 22d, and put the light corps of the army in motion against the enemy. The troops passed the frontier, surprised a picket. But the drought was found so severe that the General "had some doubts of the practicability of procuring water for the troops, horses, and teams." After exhausting the springs and wells of Odletown, the army fell back to Champlain on the 25th.

It was next decided to approach the St. Lawrence by the Chataugay route, which takes off at Champlain, and which affords at all seasons an abundant supply of water.

The army reached Chataugay on the 26th of September. On the first of October the enemy made an attack upon our out posts, which happened to be defended by Snelling and Wool's corps. The attack was made with Indians, and the regulars lay in ambush. Major Snelling attacked them in the flank and soon compelled them to retire. Lieutenant Nash of the 33d regiment, and a private, were killed.

The hostile Indians in considerable numbers continued to lurk about the camp and fire at the sentinels, as they also had done at Odletown.

On the 4th of October, General Hampton wrote to the Secretary of War, stating:

"The road to Plattsburgh will be completed to-day, and is a perfect turnpike. The artillery, consisting of eight 6 pounders, one 12, and one howitzer, tolerably appointed and found, is arrived. I have but a small stock of provisions on hand, but have the most pointed

assurance from Colonel Thomas, the Quarter Master General, that a supply of sixty days of bread and flour will arrive at once, in the course of three or four days. I have only from forty to fifty rounds of musket cartridges; but this convoy will make the supply an hundred, and give to the artillery all it requires in reserve. The supply of salted provisions will not exceed a fourth of the proportion of flour; but we have, and can have, an unlimited supply of good beef cattle. Brigadier General Parker is at Plattsburgh hastening my supplies, and presiding over some arrangements that were thought necessary. I have directed the commencement of a *petty* war, or invasion of the lines, at and near Lake Champlain, by Colonel Clark, who has some volunteers, and Brigadier General Fasset, (our Colonel) who has, at my instance, called out his brigade of militia. The latter, I understand, turn out but badly; but they will make together, I suppose, from 600 to 1000 men. There has been inculcated by the artifices of the British, a shameful and corrupt neutrality on the lines, for the purpose of gain. I have directed these officers to break the truce."

Colonel Clark, with a militia force and some riflemen, was detached to Missisquoi bay, to surprise a party of the enemy at St. Armand. So secretly was the enterprise conducted, that he arrived within fifteen rods of the enemy before they discovered him. The British were drawn up under Major Powell, well prepared for an attack from the water, but wholly incapable of defence on the land side. Colonel Clark attacked them so unexpectedly and with such spirit, that in ten minutes the whole party surrendered. Our whole force engaged was one hundred and two; the number of prisoners taken, was one hundred and one; nine killed and fourteen wounded.

On the 16th of October, the Secretary of War apprized General Hampton of the re-enforcements which had arrived at Kingston from the head of the lake, and of the probability of an immediate descent of the St. Lawrence by General Wilkinson. "Under these circumstances," continues the Secretary, "you will ap-

proach the mouth of the Chataugay, or other point which shall better favour our junction, and hold the enemy in check."

On the first of November, General Hampton again wrote to General Armstrong, detailing his movement down the Chataugay, and his reasons for retrograding to the Four Corners.

"On the morning of the 21st ultimo the army commenced its movement down the Chataugay, for the purpose of placing itself in a situation which would enable it to fulfil its parts of the proposed combined operations on the St. Lawrence.

"An extensive wood of eleven or twelve miles in front, blocked up with felled timber, and covered by the Indians and light troops of the enemy, was a serious impediment to the arduous task of opening a road for the artillery and stores. Brigadier General Izard with the light troops and one regiment of the line, was detached early in the morning to turn these impediments in flank, and to seize on the more open country below, while the army, preceded by a strong working party, advanced on a more circuitous but practicable route for a road. The measures completely succeeded, and the main body of the army reached the advanced position on the evening of the 22d. The 23d and 24th were employed in completing the road and getting up the artillery and stores.

"I had arranged," says the General, "at my departure, under the direction of Major Parker, a line of communication as far up the St. Lawrence as Ogdensburgh, for the purpose of hastening to me the earliest notice of the progress of our army down. I had surmounted twenty four miles of the most difficult part of the route, and had in advance of me seven miles of open country; but at the end of that distance commenced a wood of some miles in extent, which had been formed into an entire abatis, and filled by a succession of wooden breast works, the rearmost of which were supplied with ordnance. In front of these defences were placed the Indian force and light corps of the enemy; and in the rear, all of his disposable force. As the extent of this force depended upon his sense of danger on the St. Law-

rence, it was a cause of regret that all communication from yourself or Major Parker seemed to be at an end. As it was, however, believed that the enemy was hourly adding to his strength in his position, if free from the apprehension of danger from above, an effort was judged necessary to dislodge him; and if it succeeded, we should be in possession of a position which we could hold as long as any doubts remained of what was passing above, and of the real part to be assigned us.

"Our guides assured us of a shoal and practicable fording place, opposite the lower flank of the enemy's defences; and that the wood on the opposite side of the river, a distance of seven or eight miles, was practicable for the passage of the troops. Colonel Purdy with the light corps, and a strong body of infantry of the line, was detached at an early hour of the night of the 25th, to gain this ford by the morning, and to commence his attack in rear, and that was to be the signal for the army to fall on in front, and it was believed the pass might be carried before the enemy's distant troops could be brought forward to its support.

"I had returned to my quarters from Purdy's column, about 9 o'clock at night, when I found Mr. Thomas Baldwin, of the Quarter Master General's department, who put into my hands an open paper containing instructions to him from the Quarter Master General, respecting the building of huts for the army in the Chataugay, below the line. This paper sunk my hopes, and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficacious support which had been anticipated. I would have recalled the column, but it was in motion, and the darkness of the night rendered it impracticable. I could only go forward. The army was put in motion on the morning of the 26th, leaving its baggage, &c. on the ground of encampment.

"On advancing near the enemy, it was found that the column on the opposite side was not as far advanced as had been anticipated. The guides had misled it, and finally failed in finding the ford. We could not communicate with it, but only awaited the attack below. About 2 o'clock the firing commenced, and our troops

advanced rapidly to the attack. The enemy's light troops commenced a sharp fire; but Brigadier General Izard advanced with his brigade, drove him every where behind his defences, and silenced the fire in his front. This brigade would have pushed forward as far as courage, skill, and perseverance could have carried it; but on advancing, it was found that the firing had commenced on the opposite side, and the ford had not been gained.

"The enemy retired behind his defences, but a renewal of his attacks was expected, and the troops remained some time in their position to meet it. The troops on the opposite side were excessively fatigued. The enterprise had failed in its main point, and Colonel Purdy was ordered to withdraw his column to a shoal four or five miles above, and cross over. The day was spent, and General Izard was ordered to withdraw his brigade to a position three miles in the rear, to which place the baggage had been ordered forward.

"The slowness and order with which General Izard retired with his brigade, could but have inspired the enemy with respect. They presumed not to venture a shot at him during his movement; but the unguardedness of some part of Purdy's command exposed him to a rear attack from the Indians, which was repeated after dark, and exposed him to some loss. The attacks were always repelled, and must have cost the enemy as many lives as we lost. [Sweet consolation, indeed!] Our entire loss of killed, wounded, and missing, does not exceed fifty. In its new position, within three miles of the enemy's post, the army encamped on the night of the 26th, and remained until 12 o'clock of the 28th. All the deserters, of whom there were four, having concurred in the information that Sir George Prevost, with three other general officers, had arrived with the whole of his disposable force, and lay in the rear of these defences, and a letter from Major Parker (by express received on the evening of the 26th) having informed me that no movements of our army down the St. Lawrence had been heard of at Ogdensburgh, and for some distance above; the following questions were submitted to the

commanding officers of brigades, regiments, and corps, and the heads of the general staff, in a council convened for the purpose: "Is it advisable, under existing circumstances, to renew the attack on the enemy's position; and if not, what position is it advisable for the army to take, until it can receive advices of the advance of the grand army down the St. Lawrence?" The opinion of the council was expressed in the following words:

"It is the unanimous opinion of this council, that it is necessary, for the preservation of this army and the fulfilment of the ostensible views of the government, that we immediately return by orderly marches to such a position (Chataugay) as will secure our communications with the United States, either to retire into winter quarters or to be ready to strike below." In pursuance of this opinion, the army has returned by slow marches to this place, and now awaits the orders of the government."

COLONEL PURDY'S REPORT OF THE AFFAIR ON THE CHATAUGAY.

"WE commenced the march at sun down, and by sun rise the next morning had gained only six miles! Here we were discovered by the enemy and fired on from the opposite side of the river. During that night we were repeatedly misled by the guides who knew nothing of the country, having never been that way, and at the time we were attacked, they had led us into a thick cedar growth or swamp on the banks of the river, and immediately opposite the enemy's position, and knew not how to extricate us. Incredible as it may appear, General Hampton entrusted nearly half of his army, and those his best troops, to the guidance of men, each of whom repeatedly assured him they were not acquainted with the country, and were not competent to direct such an expedition. At the same time, General Hampton told me he had a man by the name of Smith, who had a perfect knowledge of the country, and whom he promised to send me, but which he neglected to do. The defeat of the expedition was the consequence of this neglect of the Major General.* About two o'clock, while receiving an order from Colonel King, Adjutant General, upon the opposite side of the river, to march back four miles and then ford the river and join the 2d brigade, the enemy made a furious attack on the column by a great discharge of musketry, accompanied by the yells of the savages. Unfortunately, the word *retreat*, was heard, which for a short time spread confusion among the several corps. A sufficient number, however, remained firm, and the enemy was soon compelled

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* Who will not say, if Colonel Purdy's report is true, that General Hampton ought to have been immediately arrested, and atoned for his conduct with a halter?

to retire. Towards sun-down I sent General Hampton a request that a regiment might be ordered down to cover my landing on the opposite side of the river; but judge my surprise, on receiving intelligence that he had retreated with the second brigade nearly three miles. Thus was I deserted without the smallest guard to cover my landing. To what cause shall it be attributed, that the General ordered a retreat, and that too at a moment when the presence of the second brigade was required, or could be useful, as soon afterwards he declared "he should be willing to compound with the first brigade for 500 men." The wounded had previously been conveyed across on rafts, which made a removal of my brigade to that side, absolutely necessary for their protection. An attempt was accordingly made, and a floating bridge soon constructed of old logs found on the margin of the river. The enemy discovering our disposition, commenced a firing from the opposite side, and killed several while crossing. Major Snelling, with about a hundred men, effected a landing and joined the main body. The remainder of my force, exhausted by the excessive exertions of the preceding night, and weary with the fatigues of the day, not having had a moment either for rest or refreshment, were compelled to endure the privation of sleep another night. We retired two or three miles, and took a position. At about 12 o'clock, the enemy came up and made an attack upon us, but were soon routed. The men at this time were formed and lying on the ground they were to occupy in case of an attack; and were ordered to, and did, immediately rise, seize their arms, and remain under them the residue of the night. An excessively heavy rain prevented the firing both of the enemy and ourselves, except occasionally a single gun from the former. Our troops were ordered not to fire, but in case of a repetition of attack, to charge bayonets; this was accordingly done. The enemy charged several times, and as often were put to flight. It is observable in this place, that so greatly were the men overpowered by fatigue, though in a situation every way dangerous, and in which they had every reason to believe they should be sallied upon by the

enemy every moment, many were unable to conquer their disposition to sleep, and it was not in the power of the officers to keep them awake. It was on the morning of this last attack, that the General expressed his apprehensions for the first brigade, and made the declaration above quoted. The next morning we crossed the river and joined General Hampton; on the 28th, the army retreated four miles, and on the 30th and 31st marched back to Chataugay. The troops at the times of the attack, were not in a situation to endure farther fatigue; and it is an indubitable fact, that many of them were so debilitated they were unable to proceed with the brigade on its march from the place of its last attack, and actually did not reach the main body until the day after the brigade had joined it, and some not even until the army had reached the Four Corners of Chataugay."

HEAD QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
District No. 9, *seven miles above Ogdensburgh*,
November 6, 1813, in the evening.

SIR—I address you at the special instance of the Secretary of War, who, by bad roads, worse weather, and ill health, was diverted from meeting me near this place, and determined to tread back his steps to Washington from Antwerp, on the 29th ultimo.

I am destined to, and determined on the attack of Montreal, if not prevented by some act of God; and to give security to the enterprise, the division under your command must co-operate with the corps under my immediate orders. The point of rendezvous is the circumstance of greatest interest to the issue of this operation; and the distance which separates us, and my ignorance of the practicability of the direct or devious roads or routes on which you must march, make it necessary that your own judgement should determine that point. To assist you in forming the soundest determination, and to take the most prompt and effectual measures, I can only inform you of my intentions and situation in one or two respects of first importance. I shall pass Prescott to-night, because the stage of the season will not allow me three days to take it; shall cross the

cavalry at Hambleton, which will not require a day, and shall then press forward and break down every obstruction to the confluence of this river with Grand river, there to cross to the isle Perrot, and with my scows to bridge the narrow inner channel, and thus obtain foothold on Montreal island, at about twenty miles from the city; after which, our artillery, bayonets, and swords, must secure our triumph or provide us honourable graves. Enclosed you have a memorandum of my field and battering train, pretty well found in fixed ammunition, which may enable you to dismiss your own; we are deficient in loose powder and musket cartridges, and therefore hope you may be abundantly found. On the subject of provisions, I wish I could give you as favourable information; our whole stock of bread may be computed at about fifteen days, and our meat at twenty. In speaking on this subject to the Secretary of War, he informed me that ample magazines were laid up on lake Champlain, and therefore I must request you to order forward two or three month's supply, by the safest route in a direction to the proposed scene of action. I have submitted the state of our provisions to my general officers, who unanimously agree that it should not prevent the progress of the expedition; and they also agree in opinion, that if you are not in force to face the enemy, you should meet us at St. Regis, or its vicinity.

I shall expect to hear from, if not see you, at that place, on the 9th or 10th instant.

And have the honour to be, respectfully, &c.

JAS. WILKINSON.

To Major General W. Hampton, &c.

P. S. I was preparing an express which I should have despatched to-morrow, but for the fortunate call of Colonel King.

A copy, JOHN HOOMES, Aid-de-Camp.

H. Q. Four Corners, November 8, 1813.

SIR—I had the honour to receive, at a late hour last evening, by Colonel King, your communication of the 6th, and was deeply impressed with the sense of the responsibility it imposed of deciding upon the means of our co-operation.

The idea suggested as the opinion of your officers, of effecting the junction at St. Regis, was most pleasing, as being the most immediate, until I came to the disclosure of the amount of your supplies of provision. Colonel Atkinson will explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible for me to have brought more than each man could have carried upon his back; and, when I reflected that, in throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you in the most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the opinion, after consulting the general and principal officers, that by throwing myself back on my main depot, where all the means of transportation had gone, and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from Plattsburgh to Cognawaga, or any other point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success, than by the junction at St. Regis.

The way is, in many places, blockaded and abatised, and the road impracticable for *wheels* during winter; but, by the employment of pack horses, if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to prevent your starving.

I have ascertained and witnessed that the plan of the enemy is to burn and consume every thing in our advance.

My troops and other means will be described to you by Colonel Atkinson. Besides their rawness, and sickliness, they have endured fatigues equal to a winter campaign in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen off; but upon this subject I must refer you to Colonel Atkinson.

With these means, what can be accomplished by human exertion, I will attempt, with a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign.

W. HAMPTON.

To Major General Wilkinson.

A copy, JOHN HOOMES, Aid-de-Camp.

H. Q. Plattsburgh, November 12, 1813.

SIR—I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter I

have received from General Wilkinson, and of my reply. The forage at Chataugay had been nearly consumed before the expedition down the river; and in the return of the army, enough only could be found to subsist the horses and teams two or three days. All accounts concurred in the report, that General Wilkinson had not commenced his operations against Kingston; and that no descent down the river was intended. Hence, the necessity for sending off the cavalry, artillery, and provision teams to Plattsburgh for subsistence; and hence also, the impossibility of a junction at St. Regis with more provisions than must have been consumed on the march to that place. General Wilkinson had no spare transportation for us; and the junction would have reduced the stock of provisions to eight or ten days, for the whole. The alternative was adopted under the impression of *absolute necessity.*

The army has approached on this route to the road leading to Chazy, a few miles from the lines, where I shall join it to-night. I can only repeat what I said in my letter to General Wilkinson, "that what can be accomplished by human exertion, shall be attempted, to meet the objects of the campaign." But I should be uncandid not to own, that many circumstances are unpropitious. The force is dropping off by fatigue and sickness, to a most alarming extent. My returns yesterday report the effectives at a little more than half their original state at Chataugay; and, which is more discouraging, the officers, with a few honourable exceptions, are sunk as low as the soldiers, and endure hardship and privation as badly. In a word, since the show, produced by clothing, movements, &c. has worn off, all have assumed their native rawness. Fatigue and suffering from the weather, have deprived them of that spirit which constituted my best troops. What confidence can the best officer (and I have a few surpassed by none) feel under such circumstances! It is painful to hold up to you this picture; but it is too faithfully drawn.

The Quarter Master General has been ordered to procure on hire, 400 wagons; and I shall attempt to

open a communication on the direct route from the town of Champlain. Success, under the circumstances I have mentioned, must depend upon the efforts and force opposed to me. The demonstration, however, can but produce a partial good.

On the route I took, the enemy burnt and consumed every thing before him; and this I understood to be his general plan. If the same course precede the advance of General Wilkinson, and my feeble force should be foiled, the consequences are much to be dreaded. But the Rubicon is now passed, and all that remains is to push for the capitol. I have the honour to be, &c.

W. HAMPTON.

General John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

DISASTROUS EVENTS ON THE NIAGARA, AT THE CLOSE OF 1813.

HAVING followed the movements of the armies of Generals Wilkinson and Hampton until the close of the campaign, it is now necessary to return to Fort George and note the disastrous scenes which were exhibited on the Niagara, after the departure of the central army.

Colonel Scott, who had been left in command of Fort George with 800 regular troops, remained in garrison till the 13th of October, when he marched his troops for the mouth of Genesee river, having been relieved by General George M'Clure, with a body of New-York militia. Previous to his departure, however, the British army under General Vincent, which had remained inactive in the neighbourhood of Fort George for a considerable time, broke up its camp and retreated hastily on Burlington Heights. This retreat was no doubt caused by the news of Proctor's defeat on the Thames. This army had suffered excessively from sickness and desertion. An officer of the 23d U. S. regiment assured the writer that 500 deserters came into Fort George in less than three months; and a still greater number would have deserted, but for the British Indians who were dispersed in the woods to pick up and deter deserters. The sick of this army who reached Kingston in October, in boats, amounted to nearly 1500 men.—Upwards of 700 are supposed to have died in camp. To facilitate their retreat, the enemy burnt every thing in store in the vicinity of Fort George—3000 blankets, many hundred stand of arms; also the blankets in the men's packs, and every article of clothing not in actual use.

On the 24th of October, General Harrison arrived at Buffalo by water from Detroit, with the greater part of M'Arthur's brigade and the detachment of the United

States' rifle regiment under Colonel Smith. He marched immediately to Fort George, and commenced preparations for an expedition against Burlington Heights. The arrival of Harrison at Fort George, diffused joy and confidence not only among the militia in service at that post, but among the whole population of the western counties of New-York. Already numerous parties of volunteers were on their march to fight under his orders, when Commodore Chauncey's fleet arrived at Niagara with orders from the Secretary of War, for General Harrison to embark his troops for Sackett's Harbour, at that time menaced with an attack from Kingston. This order left the General no alternative. Thus were all the objects of the campaign blasted, and the road paved for disasters on the Niagara frontier. Had Harrison been permitted to have executed his purposes upon the wreck of Vincent's army, no conceivable obstacle could have prevented the accomplishment of his views. Disgust and disappointment soured the popular mind; the troops at Fort George became discontented, and General M'Clure, after two abortive excursions towards Stony Creek, closed his operations by burning the village of Newark* and re-crossing the Niagara. The enemy, emboldened by this movement, advanced from his position at Burlington, to the banks of the Niagara. Nor did he neglect to profit from the defenceless state of that frontier. They crossed at the Five Mile Meadows on the 19th of December. A party under Colonel Murry descended the American side of the straight, surprised and captured Fort Niagara, which they found an easy conquest, either from neglect or trai-

* General M'Clure, in a letter to the Secretary of War, of the date of December 10, 1813, thus exonerates himself from the responsibility of the measures:

"The village of Newark is now in flames; the few remaining inhabitants in it, having been noticed of our intention, were enabled to remove their property. The houses were generally vacant long before. This step has not been taken without counsel; and is in conformity with the views of your excellency, disclosed to me in a former communication."

torous designs. Our men were nearly all asleep in their tents; the enemy rushed in and commenced a most horrid slaughter. Such as escaped the fray of the onset, retired to the old mess-house and fired for some minutes on the enemy. It is said that a want of ammunition compelled them to surrender. Captain Leonard, who had been entrusted with the command of the Fort, was at his farm in the vicinity of the place. Popular opinion, not always correct, finds no difficulty in attributing the loss of the Fort to *treachery* in the commanding officer. A Court Martial has, however, acquitted him from that charge.* The gate of the Fort was *not* left *open*, as has been reported. The enemy obtained the watchword from the sentinels, who were surprised. It was by this means that they entered the Fort before the garrison was apprised of their approach. About eighty Americans were bayoneted. Several escaped by leaping the pickets; some, after having received two or three stabs from a bayonet. No mercy was shown to the sick; they were inhumanly slaughtered in their beds. The enemy acknowledged only five killed, and three wounded. With the Fort were lost several thousand stand of arms, many valuable pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of ammunition.

"On the same morning, a detachment under Major Bennett, stationed at Lewistown Heights, was attacked by a party of savages; but the Major and his little corps, by making a desperate charge, effected their retreat after being nearly surrounded, with the loss of six or eight killed or taken; among whom were two sons of Captain Jones, Indian interpreter for the Six Nations. The villages of Youngstown, Lewiston, Manchester, and the Tuscarora villages were reduced to ashes; and the inoffensive inhabitants who could not escape, were, without regard to age or sex, inhumanly butchered by savages headed by British officers, painted. A British

* The War Department disclaims any agency in the appointment of Leonard to the command of Fort Niagara. General Porter had been designated to command on that frontier.

officer who was taken prisoner, avowed that many small children were murdered by the Indians."* A number of sick soldiers confined to their beds at Lewiston, were bayoneted, and the houses burnt over their heads; several dead bodies were left in the streets to be devoured by hogs and dogs. Dr. Molly, who was not attached to the army, but who, from benevolent motives, had gone from Eleven Mile Creek to Lewiston to attend the sick, being a spectator of those horrid scenes, begged his life, informing the enemy that he belonged to no army. He was answered with reproaches and a thrust of a bayonet through his abdomen, which let out a part of his bowels, on which he placed his hand and walked six miles, to Fort Niagara, and in fifteen minutes expired.†

General M'Clure speaks in terms of the highest praise of the conduct of Major Mallory, who was stationed at Schlosser, with about forty Canadian volunteers. He advanced to Lewiston Heights and compelled the advanced guard of the enemy to fall back. He fought the enemy two days, and contended every inch of ground to the Tonnawanta creek.

General M'Clure had, three days previous to the surrender of Niagara, left that post for the purpose of calling out the militia of the neighbouring counties *en masse*, and providing for the defence of Buffalo and Black Rock.

After the crossing of the enemy, the road from Lewiston to Batavia presented an indescribable scene of terrour and confusion. Mothers without children, and children without mothers; the Indian women and children of Tuscarora mixed with the whites, and swelled the terrified groupe of fugitives.

The enemy having desolated the frontier from the lake to the falls, re-crossed the straits after leaving a garrison in Fort Niagara, and ascended the river on the

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* See General M'Clure's official despatch to the Secretary of War, dated December 22, 1813.

† See Dr. Jones' statement.

British side in quest of blood and plunder. The news of these events having reached Major General Hall of the New-York militia, he hastened to Batavia for the purpose of taking measures to protect the frontier and repel the enemy in case of a second invasion. He collected a considerable force from General Wadsworth's brigade in Ontario county. At Batavia he met General M'Clure with the regular troops, under Major Riddle. A corps of 150 infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence, and a company of cavalry under Captain Marvin, were armed and ordered to join a party of militia collected at Forsyth's, on the Ridge road, fifteen miles east of Lewiston. This force, when united, were to collect the ammunition scattered on the roads, and act as circumstances might require; and if practicable, to effect a junction with the main force at Buffalo. With the residue of the militia General Hall proceeded to Buffalo, leaving to General M'Clure the organization and direction of such detachments of volunteers as might arrive. General Hall, on his arrival at Buffalo, found a numerical force of about 2000 irregulars of various descriptions, artillery, cavalry, infantry, and Indians. On the 28th, the General obtained information from a citizen who had escaped from Canada, which left no doubt of the enemy's intentions.

The evening of the 29th of December was dark and gloomy. The enemy nevertheless crossed the Niagara in boats, the foremost of which landed below Conjokaty creek, advanced and took possession of the sailor's battery, near the mouth of that stream. Some firing took place as the enemy reached the shore. Lieutenant Boughton who opposed them, had a horse shot under him.

A considerable part of the American force was stationed at Black Rock; but the darkness of the night and the uncertainty at what point the enemy intended to make his principal attack, prevented the repulse of the enemy who first landed. Two successive attempts were made to dislodge him, but the militia were soon thrown into confusion. Towards the dawn of day, General Hall arrived at Black Rock from Buffalo, with

a re-enforcement; at the same time a fresh division of boats full of British regulars were seen crossing the river and bending their course towards the rear of General Porter's house. General Hall now ascertained the object of the enemy and the disposition of his forces. "Their left wing, composed of about 800 regular troops and incorporated militia, and from 150 to 200 Indians disposed below Conjockaty creek. With this force the enemy designed to cover their left, outflank our right, and cut off our retreat by the woods. With their centre, consisting of about 400 Royal Scotts commanded by Colonel Gordon, the battle was commenced. The right, which was purposely weak, was landed near our main battery, under cover of a high bank, and was merely calculated to divert our attention from the principal attack. Lieutenant General Drummond commanded the whole. General Rial conducted the attack.

"The enemy's left wing was discovered wheeling upon our right, and was attacked by the Indians under Colonel Granger, and the Canadian volunteers under Colonel Mallory. Colonel M'Mahan's regiment was stationed at the battery, in reserve. The attack was commenced by a fire from our six pounder under Lieutenant Seely, below General Porter's house, and one 24 pounder and two 12 pounders at the battery under Lieutenant Farnum of the 21st U. S. infantry, who acted as a volunteer. At the same time the enemy opened a heavy fire from their batteries on the opposite side of the river, of shells, spherical, and hot shot and ball."* Such was the order and such the commencement of the battle, if so it deserves to be called. Of 2000 militia under General Hall who ought certainly to have repelled an inferiour British force, not more than 600 could be made to face the enemy. This number formed regularly in line and attacked the enemy in their boats, and poured upon them a very destructive fire. After maintaining their ground for half an hour, opposed to veteran and highly disciplined troops, a retreat became

* See General Hall's letter to Governour Tompkins.

necessary; which soon became a flight. General Hall attributes the loss of the action to the defection of the Indians and the cowardly conduct of the reserve and other corps to whom orders had been given to attack the right wing of the enemy, which advanced from Conjokaty creek. The General estimates the enemy's loss at not less than 200; his own, at about 30 killed, 40 wounded, and 69 taken prisoners. The principal loss fell upon the fugitive militia, who were overtaken in the woods and tomahawked by the British Indians. "Lieutenant Boughton was among the slain. He was a good officer and a valuable citizen. The veteran Blakely and his corps were pre-eminently distinguished." The General notices the bravery and good conduct of Lieutenant Seely, of the militia; Lieutenants Forman and Frasier, of the U. S. infantry; the cavalry under Colonel Boughton; the mounted volunteers under Major Warner; and his aids, Majors Hosmer and Norton. General Hall, however, admits that it was not in his power to notice all that distinguished themselves.

The enemy, after obtaining possession of the different batteries at Black Rock, pursued his march to Buffalo, which he immediately plundered and burnt. A woman by the name of Lovejoy, who refused to quit her house, was tomahawked and burnt with her dwelling. The distance from Black Rock to Buffalo, is two miles; a considerable part of the road is flanked by woods. Yet the enemy were suffered to advance in column without the least annoyance. Oh! that a Croghan or a Holmes could have been present to have diffused courage and confidence, what a different result might have safely been anticipated! For never did the enemy more expose himself to ambush, defeat, and capture; and never were the means at the disposal of the commanding General more ineffectually applied, if we except the campaign of General Hull.

General Hall retired to Eleven Mile Creek, where he rallied about 300 men with whom he afforded protection to the inhabitants. The enemy re-crossed the Niagara. Eight pieces of artillery fell into their hands, but the military stores were principally removed by the

well-timed exertions and zeal of Captain Camp, of the Quarter Master's department.

The enemy burnt two small schooners belonging to Perry's squadron, which had been stranded in October preceding.

Great individual losses were sustained. Many industrious families were reduced to extreme wretchedness, and, but for the generous hospitality and active benevolence of their fellow citizens in the interiour, great numbers would have been in danger of perishing by hunger and the rigours of the season. As charity is probably as great a virtue as courage, it will not be improper to record a few laudable instances of beneficence. Joseph Elicott, Governour Tompkins, Stephen Van Nensselaer, and Solomon Southwick, of the State of New-York, gave each one hundred dollars.

EARLY in February, General Wilkinson evacuated his camp at French Mills. Previous to his leaving it, he masked his intentions by ordering a constant march of troops from Plattsburgh and Chateaugay to the French Mills.* This movement induced the traitorous inhabitants on the lines, and the enemy at Cornwall, to believe that the American army meditated an expedition into Canada. During the march of troops to the Mills, the roads from thence to Plattsburgh were filled with the publick property.

Thus the General was enabled to send off all the baggage; the torch was applied to the huts, and the boats destroyed. The snow was between three and four feet deep, and the first night after leaving its encampment, the whole army slept upon the snow, without any other covering than the heavens. But the contented soldier, remindful of the cares which poison the felicity of political and civil life, enjoys sweeter repose than the factionist or voluptuary on beds of down.

The enemy afterwards crossed the St. Lawrence on a marauding expedition, advanced to Chateaugay, but paid dearly for his booty; for they lost from the 89th and 103d regiments, about 200 deserters. An American citizen who was a prisoner with the British, persuaded a whole picket to desert with him. Five Indians who pursued, were killed by the deserters.

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* A detachment of 200 men under Captain A. W. Odel, an officer of great promise, from Ballston, N. Y. was ordered from Chateaugay to the Mills. They performed the march in ten hours, facing a storm. Thus, in one short day, in the dead of winter, was performed a march that would, in the fall, have brought the armies of Generals Wilkinson an Hampton together, but for the perverseness of the latter. The distance is twenty-four miles.

When the news of the enemy's movement reached General Wilkinson at Plattsburgh, himself and most of his officers were at a ball. Yet in half an hour after the arrival of the news, the whole army were in motion; but the British retreated hastily, without waiting to measure swords. It is said that they lost several pieces of cannon, by the ice giving way, as they re-passed the St. Lawrence.

SECOND VICTORY ON THE THAMES.

TOWARDS the latter part of February, Captain Holmes, with 180 men, consisting of regulars and Michigan rangers, were detached on an expedition from Detroit against Fort Talbot, situated about two days march north-east of Malden. From information obtained on his march, Captain Holmes abandoned his design upon Fort Talbot, and directed his march upon Delaware, upon the Thames. When arrived within fifteen miles of that place, he received intelligence that the enemy, 300 strong, were probably within one hour's march of him. Hunger, cold, and disease, had greatly enfeebled his men, sixteen of whom had previously been sent back to Detroit, as incapable of duty.

Captain Holmes immediately retreated five miles, for the purpose of a good position, which he found upon the western bank of the Twenty Mile Creek. The enemy made his appearance in small numbers upon the opposite heights, the next morning about sunrise. He fired a few ineffectual shots, and disappeared. Lieutenant Knox, of the rangers, was sent to reconnoiter; he soon returned, and reported that the enemy had retreated with great precipitation, leaving his baggage scattered upon the road; and that his trail and files made him out less than seventy men. Mortified at the supposition of having retrograded from this diminutive force, Captain Holmes immediately commenced a pursuit; but he soon discovered that the enemy's supposed retreat was only a stratagem to draw him from his position; for at the distance of five miles, the enemy were met in force, and in the act of preparing for battle. Captain Holmes resumed his old position, and formed in the order of the *hollow square*, to prevent the necessity of evolution, which a part of his force was incompetent to perform; his horses and baggage in the centre. The militia and Indians of the enemy commenced the attack with yells, and bugles sounding in various directions. The British

regulars charged to within twenty paces of the American line, and against a fire that poured death upon their front section; those that followed were much thinned and wounded; the survivors abandoned the charge and attempted to screen themselves in the woods, which were not more than thirty paces distant. The enemy's hopes were now upon his ammunition.

Our regulars being uncovered, were ordered to kneel, that the brow of the height might partly conceal them from the enemy's view. The firing was continued on both sides with great vivacity. But, as the British regulars charged in column, and our line being extended, they derived but very little shelter from the woods; a common sized tree was found to afford no safety even to an individual, much less to the squads that often stood and breathed their last together. Our militia on the other fronts, were protected by logs hastily thrown together, and the enemy not charging, the rifle was aimed at leisure, and generally with unerring certainty.

The enemy, after a copious bleeding, and finding his numbers constantly diminishing, relinquished the attack and retreated under cover of twilight. Captain Holmes did not think it prudent to pursue. The Americans lost but two killed, and four wounded; while the enemy lost between eighty and ninety, among whom were four officers.

Captain Holmes acknowledges himself much indebted to his regular officers, particularly to Lieutenants Knox, Henry, Jackson, and Porter. Ensigns Heard and Morgan, and Captain Lee of the Michigan dragoons, distinguished themselves. In the hottest of the fire, the soldiers would frequently exclaim, "Huzza for Kentucky!" Sailing master Darling, of the U. S. schooner Somers, served as a volunteer, and was very active; another instance that Americans can fight on both elements.

The enemy's wounded and prisoners were treated with great humanity. Though some of our men were marching in their stocking feet, they were not permitted to take even a shoe from the dead.

A convoy of 100 head of cattle intended for Burlington, was subsequently taken upon the Thames.

General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War.

Province of Lower Canada,
Odeltown, March 31, 1814.

SIR—We have had an affair with the enemy, in which our troops have given him another test of firmness and valour.

Pursuant to the designs communicated to you in my last, and to accomplish your views if in my power, I entered Canada yesterday morning, and was met by the enemy near this place, about 11 o'clock, whom we forced at every point of attack on the route to La Cole, distant from hence, one league; and from St. Johns, six. We reached the former post about 3 o'clock, and found there a strong corps in possession of a spacious lofty stone mill, of which I had received some information. An eighteen pounder had been ordered forward to effect the destruction of this building; but it broke down, and after being repaired, the only road of approach through a deep forest, was reported to be impracticable to a gun of such weight. An opinion prevailed at the same time with the chief engineer, Major Totten, founded on intelligence previously received, and several of the best informed officers, that an iron twelve would suffice to make a breach; but after a fair and tedious experiment, at three hundred yards distance only, it was discovered our battery could make no impression.

Brigadier Generals Smith and Bissel covered our guns, and Brigadier General Macomb, with a select corps, formed the reserve. The enemy had been reported, from a source considered strictly confidential, to be 2500 strong; and his first attack of my right, favoured the report, from the use he made of Congreve rockets and other indications of deliberate preparation; the corps, therefore, were held in high order to receive his combined attack. Yet believing in the efficacy of our battery, dispositions had been made to intercept the

enemy, should he evacuate the post; and to give it the utmost effect, we were obliged to take ground near the margin of the field which encompassed the mill. During the cannonade, which was returned with vivacity by the enemy's gallies, (I presume,) several sorties and desperate charges were made from the mill upon our battery, which were repulsed with incredible coolness by the covering corps, at the expense of some blood and some lives on both sides: it is reported to me, that in the last charge, a Captain of grenadiers and fifteen men fell together; but I cannot vouch for the fact. Finding all our attempts to make a breach, unsuccessful, I withdrew the battery, called in my detachments, and having removed our dead and wounded, and every thing else, fell back to this place about 6 o'clock.

Where the military corps appears to be universally animated by the same sensibilities, where the only competition is for danger and glory, individual distinctions seem improper, except in extraordinary cases, such as the conduct of the officers who commanded our battery yesterday. Captain M'Pherson, of the light artillery, (my military Secretary,) impelled by the noble spirit which marks his whole character, asked permission to take part in the operation of the day with his proper arm; he was indulged, and being first for command, took charge of the pieces which followed the advance and formed our battery, in which he was seconded by Lieutenants Larrabee and Sheldon. On opening his fire he seemed inclined to the opinion he could make an impression on the work, but he soon received a wound under the chin, which he tied up with his handkerchief, and continued at his piece until a second shot, which broke his thigh, brought him to the earth. Larrabee had kept his station until shot through the lungs, and Sheldon kept up the fire until ordered to retire. The conduct of these gentlemen, from the nature of their duties, has been so conspicuously gallant as to attract the admiration of their brethren in arms, and should (I humbly conceive) be distinguished by the executive.

I have sent forward my wounded, who can bear the movement to Plattsburgh or Burlington, and those who cannot, will be provided for in Champlain.

I would hold this position until I receive further orders, were it not for the difficulty of transporting our provisions and the impossibility to cover the troops; but I shall not retire further than Champlain, which will place us twenty-five miles from St. John's, and forty-two from Montreal.

I cannot close this letter without confessing my obligations to my General and field officers, and to my General staff of every grade, for the able and prompt support I received from them. So small an affair does not merit so tedious a detail, but it warrants the remark, that it will produce a degree of self confidence, of reciprocal trust, of harmony and friendly attachments in this corps, highly beneficial to the service. It is a lesson of command to the officers, and of obedience to the soldier, worth a whole year's drill of empty parades.

The returns of killed and wounded have not yet been furnished, but they will not exceed 80 or 90, including a Captain and four subalterns; and this shall be forwarded to-morrow or next day.

With great respect, &c.,

JA. WILKINSON.

The Honourable Secretary at War.

Lieutenants Green, Parker, and Kerr, and Sergeant Childs, were among the wounded. The Commander in Chief exposed his person to the hottest of the enemy's fire.

The movement not proving successful, it has been censured as untimed and injudiciously conducted. In a letter to a friend, dated April 9th, 1814, the General explains his motives in the following words: "That upon hearing of General Brown's march to the westward, and having ascertained that the enemy continued to strengthen his garrison upon Lake Ontario, as late as the 17th of March, on which day upwards of one thousand men passed up by Hamilton, on the St. Lawrence. In combination of other motives equally important, I made the late incursion into Lower Canada, to put the enemy in fear nearer home, and thus effect a division in favour of Major-General Brown's operations, whether

offensive or defensive ; and if I am not deceived by a concurrence of information, the movement has had the effect to draw the whole of the enemy's force in Lower Canada to the vicinity of St. John's, including a corps of Glengarians, who were stationed on the St. Lawrence, at Cateau de Lac."

UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT OF THE ENEMY TO DESTROY THE SUPERIOUR BUILDING AT SACKET'S HARBOUR.

ON the night of the 25th of April, two of Commodore Chauncey's guard boats fell in with three of the enemy's boats in the bay formed by Black River. Lieutenant Dudley, who discovered them, hailed, and was answered "guard boats;" this, however, not being satisfactory, he repeated the hail, and was not answered. Finding the strange boats were attempting to cut him off from the shore, he fired upon them; the enemy escaped, and the guard boats returned to the fleet. The next day, Commodore Chauncey caused both shores of Chaumont bay to be examined, to see if the enemy had not secreted himself in some of the small creeks. Nothing, however, was discovered but six barrels of powder, found in the water near the shore where our guard boats fired on them. These barrels were all slung in such a manner that one man could take two across his shoulder and carry them; each barrel had a hole bored in the head, of about one inch diameter, with a wooden plug in it. These barrels were evidently fitted for blowing up the Superiour, then on the stocks, by placing them under the ship's bottom, and were thrown overboard for the double purpose of facilitating escape, and preventing accident in case of close action.

The discovery of the enemy's intentions in this instance, may prevent future meditated mischief.

The United States' ship Superiour, was launched at Sacket's Harbour, on the morning of the first of May, without accident. She is an uncommon beautiful ship, and could mount 64 guns if necessary. She was built in the short space of *eighty* days. The Jones and Jefferson, two brigs of 500 tons and 22 guns each, were built during the same period. All this was done during the most unfavourable part of the season, upon a remote frontier, where wilderness still maintains its empire. What is not American genius and enterprise capable of performing when properly directed?

OSWEGO Fort* stands on the right bank of the river of the same name, at its entrance into Lake Ontario. The site is elevated, and the prospect beautiful; but since its delivery to the Americans in 1796, has been suffered to go to decay. When attacked by the enemy on the 6th of May, 1814, there were but five pieces of cannon in the fort, three of which had lost their trunnions.

The enemy made the attack with a force estimated at 2000. Colonel Mitchell, who defended the fort, had but 200 effective men. The odds was fearful, but valor and skill supplied the place of numbers, and compelled the enemy to purchase a dear bought victory.

The British made their appearance in four large ships, three brigs, and a number of gun, and other boats. Colonel Mitchell, had artfully pitched his spare tents on the village side of the river, thereby inducing the enemy to attack, where, from appearances, they expected the least resistance.

"About one o'clock on the 5th, the fleet approached. Fifteen boats, large, and crowded with troops, at a given signal, moved slowly to the shore. These were preceded by gun boats, sent to rake the woods and cover the landing, while the larger vessels opened a fire upon the fort. As soon as the debarking boats got within range of our shot, Captain Boyle and Lieutenant Legate opened a very successful fire and compelled them twice to retire. They at length returned to their ships, and the whole stood off from shore for better anchorage."† Several of their boats were so perforated that they were

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* This fort was taken by the French, under the celebrated Montcalm, in 1756. It had then a garrison of 1600 men—21 pieces of cannon, 14 mortars, large stores, 2 sloops, and 200 boats. It sustained a siege of only two days.

† See Col. Mitchell's official statement.

abandoned; one of which was 60 feet long, had three sails, and could accommodate 150 men. She had received a shot through her bow, and was nearly filled with water.

The troops of the fort lay upon their arms during the night. At daybreak, on the 6th, the fleet again appeared bearing up under easy sail. The heavy ships took position directly against the fort and batteries, and for three hours kept up a heavy fire of grape, &c. Finding that the enemy had effected a landing, Colonel Mitchell withdrew his small disposable force to the rear of the fort, and with Captains Romeyn and Melvin's companies met the advancing British columns, while the other companies attacked their flanks. Lieutenant Pearce of the navy and some seamen joined and fought with their characteristick bravery. Colonel Mitchell maintained his ground for thirty minutes, when he retreated. He halted at the distance of four hundred yards from the fort.

The enemy landed 600 of De Watteville's regiment, 600 marines, two companies of Glengarians, and 350 seamen. General Drummond commanded the land forces. They burnt the old barracks, and evacuated the fort on the morning of the 7th. The British, according to their own statement, lost 19 killed and 75 wounded. Our loss was 6 killed and 38 wounded.

Lieutenant Blaney, a young man of great promise, was killed. Captain Boyle, and the subalterns Legate, M'Comb, Ansart, King, Robb, Carle, M'Clintock, and Newkirk, are noticed for conspicuous bravery in the official account.

BRILLIANT AFFAIR AT SANDY CREEK.

ON the 30th of May, Major Appling, with 120 riflemen and a small number of Oneida warriours, was detached to protect the cannon and naval stores collected at Oswego, destined for Commodore Chauncey's fleet. They embarked on board a flotilla of boats in charge of Captain Woolsey of the navy. Arrived at the mouth of Sandy Creek, and apprehending an attack from the enemy who were in sight, Major Appling placed his men in ambush in the woods on each side of the creek, a little below where Captain Woolsey's boats were moored, and at a place where the stream was narrow and shoal. He then sent a few militia with orders to make a show of resistance whenever the enemy should attempt to land. The trap was artfully set; the game was soon caught. The militia retreated on the first fire, pursued by the enemy, who expected an easy conquest of the boats; elated with their supposed triumph over the militia, they advanced up the creek and passed the ambuscade without perceiving it. At a given signal, the work of death commenced. A battery of four field pieces opened upon them in front, while the Indians and riflemen attacked them in rear.

The fire of the riflemen and Indians was too severe to be long resisted. In twenty minutes the whole party surrendered. Thirteen of the enemy were killed, 28 wounded, and 133 prisoners, together with two heavy boats and three barges, some of which carried large pieces of ordnance.

Not an American was hurt. The officers under Major Appling were Lieutenants M'Intosh, Calhoun, M'Farland, Armstrong, and Smith, and Ensign Austin; all of whom have distinguished themselves on various occasions.

DEATH OF COLONEL FORSYTH.

THIS courageous and enterprising officer fell in a skirmish near Odeltown, on the 28th of June. He had been engaged by General Smith to attempt to draw the enemy into an ambush, by offering him battle and keeping up a retreating fire until his object should be effected. When within a proper distance of the enemy, the Colonel detached a Lieutenant and eighteen men to fire on him and draw him into an ambuscade. The plan succeeded. The enemy followed the eighteen riflemen to the boundary line, where Colonel Forsyth and the residue of his detachment had remained. It is stated in the official account of this affair, that the Colonel had orders to fall still farther back; but that instead of complying with his orders, he directed his men to make a stand; and totally regardless of personal danger, he attacked the enemy, exposing his person in full view at the distance of only sixteen rods; being in uniform, he was soon shot down by two Indians who had concealed themselves in the bushes. His last words were "Rush on, my boys," which he expressed immediately on falling. He survived but a few minutes.

Colonel Forsyth was a native of North Carolina; a bachelor, and possessed of handsome property. His men, to whom he was always attentive, repaid his care with strict obedience and the warmest attachment.

The following anecdote is given as authentick: On a reconnoitering excursion near Odeltown, a party of the enemy showed themselves; Colonel Forsyth gave orders to fire, which was immediately done; but observing one of his men to take shelter behind a fence while he loaded his piece, the Colonel peremptorily commanded the trembling soldier to come and stand behind him, while he performed that part of his duty. It is unnecessary to add, that it produced the intended effect.

ON the 2d of October, Commodore Chauncey again proceeded in quest of the British fleet. He discovered them steering a course for Niagara, with studding sails, and all sails set, the wind being from the south and westward. The Commodore made all sail in chase, but as soon as his vessels were discovered by the British, they took in studding sails and hauled upon the wind to the westward, and made all sail from the Americans. The wind being light all day, little progress was made against the current. By sun-down the British were off Twenty Mile Creek, and had got a considerable distance from the Americans. At day-light, the British were perceived to be at anchor; but as soon as they saw the American squadron, they weighed, and made all sail to the west. The wind was from the south to south-west, and squally. The American Commodore made all sail in chase, and continued it the whole day. At sun-down, the British could scarcely be perceived from the mast-head of the American vessels.

On the following morning, the British fleet were out of sight. Commodore Chauncey then steered for the Ducks, with a view of intercepting the British fleet on its return, should it have gone down the lake. The wind increased to a strong gale from the northward and westward, and continued during the whole day.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th of October, seven sail were discovered near the False Ducks. Sail was immediately made in chase, by the American Commodore, who took them for the British fleet. But, in the course of an hour, he ascertained them to be sloops and schooners. Signal was made by the Commodore, for the Sylph and Lady of the Lake to cast off the vessels they had in tow, and chase N. E. Soon after this, the British were observed separating on different tacks.

The Governour Tompkins was now cast off by the Pike, and the Commodore made all sail in chase with

her, having left the American squadron in charge of Captain Crane. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the British set fire to one of their gun vessels which did not sail well, after taking out her crew. At sun-down, and opposite the Real Ducks, the Hamilton, Confiance,* and Mary Ann, struck to the Americans. The Sylph soon after captured the Drummond. The Lady Gore ran into the Ducks, but the Sylph being left to watch her, she was captured early the next morning. The only British vessel that escaped, was the Enterprise, a small schooner. The British vessels captured, were gun vessels, mounting from one to three guns each. They were transporting troops to Kingston. The number of prisoners amounted to 264, of whom 222 were soldiers. The American fleet, immediately after this affair, returned to Sacket's Harbour.

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* The Hamilton and Confiance had not long been captured from the Americans, as already related; and had been, in the American service, called the Growler and Julia.

OPERATIONS ON THE NIAGARA IN 1814.

AS early as the middle of March, General Brown made a movement with a part of his division, from Sacket's Harbour westwardly, as far as Onondaga, but suddenly re-traced his steps.

General Scott arrived at Buffalo in April, collected troops, and formed a camp of instruction. A biographer of General Scott informs us, that "in this camp were taught those tacticks which gave to our army an accuracy and celerity of movement, which had never been displayed on this continent, either by British or American troops. The French *Tactique* of the battalion and the line was adopted. Without regard to rank, all the officers were rigorously drilled by the Commanding General in person; these then instructed the rank and file; companies were then formed and subjected to the same process; next, battalions, which were also instructed by General Scott in person; and finally, the troops were carried through the evolutions of the brigade and the line, with the same strict attention to science and method. For two months and a half, these exercises were continued from seven to nine hours in a day. The effect was astonishing. Four full battalions were brought to advance in brigade line, one thousand paces in quick time, in accurate allignment. The same line was made to change front perpendicular, on a central point, in three minutes and a half. During this period of discipline and instruction, the army was perfectly organized; and by the unwearied exertions and example of the Commanding General, the strictest routine and discipline was established throughout the whole."

In June, General Brown arrived at Buffalo and assumed the command of the army, which had increased by re-enforcements from various parts of the Union, to 3000 men in round numbers.

The passage of Niagara and the capture of Fort Erie, was accomplished on the 3d of July, without loss. The

brigade of General Scott landed nearly a mile below the fort; and that of General Ripley, about the same distance above. A battery of long 18's was placed in a position which commanded the fort, and induced the enemy to surrender it, in which were found six pieces of cannon, and 137 prisoners under Major Burke.

BATTLE OF CHIPPEWAY.

FROM Fort Erie the American army moved immediately upon Chippeway; General Scott's brigade was in the advance and took up a position within three quarters of a mile of the enemy, encamped behind the Chippeway, a deep, still stream, which runs into the Niagara, nearly at right angles, three miles above the falls. General Brown arrived with General Ripley's brigade about midnight. General P. B. Porter, with the New-York and Pennsylvania volunteers, and Seneca warriours arrived about sunrise on the morning of the 5th.

"The battle of Chippeway has been described as one of the most brilliant spectacles that could well be conceived. The day was clear and bright; the sun still high in the heavens. The plain was such as might have been selected for a parade, or a tournament; the troops on both sides, though not numerous, admirably disciplined; the Generals leading on their columns in person, the glitter of the arms in the sun, and the precision and exactness of every movement, were all calculated to carry the mind back to ancient story or poetry; to the plains of Latium, or of Troy, and all those recollections which fill the imagination with images of personal heroism and romantick valour."*

The two armies being encamped within cannon shot distance, the morning of the 5th was consumed in skirmishing.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, General Porter commenced a circuitous movement on the left, which he concealed from the enemy until he had nearly reached the Chippeway. He met and drove back the light parties of the enemy, and soon found his progress stopped

* See Analectick Magazine.

by their whole column, advancing in order of battle; but he engaged them with unshaken resolution.

From the cloud of dust rising, and the heavy firing, General Brown very justly concluded that the entire force of the enemy were in march, and prepared for action, whereupon, he immediately ordered General Scott to advance with his brigade, and Towson's artillery, and meet them on the intervening plain. General Scott advanced with promptitude. In the meanwhile, General Porter's command had given way in spite of the personal gallantry and exertions of this distinguished officer. Captain Harris, with his dragoons, was directed to stop the fugitives behind the ravine, fronting the American camp. General Ripley, was ordered to advance with the 21st regiment which formed part of the reserve, pass to the left on the route taken by Porter, skirt the woods, so as to keep out of view, and fall upon the rear of the enemy's right flank. This movement was promptly made; but the alacrity with which Scott's brigade marched to combat, and an equal eagerness with which the enemy sought the rencounter, accelerated the action and its results, and prevented the co-operation of the other corps of the army.

"Of the three battalions of infantry, composing the first brigade, the first consisted of the 9th, and a detachment from the 22d regiment, under command of Major Leavenworth. The second battalion, or the 11th regiment, was gallantly conducted towards its place, in order of battle, by Colonel Campbell. who, being early wounded, was succeeded by Major M'Niel. Major Jessup commanded the 25th regiment, or the remaining battalion of the brigade. Of these three excellent officers, it would be difficult to say which was the most meritorious, or most conspicuously engaged."*

Major Jessup was detached to the left to turn the enemy's right wing. His command contributed much to the general success of the day: he had a horse shot under him.

* See General Scott's report of the battle of Chippewa.

The other two battalions with an enlarged interval between them, received the enemy in open plain; that under Major Leavenworth, paraded to the attack; that under Major M'Niel, with its left wing thrown forward to take the enemy in front and flank at the same time. Captain Towson, who commenced the fire before the troops were in order of battle, immediately after advanced to the front of the extreme right with three pieces of artillery, and took post on the river. Majors Leavenworth, and M'Niel, made prompt dispositions to receive the charge. The fire of the corps, including the artillery, produced a prodigious effect upon the enemy's ranks. That of Major M'Niel, was the most effective from the oblique position which his corps judiciously occupied. The enemy's batteries were also admirably served; to the fire of which all our troops were exposed, and that of Major Leavenworth more particularly. The canonade did not prevent the latter from preserving his corps in the most excellent order, at all times prepared, to advance or to fire, to give, or to receive the charge.

At the crisis of the action, "Major Jessup, commanding the left flank battalion, finding himself pressed in front and in flank, and his men falling fast around him, ordered his battalion to "*Support arms and advance;*" the order was most promptly obeyed, amidst the most deadly and destructive fire. He gained a more secure position, and returned upon the enemy so galling a discharge as caused them to retire. At this critical juncture, Captain Towson had silenced the enemy's most effective battery, by blowing up an ammunition wagon, which produced great confusion. Turning next a heavy discharge of canister upon their infantry, now nearly in contact with our line, advancing to charge; the enemy could not long sustain this accumulation of fire, they broke and fled to their strong works, beyond the Chippeway; as soon as they reached the sloping ground, descending towards the Chippeway Creek, they broke in confusion, and ran to gain the bridge. Our troops pressed upon the fugitives, until checked by the guns discharged from the British works.

The American loss was 60 killed, 316 wounded, and 19 missing.—Total, 395.*

The British loss, according to their own statement, was 148 killed, 320 wounded, and 44 missing.—Total, 514.

Five hundred British muskets were picked up the day after the action, upon the field of battle.

Major-General Riall had, in his front line, 1,700 men, all regular troops, supported by the 8th regiment, 400 strong. The 100th regiment, which was on the left of the British line, commanded by the Marquis of Tweedale, late Aid-de-camp to Lord Wellington, brought into action 700, and paraded the next day but 264. The other regiments engaged, suffered proportionably. General Brown has had in his possession, the most unequivocal evidence of these facts.

General Porter's command was never engaged after their first retreat, consequently, the whole action was sustained by Scott's brigade, which, including Towson's artillery, consisted of but 1300 men fit for duty—150 were on the different guards and pickets, and therefore, not in the action; so that the American force actually engaged, did not exceed 1200 men.

To the immortal honour of our arms, therefore, it may be safely affirmed, that 1200 Americans, many of them raw recruits, under the guidance of the intrepid Scott, and equally gallant Leavenworth, M'Niel, Jessup, and Towson, defeated, in *fair field fight*, 1700 veteran British troops; consisting of the Royal Scots, the Prince Regent's, and the King's own, led on and encouraged by the heroick example of General Riall.

Among the officers noticed for bravery and good conduct by General Brown, are General Ripley, from whom

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* Among the wounded was Col. Campbell, 11th infantry, severely, knee fractured, since dead. Capt. King, 22d do., severely wounded in the abdomen. Capt. Read, 25th do., badly, flesh wound in the thigh. Capt. Harrison, 42d, doing duty in the 9th regiment, severely, shot in the shoulder. Lieut. Barron, 11th do., severely, shot below the knee, and bone fractured. Lieut. De Witt, 25th do., severely. Lieut. Patchin, badly, flesh wound in the thigh. Lieut. Brienhall, slightly.

he received every assistance that he gave him an opportunity of rendering; General Porter, whose conduct was conspicuously gallant; his own family, consisting of Colonel Gardner, Major Jones, and his aids, Austin, and Spencer, who yield to none in honourable zeal, intelligence, and attention to duty—Captain Biddle of the artillery, who brought a wounded man from the field, who had been abandoned by Captain Treat—Major Camp, Deputy Quarter Master General, for great exertions in procuring means for crossing the Niagara, and Captain Deliza, of the Ordnance Department, who rendered every service in his power.

In the report of General Scott, many additional officers are named: among these is Captain Ketchum, who was detached with his company to attack a much superiour force, and who gallantly sustained himself in the execution of his orders until relieved by Major Jessup, who marched to his support. Captain Harrison was struck by a cannon ball which shattered and carried away a part of his leg; he nevertheless refused any assistance from the ranks until the enemy should be beaten. "To mention them in order of their rank," says the General, "Majors Jessup, Leavenworth, and M'Neil, and Captain Towson, deserve, in my humble opinion, every thing which conspicuous skill and gallantry can wish from a grateful country." Major Wood of the engineers, and Captain Harris of the dragoons, could not be restrained from joining during the action; the latter had a horse shot under him. Captain Crooker particularly distinguished himself in a skirmish on the 4th. Major Hindman, Captains Hull and Ritchie, Lieutenants Campbell, Randolph, and Smuck, are also noticed for their bravery.

The victorious army remained four days near the battle ground, and then took up its line of march for Queenstown. The enemy but feebly opposed the passage of the Chippeway. General Riall, with the British forces, fell back to the Twelve Mile Creek, and threw a part of his troops into Fort George. The American army advanced to within three miles of the lake. General P. B. Porter reconnoitered the fort and

offered battle to the enemy, who declined leaving their defences to risk the doubtful issue of a fight, when they were well informed that the main army, under General Brown, was at hand.

It would appear from the correspondence between General Brown and Commodore Chauncey, that a prompt co-operation of the fleet with the land forces, was expected by the General. Whether he had just grounds for this expectation, or not, no aid was afforded; and the reader will, with the documents before him, make his own comments, and draw his own inferences.

Copy of a letter from Major General Brown to Commodore Chauncey—dated

H. Q. Queenstown, July 13, 1814.

My Dear Sir,

I arrived at this place on the 10th, as I assured you that with the blessing of God I would. All accounts agree that the force of the enemy in Kingston, is very light. Meet me on the lake shore north of Fort George with your fleet, and we will be able, I have no doubt, to settle a plan of operation that will break the power of the enemy in Upper Canada, and that in the course of a short time. At all events, let me hear from you; I have looked for your fleet with the greatest anxiety, since the 10th. I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field, and to march in any direction over his country, your fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara, and carry Burlington Heights and York, and proceed directly to Kingston and carry that place. For God's sake let me see you; Sir James will not fight, two of his vessels are now in Niagara river.

If you conclude to meet me at the head of the lake, and that immediately, have the goodness to bring the guns and troops that I have ordered from the Harbour. At all events, have the politeness to let me know what aid I am to expect from the fleet on Lake Ontario.

There is not a doubt resting in my mind but we have between us the command of sufficient means to conquer Upper Canada within two months, if there is a prompt

and zealous co-operation, and a vigorous application of these means; now is our time, before the enemy can be greatly re-enforced.

JACOB BROWN.

Commodore Chauncey.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Chauncey to Major General Brown—dated

U. S. Ship Superiour, off Kingston, Aug. 10, 1814.

SIR—Your letter of the 13th ult. was received by me on a sick bed, hardly able to hear it read, and entirely unfit to reply to it. I, however, requested General Gaines to acquaint you with my situation; the probable time of the fleet's sailing, and my views of the extent of its co operation with the army.

From the tenour of your letter, it would appear that you had calculated upon the co-operation of the fleet. You cannot surely have forgotten the conversation we held on the subject at Sacket's Harbour, previous to your departure for Niagara. I then professed to feel it my duty as well as inclination, to afford every assistance in my power to the army, and to co-operate with it whenever it could be done without loosing sight of this great object, for the attainment of which this fleet has been created—to wit: the capture or destruction of the enemy's fleet. But I then distinctly stated to you, that this was a primary object, and would be first attempted; and that you must not expect the fleet at the head of the lake, unless that of the enemy should induce us to follow him there.

I will not suffer myself to believe that this conversation was misunderstood, or has since been forgotten. How then shall I account for the intimation thrown out to the publick in your despatch to the Secretary of War, that you expected the fleet to co-operate with you? Was it friendly, or just, or honourable, not only to furnish an opening to the publick, but thus to assist them to infer that I have pledged myself to meet you on a particular day, at the head of the lake, for the purpose of co-operation? and in case of disaster to your army, thus to turn their resentment from you, who are alone

responsible, upon me, who could not by any possibility have prevented or retarded even your discomfiture? You well know, Sir, that the fleet could not have rendered you the least service during your late incursion upon Upper Canada. You have not been able to approach Lake Ontario on any point nearer than Queenstown, and the enemy were then in possession of all the country between that place and the shore of Ontario; and that I could not even communicate with you without making a circuit of seventy or eighty miles. I would ask, of what possible use the fleet would have been to you, either in threatening or invading Fort George, when the shallowness of the water alone would prevent an approach with these ships, within two miles of that fort or Niagara? To pretend that the fleet could render the least assistance in your projected capture of Burlington Heights on your route to Kingston, is still more romantick; for it is well known that the fleet could not approach within nine miles of those Heights.

That you might find the fleet somewhat of a convenience in the transportation of provisions and stores for the use of the army, and an agreeable appendage to attend its marches and counter-marches, I am ready to believe. But, Sir, the Secretary of the Navy has honoured us with a higher destiny—we are intended to seek and to fight the enemy's fleet. This is the great purpose of the government in creating this fleet; and I shall not be diverted in my efforts to effectuate it by any sinister attempt to render us subordinate to, or an appendage of, the army.

We have one common object in the annoyance, defeat, and destruction of the enemy; and I shall always cheerfully unite with any military commander in the promotion of that object.

I am, Sir, &c.

I. CHAUNCEY.

Major General Jacob Brown.

While the American army remained in the vicinity of Fort George, the enemy were actively engaged in concentrating their forces. The militia were called out

en masse from Long Point to the bay of Quinte; in short, the whole population of the Peninsula were in requisition. General Riall had been re-enforced with the garrison of Burlington Heights, 300 strong; and the Glengary light infantry from York, 400 strong. The whole regular force in the Peninsula at this period, has been stated at from 10 to 15,000 men.

In a justificatory pamphlet published by a friend of General Ripley, it is said that General Scott was for investing Fort George; that General Ripley made a proposition to march on the night of the 14th of July with his brigade, and Towson's and Biddle's artillery to attack General Riall at revilee, so as to bring him to action; and for Generals Scott and Porter to be kept in supporting distance; and Colonel Hindman to bring up the park of artillery of reserve.

The reasons General Ripley assigned for this movement were, "that if we moved against Fort George, we could not carry it. To think of storming it, was out of the question; and to invest it, would be perfectly absurd; for we had only our eighteen pounders to besiege a place where by dismantling Niagara, thirty heavy pieces could be brought to bear upon us. That if we invested Fort George, we should waste a few days, which would give the enemy an opportunity to re-enforce from Kingston; and if this were allowed them, as we only had an effective force of twenty-six or twenty-seven hundred men, our movement must resolve itself into a retrograde one, for our own security. But on the other hand, if we attack Riall, and break him down before he could be re-enforced, the Peninsula was within our power. This proposition was supported by General Porter, Colonel M'Ree, and Colonel Wood. Colonel Hindman gave no opinion. Generals Brown and Scott, and Colonel Gardner, were opposed to it, and in favour of investing Fort George. The movement was made on Fort George, the 16th of July; and on the 23d, without even opening a single trench, the forces retrograded. They fell back to Chippeway, the 24th; and on that evening, General Drummond arrived with three fresh battalions from Kingston; several battalions of

militia were concentrated, and General Riall, with a force of about 3000 strong, moved forward his camp to Lundy's Lane."

In the reconnoisance of Fort George, General John Swift, of the New-York volunteers, fell by the hand of a British soldier. The General, by judicious arrangements, succeeded with a party of volunteers in capturing without the discharge of a gun, a picket consisting of a corporal and five men, one of whom shot the General through the breast, after they had surrendered.

The discharge of the gun aimed at the General, drew a patroling party of the enemy to the spot, fifty or sixty strong. But the General was not to be restrained by a mortal wound; he formed his men, and fell exhausted at the very moment he saw the enemy give way. He was borne to camp by his men.

General Swift had served seven years in the revolutionary war. Every energy of his soul was consecrated to his country. His loss excited general regret.

The army remained two days before Fort George, and then retrograded to Queenstown. General Porter's command succeeded in taking several prisoners from the enemy's light troops who hovered about the Heights.

About this time Captain Stone, of the New-York volunteers, was dismissed the service by a peremptory order of General Brown, for an alledged disobedience of orders, in permitting or conniving at the burning of the village of St. Davids, by a part of his command. Captain Stone declared that he had no agency in the transaction—that his men put fire to the houses when he was not present.

On the 23d of July, General Brown received information that the heavy guns which had been previously ordered from Sacket's Harbour, to be employed in the siege of Forts George and Niagara, were blockaded in that port, together with a rifle regiment that had been ordered up with them; and that no prospect then remained of their arriving, he retraced his steps to Chippeway and encamped near the battle ground of the 5th.

General Brown's Report of this Battle, to the Secretary of War.

SIR—Confined as I was, and have been, since the last engagement with the enemy, I fear that the account I am about to give, may be less full and satisfactory, than under other circumstances it might have been made. I particularly fear, that the conduct of the gallant men it was my good fortune to lead, will not be noticed in a way due to their fame and the honour of our country.

You are already apprized that the army had on the 25th ult. taken a position at Chippeway. About noon of that day, Colonel Swift, who was posted at Lewiston, advised me by express, that the enemy appeared in considerable force in Queenstown, and on its heights; that four of the enemy's fleet had arrived during the preceding night, and were then lying near Fort Niagara, and that a number of boats were in view moving up the strait. Within a few minutes after this intelligence had been received, I was farther informed by Captain Denmon, of the Quarter Master's department, that the enemy was landing at Lewiston; and that our baggage and stores at Schlosser, and on their way thither, were in danger of immediate capture. It is proper here to mention, that having received advices as late as the 20th from General Gaines that our fleet was then in port, and the Commodore sick, we ceased to look for co-operation from that quarter, and determined to disencumber ourselves of baggage, and march directly for Burlington Heights. To mask this intention, and to draw from Schlosser a small supply of provisions, I fell back upon Chippeway. As this arrangement, under the increased force of the enemy, left much at hazard on our side of the Niagara; and as it appeared by the before stated information, that the enemy was about avail himself of it, I conceived that the most effectual method of recalling

him from this object, was to put myself in motion towards Queenstown. General Scott, with the first brigade, Towson's artillery, and all the dragoons and mounted men, were accordingly put in march on the road leading thither, with orders to report if the enemy appeared, and to call for assistance, if that was necessary. On the General's arrival at the Falls, he learned that the enemy was in force directly in front; a narrow piece of woods alone intercepting his view of them. Waiting only to give this information, he advanced upon them. By the time Assistant Adjutant General Jones had delivered his message, the action began; and before the remaining part of the division had crossed the Chippeway, it became close and general between the advanced corps. Though General Ripley with the 2d brigade, Major Hindman with the corps of artillery, and General Porter at the head of his command, had respectively pressed forward with ardour, it was not less than an hour before they were brought to sustain General Scott, during which time his command most skilfully and gallantly maintained the conflict. Upon my arrival I found that the General had passed the wood and engaged the enemy on the Queenstown road and on the ground to the left of it, with the 9th, 11th, and 22d regiments, and Towson's artillery. The 25th had been thrown to the right to be governed by circumstances. Apprehending that these corps were much exhausted, and knowing that they had suffered severely, I determined to interpose a new line with the advancing troops, and thus disengage General Scott and hold his brigade in reserve. Orders were accordingly given to General Ripley. The enemy's artillery at this moment occupied a hill, which gave him great advantages, and was the key of the whole position. It was supported by a line of infantry. To secure the victory, it was necessary to carry this artillery, and seize the height. This duty was assigned to Colonel Miller, while, to favour its execution, the 1st regiment under the command of Colonel Nicholas, was directed to menace and amuse the infantry. To my great mortification, this regiment, after a discharge or two, gave way and retreated some distance before it

could be rallied, though it is believed the officers of the regiment exerted themselves to shorten this distance. In the meantime Colonel Miller, without regard to this occurrence, advanced steadily and gallantly to his object and carried the height and the cannon. General Ripley brought up the 23d (which had also faultered) to his support, and the enemy disappeared from before them. The 1st regiment was now brought into line on the left of the 21st, and the detachments of the 17th and 19th, General Porter occupying, with his command, the extreme left. About this time Colonel Miller carried the enemy's cannon. The 25th regiment, under Major Jessup, was engaged in a more obstinate conflict with all that remained to dispute with us the field of battle. The Major, as has been already stated, had been ordered by General Scott, at the commencement of the action, to take ground to his right. He had succeeded in turning the enemy's left flank; had captured, by a detachment under Captain Ketchum, General Riall and sundry other officers, and showed himself again to his own army, in a blaze of fire which defeated or destroyed a very superiour force of the enemy. He was ordered to form on the right of the 2d regiment. The enemy rallying his forces, and as is believed, having received re-enforcements, now attempted to drive us from our position and regain his artillery. Our line was unshaken, and the enemy were repulsed. Two other attempts having the same object, had the same issue. General Scott was again engaged in repelling the former of these; and the last I saw of him on the field of battle, he was near the head of his column, and giving to its march a direction that would have placed him on the enemy's right. It was with great pleasure I saw the good order and intrepidity of General Porter's volunteers from the moment of their arrival; but during the last charge of the enemy, those qualities were conspicuous. Stimulated by the example set them by their gallant leader; by Major Wood, of the Pennsylvania corps; by Colonel Dobbin, of New-York, and by their officers generally, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy's line, and made all the prisoners which were taken at this point of the action.

Having been for some time wounded, and being a good deal exhausted by loss of blood, it became my wish to devolve the command on General Scott, and retire from the field; but on inquiry, I had the misfortune to learn, that he was disabled by wounds: I therefore kept my post, and had the satisfaction to see the last effort repulsed. I now consigned the command to General Ripley.

While retiring from the field, I saw, and felt that the victory was complete on our part, if proper measures were promptly adopted to secure it. The exhaustion of the men, was, however, such as made some refreshment necessary. They particularly required water. I myself, was extremely sensible of the want of this necessary article. I therefore believed it proper that General Ripley, and the troops should return to camp, after bringing off the dead, the wounded, and the artillery; and in this I saw no difficulty, as the enemy had entirely ceased to act. Within an hour after my arrival in camp, I was informed that General Ripley had returned without molestation, and in good order. I now sent for him, and after giving him my reasons for the measure I was about to adopt, ordered him to put the troops into the best possible condition; to give to them the necessary refreshments; to take with him the piquets and camp guards, and every other description of force; to put himself on the field of battle as the day dawned, and there to meet, and beat the enemy, if he again appeared. To this order he made no objection, and I relied upon its execution. It was not executed. I feel most sensibly how inadequate are my powers in speaking of the troops, to do justice either to their merits, or to my own sense of them. Under abler direction, they might have done more, and better.

From the preceding detail, you have new evidence of the distinguished gallantry of Generals Scott, and Porter, of Colonel Miller, and Major Jessup.

Of the 1st brigade, the Chief, with his Aid-de-Camp Worth, his Major of brigade, Smith, and every commander of battalion, were wounded.

The 2d brigade suffered less; but as a brigade, their

conduct entitled them to the applause of their country. After the enemy's strong position had been carried by the 21st, and the detachments of the 17th and 19th, the 1st and 25th assumed a new character. They could not again be shaken or dismayed. Major M'Farland, of the latter, fell nobly at the head of his battalion.

Under the command of General Porter, the militia volunteers of Pennsylvania and New-York, stood undismayed, amidst the hottest fire, and repulsed the veterans opposed to them. The Canadian volunteers, commanded by Colonel Wilson, are reported by General Porter as having merited and received his approbation.

The corps of artillery, commanded by Major Hindman, behaved with its usual gallantry. Captain Towson's company, attached to the 1st brigade, was the first and last engaged, and during the whole conflict, maintained that high character which they had previously won by their skill and their valour. Captains Biddle, and Ritchie were both wounded early in the action, but refused to quit the field. The latter declared that he never would leave his piece; and, true to his engagement, fell by its side, covered with wounds.

The staff of the army had its peculiar merit and distinction. Colonel Gardner, Adjutant-General, though ill, was on horseback, and did all in his power; his assistant, Major Jones, was very active and useful. My gallant Aids-de-Camp, Austin, and Spencer, had many, and critical duties to perform, in the discharge of which, the latter fell; I shall ever think of this young man with pride and regret; regret that his career has been so short; pride, that he has been so noble and distinguished. The Engineers, Majors M'Ree, and Wood, were greatly distinguished on this day, and their high military talents exerted with great effect; they were much under my eye, and near my person, and to their assistance a great deal is fairly to be ascribed. I most earnestly recommend them, as worthy of the highest trust and confidence. The Staff of Generals Ripley and Porter, discovered great zeal and attention to duty. Lieutenant E. B. Randolph, of the 20th regiment, is entitled to notice, his courage was conspicuous.

I enclose a return of our loss; those noted as missing, may generally be numbered with the dead. The enemy had but little opportunity of making prisoners.

I have the honour to be, sir, &c. &c.,

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. J. Armstrong, Secretary at War.

Report of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the Left Division of the army, commanded by Major-General Brown, in the action of the afternoon and night of the 25th July, 1814, at the Falls of Niagara.

Adjutant-General's Office,
Fort Erie, July 30, 1814.

General Staff—wounded, 1 Major-General, 1 Aid-de Camp.

Light Dragoons—killed, 1 corporal; wounded, two privates.

Artillery—killed, 1 Captain, 1 Corporal, 8 privates; wounded, 1 Captain, 2 subalterns, 1 Sergeant, 2 Corporals, 1 musician, 28 privates; missing, 1 private.

First, or Brig. Gen. Scott's Brigade.

Brigade Staff—wounded, 1 Brigadier-General, 1 Aid-de-Camp, 1 Brigade Major.

Ninth Infantry—killed, 1 Captain, 2 subalterns, 1 Sergeant, 1 Corporal, 11 privates; wounded, 1 Major, 1 Quarter-Master, 1 Paymaster, 1 Captain, 5 subalterns, 7 Sergeants, 5 Corporals, 69 privates; missing, 1 subaltern, 1 Sergeant-Major, 2 Sergeants, 11 privates.

Eleventh Infantry—killed, 1 Captain, 2 Sergeants, 4 Corporals, 2 privates; wounded, 1 Major, 1 Captain, 5 subalterns, 1 Sergeant-Major, 1 chief musician, 7 Sergeants, 3 Corporals, 1 musician, 83 privates; missing, 1 subaltern, 2 privates.

Twenty-second Infantry—killed, 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, 33 privates; wounded, 1 colonel, 2 captains, 4 subalterns, 9 Sergeants, 11 Corporals, 1 musician, 62 privates; missing, 3 subalterns, 2 Sergeants, 12 privates.

Twenty-fifth Infantry—killed, 1 Captain, 1 subaltern, 26 privates; wounded, 1 Major, 1 Adjutant, 1 Quarter-Master, 1 subaltern, 6 Sergeants, 6 Corporals, 50 privates; missing, 1 Sergeant, 2 Corporals, 19 privates.

Second, or Brig. Gen. Ripley's Brigade.

First Infantry—killed 11 privates; wounded, 2 subalterns, 18 privates; missing, 1 Corporal, 1 private.

21*st Infantry*—killed, 1 subltern, 2 Sergeants, 1 Corporal, 11 privates; wounded 1 captain, 5 subalterns, 1 Sergeant, 53 privates; missing, 19 privates.

23*d Infantry*—killed, 1 Major, 2 Sergeants, 7 privates; wounded, 1 Captain, 6 subalterns, 1 Sergeant, 1 Corporal, 43 privates; missing, 3 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 22 privates.

Brig. Gen. Porter's Command.

Brigade Staff—1 Brigade Major missing.

Canadian Volunteers—killed, 1 private; wounded, 2 privates; missing, 8 privates.

Pennsylvania Volunteers—killed, 1 Adjutant, 1 Sergeant, 9 privates; wounded, 1 Major, 1 Quarter-Master, 1 subaltern, 21 privates; missing, 1 Captain.

New-York Volunteers—killed, 1 Captain, 1 Corporal, 2 privates; wounded, 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 1 subaltern, 2 Sergeants, 1 Corporal, 9 privates; missing, 1 subaltern.

Grand Total—Killed, 1 Major, 1 Adjutant, 5 Captains, 4 subalterns, 10 Sergeants, 10 Corporals, 140 privates—Total, 171.

Wounded, 1 Major-General, 1 Brigadier-General, 2 Aids-de-Camp, 1 Brigade Major, 1 Colonel, 1 Lieut. Colonel, 4 Majors, 1 Adjutant, 3 Quarter-Masters, 1 Paymaster, 7 Captains, 32 subalterns, 1 Sergeant-Major, 1 Chief Musician, 34 Sergeants, 29 Corporals, 3 musicians, 449 privates—Total, 572.

Missing, 1 Brigade Major, 1 Captain, 6 subalterns, 1 Sergeant-Major, 8 Sergeants, 5 Corporals, 95 privates—Total, 117.

C. K. GARDNER, Adjutant-General.

Officers Killed.—Major M'Farland, 23d infantry. Captain Ritchie, corps of artillery. Captain Hull, 9th infantry. Captain Kinney, 25th do. Captain Goodrich, 11th do. First Lieutenant Bigelow, 21st do. First Lieutenant Turner, 9th do. Second Lieutenant Burghardt, 9th do. Ensign Hunter, 25th do. Captain

Hooper, New-York volunteers. Adjutant Poe, Pennsylvania volunteers.

Officers Wounded.—Major-General Brown, severely wounded through the thigh and in the side.

Captain Spencer, Aid to the Major-General, through the body, supposed to be mortal.

Artillery, Captain Biddle, slightly, shot wound in the neck and arm.

Second Lieutenant Campbell, badly, shot through the leg.

Second Lieutenant Schmuck, severely.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General Scott, severely, shoulder fractured and wounded in the side.

Lieutenant J. D. Smith, 6th infantry, Brigade Major, badly, through the leg.

Lieutenant Worth, 23d infantry, Aid-de-camp, severely, grape shot in the thigh.

Ninth infantry, Major Leavenworth, slightly, contusion in the side.

Captain W. L. Foster, slightly in the shoulder.

Lieutenant and Paymaster Fowle, slightly in the foot.

Lieutenant and Quarter-Master Browning, slightly, in the face.

Second Lieutenant Fisher, severely, shot in the head and wrist.

Third Lieutenant Cushman, slightly, in the thigh and shoulder.

Ensign G. Jacobs, severely, shot in the knee.

Ensign J. P. Jacobs, slightly, in the shoulder.

Ensign Blake, slightly, in the knee.

Eleventh infantry, Major M'Niel, severely, canister shot in the knee.

Captain Briss, badly, shot in the leg.

First Lieutenant Hall, slightly, shot in the thigh.

Second Lieutenant Cooper, slightly, contusion in the breast.

Third Lieutenant Stephenson, slightly, in the thigh.

Ensign Bedford, slightly, hurt in the abdomen by a splinter.

Ensign Thompson, (26th, doing duty in the 11th,) severely, shot wound in the side.

Twenty-second infantry, Colonel Brady, severely, shot wound in the side and hip.

Captain Pentland, severely wounded and a prisoner.

Captain Foulk, severely, shot wound in the side.

First Lieutenant Culbertson, severely, shot wound in the leg.

First Lieutenant Ferguson, severely, shot in the hand from a canister.

Second Lieut. Armstrong, dangerously, shot wound in the shoulder.

Third Lieutenant Bean, slightly shot in the foot.

Twenty-fifth infantry, Major Jessup, severely, shot wounds in the hand and shoulder.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Shaylor, severely, shot wounds in the arm and side.

Lieutenant and Quarter-Master M'Glassin, badly, shot wound in the shoulder.

Third Lieutenant Glafford, severely, shot wound in the hip.

Second Brigade.

First infantry, 1st Lieutenant Vasquez, slightly, shot in the thigh, and bayoneted in the leg.

First Lieutenant Bissel, slightly, in the leg.

Twenty-first infantry, Captain Burbank, severely, shoulder fractured.

First Lieutenant Cilley, severely, thigh fractured.

Second Lieutenant Fisk, of the 19th attached, slightly, in the breast.

Ensign Jones, slightly, flesh wound in the wrist.

Ensign Camp, 2d rifle regiment, serving with the regiment attached, flesh wound in the ankle.

Ensign Thomas, slightly, contusion in the back.

Twenty-third infantry, Captain Odell, severely, shot wound in the arm.

First Lieutenant H. Whiting, severely, in the neck.

Second Lieutenant Ingersoll, slightly, in the foot.

Second Lieutenant Tappan, slightly, in the head.

Third Lieutenant Abeal, slightly, in the leg.

Third Lieutenant Deidreich, slightly, in the arm.

Third Lieutenant Lamb, severely, in the leg.

Brig. Gen. Porter's Command.

New-York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Dobbin, slightly, shot in the breast.

Lieutenant O'Fling, slightly, spent common shot in the shoulder.

Pennsylvania volunteers, Major Wood, severely, musket shots in the arm and foot, and bruised by his horse being shot and falling on him.

Quarter-Master Maclay, severely, musket shots in the head and twice through the leg.

Lieutenant Dick, severely, shot in the hand.

Brigadier-General Porter was slightly wounded, but declined being reported.

Officers Missing.

First Lieutenant Perry, 9th infantry, a prisoner.

Third Lieutenant Webster, 11th do. severely, shot in the head, and taken prisoner.

Lieutenants Sturgis, Keps, and Davidson, 22d infantry, supposed to be killed.

Volunteers, Brigadier Major Stanton, of New-York, taken prisoner.

Captain Roberts, of Pennsylvania, taken prisoner.

Lieutenant Hunt, of New-York, supposed to be killed.

No battle of the war, perhaps none in the annals of the world can compare with this in the horrour and awful grandeur of its character. If the great battles of Austerlitz, Jean, and Mount St. Jean surpass that of the Cataract in the number of the combatants, and of the slain, it must be recollected, that those actions were fought in open day, and by armies forming a line of many leagues extent—that in no instance did the defeated party return three several times to the charge, over the dead bodies of their companions; and this, in the gloom of night.

Here the conflicting armies closed at the moment the light of day was yielding to the empire of darkness, which gave an indescribable effect to the blaze of the guns, and the terrours of the fight. In no other action ever recorded was the loss in killed and wounded so great, in proportion to the number engaged. Nearly

two thirds of the American troops were either killed or wounded. Almost every officer of distinction was wounded. An equal, probably a greater loss, fell on the enemy. What a scene of carnage must the battle ground have presented! No parallel can be found in history, where both parties fought with such determined bravery, and suffered such a horrible loss. Of more than 2000 Americans who went into battle, not more than 700 escaped unhurt. The superiour numbers of the enemy enabled them to renew the attack until our troops were diminished to about one third of their original number. Yet, like a wall of granite they remained immovable amid repeated shocks and surrounding horrours, with their feet inundated with the blood of their enemies, they waded in gore to victory. In the intervals of the charges, darkness veiled the appalling spectacle, but their ears were stunned with the cries of the wounded and dying, while the tremendous force of the cataract shook the astonished earth beneath their feet; for it is here that Nature appears in all the majesty of her power. Never was human firmness put to so severe a trial. Where is the cold hearted ingrate that can withhold his admiration from such intrepid defenders? Can the Republick tarnish her glory by forgetting the services of the heroes of Niagara?

The official censure of General Ripley's conduct in not renewing the action on the morning of the 26th of July, which appears in General Brown's statement of the battle, has drawn from the officers* friendly to the reputation of General Ripley, a voluminous series of letters and statements, in which they not only exonerate him in the most pointed manner, from all blame in the transaction, but ascribe to his prudent foresight, bravery, and consummate military skill, the salvation of the

* Among the long list of officers who have come forward in defence of General Ripley's military character, we observe the names of General Miller, Colonels Leavenworth and Hindman, Majors Noon, Foster, Browning, Burbank, Marston, Odell, and Romayne, Captains Clark, Perry, M'Donald, &c.

wreck of the army put in jeopardy of total annihilation by the temerity of General Scott and the injudicious dispositions of General Brown!

In armies, as in courts and politicks, there will be courtiers and factions; and brave men may be allowed to be jealous of military glory, obtained by privations, fatigue, and an almost constant exposure of life. The best officers may for once endanger the success of a battle by a premature movement and an erroneous impression as to the force or intentions of his enemy. Cæsar was not always victorious. The great Napoleon was fairly foiled in his attempts upon St. Jean d'Acre; and but for the opportune arrival of the immortal Des Suix, he would have lost the battle of Marengo. Bulow saved Blucher and Wellington at Waterloo. A single ball sometimes decides the fate of battles, by prostrating the leader of a charge, the success of which would have determined the victory.

A correspondent friendly to General Ripley describes this memorable battle in these words:

No battle perhaps in the annals of the world was more obstinately contested, or attended with greater or more frightful carnage, according to the number engaged. The scales of victory for many hours were doubtfully suspended; sometimes vibrating on one side, and sometimes on the other; alternately promising and threatening to either party the glory of triumph or the disgrace of defeat, until at length the God of battles and the divinity of fortune, crowned our arms with glorious success. The American soldiers, flushed with the pride of recent triumphs over the boasted conquerors of Europe, and animated with the spirit of liberty and a love of glory peculiar to freemen, distinguished themselves by daring achievements, worthy the heroes of a Grecian band or a Roman legion in the proudest days of those republicks. They showed to tyrants and to the world, how unavailing is the most perfect order of slavish discipline, opposed to the resistless impetuosity of republican valour. They may venture to assert without the imputation of vanity or weakness, that the heights of Bridgewater, and the plains of Chippeway, will remain

to the latest posterity, as lasting monuments of human greatness and human glory, as those of Thermopylæ and Marathon. Commanders in after ages of our republick will refer to them for the most brilliant examples of patriotick devotion and heroick achievement, to rekindle the expiring flames of independence, liberty, and glory, in the bosoms of their degenerate and disanimated legions. Their bare recital will relume the dying fire of patriotism and valour in their languid souls, and prompt them to a glorious and successful emulation of their fathers.

The number and situation of the enemy was not precisely known upon the day of the engagement, though it afterwards appeared that he was about 4000 strong, and had advanced to the heights of Queenstown. The number of our respective corps was as follows:

The first brigade, under General Scott, consisted of about 700 effective men; and the second brigade, under General Ripley, amounted to about the same number. The volunteers, under General Porter, did not exceed 500 capable of duty. The number of artillerists and dragoons is not precisely ascertained; they probably amounted to 200, fit for service; making in the whole, a force of 2500 men, rank and file.

Upon the 25th, about 6 o'clock, P. M., General Scott, with the first brigade, marched from camp, on the high road to Fort George, without sending in advance any reconnoitering party of light troops to ascertain the position, number, or approach of the enemy, to guard against a surprise or to facilitate a retreat to the main body of the army, if occasion should require. Whether he moved from the order of the Commander, or his own inclination, with an expectation of a battle or for parade and drill, was unknown in camp at that time. If he went out to give the enemy battle agreeably to orders, why was not our whole disposable force directed to accompany or follow him? If the enterprise was only for ostentation, why was he permitted to jeopardize his gallant band and the whole army, exposing himself to be surprised and attacked alone so far from camp by the whole British army? These are things yet involved in

impenetrable mystery, which time, the retrospective and prospective expounder of events, only can reveal. If the Commander-in-Chief ordered the movement of General Scott, he must be deservedly suspected of military incapacity; if he only permitted it, he must be justly considered guilty of notorious imprudence. If General Scott made the movement without orders, he is justly chargeable with rashness, or folly, which we shall see in the progress of events, would inevitably have destroyed the whole army, and blasted the glories of the day, if they had not been fortunately retrieved by the superiour ability, skill, enterprise, and valour of General Ripley. When General Scott had proceeded about two miles from camp, he was attacked by the whole British forces, by a discharge of musketry from their whole line. Upon this signal, our camp was alarmed, and General Ripley ordered his brigade to be formed. In the meantime the thunder of artillery announced the reality, fury, and inequality of the contest, and excited in every bosom the most painful apprehensions for the fate of the first brigade, before we could arrive to support them. Orders were soon received from General Brown, through Captain Spencer, his Aid, for the second brigade to repair to the scene of action, for the relief of General Scott's corps, whose ranks were now frightfully thinned and reluctantly recoiling from the unequal contest. General Ripley instantly obeyed the order by directing us to march; and when we had proceeded to within half a mile of the field of battle, he was ordered to form his brigade in line near the skirts of a wood to the right of General Scott's, and advance upon the enemy. But from the difficulty, if not impracticability of proceeding in line through the woods, he resolved to advance within reach of the foe before he formed. Although this was taking upon himself a high responsibility, yet the order was so absurd that he dared to disobey; and the success attending his after movements, seem clearly to justify the measure. Though a scrupulous obedience to the orders of superiours in an army is generally a sacred duty, and a sure pledge of victory, yet the incompetency or mistake of a commander, may sometimes allow and require a partial defection from

them. It would have been admissible, and even meritorious for the officers of General Hull, at the capture and surrender of Detroit; and seems tolerable, and even laudable for General Ripley on this occasion.

In performing the proposed movement of General Ripley, we suffered great annoyance and sustained considerable loss from the constant and destructive fire of the enemy's battery, which was chiefly directed at General Scott's mutilated and almost exhausted corps, which we were about passing to form in line upon their left.

The enemy's artillery was placed upon an eminence, and from its destructive effect upon our advancing columns, the General was sensible unless they were taken, we should be compelled to retire, or be overpowered. He accordingly asked Colonel Miller if he could storm and take them. The intrepid though modest hero, replied, "I can try;" an answer truly worthy a Leonidas and a Milliades, and shows the striking difference between real magnanimity and empty daring.

At this time General Scott's corps was about a quarter of a mile in the rear, having ceased firing; the volunteer corps under the command of General Porter, was not yet marshalled in the field; and our artillerists and dragoons were not then nor afterwards advantageously engaged in the action, on account of the peculiar situation of the contending armies.

Agreeably to the orders of General Ripley, Colonel Miller formed his regiment directly in front of the batteries, and with a quick step advanced to storm and take them, under a tremendous fire which supplied the light of day, and produced most frightful chasms along his line; yet it did not in the least repel, disorder, or check the rapid and steady march of the assailants; like the Gallick chief and his brave companions at the bridge of Lodi, or the Spartan chief and his chosen band at the straits of Thermopylæ, they had resolved to conquer or to die. In the meantime the 23d regiment was ordered to move in column to the left, for the purpose of annoying the enemy in flank. In the execution of this order they were partially repulsed, by a discharge of musketry

from the enemy's right wing; but they were soon rallied by their General in person, and proceeded to attack the enemy as first directed. By this time the gallant Miller had taken the enemy's batteries, consisting of nine pieces of cannon, and after a stubborn and bloody contest, had forced him to abandon his position. The two lines were not more than twenty yards distant from each other, during the transaction. The darkness of night was by turns dispelled, and the light of day resumed, by the incessant and tremendous fire of the contending armies. During these operations of the 21st regiment, the 23d was attacking the enemy's right wing, and compelled it to fall back with the centre. Previous to the success of the 23d, the 21st was almost overpowered by superiour numbers; but at this trying crisis, was seasonably and happily relieved by the arrival of the 22d, and the enemy was completely driven from the heights. Soon after, the three regiments were formed in line forward of the captured batteries, together with 200 men of the 1st regiment, waiting with impatience another charge of the enemy. A considerable interval succeeded, in which General Ripley and General Brown met and conferred together some time. The former requested the latter to give orders and provide means to remove the captured cannon from the field, which seemed to be the principal object of contention, and which we shall see in the course of events, induced several desperate charges of the enemy to re-take them. Time and means were then in our power, and should have been improved. The superfluous horses of our artillery, and all our volunteer corps might have been employed for the purpose. The first were never engaged in the action, and the last only at the close of the engagement. General Brown, however, disregarded the request at this time, and soon after destroyed the means by ordering the artillery horses to camp. And those trophies, so dearly won and expensively defended, finally fell into the hands of the enemy, when we returned to our encampment. The exhausted men could not drag them; and if they could, they had no ropes for the purpose. However painful or invidious the task

may be, of canvassing the conduct of illustrious men in civil or military life, it becomes our duty in recording their actions, for the instruction and advantage of the world, impartially to state their capacity and incapacity, their virtues and their faults. It serves, like a beacon to the mariner, for future statesmen and commanders to avoid the rocks and quicksands to which they are exposed. Therefore we cannot avoid the expression of our opinion, that General Brown, in this affair, is chargeable with an unpardonable improvidence, if not with criminal neglect; and that General Ripley, so often but mistakenly blamed in the business, should be acquitted of remissness or imprudence. After this interview and conference of the two Generals concerning the removal of the captured artillery, the battle was soon renewed. The 25th regiment of the first brigade, under the command of the able and gallant Colonel Jessup, joined the second brigade, and was formed on the right to flank and annoy the enemy in his after attacks; which disposition was attended with the most brilliant success. They not only distressingly annoyed the enemy, but succeeded in capturing Major General Riall and a greater number of other officers and men, than was taken during the whole conflict.

The peculiar honour of capturing General Riall, is due to Captain Ketchum, which justly entitles him to the attention of his government, and will inevitably procure him the just confidence and grateful plaudits of his country.

While the line was thus formed upon the eminence, the enemy advanced and made a most violent charge upon our whole force. General Ripley ordered our men to reserve their fire until the enemy approached within reach of our bayonets, and firstly to receive their fire. The advantage of distance and light afforded to take aim, rendered our vollies more certain and tremendously destructive; while the enemy, from the lowness of his position in ascending the heights from which he had been driven, and the darkness of his view, generally fired over our heads. This order of the General was promptly obeyed, and with the most desired success;

for after a few discharges in this way, the enemy was again routed and compelled to retire. An interval of half an hour ensued, when the enemy again advanced and impetuously attacked our whole line, now extended by General Porter's corps of volunteers upon the left, and three battalions of General Scott's brigade upon the right. The contest was now longer, more stubborn, and attended with greater carnage; but by observing the precautions adopted in the last charge, it terminated in the entire discomfiture and retreat of the enemy. Our right and left were partially repulsed, but they were rallied before the engagement ended. A cessation for three quarters of an hour now followed before a renewal of the contest, which, like a conflagration quenched for a while by scanty showers of water, soon re-kindled with more appalling and destructive fury, ruthlessly consuming what its violence had spared.

During this interval, ancient night resumed her fearful empire and spread her shroud of gloom over the horrours of the carnage-covered field, still trembling with the convulsions of the conflict. The terrifick silence that prevailed was only interrupted by the agonizing groans of the dying, and the tremendous sound of Niagara's Cataract, stilled for a while by the deadly cannon's more awful roar. The intermitted beams of the pale faced moon and affrighted stars from behind their passing clouds, by turns exposed to view the frightful desolation of the scene, crimsoned with the blood and strewed with the mangled bodies of the dead. At length the martial clangour and exulting shouts of the advancing hosts proclaimed the renewal of the doubtful and long contested fight; which, after several impetuous charges and repulses, terminated in the complete discomfiture of the enemy, and a decisive triumph of our arms. After remaining undisputed masters of the field for some time, General Ripley retired to camp with all his forces, in pursuance of the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, in perfect order, unpursued or unmolested by the enemy. Having removed our wounded, we had nothing to regret or to tarnish our glory, but our inability to remove the captured artillery; which, as I before observed, fell into

the hands of the enemy after our retirement from the field.

Before the close of the engagement, General Brown and Scott were wounded, and retired from the scene of action, which devolved the entire command upon General Ripley. During the whole conflict, he displayed an ability, valour, enterprise, and zeal worthy a Hannibal or a Cæsar; and proved himself truly deserving supreme command, in any age and any country. He gave his orders with coolness and deliberation, and personally attended to their execution. He constantly rode a few paces in the rear of his line, rallying the routed ranks and cheering them on to combat. He avoided every refuge of protection—every resource of safety; and at all times and on all occasions, he courted every place of trial—every post of danger.

By order of General Brown, he repaired on the morning of the 26th to meet the enemy and give him battle. But finding them re-enforced and in possession of the battle ground and their artillery, he wisely declined a renewal of the contest, which the enemy showed no disposition to encourage or provoke, and returned again to camp. In this disobedience of orders, which now preserved the army as the other obtained the victory, General Ripley has been severely, though unjustly, blamed. But his conduct in both instances was perfectly accordant to military principles, and is supported by every intelligent officer in the army; and will be approved and commended by his country and posterity, when the dark cloud of falsehood, which has hitherto obscured the transaction, shall be dispelled by the refulgent sun of truth.

Our loss of men and officers had been immense. The first brigade marched into the field on the evening of the 25th, with about 800, rank and file, and the second with about the same number. The first returned from the field with not more than two hundred, and the last with not more than four hundred men, which, together with what could be spared of the other corps form the camp and attention of the wounded, amounted, perhaps, to 900 men. To suppose that this small force, impaired

by the hardships of the preceding day, fatigued by a march of three miles to and from camp, and exhausted for the want of sleep, could attack and vanquish an army of more than three thousand men, a great many of whom were re-enforcements, the remainder refreshed by rest and sleep, and possessed of the battle ground, and artillery, is really absurd and ridiculous. Such an order could only have proceeded from gross incapability and rash ambition; unwarranted by military principles, unsupported by common discretion. Generals Brown, and Scott, are justly to be esteemed for their undaunted bravery in action and honest zeal for their country, but for want of early instruction in military science, and a neglect of those precautions its practice inculcates, rendered them poorly qualified for Chief Commanders. The blunders they have committed, and the neglects of which they have been guilty on that account, must even lessen our opinion of their abilities as Generals, and will always greatly detract from their military fame. And although now undeservedly exalted at the expense of men, whose abilities, skill, and valour, achieved the victory's to which they owe their ephemeral renown; they will yet be reduced to a just standard of estimaton by the impartial and enlightened historian, stript of the gaudy plumage with which interested knavery, deluded ignorance, and blinded friendship may have clothed them.

The ability, skill, and valour of individuals, seem sufficiently shown by the preceding relation of events; yet I cannot omit to record the peculiar fate of Ambrose Spencer, Aid to General Brown. When war was declared, he was a student in Columbia College, a hopeful candidate of science and literary fame. Possessed of a bold and enterprising mind, he could not remain an idle spectator of the dangers that threatened his injured and insulted country. He cheerfully volunteered in her service, and gloriously fell in her defence. Noble youth, with the gallant heroes, who have fought, bled, and perished to establish and support our independence, you will live immortalized in fame, until our proudly towering empire shall be no more; or until this far

spreading continent, upon which it is established, shall be lost in the final conflagration and ruin of the world.

Such was the carnage among Colonel Jessup's officers, that he was obliged to place his standard in the hand of a Sergeant, whose name was Fitch.

While the colours, pierced with about seventy balls, were waving in the hand of this brave fellow, a shower of grape shot coming from the enemy, cut the staff into three pieces. Fitch deliberately gathering up the scattered fragments, turned to Jessup, who was near him, and said with a smile, "Look, Colonel, how they have cut us." In a moment afterwards, a ball passed through his body. But even that was insufficient to move him. Alike powerful in person and resolute in mind, he neither fell nor flinched; but continued to wave his mutilated standard, until, becoming faint with the loss of blood, he was forced to resign it into the hands of another.

Fitch recovered from his wound, and his good conduct being reported to the Secretary of War, he was promoted to a second Lieutenancy, his commisson bearing date from the day on which he had thus distinguished himself.

Colonel Jessup suspecting that his troops had expended nearly all their cartridges, passed along the rear of the line, to make inquiry as to the fact. Several soldiers who lay mortally wounded, some of them actually in the agonies of death, hearing the inquiry, forgot for a moment, in their devotion to their country, both the pain they endured and the approach of death, and called out, each one for himself, "Here are cartridges in my box, take and distribute them among my companions."

A soldier in the line exclaimed to his commander, "My musket is shot to pieces." His comrade, who lay expiring with his wounds at the distance of a few feet, in a voice scarcely audible, "My musket is in excellent order—take and use her."

At a moment of the greatest confusion, General Scott rode up to a large body of the British, supposing them to be Americans, and enquired to what corps they belonged; they answered, "The Glengarians;" "Keep

in order," said he "and I will be with you in a few minutes;" he then galloped off at full speed. A great number fired upon him, when they found their mistake; it was said that he received his wound at this time.

When Major-General Riall, who was made prisoner at the battle of Niagara, proffered his sword, in token of submission, to Colonel Jessup, who commanded the capturing party, the generous young American courteously declined accepting it, with a complimentary observation, that he could not deprive of his sword an officer who had worn it with such distinguished honour.

On the following day, when Jessup was sitting in his tent smarting under his wounds, Riall entered, and after eulogising his conduct as an officer, thanking him for his magnanimity, and expressing his regret at the injuries he had sustained in battle, begged his acceptance, as a favour to himself, of the same sword which he had refused when he might have claimed it by right of conquest. It is a plain gold hilted sabre, with a blade unadorned by any figures, lettering, or device, but of the finest metal and most exquisite polish.

The following letter addressed to the Secretary of War, fully exculpates General Ripley from all blame in this memorable engagement.

Washington City, May, 1815.

Hon. Alex. J. Dallas,

SIR—My report of the 7th August, created an impression, in relation to General Ripley, which I by no means intended. I did not intend to implicate his courage, his talents, or his zeal.

In that report I stated, that I had given him orders to meet, and beat the enemy, on the morning of the 25th July. This order was not given until after the command of the army had entirely devolved upon General Ripley; and I am fully convinced, that circumstances afterwards occured, to satisfy the judgement of General Ripley, that the other order could not be executed.

Justice to myself, as well as to the army, requires that I should make this statement.

(Signed) JACOB BROWN.

Generals Brown and Scott were conveyed to Buffalo. The command of the army devolved upon General Ripley, who ascended the Niagara, and took a position at Fort Erie, and made every preparation to receive the pursuing enemy, who had repaired his losses with numerous re-enforcements, and which compelled our army in its turn, to act on the defensive.

Nothing of moment occurred until the third of August, when the enemy, to the number of from 12 to 1500 crossed the Niagara, at about 2 o'clock in the morning. They made the shore a little below Conjocta Creek. Major Morgan, who had been stationed at Black Rock, and who had anticipated the enemy's movement, took a position on the upper side of the creek, and threw up a battery of logs. The British landed nine boats full of troops, and at a quarter past 4, advanced to attack our riflemen, posted behind their temporary works, calmly awaiting their approach. Our men as a precautionary measure had taken up the bridge. The enemy came on with an advance party to repair the bridge. When within rifle shot distance, our troops opened a deadly fire, which soon compelled them to faulter, and finally to retire. They then formed in the skirt of the woods, and kept up the fight at long shot, continually re-enforcing from the Canada shore, until twenty-three boat loads had landed, and then attempted to flank our men by sending a large body up the creek to ford it, when Major Morgan detached Lieutenants Ryan, Smith and Armstrong with about 60 men to oppose them, when they were again repulsed with considerable loss. Being thus foiled in this attempt, the enemy withdrew to Squaw Island and finally to the Canada shore.

Major Morgan had only 240 men to resist the superiour numbers of the enemy. He lost but two killed and eight wounded. Captain Hamilton, and Lieutenants Wadsworth, and M'Intosh, were among the latter. He estimates the loss of the British at fifty.

On the 4th of August, Brigadier-General Gaines arrived from Sacket's Harbour, and assumed the command at Fort Erie. General Ripley had previously made

the most judicious disposition for defence. General Drummond, with a force estimated at about 5,000 men, remained posted opposite Black Rock, two miles below the American position.

On the 5th, General Gaines attempted to draw out the enemy's forces, by sending the rifle corps through the woods, with orders to amuse the enemy's light troops until his strong columns should get in motion, and then to retire slowly to the plain on the American side, where a strong line was posted ready to receive him. Our riflemen met and drove the enemy's light troops into their lines, but could not provoke them to come out again. After remaining nearly two hours in the woods, our men returned to camp, having lost five killed and several wounded. Ten British and five Indians were killed.

On the 11th of August, the enemy had cautiously approached to within about twelve hundred yards in the rear of the American works, where they had constructed two batteries and erected a wooden breastwork, which enabled them to annoy our camp without exposing themselves to any danger. In examining their works, Captain Birdsall of the 4th rifle regiment, with 160 men, beat in two of their strong pickets, with a loss on the part of the British of ten killed. Captain Birdsall had but one killed and three wounded.

On the 12th, Major Morgan, who defeated the enemy on the 3d at Conjockta, fell at the head of his corps while gallantly supporting a detachment of eighty riflemen under Captain Birdsall, who had been sent to cut off a working party of the enemy, engaged in opening an avenue for a battery through the woods. The enemy were driven from their works, but were soon re-enforced and an animated contest ensued. The firing continued longer than the Major had expected; he advanced to the support of Captain Birdsall The British proving too strong for our party, the Major gave the signal of retreat with his bugle, and at the same time received a ball through his head; his men succeeded in conveying his body from the field.

About this time nearly 3000 militia from the western

counties of New York arrived at Buffalo, to aid in extricating the gallant survivors of Chippeway and Niagara from their perilous predicament; being now closely invested on the land sides of their defences, and it was not practicable to escape in boats. But deliverance was near; defeat and dismay awaited the foe, as the following official details will show.

Head Quarters, Left Wing, 2d Division,
Fort Erie, U. C. August—1814.

SIR—I have the honour to communicate for the information of the department of war, the particulars of the battle fought at this place on the 15th inst. between the left wing of the 2d division of the army under my command, and the British forces in the peninsula of Upper Canada, commanded by Lieutenant General Drummond, which terminated in a signal victory in favour of the United American arms.

Our position on the margin of the lake at the entrance of the Niagara river, being nearly a horizontal plain twelve or fifteen feet above the surface of the water, possessing few natural advantages, had been strengthened in front by temporary parapet breastworks, entrenchments, and abattis, with two batteries and six field pieces The small unfinished Fort, Erie, with a 24, 18, and 12 pounder, forms the north-east; and the Douglass battery, with an 18 and 6 pounder near the edge of the lake, the south-east angle of our right. The left is defended by a redoubt battery with six field pieces just thrown up on a small ridge. Our rear was left open to the lake, bordered by a rocky shore easy of ascent. The battery on the left was defended by Captain Towson; Fort Erie, by Captain Williams, with Major Trimble's command of the 19th infantry; the batteries on the front by Captains Biddle and Fanning; the whole of the artillery commanded by Major Hindman. Parts of the 11th, 9th, and 22d infantry (of the late veteran brigade of Major General Scott,) were posted on the right, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Aspinwall. General Ripley's brigade, consisting of the 21st and 23d, defended the left. General

Porter's brigade of New-York and Pennsylvania volunteers, with our distinguished riflemen, occupied the centre.

I have heretofore omitted stating to you, that during the 13th, and 14th, the enemy had kept up a brisk cannonade, which was sharply returned from our batteries, without any considerable loss on our part. At 6 P. M. one of their shells lodged in a small magazine in Fort Erie, which was fortunately almost empty. It blew up with an explosion more awful in appearance than injurious in its effects, as it did not disable a man or derange a gun. It occasioned but a momentary cessation of the thunders of the artillery on both sides; it was followed by a loud and joyous shout by the British army, which was instantly returned on our part; and Captain Williams, amidst the smoke of the explosion, renewed the contest by an animated roar of his heavy cannon.

From the supposed loss of our ammunition, and the consequent depression such an event was likely to produce upon the minds of our men, I felt persuaded that this explosion would lead the enemy to assault; and made my arrangements accordingly. The annexed paper, No. 1, is a copy of Lieutenant General Drummond's order and plan of attack.

The night was dark, and the early part of it raining; but the faithful sentinel slept not; one third of the troops were up at their posts. At half past 2 o'clock, the right column of the enemy approached, and though enveloped in darkness, black as his designs and principles,* was distinctly heard on our left, and promptly marked by our musketry under Major Wood, and cannon under Captain Towson. Being mounted at the moment, I repaired to the point of attack, where the sheet of fire rolling from Towson's battery, and the musketry of the left wing of the 25th infantry under Major Wood, enabled me to see the enemy's column of

* I several times heard; and many of our officers heard orders given "to give the damned Yankee rascals no quarters."

about 1500 men approaching on that point; his advance was not checked until it had approached within ten feet of our infantry. A line of loose brush representing an abattis, only intervened. A column of the enemy attempted to pass round the abattis through the water where it was nearly breast deep. Apprehending that this point would be carried, I ordered a detachment of riflemen and infantry to its support; but having met with the gallant commander, Major Wood, was assured by him that he could defend his position without reenforcements. At this moment the enemy were repulsed, but instantly renewed the charge, and were again repulsed. My attention was now called to the right, where our batteries and lines were soon lighted by a most brilliant fire of cannon and musketry; it announced the approach of the centre and left columns of the enemy, under Colonels Drummond and Scott; the latter was received by the veteran 9th under the command of Captain Foster, and Captains Boughton and Harding's companies of New-York and Pennsylvania volunteers, aided by a 6 pounder judiciously posted by Major M'Kee, chief engineer, who was most active and useful at this point; they were repulsed. That of the centre, led by Colonel Drummond, was not long kept in check; it approached at once every assailable point of the fort, and with scaling ladders ascended the parapet, but was repulsed with dreadful carnage. The assault was twice repeated, and as often checked; but the enemy having moved round in the ditch, covered by the darkness added to the heavy cloud of smoke which had rolled from our cannon and musketry, enveloping surrounding objects, repeated the charge, re-ascended the ladders; their pikes, bayonets, and spears, fell upon our gallant artillerists. The gallant spirits of our favourite Captain Williams and Lieutenants M'Donough and Watmough, with their brave men, were overcome. The two former and several of their men, received deadly wounds. Our bastion was lost. Lieutenant M'Donough, being severely wounded, demanded quarter. It was refused by Colonel Drummond. The Lieutenant then seized a handspike, and nobly defended himself until he was shot

down with a pistol by the monster who had refused him quarter, who often reiterated the order—"Give the damned Yankees no quarter." This officer, whose bravery, if it had been seasoned with virtue, would have entitled him to the admiration of every soldier—this hardened murderer soon met his fate. He was shot through the breast while repeating the order to "give no quarter."

The battle now raged with increased fury on the right, but on the left the enemy was repulsed and put to flight. Thence and from the centre I ordered re-enforcements. They were promptly sent by Brigadier General Ripley and Brigadier General Porter. Captain Fanning, of the corps of artillery, kept up a spirited and destructive fire with his field pieces on the enemy attempting to approach the fort. Major Hindman's gallant efforts, aided by Major Trimble, having failed to drive the enemy from the bastion with the remaining artillerists and infantry in the fort, Captain Birdsall of the 4th rifle regiment, with a detachment of riflemen, gallantly rushed through the gateway to their assistance, and with some infantry charged the enemy; but was repulsed, and the Captain wounded. A detachment from the 11th, 19th, and 22d infantry, under Captain Foster of the 11th, was introduced over the interiour bastion, for the purpose of charging the enemy. Major Hall, assistant inspector general, very handsomely tendered his services to the charge. The charge was gallantly made by Captain Foster and Major Hall; but owing to the narrowness of the passage up the bastion, admitting only two or three men abreast, it failed. It was often repeated, and as often checked. The enemy's force was, however, much cut to pieces and diminished by our artillery and small arms. At this moment every operation was arrested by the explosion of some cartridges deposited in the end of the stone building adjoining the contested bastion. The explosion was tremendous—it was decisive; the bastion was restored. At this moment Captain Biddle was ordered to have a field piece posted so as to enfilade the exteriour plain and salient glacis. The Captain, though not recovered from a

severe contusion in the shoulder, received from one of the enemy's shells, promptly took his position and served his piece with vivacity and effect. Captain Fanning's battery likewise played upon them with great effect. The enemy were in a few moments entirely defeated, taken, or put to flight, leaving on the field 221 killed, 174 wounded, and 186 prisoners, including 14 officers killed, and 7 wounded and prisoners. A large portion are so severely wounded, that they cannot survive; the slightly wounded, it is presumed, were carried off.

To Brigadier General Ripley much credit is due for the judicious disposition of the left wing previous to the action, and for the steady disciplined courage manifested by him and his immediate command, and for the promptness with which he complied with my orders for re-enforcement during the action. Brigadier General Porter, commanding the New-York and Pennsylvania volunteers, manifested a degree of vigilance and judgement in his preparatory arrangements, as well as military skill and courage in action, which proves him to be worthy of the confidence of his country and the brave volunteers who fought under him. Of the volunteers, Captains Boughton and Harding, with their detachments, posted on the right and attached to the line, commanded by Captain E. Foster of the veteran 9th infantry, handsomely contributed to the repulse of the left column of the enemy under Colonel Scott.

The judicious preparations and steady conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Aspinwall, commanding the first brigade, merit approbation.

To Major M'Kee, chief engineer, the greatest credit is due for the excellent arrangement and skilful execution of his plans for fortifying and defending the right, and for his correct and seasonable suggestions to regain the bastion. Major Wood, of the engineers, also greatly contributed to the previous measures of defence. He had accepted the command of a regiment of infantry, (the 21st) for which he has often proved himself well qualified, but never so conspicuously as on this occasion.

Towson's battery emitted a constant sheet of fire.

Wood's small arms lighted up the space, and repulsed five terrible charges made between the battery and the lake. Brigadier General Ripley speaks in high terms of the officers and men engaged, particularly Captains Marston and Ropes; Lieutenants Riddle (of the 15th, doing duty with the 21st) and Hall; Ensigns Benn, Jones, Cummings, and Thomas, of the 21st; and Keally and Green, of the 19th.

Major Hindman and the whole of the artillery under the command of that excellent officer, displayed a degree of gallantry and good conduct not to be surpassed. The particular situation of Captain Towson, and the much lamented Captain Williams and Lieutenant M'Donough, and that of Lieutenant Watmough, as already described, with their respective commands, rendered them most conspicuous. The courage and good conduct of Lieutenants Zantzinger and Childs, are spoken of in the highest terms by Major Hindman and Captain Towson, as also that of Sergeant Major Denhon. Captains Biddle and Fanning, on the centre and right of their entrenchments, threw their shot to the right, left, and front, and annoyed the Indians and light troops of the enemy approaching from the woods. Lieutenant Fontaine, in his zeal to meet the enemy, was unfortunately wounded and made prisoner. Lieutenant Bird was active and useful, and in fact every individual of the corps did their duty.

The detachment of Scott's gallant brigade, consisting of parts of the 9th, 11th, and 22d infantry, did its duty in a manner worthy the high reputation the brigade had acquired at Chippeway and at the falls of the Niagara. The 9th, under the command of Captain Edmund Foster, was actively engaged against the left of the enemy, and with the aid of Lieutenant Douglass' corps of bombadiers, commanding the water battery, and of that of the volunteers under Captains Boughton and Harding, effected their repulse. The good conduct of Lieutenants Childs, Cushman, and Foot, and Ensign Blake, deserves commendation.

The officers killed, are Captain Williams and Lieutenant M'Donough, of the artillery; wounded, Lieu-

tenant Watmough, of the artillery; Ensign Cisna, 19th; Lieutenant Bushnell, 21st; Lieutenants Brown and Belknap, 23d; and Captain Birdsall, 4th rifle regiment, all severely.

Lieutenant Fontaine, of the artillery, who was taken prisoner, writes from the British camp, that he fortunately fell into the hands of the Indians, who, after taking his money, treated him kindly. It would seem, then, that these savages had not joined in the resolution to give no quarter.

To Major Jones, assistant adjutant general, and Major Hall, assistant inspector general; Captain Harris, of the dragoons, volunteer Aid-de-Camp; Lieutenant Belton, Aid-de-Camp—much credit is due for their constant vigilance and strict attention to every duty previous to the action, and the steady courage, zeal, and activity which they manifested during the action.

The Surgeons, Drs. Fuller, 23d, Trowbridge, 21st, with their mates; Drs. Gale, of the 33d, and Everitt and Allen, of the 21st, deserve the warmest approbation for their indefatigable exertions and humane attention to the wounded of our army, as well as to the prisoners who fell into their hands.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your very obedient servant,
E. P. GAINES,
Brig. Gen. Commanding.

The disparity of loss between the assailants and the besieged, sufficiently marks the importance of the victory. The enemy admit a loss of 805. Our loss was only 84.

The cause of the explosion has never been officially explained. Much difference of opinion exists; but the true cause, we are persuaded, is to be traced to the wadding of the British guns which fell on a quantity of cartridges deposited under the east end of the bastion, and to which accident we unquestionably owe the success of the conflict, and the safety of our gallant little army. For the enemy had in considerable numbers gained the top of the bastion upon which were placed

our principal guns, and these they had actually turned upon our men. This advantage enabled them to rake the whole extent of the encampment. Besides, several desperate but abortive attemps had been made to regain possession of the bastion. It was therefore the explosion which cleared it, and saved our troops from the horrours of a general massacre.

The enemy on the bastion were thrown high into the air, with their cartouch boxes full of fixed ammunition exploding at every point of elevation, exhibited a spectacle of awful grandeur, never before surpassed. Nearly 200 unfortunate beings were blown into eternity; each of whom described in his course a blazing parabola. No description can reach the tremendous reality of this shocking catastrophe.

Every thing conspired to give to menacing danger the utmost of its appalling influence. The darkness of night; the unknown effect of the explosion; the incipient success of the enemy; his vastly superiour numbers; his well known intentions to "give no quarter;" the unsuccessful attempt to regain the bastion, and the impossibility of escape, left nothing in prospective to feed expiring hope. It is in scenes like this that the brave man acquires additional strength from the terrours of surrounding objects. Even the coward, if he resists the onset, forgets the weakness of his nature, and, electrified by magick sympathy, rises superiour to himself. It is in this school of fortitude that heroes are born to distinction; that the long and glorious list of our military and naval commanders have been trained to deeds of noble achievement.

Some of the enemy survived this awful explosion, even after having lost both legs and an arm.

About 1000 British muskets were picked up at the different points of assault, the day after the action.

In addition to the officers and corps named in General Gaine's official report, Captain Chunn and his company signalized themselves by sallying out and pursuing a retreating column of the enemy nearly a mile. They made nearly 100 prisoners. Lieutenants Bowman and Larned bore conspicuous parts: Lieutenant Gleason, as usual, was particularly active.

General Ripley commanded on the left flank; so regular and vivid was the fire on this point, that the enemy called it the Light House.

Although foiled in this attempt to carry our works, the enemy did not relinquish his views of conquest. The blockade was continued. Severe cannonades were occasionally kept up; particularly on the 13th and 14th of August, during which time our loss was nine killed and thirty-six wounded. Scarcely a day passed without an exchange of several shots. The situation of our troops was distressing, for they were exposed to incessant danger and annoyance. Many valuable lives were lost by the bursting of the enemy's shells in camp, and by their cannon shot, which unfortunately, were but too well aimed.*

On the 28th of August, a shell fell in the room which General Gaines occupied as his head quarters; it struck the floor close by the General's chair, and instantly burst. He received a violent contusion in the side, which at first was considered mortal; but from the effects of which he afterwards recovered.

The command of the army again devolved on General Ripley, who retained it only until the 2d of September, when General Brown resumed the command.

Between the 16th and 18th of September, several animated skirmishes were fought, in one of which fell the gallant Colonel Wilcox, the leader of the Canadian volunteers. He was killed in the act of storming one of the enemy's batteries, which he approached sword in hand, at the head of his troops. He gave a noble example of personal courage. His loss was regretted by the whole army.

Two of the enemy's batteries were very formidable, being served with great skill and effect. A third had been completed, and was about to open its fire. The militia of the western counties of New-York, crossed

* It is the opinion of our officers who remained with the army during the whole blockade, that we had 300 men killed or wounded, by the enemy's fire, exclusive of those who fell during the sortie and assault.

over to Fort Erie and generously participated in the dangers of the regular troops. Every thing was at length in readiness to resume the offensive, and chastise the enemy for his insolence; about one third of whose force was kept constantly on duty in his numerous works. The remainder, consisting of three brigades of infantry, estimated at 12 or 1500 men each, occupied his main camp, situated in a field surrounded by woods, nearly two miles distant from their batteries and intrenchments.

On the morning of the 17th September, the General had matured his plans. By twelve, his whole force were paraded in readiness to act according to his directions. General Porter, with the volunteers, riflemen, and a few Indians, commanded the left wing; he had orders to move from the extreme left of our position, upon the enemy's right; his command was subdivided into three divisions: 200 riflemen and a few Indians under Colonel Gibson, formed the advance, followed by two columns moving parallel to, and thirty yards distant from each other; the left column commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Wood, headed by 400 infantry under Major Brook of the 23d, and followed by 500 volunteers and militia, being parts of Lieutenant Colonel Dobbin, M'Burney's and Flemming's regiments, and was intended to attack the batteries. The left column of 500 militia was commanded by Brigadier General Davis, and comprised the commands of Lieutenant Colonels Hopkins, Churchill, and Crosby, and was intended to repel any re-enforcement from the enemy's camp; both columns were ordered to co-operate in the same object, should circumstances require it; which was the case. General Miller was directed to station his command in the ravine which lies between Fort Erie and the enemy's batteries, by passing them by detachments through the woods; and the 21st, under General Ripley, was posted as a corps of reserve between the new bastions of Fort Erie; all under cover, and out of the view of the enemy. About half past 3, P. M. the action commenced on the left. At this moment General Brown directed General Miller to pierce the ene-

my's intrenchments between bastions No. 2 and 3. His orders were promptly and ably executed. Within thirty minutes after the first gun was fired, batteries No. 2 and 3, the enemy's line of intrenchments, and his two block houses, were in our possession.* Soon after, battery No. 1 was abandoned by the British. The guns in each were spiked by us, or otherwise destroyed; the magazine of No. 3 was blown up.

General Ripley was ordered to re-enforce General Miller with the 21st; but in advancing to his support, inclined to the left, where Major Brooks' command was engaged, with a view of making some necessary inquiries of that officer; and, in the act of doing so, was unfortunately wounded. Nevertheless, Colonel Upham led the 21st to the aid of General Miller, who, however, had previously ordered the troops on the right to fall back. General Brown, perceiving this movement, sent his staff along the whole line to call in the other corps, which successively, according to their distance, returned to camp.

No one knows better how to appreciate military merit than General Porter. It is thus he speaks of his companions in arms:

After carrying by storm, in the handsomest style, a strong block house, in the rear of the third battery, making its garrison prisoners, destroying the three 24 pounders and their carriages in the third battery, and blowing up the enemy's magazine; and after co-operating with General Miller in taking the second battery, the gallant leaders of the three divisions all fell nearly at the same time; Colonel Gibson, at the second battery, and General Davis and Lieutenant Colonel Wood, in an assault upon the first.

Brigadier General Davis, although a militia officer of little experience, conducted on this occasion with all the coolness and bravery of a veteran, and fell while advancing upon the enemy's intrenchments. His loss as a citizen, as well as a soldier, will be severely felt in the

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* See General Brown's official statement of September 29, 1814.

patriotick county of Genesee. Colonel Gibson fully sustained the high military reputation which he had before so justly acquired. You know how exalted an opinion I have always entertained of Lieutenant Colonel Wood, of the engineers. His conduct on this day, was what it uniformly has been, on every similar occasion, an exhibition of military skill, acute judgement, and heroick valour. Of the other regular officers, Lieutenant Colonel M'Donald and Major Brooks, senior in command, will report to you in relation to their respective divisions. Permit me, however, to say of these two officers, that, much as was left to them by the fall of their distinguished leaders, they were able to sustain their parts in the most admirable manner, and they richly deserve the notice of the government.

Of the militia, I regret that the limits of a report will not permit me even to name all of those, who on this occasion established claims to the gratitude of their fellow citizens; much less to particularize individual merit. Lieutenant Colonels Hopkins, M'Burney, Churchill, and Crosby; and Majors Lee, Marcle, Wilson, Lawrence, Burr, Dunham, Kellogg, and Ganson, are entitled to the highest praise for their gallant conduct, their steady and persevering exertions. Lieutenant Colonel Dobbin being prevented by severe indisposition, from taking the field, Major Hall, Assistant Inspector General, volunteered his services to join Major Lee in the command of the volunteer regiment; and Major Lee and every other officer speaks in the highest terms of the gallant and good conduct of this young officer.

Captain Fleming, who commanded the Indians, was, as he always is, in the front of the battle. There is not a more intrepid soldier in the army. I should be ungrateful, were I to omit the names of Captains Knapp and Hull of the volunteers, and Captain Parker and Lieutenant Chatfield of the militia, by whose intrepidity I was, during the action, extricated from the most unpleasant situation. Captains Richardson, Buel, and Kennedy; Lieutenants Parkhurst and Brown, and Adjutants Dobbin, Bates, and Robinson, particularly dis-

tinguished themselves. The patriotick conduct of Captain Elliot, with twenty young gentlemen, who volunteered from Batavia, and of Major Hubbard with fourteen men exempted by age from military duty, should not be omitted. They were conspicuous during the action.

You will excuse me, if I seem partial, in speaking of my own family, consisting of my Brigade Major Frazer, my volunteer Aid-de-Camp Riddle, (both 1st Lieutenants in the 15th infantry) Captain Bigger of the Canadian volunteers, Messrs. Williams and D'Lapierre, volunteer Aids for the day, all of whom, except Mr. Williams, were wounded.

Lieutenants Frazer and Riddle were engaged for most of the preceding day with fatigue parties, cutting roads for the advance of the column through the swamp, and falling timber to the rear, and within 150 yards of the enemy's right; which service they executed with so much address as to avoid discovery; and on the succeeding day they conducted the two columns to the attack. Frazer was severely wounded by a musket ball while spiking a gun on the second battery. Riddle, after the first battery was carried, descended into the enemy's magazine, and after securing (with the assistance of Quarter Master Greene, of the volunteers, whose good conduct deserves much praise) a quantity of fixed ammunition, blew up the magazine and suffered severely by the explosion I must solicit through you, Sir, the attention of the general government to these meritorious young men. Captain Bigger is an excellent officer, and rendered me much assistance, but was dangerously wounded. The other young men are citizens, and deserve much credit for their activity, and for having voluntarily encountered danger. My Aid-de Camp, Major Dox, was confined at Buffalo by sickness.

On the whole, Sir, I can say of the regular troops attached to the left column, and of the veteran volunteers of Lieutenant Colonel Dobbin's regiment, that every man did his duty, and their conduct on this occasion reflects a new luster on their former brilliant achievements. To the militia, the compliment is justly due,

and I could pay them no greater one than to say, that they were not surpassed by the heroes of Chippeway and Niagara, in steadiness and bravery.

The studied intricacy of the enemy's defences, consisting not only of the breast work connecting their batteries, but of successive lines of intrenchments for a hundred yards in the rear, covering the batteries and enfilading each other, and the whole obstructed by abattis, brush, and felled timber, was calculated to produce confusion among the assailants, and led to several contests at the point of the bayonet. But by our double columns any temporary irregularity in the one, was always corrected by the other. Our success would probably have been more complete, but for the rain which unfortunately set in soon after we commenced our march, which rendered the fire of many of our muskets useless, and by obscuring the sun, led to several unlucky mistakes. As an instance of this, a body of fifty prisoners who had surrendered, were ordered to the fort in charge of a subaltern and fourteen volunteers; the officer mistaking the direction, conducted them towards the British camp in the route by which we had advanced, and they were re-taken with the whole of the guard, excepting the officer and one man, who fought their way back. Several of our stragglers were made prisoners by the same mistake. But, Sir, notwithstanding these accidents, we have reason to rejoice at our signal success in inflicting a vastly disproportionate injury on the enemy, and in wholly defeating all his plans of operation against this army.

I have the honour to be, with very great respect, your obedient servant,

P. B. PORTER, Brig. Gen.
Com'g Volunteers and Militia.

The militia, although fresh from their fire sides, during the various rencounters of the day, rivalled the regulars in cool and determined bravery. Numerous were the feats of individual heroism. The rustick sons of Cayuga, Seneca, Ontario, Genessee, and Niagara, most of whom were ignorant of the manual exercise, faced

the Glengarian sharp shooters, often at half pistol shot distance, and with a deadly and certain fire, were more than a match for their experienced enemy. The scene of the action was in the woods, which afforded opportunities for exercising address in the choice of objects. Frequently two hostile columns would approach unperceived, to within a few paces of each other, when a most deadly contest would ensue. The sun was obscured by thick clouds; indeed it rained during the greater part of the afternoon. The point of direction was often lost, by corps, as well as individuals.

General Miller was at one time several rods in advance of his men; nay, even of his Aids. On a sudden, he perceived himself almost surrounded by the enemy. By a singular stroke of good fortune, he extricated himself from his perilous situation, and regained his command, unhurt by a shower of balls which was aimed at his person.

Major Burr, who led Colonel M'Burney's regiment, decided, by a prompt and judicious movement in the rear of battery No. 3, the contest at this point. The enemy perceiving himself hemmed in, surrendered at discretion. Advancing still further in the rear of the batteries, in a line parallel thereto, he fell in with a party of the enemy, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fisher, who, on account of the thickness of the brush, had approached, unseen, to within 4 or 5 rods of our men. This party was immediately put *hors du combat*. Fisher was wounded. One Major and five other officers, and nearly 100 privates were taken prisoners. Battery No. 2, next surrendered; and the Major would, with his command, advance still further upon the enemy's camp, but he had not proceeded many rods, before his attention was arrested by the appearance of a British force, advancing in close column to the relief of their batteries. The numbers and nearness of the enemy would have justified Major Burr in a hasty retreat; but knowing General Davis to be in his rear, he despatched a Sergeant to apprize him of his situation, and immediately formed his line within eight rods of the enemy. But this was scarcely done, before his right was all cut

down. For a moment his men were disordered, but were quickly rallied. The words "aim low," "break their shins," produced a magical effect, as they were repeated by every soldier in the line. "It is the hero's glory to live in thunder. Danger was forgotten in the love of glory and of country." For five minutes our gallant little band were enveloped in a blaze of lightning produced by the vivacity of their fire. The British regulars became entangled in the brush; they were thrown into confusion, and at intervals were heard swearing as if in mutiny; they wanted open and level ground to deploy upon. The oblique and low fire of our men, carried death into the enemy's ranks. In the height of this combat, Major Burr received orders to retreat. Instead, however, of obeying the mandate, he exclaimed to his brave troops, "*charge! charge!!*" The order was obeyed with a resistless impetuosity. The enemy fled at all points, and in the greatest disorder on his camp. The slaughter was great, in proportion to the number engaged, it was immense. It was at this point that the most obstinate fighting took place. It is the opionion of those engaged in that deadly rencounter, that nearly two hundred of the enemy fell upon this sanguinary spot. Indeed, General Drummond, in his official report of the events of the day, particularly notice the obstinacy of the action on this part of the line. It was here that he admits the greatest loss. Of 176 men with which Major Burr marched from the fort, only 76 returned unhurt. Of twelve platoon and staff officers, eight were killed, wounded, or taken and three others taken besides, two who returned, were wounded.

Major Burr, receiving no support from the other corps of the army, which in fact had returned at the first order of retreat, and perceiving the enemy attempting to out-flank him, determined on a retreat, in which hewas closely pressed in rear, and and exposed to a cross fire from the fresh re-enforcements from the British camp.

General Porter has rendered a suitable homage to the valour of his fellow citizens; but the limits of his report would not permit him to notice all the incidents

of the action, nor to particularize half the instances of individual bravery. The eloquence of the cannon awakens the brave to feats of courage. It is impossible to do justice to the merits of those brave men. Captain Huick, who was wounded, deserves all that can be said in his praise, or a grateful country bestow. Captains Pullock and Case, Lieutenants Clark and Beebe, Adjutant Bates, Paymaster Watkins, and Quarter-Master Greene, both slightly wounded, merit a greatful and lasting recollection of their services. Although the virtuous dead cannot profit by eulogy, still let the names of Lieutenant Brown and Ensign Blakely live in the history of that day. "Amiable as citizens, cool and undauntedly brave as soldiers, they died as they lived, patriots and heroes."

A veteran officer, speaking of the militia volunteers, renders them the tribute of his admiration in these words: "In the rage of battle they were cool and collected, paying strict attention to every order, as though they had been on parade."

In the course of the action, a New-York volunteer named William Holmes, from Ontario county, received a musket ball in his mouth, which shattered several of his teeth, and lodged in his neck, he fell, and his companions supposing him to be mortally wounded, paid no attention to him. After lying some time in a state of insensibility, he regained sufficient reason and strength to rise. The scene of the battle had changed, and he knew not which course would take him to the fort, but wandering at random, he blundered upon a party of the enemy, who were also bewildered. Holmes, rendered desperate by the anguish of his wounds, instantly levelled his piece at them; upon which, they made signs of submission; he went up to them, and ordered them to march, which they very readily obeyed. He followed close to their heels. By chance they took the right course to bring them to the fort, when it was proved that he had eleven of De Wateville's corps, prisoners. Extraordinary as this relation may appear, it is nevertheless strictly true. General Porter gave Holmes a certificate of the fact. The improbability is at once

removed by the rational inference that the party had made up their minds to desert.

The following authentick anecdote, although rather out of place, is only a specimen of the heroick fortitude of the brave men who perished at Fort Erie. When Colonel Wilcox was mortally wounded in storming a battery a few days before the sortie, he said *jocosely* to the next in command, "Tell the General I was fairly hit in front," and expired in a few minutes.

The modesty of General Porter would not permit him to give the particulars of the following adventure; of the truth of which we have received the most indubitable testimony. "In the course of the action, he had occasion to go from the right column of his command to the left. He had proceeded but a short distance in the woods, when he found himself within a few yards of the enemy, who had just emerged from a ditch, and who, discovering probably that our troops were formed in their rear, stood formed in two lines with their arms at rest, apparently hesitating which way to go, or how to act. General Porter finding himself within their power, and seeing that the occasion required resolution and decision, instantly left his company and running to them with the greatest boldness, exclaimed, "That's right, my brave fellows, surrender, and we will take care of you;" and coming up to the man on the left, he took his musket out of his hand, and threw it on the ground, at the same time pushing him forward towards the fort. In this way he proceeded through the first line, most of the men voluntarily throwing down their arms and advancing to the fort; when, on a sudden, a soldier, whose musket he was about to take, stepped back and presenting his bayonet to General Porter's breast, demanded *his* surrender. The general seized the musket and was wresting it from him, when he was assaulted by an officer who stood next in the ranks, and three or four soldiers, who after a short scuffle, brought him to the ground. He however, soon recovered his feet, when he found himself surrounded by 15 or 20 men, with their guns presented to him, again demanding his surrender. By

this time several of our officers were advancing with their men to the scene of action, and General Porter, assuming an air of composure and decision, told the enemy that they were surrounded and prisoners; and that if they fired a gun, they should all be put to the sword. Without venturing to fire, they still continued to vociferate, "surrender, you are my prisoner;" when Lieutenant Silas Chatfield, of the Cayuga riflemen, who had got near the spot, ordered his men to fire. This drew their attention from the General, and after a momentary scene of confusion and carnage, the enemy were all either killed or taken prisoners. In this affair, Captain Knapp of the New-York volunteers was badly wounded by a musket ball in the side, and General Porter in the hand by the cut of a sword."

Lieutenant General Drummond broke up his camp on the night of the 21st, and retired to his entrenchments behind the Chippeway. A party of our men came up with the rear of his army at Frenchman's creek. The enemy destroyed a part of their stores, by burning the buildings from which they were employed in removing them. A considerable quantity of cannon ball, and upwards of 100 stand of arms, were found in their camp.

General Izard, with his brigade, amounting to nearly 4000 men, was now on his march from Plattsburgh, for the purpose of forming a junction with General Brown's army. He reached Sacket's Harbour on the 16th September. The advance of this respectable re-enforcement to the Niagara frontier, the splended and decisive result of the sortie of the 17th, the diminished and dispirited state of the enemy's forces in the Peninsula, and the physical impracticability of their receiving fresh re-enforcements until the succeeding spring, combined to raise publick expectation to anxious solicitude. The junction or concert of the two armies was considered as certain; and as the pressage to the conquest of Upper Canada, including the enemy's naval force on Lake Ontario.

But Pandora's fruitful box was not yet exhausted of its evils; a chilling disappointment succeeds to the ar-

dour of hope, and again the most brilliant military prospects are blasted by the absurd dispositions of the War Department, the tardiness of Izard, fastidious jealousy, or the date of a commission. At last, General Izard arrives at Batavia, the two Generals confer, which results in the speedy departure of General Brown for Sacket's Harbour, and the passage of the Niagara by General Izard, at Black Rock, on the 11th of October.

On the 14th, General Izard displayed his force on the Plains of Chippeway. The enemy appeared in force on the 15th; but evinced no disposition to offer battle. The bridge being destroyed, both armies contented themselves with a brisk cannonade across the river, in which the artillery of Towson and Archer, nearly silenced that of the enemy. General Izard returned to Black Rock.

On the 18th of October, Brigadier-General Bissell marched from General Izard's head quarters with 900 men, for the purpose of seizing a quantity of provisions at Lyon's Creek. On the morning of the 19th, the detachment was attacked by a select corps of the enemy, 1200 strong. The light infantry under Captain Dorman, and Irvine's riflemen, sustained the whole of the enemy's fire for fifteen minutes, during which time the fifth and fourteenth were formed. The 5th turned the enemy's left flank, while the 14th charged directly in front. These movements were gallantly executed; the enemy were compelled to make a hasty retreat. The enemy's loss in this affair was estimated at nearly 200, while ours amounted to 12 killed and 55 wounded. Captain Allison had a horse shot under him. Colonels Snelling, and Pinckney, Majors Barker, and Barnard, Captains Dorman and Irvine, and Lieutenants Gassaway Horriel, Anspach, and Prestman, were the most conspicuous actors on the American side, and were all noticed for bravery and skill by General Bissell.

The army remained in Canada until the 5th of November, when it closed the campaign by blowing up the fortifications at Fort Erie, and recrossing the Niagara.

BATTLE OF BLADENSBURGH, AND FALL OF WASHINGTON CITY.

THE British divided their forces of shipping and men; the greater part ascended the Patuxent as high as Benedict village, preceded by the American flotilla; the residue ascended the Potomack; the main force of the enemy, led on by General Ross, advanced to Upper Marlborough. On the 22d August, Commodore Barney blew up his flotilla to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, and joined the American army under the command of General Winder. The enemy were now left to proceed in an uninterrupted march, the distance of about sixty miles along a road that might have been flanked, and their troops harrassed and defeated without a general engagement, by two regiments of well officered men. Thus they arrived at Bladensburgh without molestation, where the American army was drawn up to receive them. It was principally composed of militia and volunteers without much discipline, and who had not the least confidence in their officers, from the circumstance of their long march through the richest country in the United States without food; and when arrived, were served with dry wheat flour, which was mixed in muddy water and baked on fence rails, camp kettles, or in the fire. This circumstance, together with that of the uninterrupted march of the British, gave rise to a suspicion of treachery, which suspicion seemed generally to rest on Armstrong, the then Secretary of War. In this situation of things, the British arrived at Bladensburgh; the fire of their infantry, preceded by a storm of Congreve rockets, caused the American line to faulter; and the left, under General Stansberry, gave way on about the third, and the right, on the fifth, fire; the British then commenced outflanking the centre, who of course were compelled to retreat, which they did in tolerable order, and formed on the right of Commodore Barney's flotillamen; the

Commodore had formed across the road leading directly from Bladensburgh to Washington city ; here the enemy met with their principal resistance, and were swept down several times by whole columns rank and file. They then commenced outflanking on the right, which compelled the Commodore to retreat, which he did four different times, and formed in good order, as if determined to dispute every inch of ground, until he had five horses killed under him, and received three wounds, when he ordered his men to make a final retreat. He fell into the hands of the enemy, who, contrary to their usual custom, treated him well, giving him a parole and ordered him to be carried into Bladensburgh on a litter, leaving two of their surgeons to attend him. They pushed on for the city, which in a short time was in flames ; the capitol, President's house, the printing office, one of the former residences of Mrs. Washington, and all the other publick buildings, except the general Post-Office.

This is my statement; and being in the action, and twice wounded in near the close of it, I think I had an opportunity of observing the different circumstances attending this disastrous day. I am aware that this statement differs from the Report of the Committee of Congress, which will now be inserted.

REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE OF IN-INVESTIGATION, ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN CAPITOL.

PREVIOUS to the 2d of July, this district formed a part of military district No. 5. Early in June the cabinet assembled for purposes extraneous to the defence of the district. A plan was however suggested by the Secretary of the Navy relative to its defence, which was adopted. The effective force of district No. 5, was, on the 7th June, 2154 effectives, stationed at various points. On the 1st July a cabinet council was again convened by the President, from a variety of considerations, and a plan of defence proposed by him, which was adopted. On the 2d July the 10th military district was created, and General Winder appointed to command it. On the 4th of July a requisition of 93,500 men was made. Of this requisition, 2,000 effectives from the State of Virginia, 5,000 from Pennsylvania, 6,000 from Maryland, and 2,000 from the District of Columbia, were put at the disposal of General Winder; making a total of 15,000 men, exclusive of the regular force, estimated at 1,000 more. The committee states, that the Secretary of War, on the 12th July enclosed to General Winder a circular addressed to the Governours of certain States, requiring a body of militia to be organized, equipped, and held in readiness for future service, and authorizes him to call for a part or a whole of the quota assigned to Maryland; and on the 17th the Secretary authorizes him to draw from Virginia her quota of 2,000, from Pennsylvania 5,000, and informed him that the district militia were at his disposal; making 6,000 from Maryland, the estimate of 15,000 men.

In a letter of the 13th of August, from General Winder to the Secretary of War, he states, that in consequence of the acceptance of the 2d regiment of General Smith's division, and the impracticability and impropriety of taking any portion of the militia from the eastern

shore of Maryland, and the necessity of leaving the men upon the bay for local defence, instead of 3,000 he would not get as many hundred at Bladensburgh. He suggests the propriety of taking the troops, about 1,000, drawn out under the State authority, into the service of the United States, and to call on Pennsylvania for one regiment which would make his militia between 2 and 3,000, besides the 2d regiment from General Smith's division. In answer, the Secretary authorizes him to take them into the service of the United States. On the 27th July, the Governour of Maryland, in a letter to the Secretary of War, states that the requisition of the President was complied with, and that the requisition of General Winder for the 3,000 drafts, was ordered to embody. On July 30th, General Winder made a requisition on the Governour of Maryland, for 3,000 militia; and on the 5th of August the Governour informs him that his demand could not be complied with. On the 14th July, Mr. Boileau, Secretary of State for Pennsylvania, writes to the Secretary of War to the same effect, already mentioned, in relation to the difficulties, &c. resulting from the non-existence of the militia laws of that State; but relies on the patriotism of the people. On the 14th of July the Deputy Adjutant General, in answer to the communication from the war department, containing the requisition of the 4th July, states that orders had been issued by the Governour of Virginia, placing a provisional force of 15,000 in readiness for defence, &c. to be organized for three months only; he also states that the whole militia would be furnished with arms, &c. by Virginia; and on the 18th, the Secretary of War informs the Governour that 2,000 of the Virginia militia would be placed at the disposition of General Winder.

In relation to General Winder, the committee states, that on the 4th or 5th of July he received notice of his appointment to the 10th military district, and proceeded to Washington, when the Secretary of War enumerated the regular force, and showed him the requisition of the 4th. He then proceeded to explore the 10th military district generally. On the 17th, at Nottingham, he was

informed that the enemy was ascending the Patuxent, wrote to the Secretary, and General West, advising him to collect the militia. The 36th and 38th, regiments were ordered to Nottingham, and three companies of city militia were sent to him. On the 18th August, information was received that the enemy's fleet had, on the 17th, been considerably re-enforced. Immediately requisitions were made on the Governours of Pennsylvania and Maryland. Various officers, and the district militia were ordered out *en masse*. On the 19th General Winder submits several propositions relative to the defence of the City, which the Secretary of War informs him had been submitted to the President, and refers him to the Navy Department in relation to the means in that department. His call on the militia *en masse* is approved, and advises that the cavalry be pushed immediately into the neighbourhood of the enemy. On the 20th, information was received of the arrival of the enemy at Benedict, in force; and the same day Colonel Tilman and Captain Caldwell were despatched to annoy the enemy, impede his march, and remove and destroy his forage and provisions.

On Sunday morning, the 21st, the troops were mustered, and the articles of war read to them. At 12 o'clock the marines under Captain Miller joined the army; the regulars of the 36th and 38th also joined at the Wood Yard, seven miles in advance, to which the main body of our troops were marched, and encamped on Sunday night. Two letters from Colonel Monroe, on the 21st, one stating that he had viewed the enemy near Benedict, enumerated 27 square rigged vessels, some bay craft and barges; the other dated at Nottingham, stating the advance of the enemy upon that place by land and water; and recommending the commanding General to despatch 5 or 600 men to fall upon the enemy. Colonels Monroe and Beall both joined the army at night, and gave an account that the enemy had been viewed by them. Colonel Beall calculated that he had seen 4,000, without supposing he had seen all. Colonel Monroe estimated the enemy at about 6,000; Captain Herbert joins with his troops; Colonel Lavall had join-

ed with two companies of cavalry on the day previous; the enemy remained at Nottingham, except an advanced detachment about three miles from town. Monday the 22d, early in the morning a light detachment was ordered to meet the enemy, composed of the 36th and 38th, Lieutenant Colonel Scott, Colonel Lavall's cavalry, and three companies from the brigade of General Smith, under Major Peter, viz. his own company of artillery, Captain Stull's rifle corps, Captain Davison's light infantry. This detachment marched on the road to Nottingham, about nine o'clock; the remainder of the army marched about one mile in advance to an elevated position; the commanding General with his staff, accompanied by Colonel Monroe, proceeded in advance to reconnoiter the march of the enemy. Commodore Barney had joined the army with his flotillamen, besides the marines under Captain Miller; the horse preceded the advanced detachment of our forces, met the enemy, and retired before them. This induced the advance corps to take a position to impede the march of the enemy; but the advance detachment was ordered to retrograde and join the main body of the army that had remained some hours in line of battle, expecting the enemy to come that route to the city, but they were disappointed, for he took the road to Upper Marlborough, turning to his right after having come within a few miles of our forces; upon which the commanding General fell back with his whole forces to the battalion old field, about eight miles from Marlborough, and about the same distance from the city of Washington. At this time heavy explosions in the direction of Marlborough announced the destruction of the flotilla under command of Commodore Barney. The enemy arrived at Upper Marlborough about 2 o'clock, and remained there until late next day, to be joined, it is presumed, by the detachment of the enemy which had been sent against the flotilla.

The commanding General proceeded to Marlborough, and found the enemy encamped; several prisoners taken gave information that the enemy would remain in that position until the next day; and, after making observations of the enemy until the close of the day, General

Winder returned to the army. Late in the evening of this day the President, with the Secretaries of War and Navy, and the Attorney General, joined General Winder at the battalion old fields, and remained with him till the evening of the 23d. In the morning the troops were drawn up and reviewed by the President. The most contradictory reports prevailed as to the movements and force of the enemy, and it was doubted in camp whether Annapolis, Fort Washington, with a view to co-operate with his naval forces, or the city of Washington, was his object. As to numbers, rumours vibrated from 4 to 12,000; the best opinion was from 5 to 7,000. Our forces at this time, at the old fields, are variously estimated, with no material difference, at about 3,000 men, in the following corps: about 400 horse under the command of the following officers: Lieutenant Colonel Lavall, Colonel Tilghman, Captains Caldwell, Thornton, Herbert, Williams, &c.; 400 regular troops, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Scott, viz. 36th, 38th, and Captain Morgan's company of the 12th infantry; 600 marines and flotillamen under Commodore Barney and Captain Miller, with five pieces of heavy artillery, two 18 pounders, and three 12 pounders; 1,800 militia and volunteers, General Smith's brigade of Georgetown and city militia, and Maryland militia under Colonel Kramer, of which there were two companies of artillery under Captain Burch and Major Peter, with six 6 pounders each, making an aggregate of 3,200, with 17 pieces of artillery. The enemy was without cavalry, and had two small field pieces and one howitzer, drawn by men; and the whole country well calculated for defence, skirmishing, and to impede the march of an enemy.

The enemy remained at Upper Marlborough till after 12 o'clock; about which time General Winder again ordered the detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Scott and Major Peter, to advance and meet the enemy if he should be found advancing, or to attack his positions. About this time, 12 o'clock, some prisoners were taken; and from the information given by them, and the observations of the videts, General Winder was induced to

believe that the enemy intended to remain stationary for the day, which induced him to think of uniting with him the forces at Bladensburgh, and despatched orders to General Stansbury, and other corps at Bladensburgh to move direct for Upper Marlborough, and proceeded himself towards Bladensburgh, to meet and hurry on the forces to form a junction. When General Winder left the command with General Smith and proceeded towards Bladensburgh with several troops of cavalry, he left orders that the advanced corps should march upon the enemy and annoy him by all possible means, if in march, or if not, then in his positions; and if he advanced upon Bladensburgh, General Smith, with the main body, should fall upon his flank, or be governed by circumstances in other movements.

Captain Caldwell joined the advanced corps at two o'clock, P. M. An express brought intelligence that the enemy had left Upper Marlborough; that our advance had met the enemy about six miles in advance of our forces, and after a skirmish, in which Captain Stull's company had about four or five rounds, was compelled to retreat; and that the enemy was advancing. One of the Aids of General Smith was despatched for General Winder; the whole army was placed in a favourable attitude for defence, in which position it remained until about sun set, when General Winder, who had arrived some time previous, ordered the army to march to the city of Washington. The enemy was about three miles distant, and remained there that night. Having remained till the going down of the sun, the retreat to the city was induced by several considerations, stated by the commanding General. 1st. To effect a union of his whole forces. 2d. The fear of a night attack, from the superiority of the enemy, and want of discipline in his troops. And, 3d. In a night attack, his superiority in artillery could not be used. The march of our army to the city was extremely rapid and precipitate, and orders occasionally given to Captains of companies to hurry on the men, who were extremely fatigued and exhausted before the camping ground was reached near the Eastern branch ridge, within the district of Columbia.

General Stansbury had arrived at Bladensburgh on the 22d, and the 5th Baltimore regiment, including the artillery and rifle corps, on the evening of the 23d; and at 12 o'clock at night, Colonel Monroe, in passing through Bladensburgh to the city of Washington, advised General Stansbury to fall upon the rear of the enemy forthwith, as it was understood that he was in motion for the city. General Stansbury having been ordered to take post at Bladensburgh, did not think he was liberty to leave it; but, independent of this consideration, the fatigue of the troops under Colonel Sterret made it impracticable.

It is here proper to state that on the 22d, the Secretary of War, in a letter to General Winder, which closes their written communications previous to the 24th, except a short note of that morning, states that he had ordered General Douglass to march with his command to the district without seeking a rendezvous with General Hungerford; that a detachment of the 12th infantry had arrived; that it should be armed, equipped, and marched to the Wood Yard; that the Baltimore brigade would arrive at Bladensburgh that day; and suggests the propriety of throwing Barney's seamen and some other troops on the right of Nottingham, a demonstration which would menace the rear of the enemy, and his communication with his shipping, which would, if not stop, much retard his progress. On the morning of the 24th, in a short note to the Secretary of War, General Winder says, the information up the river is threatening; Barney or some other force should occupy the batteries at Greenleaf's Point and Navy Yard, and wishes counsel from the government or Secretary of War. Upon this note is an endorsement in the hand writing of General Armstrong, to this effect: "went to General Winder, saw no necessity for ordering Barney to Greenleaf's Point or Navy Yard—advised the Commodore to join the army at Bladengburgh, and ordered Minor's regiment to that place."

On the 21st, late at night, Colonel Taylor arrived in the city from the Northern Neck, where he had been charged with orders in relation to Virginia drafts, and

reported himself to General Armstrong, who issued the following general order:

War Department, 22d August, 1814.—12 o'clock.
General Order.

General Douglass will assemble his brigade at Alexandria, and hold it there subject to orders.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Colonel Taylor executed this order, and Tuesday night, the 23d, again reported himself to General Armstrong, who issued the following orders:

War Department.
General Order.

Lieutenant Colonel Minor will repair to Washington with the regiment under his command, with the utmost despatch; he will report on his arrival to Colonel Charberry of the 36th regiment, and make a requisition for arms and ammunition.

(Signed) JOHN ARMSTRONG.

War Department, August 23, 1814.
General Order.

All the militia now in and marching to Alexandria, besides Colonel Minor, will march immediately to Washington; these orders will be communicated by Colonel Taylor.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

On the 18th of August, General Van Ness ordered General Young to call out, en masse, the brigade under his command, including the Alexandria militia; the same day two troops of cavalry attached to the brigade were ordered to rendezvous at Bladensburgh; on the 19th, at 4 o'clock in the morning, to accompany Colonel Monroe, Secretary of State, and to be subject to his order. On the 20th, in the afternoon, General Young's brigade was ordered by General Winder to cross the Potomack, opposite Alexandria, and encamp in the best position and wait farther orders, which was effected.

The brigade consisting of 454 men, two brass six pounders, and one brass four pounder. On the 22d early, General Young, by orders of General Winder, marched his brigade and took a position on a height near the head of Piscataway creek, about three miles in the rear of Fort Washington, where the ground was favourable for a small detachment to defend the country against a much greater force, and remained in this position until the morning of the 24th, when several orders were given to him; first, to march towards the eastern branch bridge; second, to cross the Potomack to the Virginia side, &c. This brigade was intended in its dispositions to aid Fort Washington, the town of Alexandria, and to be in a situation to join General Winder.

On the morning of the 24th, General Winder established his head quarters near the eastern branch bridge; detachments of horse were out in various directions as videts and reconnoitering parties, and arrangements made to destroy the eastern branch bridge. Colonel George Minor with his regiment of Virginia militia, composed of 600 infantry and 100 cavalry, arrived at the city of Washington in the twilight of the evening of the 23d; he called on the President, who referred him to the Secretary of War for orders; the Secretary informed him that arms could not be had that night, but gave orders to report himself to Colonel Carberry early in the morning, who would furnish him with arms and ammunition, as he was charged with that duty by General Winder. From early in the morning till late in the afternoon, Colonel Minor sought Colonel Carberry diligently, but he could not be found. He rode to head quarters and obtained an order from General Winder upon the arsenal for arms, &c. marched to the place with his regiment, and its care he found committed to a young man whose caution in giving out arms, &c. very much delayed the arming and supplying this regiment. An instance is here given; when the flints were counted out by the officers of the regiment, to expedite business at this crisis, the young man would count them over before they could be obtained.

Colonel Carberry arrived at this moment, apologized

for his absence, and informed Colonel Minor, that he had the evening previous ridden out to his country seat. Colonel Minor was again delayed some small length of time in having to remain to sign receipts, &c. His men were ordered to Capitol Hill; in the mean time various reports were brought into head quarters as to the movements and intentions of the enemy; the President and heads of departments collected at head quarters, in the following order: The President, next Secretary of State, next the Attorney General, next the Secretary of the Navy, and last the Secretary of War and Treasury together. Colonel Monroe had left head quarters upon a rumour that gained ground, that the enemy was marching upon the city by way of Bladensburgh, with a view of joining General Stansbury, advising him of the rumour and to aid him in the formation of a line of battle to meet the enemy. General Stansbury, for reasons given in his report, had marched from his position in advance of Bladensburgh, and occupied the ground west of that village on the banks of the Eastern Branch. Here the front line of battle was formed by General Stansbury and his officers, with the aid of Colonel Monroe, on the presumption that General Stansbury's brigade and the command of Colonel Sterret, including the command of Major Pinkney and Baltimore artillery.

There is a bridge over the Eastern Branch at Bladensburgh, and a large turnpike road leading direct to the city of Washington. About 400 yards from this bridge, some small distance to the left of the road, the Baltimore artillery, six pieces of six pounders, occupied a temporary breastwork of earth, well calculated to command the pass over the bridge. Part of the battalion of riflemen, under Major William Pinkney, and one other company, took position on the right of the artillery, partially protected by a fence and brush; and on the left of the battery, leading to the rear of a barn, two companies, from the regiment under Colonel Shutz, and the other part of the riflemen from Baltimore. Colonel Ragan was posted in the rear of Major Pinkney, his right resting on the road; Colonel Shutz continuing the line on the left, with a small vacancy in the centre of

the two regiments; and Colonel Sterret, formed the extreme left flank of the infantry. At this moment, Colonels Beall and Hood entered Bladensburgh with the Maryland militia from Annapolis, crossed the bridge, and took a position on a most commanding height, on the right of the turnpike, about 300 yards from the road, to secure the right flank. In the mean time, (about 11 o'clock) certain intelligence was received at head quarters, that the enemy was in full march towards Bladensburgh; which induced General Winder to put in motion his whole force, except a few men and a piece of artillery left at the Eastern Branch bridge to destroy it. The day was hot, and the road dusty; the march was rapid to Bladensburgh. The cavalry and mounted men arrived, and were placed on the left flank, and some small distance in its rear. General Winder now arrived, and told General Stansbury and Colonel Monroe, that his whole force was marching for Bladensburgh, and approved the dispositions which had been made of the troops; at which moment, it had become impracticable, in the opinion of the officers, to make any essential change; for the two armies were now coming to the battle ground, in opposite directions; and the enemy appeared on the opposite heights of Bladensburgh, about a mile distant, and halted fifteen or twenty minutes. this was about 12 o'clock. The troops from the city were disposed of as they arrived. Captain Burch, with three pieces of artillery, was stationed on the extreme left of the infantry of the line; and a rifle company, armed with muskets, near the battery, to support it. About this time the Secretary of War arrived, and in a few minutes after, the President and Attorney General, and proceeded to examine the disposition of the troops. In the mean time, as the enemy advanced into Bladensburgh, the officers were forming rapidly the second line. The command of Commodore Barney came up in a trot, and formed his men on the right of the main road, in a line with the command under Colonels Beall and Hood, with a considerable vacancy, owing to the ground. The heavy artillery, Commodore Barney

planted in the road, the three 12 pounders to the right, under Captain Miller, who commanded the flotillamen and marines, as infantry, to support the artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Kramer, with a battalion of Maryland militia, was posted in a wood, in advance of the marines and Colonels Beall and Hood's command. The regiment under command of Colonel Magruder, was stationed on the left of Com. Barney, and in a line with him and Col. Beall. The regiment under command of Col. Brent, and Maj. Warring's battalion, and some other small detachments, formed in the left flank of this second line, and in the rear of Major Peter's battery; and Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, with the regulars, was placed in advance of Colonel Magruder, and to the left, forming a line towards Major Peter's battery, but in such a manner as not to mask it; other small detachments in various directions.

About half after 12 o'clock, while the second line was thus forming, the enemy approached, and the battle commenced; the Baltimore artillery opened a fire and dispersed the enemy's light troops now advancing along the street of the village, who took a temporary cover behind the houses and trees, in loose order, and presented objects only occasionally for the fire of the cannon. The enemy commenced throwing his rockets, and his light troops began to concentrate near the bridge, and to press across it and the river, which was fordable above. The battalion of riflemen under Major Pinkney, now united gallantly with the fire from the battery. For some minutes the fire was continued with considerable effect; the enemy's column was not only dispersed while in the streets, but while approaching the bridge they were thrown into some confusion, and the British officers were seen exerting themselves to press the soldiers on. Having now gained the bridge, it was passed rapidly, and as the enemy crossed, flanked, formed the line and advanced steadily on, which compelled the artillery and battalion of riflemen to give way, after which Major Pinkney was severely wounded. He exerted himself to rally his men, and succeeded at a small dis-

tance in the rear of his first position, and united with the fifth Baltimore regiment.

It appears from the reports of several officers, Stansbury, Pinkney, Law, Sterret, &c. that the command of General Stansbury was 3 or 400 yards in the rear of the battery, and Major Pinkney's riflemen and some other small corps to the left of the battery; of course this small party had to fight with the whole force of the enemy until they retired; and the enemy occupied the ground they left without any considerable resistance, as the enemy marched on without halting, after the bridge was passed. Captain Burch and Colonel Sterret were about the same distance, when Colonel Sterret was ordered to advance to support the first line. One of the pieces of artillery was abandoned, but spiked previously. The enemy soon took advantage of the trees of an orchard which was occupied or held by the force which had just retreated, and kept up a galling fire on part of our line. Captain Burch's artillery and a small detachment near it, now opened a cross fire upon the enemy. Colonel Sterret, with the fifth Baltimore regiment, was ordered to advance and make a prompt movement until ordered to halt, as at this moment the rockets assuming a more horizontal direction and passing near the heads of Colonels Schutz and Ragan's regiments, the right gave way, which was followed in a few minutes by a general flight of the two regiments, in defiance of all the exertions of Generals Winder, Stansbury, and other officers. Burch's artillery and the 5th regiment remained with firmness; the orchard obstructed their fire; but notwithstanding, the enemy's light troops were for a moment driven back by them; the enemy having gained the right flank of the fifth, which exposed it, Burch's artillery, and Colonel Sterret who commanded the fifth, were ordered by General Winder to retrat, with a view of forming at a small distance in the rear; but, instead of retiring in order, the fifth, like the other two regiments under General Stansbury, in a very few minutes were retreating in disorder and confusion, notwithstanding the exertions of Colonel Sterret to prevent it. From reports

of various officers, exertions were made to rally the men and to bring them again to battle, which partly succeeded in the first instance; but ultimately, and in a short time, all attempts were vain, and the forces routed; and the first line, together with the horse, were totally routed and retreated in a road which forked in three directions; one branch led by Rock Creek Church, to Tenleytown and Montgomery court-house; another led to Georgetown, and a third to the city of Washington. It does not appear that any movement was made or attempted by the cavalry or horsemen, although the enemy to the left were in open and scattered order, as they pursued or pressed upon our lines, and a most fortunate moment presented itself for a charge of cavalry and horsemen.

It may be proper here to observe, that General Winder states his exertions to direct the retreating line to the capitol, with a view of rallying. This intention is corroborated by Colonel Sterret; but it appears as if this determination was not generally understood by the officers or men. Colonel Kramer, posted on the right of the road and in advance of Commodore Barney, was next drawn from his position after having maintained his ground with considerable injury to the enemy, and retreated upon the command of Colonels Beall and Hood, on a commanding eminence to the right. After the retreat of the militia under Colonel Kramer from his first position, the enemy's column in the road was exposed to an animated discharge from Major Peter's artillery, which continued until they came in contact with Commodore Barney; here the enemy met the greatest resistance and sustained the greatest loss, advancing upon our retreating line. When the enemy came in full view, and in a heavy column in the main road, Commodore Barney ordered an 18 pounder to be opened upon them, which completely cleared the road, scattered and repulsed the enemy for a moment. In several attempts to rally and advance, the enemy was repulsed, which induced him to flank to the right of our lines in the open field. Here Captain Miller opened upon him with the three 12 pounders, and the flotilla

men acting as infantry, with considerable effect. The enemy continued flanking to the right and pressing upon the command of Colonels Beall and Hood, which gave way after three or four rounds of ineffectual fire, at a considerable distance from the enemy, while Colonel Beall and officers attempted to rally the men on this high position. The enemy very soon gained the flank, and even the rear of the right of the second line. Commodore Barney, Captain Miller, and some other officers of his command being wounded, his ammunition wagon having gone off in the disorder, and that which the marines and flotillamen had, being exhausted; in this situation, a retreat was ordered by Commodore Barney, who fell himself into the hands of the enemy.

The second line was not exactly connected, but posted in advantageous positions in connexion with, and supporting each other. The command of General Smith, including the Georgetown and city militia, still remained in order and firm, without any part having given away, as well as the command of Lieutenant Colonel Scott of the regulars, and some other corps. The enemy's light troops had in the mean time advanced on the left side of the road, and had gained a line parallel with Smith's command, and in endeavouring to turn the flank Colonel Brent was placed in a position calculated to prevent it, the enemy also advanced, and came within long shot of part of Colonel Magruder's command, which opened a partial fire, but without effect; and at this moment, and in this situation, General Winder ordered the whole of the troops, then stationary, to retreat, which was effected with as much order as the nature of the ground and the occasion would permit; these troops, after retreating 5 or 600 paces, were halted and formed; but were again ordered to retreat, by General Winder. General Winder then gave orders to collect and form the troops on the heights west of the turnpike gate, about one mile and a half from the capitol, which order was in part executed, and the forces formed by General Smith and the other officers, when Colonel George Minor came up with his regiment of Virginia volunteers, and united his forces with General Smith's command, having been detained,

as before stated, in obtaining arms, ammunition, &c.; but while in the act of forming, General Winder gave orders to retire to the capitol, with an expectation of being united with the troops of the first line. Colonel Minor was ordered to take a certain position and cover the retreat of all the forces, by remaining until all had marched for the capitol. The troops were again halted at the capitol, while General Winder was in conference with Colonel Monroe and General Armstrong.

The first line and the cavalry, except one troop of Colonel Lavall's, had taken a route which did not bring them to the capitol; the most of them had proceeded north of the District of Columbia, and others dispersed and returned home, and sought refreshment in the country. The commanding General represented the diminution of his force, the dispersion of a large portion of it, the want of discipline, the great fatigue of the troops, and believed that it would be impossible to make effectual resistance to the invasion of the city; nor did he think it would be proper to attempt to defend the capitol, the troops being without provisions, and which would leave every other part of the city to the mercy of the enemy, and the prospect of losing his army. In this consultation, the Secretaries of State and War, it appears, concurred in their views, with General Winder, and advised him to retire and rally the troops upon the heights of Georgetown; this produced an order for the whole forces to retreat from capitol hill through Georgetown. On receiving this order, the troops evinced the deepest anguish; and that order which had been previously maintained, was destroyed. General Smith, in his report, uses this language: "When the order for a retreat from capitol hill was received, the troops evinced an anguish beyond the power of language to express." The troops were halted at Tenleytown, and an attempt was made to collect them together, which only partially succeeded. Some returned home; some went in pursuit of refreshments; and those that halted, gave themselves up to the uncontrolled feelings which fatigue, exhaustion, privation, and disappointment produced. The force thus collected was marched about five miles

up the Potomack, and early in the morning, Thursday the 25th, orders were given to assemble the troops at Montgomery court-house. General Winder seems to have taken this position with a view to collect his forces, and to interpose for the protection of Baltimore, in case the enemy marched upon it, as it was anticipated by him. On the 23d, General Winder despatched an order to the commanding officer at Fort Washington, to place patroles on every road leading to the garrison; and upon the event of his being taken in the rear of the Fort, to blow it up and retire across the river. On the 26th, the army at Montgomery took up the line of march about ten o'clock, towards Baltimore; General Winder proceeded on to Baltimore. On the 27th, General Smith's brigade marched to this district.

The distance from Benedict to the city of Washington, by Blandensburgh, is upwards of fifty miles. The enemy was without baggage wagons or means of transportation; his troops much exhausted with fatigue; many compelled to quit the ranks, and extraordinary exertions used to keep others in motion; and as if unable to pursue our forces, remained on the battle ground; the enemy's advance reached this city about 8 o'clock in the evening, the battle having ended about 2 o'clock, or before. The main body of the enemy remained on the heights west of the turnpike gate.

Doctor Catlett, the superintending Surgeon, who was admitted to attend upon the wounded, and who passed through the enemy's camps, and remained at Blandensburgh until the city was evacuated, had the best opportunity of estimating the loss on both sides, as well as a good opportunity of ascertaining the number and force of the enemy. His estimate is as follows:

Of the enemy.—On Capitol Hill, 700; Turnpike Hill, 2,000; wounded at Blandensburgh, 300; attendants, 300; wounded and attendants in the city of Washington, 60; killed at Blandensburgh and the city, 180; total force, 3,540. This statement is corroborated by all information in his power, besides his own observations. Mr. Law estimated the enemy, on his march, at 5,000; but from the best information, his estimate

would be about 4,500. Colonel Monroe, who viewed the enemy on his march, estimated the number at about 6,000. General Winder states that the best opinion at the Wood Yard, made the enemy from 5 to 7,000. Our forces are variously estimated; and, indeed, from the manner of collecting them, and their dispersion, makes it difficult to ascertain the number with perfect accuracy. General Stansbury represents Colonel Ragan's regiment at 550, Colonel Shutz's regiment at 700, Colonels Beall and Hood's at 800, Colonel Sterret's regiment at 500, Major Pinkney's command, including two companies of artillery, 300; making 2,953. But General Winder estimates Colonel Beall, 6 or 700; deduct 100, this leaves 2,853. To which add the command of General Smith, and militia that united with him at the Wood Yard, Battalion Old Fields, the regulars under Lieutenant Colonel Scott, Barney's command, the cavalry, &c., 3,200; making an aggregate number of 6053. Besides this force, several detachments are spoken of by General Winder's officers not known, amounting to several hundred. But as a small detachment was left at the Eastern Branch Bridge, others, particularly some of the cavalry, were on detachment, reconnoitering, &c.; the number of our forces may be estimated at least 6,000, including about 20 pieces of artillery, two 18 pounders, 3 twelves, and the others, 6 pounders. Our loss on the field of battle, killed, is estimated by the superintending Surgeon, at 10 or 12, and the wounded, some of whom died, at about 30. General Winder's official report estimates our loss at about 30 killed and 50 wounded.

The probable estimate of British forces on the 24th August: Total, 4,500. Killed at Bladensburgh and in the city, 800; wounded at both places, 300. American forces, 6,000. Killed, 20; wounded, 40; besides the regiment under Colonel Minor, 600 infantry and 100 horse, which met the retreat on the west of the turnpike gate; and General Young's brigade, about 500, which was ordered to remain on the banks of the Potomack, about 12 miles from the city of Washington, until the evening of the 24th, when he crossed over to Al-

exandria, and proceeded to Montgomery Court-House, to join the main army.

The enemy, on the evening of the 25th, made the greatest exertions to leave the city of Washington. They had about 40 indifferent looking horses, 10 or 12 carts and wagons, one ox cart, one coach, and several gigs; these were sent to Bladensburgh to move off the wounded; a drove of 60 or 70 cattle preceded this party. Arriving at Bladensburgh, the British Surgeon was ordered to select the wounded who could walk, the 40 horses were mounted by those who could ride, the carts and wagons loaded, and upwards of 90 wounded left behind. About 12 o'clock at night, the British army passed through Bladensburgh and parties continued until morning, and stragglers until after mid day. The retreat of the enemy to his shipping was precipitate apparently under an alarm and it is supposed that it was known to him that our forces had marched to Montgomery court-house.

The Hon. Richard Rush, General Stansbury, Major Wm. Pinkney, Dr. Catlett, and Mr. Law, all remark, General Winder was active, and zealous, encouraged the men, and exposed himself, and acted as a man of firmness during the engagement, and endeavoured to rally, with other officers, the lines as they gave way.

There seems to be a general concurrence of statements, that our forces were much fatigued, and worn down with marching, counter marching, and their strength much exhausted, during their service, by remaining under arms much of the night, as well as the day, by false alarms, and otherwise. Nor does it appear, that it was generally known, among the officers and men of the first line, that the forces from the city were formed behind in the second line, to meet the enemy and support them. This statement is made by General Stanbury, Major Wm. Pinkney, and some other officers of the first line.

ON the evening of the 12th of May, Sir J. L. Yeo appeared off the mouth of Genesee river. On the 13th the Commodore demanded the surrender of the village, and in case of refusal, threatened to land 1200 regulars and 400 Indians. The alarm occasioned by the appearance of the enemy had reached the interiour of Ontario county. General Porter and Colonel Hopkins, with a large number of volunteers, hastened to the defence of the place. The enemy contented himself with throwing a great number of rockets, shells, and shot from the size of grape to 68 pounds. He finally withdrew on the morning of the 14th, without daring to land.

About the middle of June, Lieutenant Gregory, was despatched by Commodore Chauncey for the purpose of destroying a brigade of boats which were ascending the St. Lawrence. His force consisted only of three gigs, having only their crew and one settee in each boat. On the 19th of June, Lieutenant Gregory found he had been discovered by the enemy's look-out boats, and that a gun boat had been sent in pursuit, which was then close upon him; he instantly formed the bold design of boarding her, which he did, without losing a man. She proved to be a fine gun boat, mounting one 18 pounder, and manned by eighteen royal marines; being afterwards closely pursued by a very large gun boat, he was obliged to scuttle his prize.

On the 28th of June, this active and enterprising officer succeeded in destroying by stratagem a large schooner on the stocks at Presqu'ile on the north side of lake Ontario. She was a stout, well built vessel, and would probably have been launched in ten days.

On the 7th of August, Commodore Chauncey chased one of the enemy's vessels ashore near Niagara. She was formerly the Prince Regent, and mounted 14 guns. Being loaded with stores for the garrison of Niagara, the British blew her up.

About the last of September, a gig belonging to the American squadron, with an officer and four men, captured near the outlet of the lake, six boats, manned with 35 men, all armed, and laden with brandy, crates, and dry goods, bound to Kingston, and brought them all to Sacket's Harbour. The boats and their cargoes were estimated at $12,000.

EXPEDITION AGAINST MICHILIMACKINACK.

ABOUT the 5th of July, a military and naval expedition sailed from Detroit, under the orders of Colonel Croghan and Commodore Sinclair, for the double purpose of reducing the garrison of Michilimackinack, and of securing a naval ascendency on the upper lakes. The fleet first touched at St. Josephs, where troops were landed, and the Fort, which had been evacuated, burnt. Major Holmes marched to the Sault de St. Marie, for the purpose of breaking up the enemy's establishment. The agent of the N. W. Company being informed of the approach of our troops, escaped with a part of the merchandize deposited there, though a considerable quantity was concealed in the woods. A valuable vessel was taken at the entrance into Lake Superiour, but which was lost in an attempt to bring her down over the Sault.

The expedition next proceeded to Michilimackinack, and a landing of the troops under Colonel Croghan and Major Holmes was effected at some distance from the Fort. But in attempting to force his way to the garrison, Colonel Croghan found the enemy too strong in numbers and position, to accomplish his object. Accordingly, after an hour's desperate fighting, he was compelled to order a retreat; which, however, was effected in good order. This affair cost many valuable lives. The intrepid Major Holmes, who had so nobly distinguished himself in the preceding Spring, on the Thames, was among the killed. Captain Van Horne of the 19th, and Lieutenant Jackson of the 24th infantry, both promising young men, fell, mortally wounded, at the head of their respective commands. The small numbers of the troops, compared with the strength of the enemy's works and the cloud of Indian allies lurking in the vicinity, determined Colonel Croghan to relinquish farther operations against Michilimackinack; at least during that season. No blame has ever been ascribed to Colo-

nel Croghan, as every thing was done that bravery, vigilance, and skill could accomplish. The American loss was 13 killed, 51 wounded, and 2 missing. A few of the wounded fell into the hands of the enemy, who, shocking to record, were butchered by the ferocious savages in British pay. The hearts of these unfortunate men were taken out and eaten at an Indian festival held at the Fort, and at which was present Major M'Dowell, the English commander of the place, and his officers !*

Colonel Croghan was fortunate enough to learn that the most eligible line of communication from York to Mackinaw, &c. was by lake Simcoe and Nawtawwawsaga river, which empties into lake Huron about 100 miles south-east of its head.

The expedition arrived off the mouth of this river on the 13th of August, where the enemy had a block house, and the schooner Nancy, with a very valuable cargo of several hundred barrels of provisions destined to supply the garrison of Mackinaw, at anchor in the harbour. The troops were quickly disembarked on the Peninsula formed by the river and lake, for the purpose of fixing a camp. A fire was opened upon the block house, but with little effect. At 12 o'clock two howitzers being placed within a few hundred yards, commenced a fire which lasted but a few minutes, when the block house blew up; nearly at the same instant the Nancy was enveloped in flames, by the bursting of a shell; no part of the vessel or cargo was saved. The enemy's garrison escaped into the woods, and the expedition returned to Detroit, except gun boats Tigress and Scorpion, who were left on lake Huron to prevent the enemy's small boats throwing supplies into Mackinaw. These vessels were unfortunately surprised by the enemy, and taken in October following. Commodore Sinclair captured, during the cruise on lake Huron, the British schooner Mink, laden with three hundred barrels of flour, the last of their vessels on the upper lakes.

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* See Commodore Sinclair's official statement.

GENERAL M'ARTHUR'S EXPEDITION INTO CANADA.

ON the 22d of October, General M'Arthur with 600 mounted volunteers, 50 rangers, and 70 Indians, left Detroit on a secret expedition against the enemy. The General justly suspecting the futility of some of the citizens of Detroit, had the address to induce a general belief among the inhabitants of the place, that the object of his movement was the chastisement of the Indians at Sagaunia, on the south side of lake Huron. To keep up the deception, he actually went round lake St. Clair, by crossing the strait of the same name at Beldone, and all the streams which fall into that lake between Lord Selkirk's settlement and the river Thames. To overcome the natural obstacles in this route, is sufficient to establish his claim to uncommon fortitude and perseverance. Several rivers were crossed by swimming. The general aspect of the country is low and swampy.

General M'Arthur reached the Moravian towns on the 30th of October. Here he had the good fortune to take a British sergeant who was going to Burlington Heights with the news, that the expedition had passed into Canada. This enabled the General to reach Delaware undiscovered. The rangers were detached on a circuitous route in order to reach the rear of the settlements and guard the different roads, while the main body were engaged in swimming their horses and transporting their baggage on rafts. They were thus enabled to arrive at Oxford, 150 miles from Detroit, before the inhabitants knew that a force was approaching.

The next day, November 5, the detachment proceeded to Burford. A few hours before their arrival, the enemy had retreated to Malcom's mills, ten miles distant. It was the General's intention to have crossed Grand river without regarding the force at the mills, and attack Burlington; but on arriving at that river, he found it swelled by the rains to such a degree that it was impossible to ford it; he therefore determined to attack and disperse the militia at the mills.

The enemy to the number of between 4 and 500 were found encamped on a commanding ground behind a creek deep and difficult of passage, except at a bridge immediately in their rear. The Ohio troops, with the advance guard of Indians, were thrown over the creek under cover of a thick wood, to oppose the enemy in rear, while the Kentucky troops were to attack in front as soon as the attention of the enemy was engaged by the attack in rear. The whole of the enemy would undoubtedly have been completely surprised and captured, but for the too hasty yell from one of our Indians, which announced the approach of the troops advancing against their rear. They were nevertheless defeated and dispersed with the loss of one captain and seventeen privates killed, nine privates wounded, and 111 prisoners; while our loss was only one killed, and six wounded.

After this brilliant affair, the General pursued his route to Dover, and burnt five mills employed in the use of the British army.

The humanity of General M'Arthur, and the discipline he maintained in his corps, disarmed the people of their prejudice which the conduct of Hull had excited in their minds.

The General was at one time within one day's march of Fort Erie, and was about to move to that point and form a junction with General Izard, at the very moment he learnt that our army had re-passed the Niagara. This information induced the General to return to Detroit, where he arrived, without accident, on the 17th of November. The General speaks in terms of admiration at the almost unusual good conduct of his officers and men.

EXPEDITION OF SIR GEORGE PREVOST AGAINST PLATTSBURGH.

THE withdrawal of nearly 4000 men under General Izard from the Champlain frontier, presented to the Governour-General of Canada the prospect of an easy conquest of Plattsburgh and the gallant little army of General Macomb.

Having collected all the disposable force in Lower Canada, Sir George Prevost entered the territory of the United States on the 1st of September, 1814, with a force officially estimated at 14,000 men, the greater part veteran troops who had fought in Spain and France under the banners of Wellington. He first occupied the village of Champlain, where he avowed his intentions, and issued orders and proclamations tending to dissuade the people from their allegiance, and inviting them to furnish his army with provisions. He immediately began to impress the wagons and teams in the vicinity, and loaded them with his heavy baggage and stores.

At this time General Macomb had not an organized battalion, General Izard having taken the flower of the army to the Niagara frontier. The garrison was composed of the convalescents and the recruits of the new regiments; all in the greatest confusion, as well as the ordnance and stores, and the works in no state of defence.*

To create an emulation and zeal among the officers and men in completing the works, General Macomb divided them into detachments and placed them near the several forts; declaring in orders, that each detachment was the garrison of its own works, and bound to defend them to the last extremity. It is thus that an able general knows how to call every physical and moral energy into action.

* We have followed the text of Gen. Macomb, with slight variation

The enemy advanced cautiously and by short marches; our men worked day and night, so that by the time he made his appearance before the place, every thing was in readiness to receive him.

The principal fort which stands on the right bank of the Saranack, a short distance from the lake, is called Fort Moreau; and to remind the troops of the actions of their brave countrymen, the General called the redoubt on the right, Fort Brown; and that on the left, Fort Scott. Besides these three works, there were two block houses strongly fortified. The whole number of regular troops amounted to about 1500 men. The militia were called out en masse. The regiment from Clinton county, under Lieutenant Colonel Miller, were the first to assemble. The brigade of General Wright followed the example. The whole, under General Mooers, amounted to about 700 men, who advanced on the 4th seven miles on the Beekmantown road to watch the motions of the enemy, and skirmish with him as he advanced; to obstruct the roads by fallen trees, and to break up the bridges.

The inhabitants of the village fled with their families and effects, except a few worthy citizens and some boys who formed themselves into a party, and were very useful.

On the lake road at Dead Creek bridge, the General posted 200 men under Captain Sproul, with orders to abbatis the woods, to place obstructions in the road and fortify himself. In advance of this position was Lieutenant Colonel Appling with 110 riflemen. On the 6th, before day light, the enemy advanced on both roads. The militia skirmished with his advanced parties, and except a few brave men, they fell back most precipitately in the greatest disorder, notwithstanding the British troops did not deign to fire on them, except by their flanks and advanced patroles. The night previous, Major Wood advanced with a detachment of 250 men to support the militia, and set them an example of firmness. Captain Leonard, of the light artillery, was directed to proceed with two pieces to be on the ground before day light, but failed. Major Wood with his par-

ty disputed the road with great obstinacy, but the militia could not be prevailed on to stand, although the fields were divided by strong stone walls.

Finding that the enemy's columns had penetrated within a mile of Plattsburgh, the General despatched his Aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Root, to bring off the detachment at Dead Creek, and to inform Colonel Appling that he wished him to fall on the enemy's right flank. The Colonel fortunately arrived just in time to save his retreat, and to fall in with the head of a column *debauching* from the woods. Here he poured in a most destructive fire from his riflemen at rest, and continued to annoy the column until he formed a junction with Major Wood. The field pieces also did considerable execution. So undaunted, however, was the enemy, that he never deployed in his whole march, always pressing on in column. The whole force of the enemy having approached the Saranack, our troops withdrew to the south side, disputing every inch of ground as they retired. The enemy's light troops occupied the houses near the bridge, and kept a constant firing from the windows and balconies; but the hot shot from the fort soon put the buildings in flames, and obliged these sharp shooters to retire. The enemy made constant attempts during the whole day to dislodge our men from the lower bridge, and suffered dearly for his perseverance. An attempt was made to cross the upper bridge, which was handsomely repelled by the militia. The planks were taken off the bridges and piled up in form of breastworks. The rear of the enemy arrived towards night with his heavy artillery and baggage, on the lake road, where he was sorely galled by our row gallies. The enemy encamped on the ridge west of the town, occupying an extent of nearly three miles.

From the 6th until the morning of the 11th, an almost continued skirmishing was kept up, between the enemy's pickets and the militia on the river; and in the mean time the dreadful note of preparation continually resounding in both armies. Our's was busily employed in strengthening its works; their's in erecting batteries, collecting ladders, and bringing up its heavy ordnance.

The New-York and Vermont volunteers were pouring in from all quarters. General Mooers was directed to keep his force along the Saranack to prevent the enemy's crossing, and to send a strong body into his rear and keep it in continual alarm.

On the morning of the 11th, the British fleet made its appearance round Cumberland Head, and at nine bore down and engaged our flotilla at anchor in the bay off the town. This was the signal for a general attack by land. At the same instant the British simultaneously opened several batteries and continued throwing bomb shells, shrapnells, balls, and congreve rockets until sun set, when the bombardment ceased, the superiority of our fire having silenced all the enemy's batteries. The naval engagement lasted two hours, in full view of both armies. Our troops all cheered at the result. Three efforts were made by the enemy to pass the river at the commencement of the cannonade, to carry the works by storm; for which purpose he had provided an immense number of scaling ladders.

One attempt was made to cross at the village bridge, and another at the upper bridge, and a third at a ford about three miles from the works. At the two first he was repulsed by the regulars. At the ford, by the brave volunteers and militia, where he suffered severely in killed, wounded, and prisoners; a considerable body having crossed the stream, compelled the militia to retire before them about a mile and a half, when the resistance became too formidable for them to advance farther. They kept always in close column, and the ground being peculiarly favourable, it gave the militia a fine opportunity to take sure aim from behind every tree, log, or stump. The Vermont volunteers, who hastened to the scene of action, hung on the enemy's flanks and made many prisoners. Had the British remained on the south side thirty minutes longer, the whole detachment must have been cut off.

A daring enterprise was executed by Captain M'Glassin, who was ordered to ford the river and attack a party constructing a battery, within 500 yards of Fort Brown, which he handsomely performed at midnight, with 50

men; drove off the working party consisting of 150, and defeated a covering party of the number; killing one officer and six men in the charge, and wounding many more.

Being repulsed at all points, at dusk the enemy withdrew his artillery from the batteries and raised the siege. At nine, under cover of the night, he sent off all the baggage he could find transports to carry. At two o'clock in the morning, the army precipitately retreated, leaving their sick and wounded behind, whom he recommended to the humanity of the American General.

The British camp was found covered with vast quantities of provisions partially destroyed, concealed in holes, buried in the earth, and thrown into ponds and creeks. Also an immense quantity of bomb shells, grape shot, muskets, ammunition, flints, &c. &c.; intrenching tools of all sorts, tents, markees, clothing, &c.

A continual fall of rain and a violent storm prevented a general pursuit. The light troops harrassed their rear, captured several baggage wagons, and some prisoners.

The total loss of the enemy was upwards of 2,000, about 300 of whom were deserters.

The American loss, from the 6th to the 11th of September, was 37 killed, 62 wounded, and 20 missing.

THIS battle was fought on the 11th of September, 1814, in full view of the American and British armies, in Plattsburgh bay.

The American fleet, consisted of the ship Saratoga, of 16 guns, brig Eagle, 20, schooner Ticonderoga, 17, Preble sloop, 7, and 10 gun boats, carrying 16 guns, making in all, 86 guns.

The British fleet, under Commodore Downie, comprised the new ship La Confiance, of 39 guns, brig Linnet of 16, sloop Chubb of 11, sloop Eagle of 10, and thirteen gun boats, carrying 18 guns, which gave the enemy a superiority of 9 guns.

The British fleet was manned by 1,030 men, the American by 820.

When the enemy made his appearance, the American fleet were at anchor in line of battle. He also anchored in line at the distance of 300 yards from Commodore M'Donough's line, with La Confiance opposed to the Saratoga, his brig to the Eagle, his gallies and sloops to the Ticonderoga and Preble and a division of our gallies; our remaining gallies with the Saratoga and Eagle.

Commodore M'Donough gives the details of the action in the following words:

"In this situation, the whole force on both sides became engaged, the Saratoga suffering much from the heavy fire of the Confiance. I could perceive at the same time, however, that our fire was very destructive to her. The Ticonderoga, Lieutenant Commandant Cassin, gallantly sustained her full share of the action. At half past 10 o'clock, the Eagle, not being able to bring her guns to bear, cut her cable and anchored in a more eligible position, between my ship and the Ticonderoga, where she very much annoyed the enemy, but unfortunately leaving me exposed to a galling fire from

the enemy's brig. Our guns on the starboard side being nearly all dismounted or not manageable, a stern anchor was let go, the bow cable cut and the ship winded with a fresh broadside on the enemy's ship, which soon after surrendered. Our broadside was then sprung to bear on the brig, which surrendered in about fifteen minutes after.

"The sloop that was opposed to the Eagle, had struck some time before and drifted down the line; the sloop which was with the gallies having struck also. Three of their gallies are said to be sunk, the others pulled off. Our gallies were about obeying, with alacrity, the signal to follow them, when all the vessels were reported to be in a sinking state; it then became necessary to annul the signal to the gallies, and order their men to the pumps.

"I could only look at the enemy's gallies going off in a shattered condition, for there was not a mast in either squadron that could stand to make a sail on; the lower rigging being nearly shot away, hung down as though it had been just placed over mast heads.

"The Saratoga had 55 round shot in her hull; the Confiance 105. The enemy's shot passed principally just over our heads, as there was not 20 whole hammocks in the nettings at the close of the action, which lasted without intermision two hours and twenty minutes.

"The absence and sickness of Lieutenant Reymond Perry, left me without the services of that excellent officer; much ought fairly to be attributed to him for his great care and attention in disciplining the ship's crew, as her first Lieutenant. His place was filled by a gallant young officer, Lieutenant Peter Gamble, who, I regret to inform you, was killed early in the action. Acting Lieutenant Vallette worked the 1st and 2d division of guns with able effect. Sailing Master Brum's attention to the springs and in the execution of the order to wind the ship, and occasionally at the guns, met with my entire approbation; also Captain Youngs, commanding the acting marines, who took his men to the guns. Mr. Beal, purser, was of great service at the

guns, and in carrying my orders throughout the ship with Midshipman Montgomery. Master's Mate, Joshua Justin had command of the 3d division; his conduct during the action was that of a brave and correct officer. Midshipmen Monteith, Graham, Williamson, Platt, and Thwing, and acting Midshipman Baldwin, all behaved well, and gave evidence of their making valuable officers.

"The Saratoga was twice set on fire by hot shot from the enemy's ships.

"I close, sir, this communication with feelings of gratitude for the able support I received from every officer and man attached to the squadron which I had the honour to command."

According to an official statement of the purser of the Saratoga, the killed and wounded of the enemy exceeded 260. The American loss in killed and and wounded amounted to 110. We had but two officers killed; these were Lieutenants Gamble and Stansbury. The British officers killed, were Commodore Downie, and three Lieutenants.

There was taken on board the enemy's fleet 17,000 pounds of powder, besides fixed ammunition for their ships; between 80 and 90,000 pounds of balls, &c.; 600 muskets, 600 suits of soldiers' clothing, and the winter clothing for the whole of the land army.

In addition to this, the enemy sunk eight tons of balls at Chazey, and a vessel laden with various warlike instruments at Isle La Motte, which was raised by the Americans.

MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE MARITIME FRONTIER OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN April 1813, Admiral Cockburn entered the Chesapeake with three line of battle ships and several frigates, and commenced a predatory warfare against the settlements bordering on the waters of the bay.

The villages of Frenchtown, Fredericktown, and Georgetown were plundered and partially burnt. No respect was paid to private property. The noble Admiral headed the marauding parties, and assisted in stealing negroes, pigs, and poultry. Sharp's and Poplar Islands were stripped of every living domestick animal; such as were not in a condition for eating, were bayoneted or otherwise destroyed. A Mr. Segourney, the master of a small vessel, was wounded in defending it against three launches. He fell wounded, and his men jumped overboard, when the enemy got on board and finding his colours still flying, knocked out his brains with the end of a musket.

On the 3d of May, the village Havre de Grace was laid in ashes, the windows of the church broken in, and the most of the private property carried off, among which was a gig belonging to Commodore Rodgers, which the redoubtable leader of the enterprize, Cockburn, appropriated to himself.

On the 22d of June, the enemy were foiled in an attempt upon Crany Island. Three of their brigs were sunk; one of them belonging to Admiral Warren's ship had 75 men in her, most of whom were drowned; about 50 of the enemy deserted. Lieutenant Beaty commanded the Americans.

The British with 2,500 men attacked Hampton three days afterwards. The place was defended by 400 Americans, under Major Cratchfield, who made a noble defence; but were finally overpowered and put to flight. It was here that the enemy excelled himself, if possi-

ble in acts of brutal ferocity. Several defenceless women were dishonoured—two sick men were stabbed in their beds, one in the arms of his wife: Negroes were encouraged in their rudeness to females,; the church was pillaged, and the plate belonging to it taken away. An apprehension of an attack from the militia of the neighbouring country caused them to return hastily.

In April, 1814, the enemy made a dash at Pettipaug, (Conn.) where they captured and burnt 21 sail of vessels of various tonnage, the value of which was estimaded at 150,000 dollars. No resistance was made by the inhabitants.

On the 13th of June they landed at Wareham, in Massachusetts, and burnt five merchant vessels, and set fire to a cotton factory, which the inhabitants saved by extinguishing the flames after the enemy retreated.

Soon after, they entered the harbour of Scituate and burnt nine small vessels.

Early in August a British 74 gun ship, a sloop of war, and an armed brig, arrived off Stonington, Connecticut, and commenced bombarding the town, which lasted the greater part of three days. The enemy attempted to land in their launches, but were driven back. The brig which had approached nearest the shore was hulled and obliged to haul off. The only defence of the place was two 18 pounders and a 4 pounder, worked by a company of militia under Colonel Randall. Six of the militia received slight wounds; a few of the buildings were injured. A prodigious number of rockets, balls, and shells were thrown into the town.

On the evening of the 11th of July the British captured the town and garrison of Eastport, in the province of Maine. The fort was defended by six pieces of cannon and 40 men. The enemy's force amounted to 2000 men, transported on board eight ships of war. No defence was made. The vessels in the harbour were confiscated, and the inhabitants allowed four days either to take the oath of allegiance to his Britanick Majesty, or to remove from the island. Many of the federalists preferred remaining on that degrading con-

dition. The place contains about 1000 inhabitants, and is situated on an island.

Castine was the next object of attack; the force employed on the expedition against it was too strong for the garrison, who blew up the fort and evacuated the place. The Adams frigate was at that time lying in the mouth of the Penobscot. On the approach of the English fleet, Captain Morris ascended the river as far as Hampden, where he landed his guns and erected batteries. The enemy, to the number of 2000, pursued. The militia who had assembled for its protection, disgracefully fled. Captain Morris, after a hopeless resistance, spiked his guns, blew up his vessel, and effected his escape through the woods.

The enemy took possession of Belfast and several small places in the district of Maine without opposition, and retained undisturbed of them until after the exchange of the ratification of the treaty of Ghent. Several of the inhabitants were actually flogged like slaves by their new masters.

The continued depredations of the British in the Chesapeake, suggested to our government the necessity of a flotilla on that bay to counteract the enemy's designs. Three or four light schooners and eight barges were armed and manned by 200 men, the command of which was given to Commodore Barney, an officer of tried valour and skill.

This flotilla was an object of peculiar attention from the enemy; and frequent attempts were made by him to destroy it, in each of which he was roughly handled, owing to our superiour gunners, and facility with which it could run into shoals water, creeks, &c.

About the 16th of August, great alarm was excited by the arrival of a formidable British naval force in the Chesapeake; on board of which were about 12,000 land troops.

ATTACK ON BALTIMORE.

ELATED with recent success, the British General descended the Patuxent and prepared to gather fresh laurels in an attack on Baltimore. The citizens of this patriotick city, knowing themselves to be the peculiar objects of British hatred, had not been unmindful of their own safety; they were prepared to face the approaching storm.

On the 10th of September, intelligence was received that 50 hostile sail were ascending the bay. A part of that formidable expedition touched at North Point, fourteen miles below Baltimore, and disembarked the land forces.

The citizens of Baltimore turned out *en masse*. A part of General Winder's force had repaired to that city in anticipation of an attack; the militia of the vicinity came in. The whole were under the orders of General Smith.

General Stricker took a position at the junction of two roads leading from the city to North Point; his right flanked by Cove Creek, and his left by a marsh. He here awaited the approach of the enemy. A reconnoitering detachment met the enemy's advance, skirmished, and retreated to the line. Between 2 and 3 o'clock, the enemy's whole force came up and commenced battle by some discharges of rockets; and soon after the action became general along the whole line. General Stricker gallantly maintained his position against a great superiority of numbers, for the space of one hour and twenty minutes, when a regiment on the left gave way, which obliged him to fall back on his reserve. He then formed his brigade, but the enemy having lost their Commander-in-Chief, General Ross, did not renew the attack, and the General fell back to the entrenchments near the city. The enemy made some further demonstrations; but finding our troops on

the alert at all points, and the entrenchments strong and well manned, silently withdrew his troops in the night. General Smith states the British loss, as nearly as he could ascertain, at between six and seven hundred. General Stricker's brigade lost about 150 killed and wounded.

At the same time the British army was advancing by land, their fleet made its approach by water, and commenced a discharge of rockets and bombs as soon as it came in range of Fort M'Henry. The situation of Major Armstead, the commander of the fort, was peculiarly trying; the enemy having taken his position at such a distance as to render offensive operations on his part entirely fruitless; while the bombs and rockets were every moment falling in and about it; the officers and men being at the same time entirely exposed. The vessels, however, had the temerity to approach somewhat nearer. They were as soon compelled to withdraw. During the night, while the land forces of the enemy were retreating, and whilst the bombardment was the most severe, two or three rocket vessels and barges succeeded in getting up the Ferry Branch; but they were soon compelled to retire, by the forts and batteries in that quarter. These forts also destroyed one of the barges with all on board. The loss in Fort M'Henry was 4 killed and 24 wounded. The enemy finding that there was little to be expected from their attack but hard blows, disappeared on the morning of the 11th.

Among the citizens of Baltimore who fell on the 11th, was James Loury Donaldson, a representative in the State Legislature from that city.

The British Admiral, Sir Peter Parker, was killed in one of the predatory attempts of the enemy.

Soon after the repulse of the enemy at Baltimore, he withdrew the greater part of his troops and ships of war from the Chesapeake; he however left enough to maraud and harrass the inhabitants contiguous to the bay and its tributary streams. Kent Island was the principal rendezvous of his land troops. The brutality and ferocity of the enemy while on that station, exceeds

any recorded of the most barbarous nations. Their expedition up the Rappahannock outstrips previous depredations; for here British rapacity was found ransacking vaults and tombs, and profaning the sanctuary of the dead in quest of plunder.

At Tappahannock they burnt the court-house, jail, Collector's office, Clerk's office, a large ware house, and destroyed a large amount of private property. In a skirmish they lost 15 men killed and 31 wounded. In another, two of their barges lost almost every man on board, with twelve prisoners and several deserters. Captain Shackleford of the Virginia House of Delegates, attacked a large party of the enemy, with only 60 men, but was eventually taken prisoner.

CREEK WAR.

THE Muscogees, commonly called the Creeks, inhabit the extensive country between the frontiers of Georgia and the Tombigbee river. They enjoy a most delightful climate, and are an artful and warlike people. Their language is musical, and abounds with a great number of remarkable *long* words.

Before the commencement of the late war, the number of warriours was estimated at 6,000; the whole population, to 26,000 souls. The British have always exercised a preponderating influence over their minds; but in 1812, civil dissension produced great bloodshed in the nation. One party declared themselves against the United States, the enemies of civilization, and the friends of Britain. The other party, headed by the Big Warriour, avowed themselves the friends of the Americans and civilization.

MASSACRE AT FORT MIMS.

THIS Fort stands on the eastern side of the Alabama, nearly opposite of Fort Stoddert, in the Mississippi Territory. Major Beasely, who commanded the garrison, had frequent warnings of the danger which awaited him; but instead of preparing to ward off the meditated blow, flogged the negroes who informed him of the approach of the Indians. The fort was filled with the inhabitants of the surrounding settlements. The appearance of the Indians was sudden and unexpected. They had to come through an open field 150 rods wide, yet they were within a few steps of the fort before they were noticed. The gate was open. They rushed immediately into one side of the fort, which was separated from the other by a line of pickets. The women and children took refuge in the houses, which were fired by the Indians; and it is said that the Indians, when the buildings were in flames, danced round them with savage

delight. A general massacre ensued. One hundred and seven officers and privates; 100 men, women, and children; and 100 negroes, fell victims to their fury. Only eighteen of the whites escaped. This took place in August, 1813.

BATTLE OF TALLUSHATCHES.

THE alarm and terrour excited by the catastrophe of Mims pervaded the whole Mississippi Territory and spread to the borders of Tennessee and Georgia. Ten thousand militia were put in motion to avenge the blood of their fellow citizens.

General Jackson was selected to lead the Tennessee volunteers to victory and vengeance. He rendezvoused at the Ten Islands, in the river Coosee. On the 2d of November, he marched in the night with 900 mounted riflemen, to enclose the Indian town of Tallushatches. He disposed his troops so as to encircle the town; he then ordered two companies to advance beyond the circle of allignment, for the purpose of drawing out the enemy from their buildings, which stood in open woodland. The plan succeeded. The Indians began to beat their drums, mingled with the most savage yells. They rushed out and charged with great fury the reconnoitering party, who gave way as they advanced, until they met the troops in the line, which gave them a general fire and then charged. The Indians could not resist the shock. They fell back upon their town, when they made all the resistance that an overpowered force could; they fought as long as one existed. The work was soon over. Our men rushed up to their houses, and in a few minutes killed the last warriour. The enemy fought with savage fury, and met death with all its horrours, without shrinking or complaining; not one asked to be spared, but fought as long as they could stand or sit. Several squaws and children were unintentionally killed by our men. One hundred and eighty-six warriours were counted dead, besides those killed in the woods. Not one escaped to tell the dismal tale. Eighty-four women and children were taken. General Jackson lost five killed and forty-one wounded, mostly with arrows.

On the 7th, General Jackson received word that the friendly Creeks at Talladega were menaced with an attack from the hostile Creeks. The distance was thirty miles; he marched to their relief in the evening. The next morning at sunrise he was within half a mile of the encampment of the enemy. Here again the General arranged his columns so as to enclose the enemy in a circle. A select corps was pushed forward to bring on the action. The bait took. The enemy met and pursued; but the militia who were to have checked them, faultered, which enabled a part of the Indians to escape. Nevertheless, the combat was very bloody; 290 savage warriours were left dead on the ground, and those who escaped were pursued to the distance of three miles. Fifteen whites were killed, the same number wounded.

BATTLE OF HILLABEE TOWNS.

On the 11th of November, a detachment of the Tennessee army marched into the heart of the Creek nation. They burnt in their progress the villages at Little Opiskee, and at Galenga; they then proceeded to Nitty Chapton, and from thence to the Hillabee Towns. When within six miles of these towns, General White, who led the expedition, dismounted his troops to surround the towns in the night. A little before daylight, he commenced the attack; the Indians were completely surprised. The whole were killed or taken. Sixty warriours were slain; the prisoners amounted to 256. Not one of our men received the slightest injury. This feat was performed at the distance of 100 miles from the main army.

BATTLE OF AUTOSSEE.

Towards the close of November, General Floyd with 950 Georgia militia, accompanied by 350 friendly Indians, marched into the most flourishing part of the Creek country. He defeated the enemy on Cenlabee Creek, and burnt their town, including 400 houses. The dead of the enemy covered the plain; 200 warriours

were killed. The American loss was 54 killed and wounded.

BATTLE OF ECCONNACHAED.

In December, General Claiborne with a party of Mississippi volunteers, marched into the Creek country and engaged the Indians at Ecconnachaed (or holy ground.) Colonel Carson commanded the whites in the battle, and the celebrated Weathersford, the savages. The battle was obstinate; but the combattants were not numerous. Thirty Indians were killed. Their favourite town, which comprised upwards of 200 houses, was laid in ashes. Great quantities of Indian goods were taken.

BATTLE OF CAMP DEFIANCE.

On the 27th of January, General Floyd was attacked in his camp, west of Cohahovehie. The Indians attacked at 5 o'clock in the morning. They stole on the sentinels, and with great impetuosity rushed upon our line. They even advanced to within 30 yards of our artillery, and fought with veteran courage. But the firmness of the men and the influence of the bayonet, saved the army. The enemy was at last routed, with some loss. General Floyd was dangerously wounded, and many of his troops killed.

EXPEDITION TO THE HEAD OF THE TALLAPOOSEE.

On the 14th of January, General Jackson was reenforced by 800 volunteers; the term of service of his original force had expired, and most of the men had departed for their homes. On the 17th he took up his line of march for the Tallapoosee with 930 men, exclusive of 300 Indians. This expedition had two objects: First, to make a diversion in favour of General Floyd; secondly, to indulge the ardour of his troops, which would attach them to the service.

Nine hundred hostile Indians were known to be assembled near Emuesau. Early in the morning of the 21st of January, while the army was encamped, the

Indians attacked the left wing, and continued it vigorously until it was light enough for the troops to charge, when the enemy was routed at every point.

Four hundred men under General Coffee were then detached to burn the Indian camp at the bend of the river, which was found too strong to attack. He returned to camp. Half an hour afterwards the Indians again appeared in force, and fired on the pickets. General Coffee made a movement to turn their left flank, but his men, from some mistake, did not follow in sufficient numbers; he nevertheless immediately attacked their left flank with only 154 men. The action became general and bloody. A charge decided the struggle. "The effect was immediate and inevitable." Forty-five of the savages were found dead. General Coffee was wounded in the body; his Aid was killed by his side. The venerable Judge Cocke, at the age of 65, fought with youthful ardour, and saved a fellow soldier by killing his antagonist.

On the 23d, General Jackson commenced his return march; but in passing a defile on the 24th, he was again attacked. His previous arrangements had provided for every contingency. Yet, as soon as the word was given to halt, and a few guns had been fired, the right and left columns of the rear guard precipitately gave way. This shameful retreat throwed the greater part of the army into confusion. Colonel Carrol rallied a few of the centre column who checked the enemy until order was restored. The brunt of the action fell on a small part of the troops. Never was more bravery displayed than on this occasion. The Indians were defeated, but not without considerable bloodshed on both sides.

BATTLE OF TOHOPISKA.

THE village of Tohopiska, stands in the great bend of the Tallapoosa. It contained 300 houses. The course of the river here, describes the figure of a horse shoe, and forms a peninsula, including about 100 acres of land. It was on this point of land that the hostile Creeks had resolved to make their last desperate effort to check the tide of conquest, which threatened a total

extinction of their tribe. "Nature furnishes few situations so eligible for defence; and barbarians have never rendered one more secure by art. Across the neck of the bend which leads into it from the north, they had erected a breast work of the greatest compactness and strength, from five to eight feet high and prepared with double port holes, very artfully arranged. An army could not approach it without being exposed to a double and cross fire of the enemy, who lay in perfect security behind it."* To defend this position, 1000 desperate Indian warriours had assembled. The river was deep and unfordable.

On the 26th of March, General Jackson, who had again advanced to the Tallapoosa, encamped within five miles of the enemy's lines. On the morning of the 27th, he made his arrangements for an attack. General Coffee with the mounted and Indian forces, crossed the river and surrounded the bend, to prevent the escape of the enemy by swimming, or in canoes. With the remainder of the forces, the General marched and took a position in front of the thin breast works, and planted his cannon at the distance of eight yards, and immediately opened a brisk fire from his artillery and musketry, which continued about two hours, when a company of spies and the Cherokee forces crossed over to the peninsula in canoes, set fire to a part of the town, and fell on the rear of the enemy as he lay concealed behind his defences. This diversion determined General Jackson to storm the breast work. His men were eager to be led to the charge, and obeyed the order with the greatest enthusiasm; they marched with a quick and firm step in the face of a shower of balls, the blaze of a thousand guns, and infuriate yells of savage desperation. At first the contest was maintained musket to musket, through the port holes, in which many of the enemy's balls were welded to the bayonets of our muskets. The Indians, made desperate by their situation, fought like devils. But nothing could withstand the

* General Jackson.

valour of our men; they threw themselves over the works and finished the massacre with the bayonet and the but-ends of their muskets. Eight hundred of the enemy were killed upon the peninsula. Nearly three hundred were shot as they attempted to swim the river. Never was there a more terrible vengeance inflicted upon an enemy. "Among the dead was found their famous prophet Monahell, shot in the mouth by a grape shot, as though Heaven designed to chastise his impostures by an appropriate punishment." Three hundred prisoners were taken, all women and children except three. Our loss was 26 whites killed, and 107 wounded; 18 Cherokees killed, and 17 wounded.

This decisive battle terminated the Creek war in the submission of the surviving warriours. General Jackson returned to Tennessee, but was soon appointed a Major General in the service of the United States.

ATTACK ON FORT BOYER.

THIS fort stands on the eastern point forming Mobile bay, and was built by Colonel Boyer, by the order of General Wilkinson.

On the 15th of September, the British made a combined attack by land and water. The naval force consisted of two ships of 24 and 28 guns, two brigs and three tenders. The land troops were composed of 100 marines under Colonel Nichols, and 300 Indians under Captain Woodbine of the British army. The effective force in the fort amounted to 120 men, under Major Lawrence.

The Hermes, of 28 guns, anchored nearest the fort, and was set on fire and blew up. Of 170 men, which composed her crew, only 20 escaped. The Charon lost 85 men. The loss of the vessels was not ascertained. Between 4 and 500 hand guns were fired from the fort during the attack. Only four Americans were killed.

The flag staff of the fort was shot away, and the flag re-hoisted on a sponge staff planted on a parapet, during the hottest of the fire.

ENTRANCE INTO PENSACOLA.

THIS place had long been a principal rendezvous for the Indians and British, much to the prejudice of the United States. In November 1814, General Jackson, indignant at the barefaced violation of the neutrality of the place, determined to enter the place and seize on its defences. On his approach he sent an officer with a flag to the Governour, who was fired upon from fort St. George. This outrage produced a resolution in the Commander-in-Chief to storm the place, which was defended by British and Spanish troops, and seven English ships of war in the harbour. Our troops advanced for this purpose; as they were entering the town they were saluted with a shower of ball and grape from a battery and the musketry from the houses and gardens. The Governour met the officers in advance with a flag, begged for mercy, and surrendered the town and fort unconditionally. The British blew up the principal fort, called the Baruncas, which commands the entrance into the bay. After this, General Jackson repaired to New-Orleans, which was then menaced with an attack from a most formidable naval and military expedition.

On the 12th of December, the British fleet, with the expedition on board, arrived at Ship Island in the bay of St. Louis, and about 70 miles N. E. of New Orleans. On the 13th they landed at pass Christienne, which communicates with Lake Ponchartrain with 106 barges, manned by upwards of a thousand men and officers, from the squadron, and proceeded directly in quest of the American flotilla, commanded by Lieutenant Jones, which they engaged on the 14th. The American force consisted of two light schooners, five gun-boats carrying 23 guns, manned with 182 men. The sanguinary character of this contest has few parallels. Several of the barges were sunk. Our little force was finally overpowered and taken; not, however, until they had killed

or disabled nearly 400 of their enemies.* The capture of our flotilla gave the enemy command of the lakes, and enabled him to choose his point of attack.

But it was yet doubtful at what point the enemy would strike the contemplated blow; whether he would approach through the lakes, or attempt to ascend the Mississippi by the way of the Balize and fort St. Phillip. General Jackson was indefatigable in his preparations to receive him. Large bodies of Tennessee and Kentucky militia were on their way for the defence of the city. The numerous approaches from the side of the lakes, were carefully guarded. The eyes of the Union were directed to this new theatre of war.

The enemy approached the city by the way of the lakes, and on the 23d of December succeeded in reaching the Mississippi, six miles below New-Orleans, undiscovered by any one disposed to give the intelligence. The artillery and baggage were conveyed in boats up the Bayou and canal which passes from the Levee to Lake Bourgere, and through the farm of Mr. Villere. Had it not been for the fortunate escape of the son of Mr. Villere, they would have reached the city before it was known that they had disembarked at the mouth of the Bayou. This unexpected appearance of the enemy is not to be attributed to any want of precaution in the commanding General. He had guarded all the approaches; a picket had been stationed at the mouth of the Bayou, which was completely surprised.

It was about 12 o'clock when the news of their arrival reached the General, who, apprehending a double attack by the way of Chef Monteau, left General Carrol's and the militia of the city to guard the canal of Carondelet, and at 5 o'clock marched with 500 men to meet the enemy, at that time about 3,000 strong, occupying a line upon the river of half a mile extent, and leisurely employed in cooking their suppers. Commodore Patterson, in the Carolina schooner, was ordered to drop down the river and open a fire upon their camp,

* See the official account.

which he executed about half past seven. His fire was the signal for our troops to attack, which they executed with great spirit. General Coffee's brigade rushed into the enemy's camp. Several other corps did the same. The city riflemen penetrated to the enemy's centre, were surrounded, and fought their way out again, bringing off a number of prisoners. One hour after the commencement of the action, a thick fog arose which produced some confusion. It became prudent to recall the troops from a murderous conflict of doubtful result. Our men lay on their arms during the night, and in the morning took a stronger position two miles nearer the city. General Jackson lost about 100 men killed wounded and prisoners. The enemy must have suffered severely from the certain aim of the riflemen.* Colonel Lauderdale of General Coffee's corps fell, nobly fighting at the head of his regiment. Colonels Dyer and Gibson, of the same corps, were wounded.

On the 27th, the enemy succeeded in blowing up the Carolina schooner, which had become becalmed. The enemy fired her by hot shot from a land battery. The crew escaped by swimming.

The next day the enemy marched up the Levee for the purpose of forcing the American lines. At the distance of half a mile, he opened upon our works with bombs and rockets. They continued to advance in solid column until they were saluted with a shower of canister and grape, when they fell on their bellies and laid still until it was dark, and retired under cover of the night. Their loss on this occasion was about 100.

The *new year* opened by a discharge from the enemy's batteries; the principal fire was on the left, near the cypress woods. Twelve Americans were killed; many of the enemy were killed and wounded.

On the 2d, General Jackson ordered a sortie of 400

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* A Journal found upon one of the British officers killed in the assault of the 8th of January, mentioned that they lost on the night of the 23d of December, 224 killed, and an immense number wounded.

men, half of them mounted, to go and reconnoiter the enemy's batteries which had fired so briskly on the preceding day. It was found by the sallying party that our fire had dismounted several of their guns, which they had taken off, razed their redoubts, and retreated to their first lines.

General Adair, from Kentucky, arrived with 4,000 men, and encamped three miles above the city. Considerable inconvenience was experienced for the want of arms, in consequence of the continual arrival of the militia.

At this time the enemy received a re-enforcement of 3,000 men, under General Lambert. On the 7th they were disembarked at the Bayou Beenvenu. The same evening they dug through the Levee to admit the river into the canal, through which they dragged twenty-five of their boats and thus transported 600 of their men to the opposite side of the river, for the purpose of attacking the batteries and a party of Kentucky militia entrusted with their defence. These troops under the command of Colonel Thornton, were intended to create a diversion on that side of the river, while the main attack was carried on on the east side.

Accordingly, before day-light on the morning of the 8th, they moved in silence upon the American intrenchments. Let us first introduce the official account of the various fortunes of the day.

Camp, 4 miles below Orleans, 9th Jan. 1815.

SIR—During the day of the 6th and 7th, the enemy had been actively employed in making preparations for an attack on my lines. With infinite labour they had succeeded on the night of the 7th in getting their boats across from the lake to the river, by widening and deepening the canal on which they had effected their disembarkation. It had not been in my power to impede these operations by a general attack; added to other reasons, the nature of the troops under my command, mostly militia, rendered it too hazardous to attempt extensive *offensive* movements in an open country, against a numerous and well disciplined army. Although my

forces, as to number, had been increased by the arrival of the Kentucky division, my strength had received very little addition; a small portion only of that detachment being provided with arms. Compelled thus to wait the attack of the enemy, I took every measure to repel it when it should be made, and to defeat the object he had in view. General Morgan, with the New-Orleans contingent, the Louisiana militia, and a strong detachment of the Kentucky troops, occupied an intrenched camp on the opposite side of the river, protected by strong batteries on the back, erected and superintended by Commodore Patterson.

In *my* encampment every thing was ready for action, when, early on the morning of the 8th, the enemy after throwing a heavy shower of bombs and congreve rockets, advanced their columns on my right and left, to storm my intrenchments. I cannot speak sufficiently in praise of the firmness and deliberation with which my whole line received their approach; *more* could not have been expected from veterans inured to war. For an hour the fire of the small arms was as incessant and severe as can be imagined. The artillery, too, directed by officers who displayed equal skill and courage, did great execution. Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the greatest credit. Twice the column which approached me on my left, was repulsed by the troops of General Carrol, those of General Coffee, and a division of the Kentucky militia, and twice they formed again and renewed the assault. At length, however, cut to pieces, they fled in confusion from the field, leaving it covered with their dead and wounded. The loss which the enemy sustained on this occasion, cannot be estimated at less than 1500 in killed, wounded and prisoners. Upwards of three hundred have already been delivered over for burial; and my men are still engaged in picking them up within my lines and carrying them to the point where the enemy are to receive them. This is in addition to the dead and wounded whom the enemy have been enabled to carry from the field, during and since the action, and to those who have since died of the

wounds they received. We have taken about 500 prisoners, upwards of 300 of whom are wounded, and a great part of them mortally. My loss has not exceeded, and I believe has not amounted to ten killed, and as many wounded. The entire destruction of the enemy's army was now inevitable, had it not been for an unfortunate occurrence which at this moment took place on the other side of the river., Simultaneously with his advance upon my lines, he had thrown over in his boats a considerable force to the other side of the river. These having landed were hardly enough to advance against the works of General Morgan; and what is strange, and difficult to account for, at the very moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for with a confidence approaching to certainty, the Kentucky re-enforcements ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the forces; and thus yielding to the enemy that most fortunate position. The batteries which had rendered me, for many days, the most important service, though bravely defended, were of course now abandoned; not, however, until the guns had been spiked.

This unfortunate rout had totally changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which they might have been enabled to defeat, in a great measure, the effects of our success on this side of the river. It became therefore an object of the first consequence to dislodge him as soon as possible. For this object, all the means in my power, which I could with any safety use, were immediately put in preparation. Perhaps, however, it was somewhat owing to another cause, that I succeeded beyond my expectations. In negotiating the terms of a temporary suspension of hostilities to enable the enemy to bury their dead and provide for their wounded, I had required certain propositions to be acceded to as a basis; among which this was one: that, although hostilities should cease on *this* side the river until 12 o'clock of this day, yet it was not to be understood that they should cease on the *other* side; but that no re-enforcements should be sent across

by either army, until the expiration of that day. His excellency Major General Lambert begged time to consider those propositions until 10 o'clock of to-day, and in the mean time re-crossed his troops. I need not tell you with how much eagerness I immediately regained possession of the position he had thus hastily quitted.

After the signal defeat of the enemy on the 8th, they showed no disposition to renew the attack But General Jackson did not long permit them to remain undisturbed; a constant cannonade was kept up from all our batteries, and on the night of the 18th of January the enemy silently withdrew to their boats on lake Borgen. They left on the field sixteen pieces of cannon, their equipments, and an immense quantity of ball. Seventy of their wounded were mangled to such a degree that it was impossible to remove them. These they recommended to the humanity of the American commander.

The British ships of war which attempted to ascend the Mississippi, found themselves completely checked at Fort St. Phillip. They bombarded the fort for nine days; during which time they threw about 1000 shells at our works. They withdrew on the 17th of January. This fort has 44 cannon, and is considered bomb proof. It was defended by 500 men under the command of the brave Major Overton.

Action between the Constitution and Guerriere.

THE Constitution fell in with the Guerriere on the 19th of August, 1812, in latitude 41 degrees 42 minutes, and longitude 55 degrees 48 minutes. As soon as the Constitution was ready for action, she bore down to bring her adversary to close action immediately; but on coming within gun shot, received a broadside which did no injury. After which the Guerriere kept wearing and manouvreing for three quarters of an hour, to get a raking position, without success. At 6 P. M., the Constitution being along side, within half pistol shot, she commenced a heavy fire from all her guns, double shotted with round grape, and so well directed and so warmly kept up, that in 15 minut esthe Guerriere's mizzen mast went by the board, her main yard in the slings, and her hull, rigging, and sails very much torn to pieces. The fire was kept up with equal warmth for 15 minutes longer, when her masts went by the board, taking with them every spar except the bowsprit. On seeing this, Captain Hull ceased firing, so that in thirty minutes after he got fairly along side the Guerriere, she surrendered. She had not a spar standing, and her hull below and above water so shattered that a few more broadsides must have carried her down.

The Constitution had seven men killed and seven wounded.

The Guerriere had thirty-nine killed and missing and 61 wounded.

Captain Hull, not deeming it prudent to attempt to take his prize into port, destroyed her.

Fourteen impressed Americans were found on board the Guerriere.

The crew of the Constitution gave three cheers as they went into action, and requested to be laid close

along side of the enemy. "From the smallest boy in the ship, to the oldest seaman, not a look of fear was seen." In the heat of the action, a sailor perceiving that the flag at the topmasthead had been shot away, went up and lashed it in such a manner as to render it impossible for shot to take it away without taking the mast with it.

Captain Dacres of the Guerriere, gravely ascribes the loss of his ship to the defective state of her masts and the number of American seamen on board, whom he could not permit to fight against their own countrymen, and ordered them below.

CAPTURE OF THE ALERT.

On the 13th of August, 1812, off the Grand Banks, the Essex frigate, Captain Porter, fell in with the Alert British sloop of war, Captain T. L. P. Laughame, which immediately ran down on the weather quarter of the Essex, gave three cheers and commenced the action; and after eight minutes firing, struck her colours with 7 feet water in her hold and much cut to pieces. The Essex did not receive the slightest injury.

This cruise of the Essex was most brilliant. She annoyed the enemy's commerce in the West Indies, upon the coast of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, and after the capture of the Alert, had 500 prisoners on board. On her return to port, she narrowly escaped capture from a British squadron.

ACTION BETWEEN THE WASP AND FROLICK.

Captain Jones, of the Wasp, put to sea on the 13th of August, 1812, and five days afterwards fell in with the British sloop of war, Frolick, convoying several armed merchantmen. The sea was rough and the water boistrous. The two sloops approached each other until within about sixty yards, when the Wasp hailed and was instantly answered by a fire of cannon and musketry which she returned with spirit. In ten minutes her main topmast, gaft and mizzen topgallant sail were shot away and fell, entangling the rigging so that her head guns were unmanageable during the heat of the action.

"Still she continued a close and constant fire. The sea was so rough that the muzzles of the Wasp's guns were in the water. The Americans, therefore, fired as the ship's side was going down, so that their shot went either on the enemy's deck, or below it, while the English fired as the vessel rose, and thus her balls chiefly touched the rigging or were thrown away. The Wasp now shot ahead of the Frolick, raked her and then resumed her position on her larboard bow. Her fire was now obviously attended with such success, and that of the Frolick so slackened, that Captain Jones did not wish to board her, lest the roughness of the sea might endanger both vessels; but in the course of a few minutes more, every brace of the Wasp was shot away, and the rigging so much torn to pieces, that he was afraid that his masts, being unsupported, would go by the board, and the Frolick be able to escape. He thought therefore, the best chance for securing her was to board and decide the contest at once. With this view, he wore ship, and running down upon the enemy, the vessels struck each other, the Wasp's side rubbing along the Frolick's bow, so that her jib boom came in between the main and mizzen rigging of the Wasp, directly over the heads of Captain Jones and the first Lieutenant, Mr. Biddle, who were at that time standing together near the capstan. The Frolick lay so fair for raking that they decided not to board until they had given a closing broadside. Whilst they were loading for this, so near were the two vessels that the rammers of the Wasp were pushed against the Frolick's sides, and two of the guns went through the bow ports of the Frolick and swept the whole length of her deck. At this moment Jack Lang, a seaman of the Wasp, a gallant fellow, who had been once impressed by a British man of war, jumped on a gun with his cutlass, and was springing on board the Frolick, Captain Jones, wishing to fire again before boarding, called him down, but his impatience could not be restrained, and he was already on the bowsprit of the Frolick; when, on seeing the ardour and enthusiasm of the Wasp's crew, Lieutenant Biddle mounted on the hammock cloth to board. At

this signal the crew followed, but Lieutenant Biddle's feet got entangled in the enemy's bowsprit, and Midshipman Baker, in his ardour to get on board, laying hold of his coat, he fell back on the Wasp's deck. He sprung up, and as the next swell of the sea brought the Frolick nearer, he got on her bowsprit, where Lang, and another seaman were already. He passed them on the forecastle, and was surprised at seeing not a single man alive on the Frolick's deck, except the seamen at the wheel, and three officers. The deck was slippery with blood, and strewed with the bodies of the dead. As he went forward, the Captain of the Frolick, with two other officers who were standing on the quarter deck, threw down their swords and made an inclination of their bodies, denoting that they had surrendered. At this moment the colours were flying, as probably, none of the seamen of the Frolick would dare to go into the rigging for fear of the musketry of the Wasp. Lieutenant Biddle jumped into the rigging himself, and hauled down the British ensign, and possession was taken of the Frolick in forty-three minutes after the first fire. She was in a shocking condition, the birth deck, particularly, was crowded with dead and wounded and dying; there being but a small proportion of the Frolick's crew escaped Captain Jones instantly sent on board his surgeon's mate, and all the blankets of the Frolick were brought from the slop room, for the comfort of the wounded. To increase the confusion, both of the Frolick's masts soon fell, covering the dead and every thing on deck, and she lay a complete wreck.

The Wasp had five men killed and five slightly wounded.

The Frolick lost about thirty killed and forty-five wounded.

She was superiour in her armament to the Wasp by exactly four 12 pounders. The number of men is believed to have been about equal.

After the decks were cleared of the dead, and the wounded taken care of, Captain Jones ordered Lieutenant Biddle to proceed in the Frolick to a southern port, and as there was a suspicious sail to the windward, the

Wasp would continue her cruise. The ships then parted. The strange sail unfortunately proved to be a British ship of the line, the Poictiers of 74 guns. It is hardly necessary to add, that the Wasp and her prize were taken, they both being in such a shattered state it was next to impossible for them to escape. They were both sent into Bermuda.

CAPTURE OF THE MACEDONIAN.

On the 25th of October, 1812, early in the morning, lat. 30, lon. 26, the United States discovered the Macedonian to the windward, and gave chase. The enemy bore down upon her, and about 10 o'clock, a distant and partial exchange of shot commenced, when the Macedonian having her mizen topmast shot away, bore down for close action. In fifteen minutes afterwards, she struck her flag to the United States. She was one of the first frigates in the British navy, and commanded by Captain John S. Carden, an able and experienced officer. She lost her mizzen mast, fore and main topmasts and main yard, and was much cut up in her hull. Her loss was 36 killed and 68 wounded. The United States had four killed and seven wounded; she suffered so little in her hull and rigging that she might continue her cruise, had not Commodore Decatur preferred convoying his prize into port, which he successfully accomplished across a vast extent of ocean, swarming with the enemy's cruisers. His reception of Captain Carden on board the United States was nobly generous. On presenting his sword, Decatur declined receiving it saying, "give me your hand, I cannot take the sword from an officer who has defended his ship so gallantly."

SINKING OF THE PEACOCK.

In the autumn of 1812, the Constitution and Hornet sailed in company for a long cruise on the coast of Brazil. At St. Salvador, Captain Lawrence challenged the Bonne Citoyenne which he chased into that port. But the British commander, Captain Green, declined the contest, notwithstanding the superiour force of his ship.

On the 24th of February, 1813, when cruising off

Demerara, the Hornet fell in with the British brig Peacock, Captain Peake, a vessel of about equal force. "The contest commenced within half pistol shot, and so tremendous was the American's fire, that in less than fifteen minutes the enemy surrendered, and made signals of distress, being in a sinking condition. Her mainmast shortly after fell by the board, and she was left such an absolute wreck, that notwithstanding every exertion was made to keep her afloat till the prisoners could be removed, she sunk with thirteen of her crew, and three brave American tars, who thus nobly perished in relieving a conquered foe. The slaughter on board the Peacock was very severe; among the slain was found the body of her commander, Captain Peak. He was twice wounded in the course of the action. The last wound proved fatal. His body was wrapped in the flag of his vessel, and laid in the cabin to sink with her, a shroud and a sepulchre worthy so brave a sailor.

"During the battle the British brig L'Espeigle, mounting 15 two-and-thirty pound carronades and two long nines, lay at anchor about six miles in shore. Being apprehensive that she would beat out to the assistance of her consort, the utmost exertions were made to put the Hornet in a situation for action, and in about three hours she was in complete preparation, but the enemy did not think proper to make an attack."

The crew of the Peacock, who had lost their clothing by the sudden sinking of their vessel, were gratuitously supplied each man with two shirts and a blue jacket and trowsers. The British officers, on the arrival of the Peacock at New-York, made a grateful acknowledgement in the publick papers, in which they said, "we ceased to consider ourselves prisoners."

CAPTURE OF THE JAVA.

On the 29th of December, 1812, in south lat. 13, west long. 33, about 10 degrees from the coast of Brazil, the Constitution, Captain Bainbridge, fell in with his Britanick Majesty's frigate Java, of 49 guns, and upwards of 400 men. Some time was spent in manœuvreing. At two P. M., the action commenced at grape

and canister distance. At five minutes past four, the Java's fire was completely silenced. An interval of fifteen minutes succeeded without firing on either side, in which Commodore Bainbridge was busy in repairing damages. Perceiving that the flag of the Java was yet flying, the Constitution took a position athwart her bows, and at the very moment that Commodore Bainbridge was about to pour into her a raking broadside, she prudently struck her flag. Every mast and spar was shot out of the Java. She had 60 men killed and 170 wounded. In addition to her own crew, she had upwards of 100 supernumerary officers and seamen, to join the British ships of war in India, among whom was Lieutenant-General Hislop, appointed Governour of Bombay. She had also on board forty tons of sheet copper destined for the British ships, building at Bombay Several impressed Americans were found on board.

The Constitution had nine men killed and twenty-five wounded.

Commodore Bainbridge not daring to trust his prize in the neutral port of St. Salvador, and being at too great a distance from the United States to think of taking the Java with him, very properly destroyed her.

LOSS OF THE ARGUS.

In May, 1813, Captain Allen, of the United States' brig Argus, sailed from this country for France, having on board Mr. Crawford, our Minister to the French Court. After landing our envoy at L'Orient, he proceeded on a cruise in the British channel, where he captured 21 English vessels, many of which had very valuable cargoes.

On the 14th of August, the Argus fell in with the British brig Pelicon; an action ensued which terminated in the capture of the Argus, which soon became unmanageable and fell an easy conquest to the superiour force of the enemy. Captain Allen lost a leg early in the action. The next in command on board the Argus, Lieutenant Watson, received a wound in the head and was carried below; at which time the wheel ropes and

rigging of every description were shot away, and the enemy in a raking position. Further resistance, therefore, would have been unavailing.

Captain Allen died the day after the action. He was considered as one of the best officers in the navy. The Argus lost 6 killed and 12 wounded. The English states their loss to have been 8 killed and wounded.

The Pelicon was in every respect a superiour vessel to the Argus; she was of 485 tons burden. Her shot in pounds, was 660. The burden of the Argus was 298 tons; her shot in pounds, 402.

LOSS OF THE CHESAPEAKE.

THIS disastrous and memorable engagement was fought off Boston harbour on the 2d June, 1813.

The British frigate Shannon, with a select and numerous crew, had for several days hovered near the entrance of the port. On seeing the Chesapeake come out, she bore away and was followed by Captain Lawrence. "The vessels manœuvred in awful silence, until within pistol shot, when the Shannon opened her fire, and both vessels almost at the same moment poured forth tremendous broadsides. The execution on both sides was terrible, but the fire of the Shannon was peculiarly fatal, not only making great slaughter among the men, but cutting down some of the most valuable officers. The very first shot killed Mr. White, Sailing Master of the Chesapeake, an excellent officer, whose loss at such a moment was disastrous in the extreme. The fourth Lieutenant, Mr. Ballard, received also a mortal wound in this broadside, and at the same moment Captain Lawrence was shot through the leg with a musket ball; he however supported himself on the companion way, and continued to give orders with his usual coolness. About three broadsides were exchanged which, from the closeness of the ships, were dreadfully destructive. The Chesapeake had three men shot from her helm successively, each taking it as the other fell; this, of course, produced irregularity in steering, and the consequence was, that her anchor caught in one of the Shannon's after ports. She was thus in a position

where her guns could not be brought to bear upon the enemy, while the latter was enabled to fire raking shots from her foremast guns, which swept the upper decks of the Chesapeake, killing or wounding the greater portion of her men. A hand grenade was thrown on the quarter deck which set fire to some musket cartridges, but did no other damage.

In this state of carnage and exposure, about twenty of the Shannon's men, seeing a favourable opportunity for boarding, without waiting for orders, jumped on the deck of the Chesapeake. Captain Lawrence had scarce time to call to his boarders, when he received a second, mortal wound from a musket ball, which lodged in his intestines. Lieutenant Cox, who commanded the second division, rushed up to call the boarders, but come just in time to receive his falling commander He was in the act of carrying him below, when Captain Broke, accompanied by his first Lieutenant, and followed by his regular boarders, sprung on board the Chesapeake. The brave Lawrence saw the overwhelming danger; his last words, as he was born bleeding from the deck, were, "Don't surrender the ship!"

Embarrassment, confusion, and a terrible carnage ensued, and the Chesapeake was finally surrendered by Lieutenant Ludlow. While the cannonade continued, the Chesapeake is said to have had a decided advantage. The Shannon had many shots between wind and water, and was represented to have been in a dangerous situation, when victory was decided in her favour.

The Chesapeake had 48 killed and 98 wounded. The loss of the Shannon was 26 killed and 58 wounded.

CAPTURE OF THE BOXER.

THE action between the Enterprise and Boxer, was fought on the 5th of September, 1813, off the coast of Maine. The Enterprise had the weathergage. After manœuvreing for some time to the windward, she hoisted three ensigns and ran down with the intention of closing with her antagonist; when within pistol shot, the crew of the Boxer gave three cheers and commenced the action by a discharge of her starboard broadside,

which was returned in like manner by the Enterprise. The action continued 40 minutes, when the guns of the British vessel being silenced, the crew cried for quarters, saying that their colours being nailed to the mast, could not be hauled down. Both vessels were much cut up. The Enterprise lost one man killed and thirteen wounded. The American and British commanders both fell. Lieutenant Burrows of the Enterprise, expired a few hours after the engagement. While lying on the deck, previous to the capture of the Boxer, he raised his head and desired that his flag might never be struck. When the sword of his vanquished enemy was presented to him, he clasped his hands and exclaimed, "I die contented!" The British loss was not precisely known, as their dead were thrown overboard during the action. Seventeen wounded were found on board at the time of her surrender.

GLORIOUS CRUISE OF THE WASP.

THE Wasp, Captain Johnson Blakely, sailed from Portsmouth, New-Hampshire, on the 18th of May, 1814. On the 28th of June, in lat. 48 degrees, and long. 11 degrees, she fell in with and captured, after an action of 19 minutes, his Britanick Majesty's brig Reindeer, of 19 guns. She was literally cut to pieces in a line with her ports. Her loss was 23 killed and 48 wounded. On board the Wasp, 5 were killed and 21 wounded. Captain Blakley, not deeming it prudent to attempt taking his prize into port, destroyed her.

After this victory, the Wasp put into port L'Orient in France, to repair damages. She sailed again on the 27th of August, and on the 18th of September, fell in with the British sloop of war Avon, and compelled her to surrendered after an action of 45 minutes. The Avon had 40 killed and 60 wounded. The Wasp had two killed and one wounded. Just at the close of the action three other British ships of war hove in sight, which induced Captain Blakely to abandon his prize, which, however, sunk soon after he left her. The Wasp afterwards continued her cruise and made a great number of valuable prizes. Unfortunately, this successful ves-

sel never returned to the United States. Her fate is involved in uncertainty.

LOSS OF THE ESSEX.

THIS adventurous vessel was captured at Valparaiso, a Spanish port in the Pacifick Ocean, on the 28th of March, 1813. In violation of the neutrality of the port, she was attacked while at anchor within pistol shot of the shore, by the Phœbe frigate and Cherub sloop of war. The action lasted 2 hours and 30 mintes, during which time, the Essex had 58 men killed and 65 wounded. The British state their loss at 5 killed and 10 wounded. For a long time after the Essex had struck, the British continued their fire, in violation of every principle of decency and honour.

CAPTURE OF THE L'EPERVIER.

ON the 29th of April, in lat. 47 degrees, long. 80 degrees, the United States' brig Peacock, Captain Warrington, captured the British brig L'Epervier of 18 guns and 128 men, having on board $120,000 in specie. The L'Epervier had 8 killed and 13 wounded. Not a man of the Peacock was killed, and only two wounded. The Peacock received so little damage that she continued her cruise.

LOSS OF THE PRESIDENT FRIGATE.

THIS frigate, in which Commodore Rodgers had three times scoured the ocean, was at last captured, while commanded by Commodore Decatur. She was chased by the Endymion, Pomone, and Tenedos, British frigates, the first of which was completely silenced and thrown out of combat by the superiour fire of the President. Two fresh frigates coming up, just as the Endymeon was silenced, a surrender of the ship became indispensable.

CAPTURE OF THE CYANE AND LEVANT.

ON the evening of the 20th of February, 1815, Captain Stewart, of the Constitution, off the Island of Mederia, fell in with his Britanick Majesty's ships of war

Cyane and Levant, and after a spirited action of 40 minutes, succeeded in capturing them. The Cyane mounted 34, and the Levant 21 guns. The two vessels lost 35 killed and 42 wounded. The Constitution received but little injury; she had 3 killed and 12 wounded.

CAPTURE OF THE PENGUIN.

THE Hornet fell in with the Penguin off the Island of Tristian de Cunha, off the coast of Brazil, on the 23d of March, 1815. The Penguin was fitted out for the express purpose of capturing the Wasp. But mark the result—in 22 minutes after the action commenced, the Penguin struck to the Hornet, a vessel greatly inferiour to the Wasp. The Hornet lost one man killed and 11 wounded. The Penguin had 17 men killed and 28 wounded.

MILITARY PEACE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Department of War, May 17, 1815.

THE act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1815, declares—"That the military peace establishment of the United States shall consist of such proportions of artillery, infantry, and riflemen, not exceeding, in the whole, ten thousand men, as the President of the United States shall judge proper; that the corps of engineers, as at present established, be retained; that the President of the United States cause to be arranged the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, of the several corps of troops in the service of the United States, in such manner as to form and complete out of the same, the corps authorized by this act; and that he cause the supernumerary officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, to be discharged from the service of the United States, from and after the first day of May next, or as soon as circumstances may permit."

The President of the United States, having performed the duty which the law assigned to him, has directed that the military peace establishment be announced in general orders; and that the supernumerary officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, be discharged from the service of the United States, as soon as the circumstances, which are necessary for the payment and discharge of the troops, will permit.

But on this important and interesting occasion, the President of the United States is aware, that he owes to the feelings of the nation, as well as to his own feelings, an expression of the high sense entertained of the services of the American army. Leaving the scenes of private life, the citizens became the soldiers of the United States; the spirit of a genuine patriotism quickly pervaded the military establishment; and the events of the war have conspicuously developed the moral, as well as the physical character of the army, in which

every man seems to have deemed himself the chosen champion of his country.

The pacifick policy of the American government the domestick habits of the people, and a long sequestration from the use of arms, will justly account for the want of warlike preparations, for an imperfect state of discipline, and for various other sources of embarrassment, or disaster, which existed at the commencement of hostilities; but to account for the achievements of the American army, in all their splendour, and for its efficient acquirements in every important branch of the military art, during a war of little more than two years continuance—it is necessary to resort to that principle of action, which, in a free country, identifies the citizen with his government; impels each individual to seek the knowledge that is requisite for the performance of his duty; and renders every soldier, in effect, a combattant in his own cause.

The President of the United States anticipated from the career of an army thus constituted, all the glory and the fruits of victory; and it has been his happiness to see a just war terminated by an honourable peace, after such demonstrations of valour, genius, and enterprise, as secure for the land and naval forces of the United States an imperishable renown; for the citizens, the best prospect of an undisturbed enjoyment of their rights; and for the government, the respect and confidence of the world.

To the American army, which has so nobly contributed to these results, the President of the United States presents this publick testimonial of approbation and applause, at a moment when many of its gallant officers and men must, unavoidably, be separated from the standard of their country. Under all governments, and especially under all free governments, the restoration of peace has uniformly produced a reduction of the military establishment. The United States disbanded in 1800 the troops which had been raised on account of the differences with France; and the memorable peace of 1783, was followed by a discharge of the illustrious army of the revolution. The frequency, or the necessi-

ty, of the occurrence does not, however, deprive it of its interest; and the dispersion of the military family, at this juncture, under circumstances peculiarly affecting, cannot fail to awaken all the sympathies of the generous and the just.

The difficulty of accomplishing a satisfactory organization of the military peace establishment, has been anxiously felt. The act of Congress contemplates a small but an effective force; and, consequently, the honourable men, whose years or infirmities, or wounds, render them incapable of farther service in active warfare, are necessarily excluded from the establishment. The act contemplates a reduction of the army from many, to a few regiments; and consequently a long list of meritorious officers must inevitably be laid aside. But the attempt has been assiduously made to collect authentick information from every source, as a foundation for an impartial judgement on the various claims to attention; and even while a decision is pronounced, the President of the United States desires it may be distinctly understood, that from the designation of the officers who are retained in service, nothing more is to be inferred, than his approbation of the designated individuals, without derogating, in any degree, from the fame and worth of those whose lot it is to retire.

The American army of the war of 1812 has hitherto successfully emulated the patriotism and the valour of the army of the war of 1776. The closing scene of the example remains alone to be performed. Having established the independence of their country, the revolutionary warriours cheerfully returned to the walks of civil life; many of them became the benefactors and ornaments of society, in the prosecution of the various arts and professions; and all of them, as well as the veteran few who survive the lapse of time, have been the objects of grateful recollection and constant regard. It is for the American army, now dissolved, to pursue the same honourable course, in order to enjoy the same inestimable reward. The hope may be respectfully indulged, that the beneficence of the legislative authority will beam upon suffering merit; an admiring nation will

unite the civick with the martial honours, which adorn its heroes; and posterity, in its theme of gratitude, will indiscriminately praise the protectors and the founders of American Independence.

By order of the President of the United States,

A. J. DALLAS,
Acting Secretary of War.

Department of War, April 17, 1815.

GENTLEMEN,

I proceed to state some additional views connected with the execution of the act of Congress fixing the military peace establishment.

I. Corps belonging to the army, which are not expressly retained by the provisions of the act, are to be discharged.

The corps expressly provided for, are

1. The corps of artillery;
2. The regiment of light artillery;
3. The corps of engineers;
4. Regiments of infantry and riflemen.

The corps not provided for, are

1. The regiment of light dragoons;
2. The Canadian volunteers;
3. The sea fencibles.

II. The officers of the general staff employed in the command, discipline and duties of the army, who are not expressly retained by the provisions of the act, are to be discharged.

The officers provided for, are

1. Two Major Generals, with two Aids-de-camp each;
2. Four Brigadier Generals, with one Aid-de-camp each;
3. Four brigade Inspectors;
4. Four brigade Quarter Masters.

The officers not provided for, are

1. All the general officers, except the six above mentioned;
2. All the officers of the Adjutant General's department;

3. All the officers of the Inspector General's department—four brigade Inspectors being substituted ;

4. All the officers of the Quarter Master's department—four brigade Quarter Masters being substituted ;

5. All the officers of the topographical department.

III. Departments which do not form a constituent part of the army, are preserved, except so far as the act of Congress by express provision, or necessary implication, introduces an alteration.

1. The Ordnance Department is preserved. It is a distinct establishment, with a view to a state of peace, as well as a state of war. It is not affected by any express provision in the act of Congress ; and it is an object of the appropriations made for the military peace establishment.

2. The Purchasing Department is preserved for similar reasons.

3. The Pay Department is preserved, with specifick modifications. The act of Congress expressly provides for the appointment of regimental paymasters. The office of district paymaster, and assistant district paymaster, is abolished : but the act of the 18th of April, 1814, which continues in force for one year after the war, is not repealed, nor affected in any other manner, than has been mentioned by the act of the 3d of March, 1815. It is seen, therefore, that the act of the 16th of March, 1802, fixing the military peace establishment, constituted the office of paymaster of the army, seven paymasters, and two assistants ; and that the act of the 18th of April, 1814, recognizes the office of paymaster of the army ; and in lieu of a monthly compensation, allows the paymaster an annual salary of two thousand dollars, payable quarterly at the Treasury. The former act is of indefinite continuance ; and the latter will continue in force until the 17th of February, 1816. Nor does the act of the 3d of March, 1815, affect the office of deputy paymaster general : the act of the 6th July, 1812, providing that to any army of the United States other than that in which the paymaster of the army shall serve, the President may appoint one deputy paymaster gen-

eral, to be taken from the line of the army; and each deputy shall have a competent number of assistants.

4. The office of Judge Advocate is preserved. The act of the 11th of January, 1812, provides that there shall be appointed to each division, a Judge Advocate. The act of the 3d of March, 1815, neither expressly, nor by necessary implication, repeals that provision.

5. The Chaplains are preserved. The act of the 11th January, 1812, provides that there shall be appointed to each brigade, one Chaplain. The act of the 3d of March, 1815, neither expressly, nor by necessary implication, repeals that provision.

6. The Hospital Department is not preserved. The act of the 3d of March, 1815, provides for regimental surgeons and surgeon's mates, and for such number of hospital surgeons and surgeon's mates, as the service may require, not exceeding five surgeons and fifteen mates, with one steward, and one wardmaster to each hospital. From this specifick arrangement, it is necessarily implied, that the physician and surgeon general, the assistant apothecaries general, and all the hospital surgeons and surgeon's mates, garrison surgeons and surgeon's mates, except the above specified number, are to be discharged. The physician and surgeon general, and the apothecary general, were appointed, the better to superintend the hospital and medical establishment of the army of the United States, under the act of the 3d of March, 1813; and the act of the 30th of March, 1814, authorized the President to appoint so many assistant apothecaries as the service might, in his judgement, require. The occasion for the appointments under both acts has ceased; and the act of the 3d of March, 1815, meant to provide a substitute for the whole department, according to the demands of the peace establishment.

7. The Military Academy is preserved. The act of the 3d of March, 1815, provides that the corps of engineers, as at present established, shall be retained. By the act of the 16th of March, 1802, ten cadets were assigned to the corps of engineers. By the act of the 29th of April, 1812, the cadets, whether of artillery,

cavalry, riflemen, or infantry, were limited to the number of 250, who might be attached, by the President, as students to the military academy; but the act of the 2d of March, 1815, declares that the regiment of light artillery shall have the same organization as is prescribed by the act passed the 12th of April, 1808; and by that act, two cadets are to be attached to each company. It is therefore to be considered, that there are 250 cadets attached to the military academy, under the establishment of the act of the 29th of April, 1812, and twenty cadets attached to the regiment of light artillery.

Upon this analysis of the act of Congress for fixing the military peace establishment, the President wishes to receive any information which you think will tend to promote the publick service, in reference to the following inquiries.

1. The best arrangements to adopt to the peace establishment—the ordnance department—the purchasing department—the pay department—and the military academy.

2. The arrangements best adapted to render the medical establishment competent to the garrison, as well as to the regimental service.

It is obvious that considerable difficulty will arise, if the adjutant general's and the quarter master general's departments should be immediately and entirely abolished, and if the garrison surgeons should be immediately discharged. The President is desirous to execute the act of Congress, as far as it is practicable and safe, on the first of May next; but he is disposed to take the latitude which the act allows, in cases that clearly require a continuance of the officers for the necessary publick service. You will be pleased, therefore to state,

1. Whether, in your judgement, the continuance of the office of adjutant and inspector general is necessary for the publick service?

2. Whether, in your judgement, the continuance of any, and which of the offices in the quarter master's department, is necessary for the publick service?

3. Whether, in your judgement, the continuance of

any, and which of the offices in the medical department, not expressly provided for by law, is necessary for the publick service ?

I have the honour to be, gentlemen, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

A. J. DALLAS,
Acting Secretary of War.

Major Generals Brown, Jackson, Scott,
Gaines, Macomb and Ripley.

Department of War, 12*th May*, 1815.

The Acting Secretary of War has the honour to submit to the President of the United States the following report :

That the act of Congress, entitled " An act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States," passed on the 3d of March, 1815, provided, that after the corps constituting the peace establishment was formed and completed, the supernumerary officers non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates, should be discharged from the service of the United States, from, and after the first day of May ensuing the date of the act, or as soon as circumstances might permit. But it was soon found impracticable to obtain from all the military districts the information which was requisite to do justice to the army, and to the nation, in reducing the military establishment from a force of thousand men, to a force of ten thousand men, so early as the first day of May. And it is obvious, that circumstances do not even yet permit the entire reduction contemplated by Congress, with regard to the settlement of the numerous accounts depending in the quarter master, commissary and pay departments, and the medical care of the troops at the many military stations to which they must be apportioned.

That having, however, dilligently collected from every proper source of information, the necessary materials for deciding upon the various subjects involved in the execution of the act of Congress; and having obtained from the board of general officers convened at Washington, the most valuable assistance, the Acting Secre-

tary of War respectfully lays the result before the President of the United States, in the form of four general orders to be issued from this department:

No. 1. A general order, announcing the military divisions and departments of the United States; the corps and regiments constituting the military peace establishment; and the distribution and apportionment of the troops.

No. 2. A general order, announcing the army register for the peace establishment, including the officers provisionally retained in service, until circumstances shall permit their discharge.

No. 3. A general order, directing the supernumerary officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates to be paid, and discharging them from the service of the United States on the 15th day of June next, or as soon thereafter as the payment can be completed; provided, 1st, that such officers of every rank, as may be necessary to supply vacancies created by resignations on the first organization of the corps and regiments for the peace establishment, shall be deemed to be in service for that purpose alone; and, 2d, that paymasters, quartermasters, commissaries and other officers, who have been charged with the disbursement of publick money, shall be deemed to be in service for the single purpose of rendering their accounts for settlement, within a seasonable time.

No. 4. A general order, requiring the Major Generals to assume the command of their respective divisions, and to proceed to form and distribute the corps and regiments for their respective commands, according to the system announced for the military peace establishment.

All which is respectfully submitted.

A. J. DALLAS,
Acting Secretary of War.

The President of the United States.

APPROVED, May 15, 1815.

JAMES MADISON.

Adjutant and Inspector General's Office.
May 17, 1815.

GENERAL ORDERS.

In pursuance of the act of Congress, entitled, "An act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States," approved the 3d of March, 1815, the President of the United States has judged proper that the military peace establishment shall consist of the following proportions of artillery, infantry and riflemen; the corps of engineers being retained as at present established.

1. Of the corps of artillery, there shall be thirty-two companies, or eight battalions, making 3,200 men.

2. Of the light artillery, there shall be ten companies, or one regiment, making 660 men.

3. Of the infantry, there shall be eighty companies, or eight regiments, making 5,440 men.

4. Of the riflemen, there shall be ten companies, or one regiment, making 680 men. Total, 9,980.

And the President of the United States has farther judged proper, that the United States be divided into two military divisions; and that each military division be subdivided into military departments, as follows:

The division of the north to comprise five military departments, to wit:

No. 1. New-York, above the highlands, and Vermont.

No. 2. New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Connecticut.

No. 3. New-York, below the highlands, and that part of New-Jersey which furnishes the first division of militia.

No. 4. Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and that part of New-Jersey which furnishes the second division of militia.

No. 5. Ohio, and the Territories of Michigan and Indiana.

The division of the south, to comprise four military departments, to wit:

No. 6. Virginia, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia.

No. 7. South Carolina and Georgia.

No. 8. Louisiana and the Mississippi Territory.

No. 9. Tennessee, Kentucky, and the Territories of Missouri and Illinois.

And the President of the United States has farther judged proper, that the general distribution of the regiments and corps constituting the military peace establishment, shall be made in the following manner:

To the division of the north—

The second, third, fifth and sixth regiments of infantry, forming two brigades.

Four battalions of the corps of artillery; and the regiment of light artillery.

To the division of the south—

The first, fourth, seventh and eighth regiments of infantry, forming two brigades.

Four battalions of the corps of artillery, and the regiment of riflemen.

And the President of the United States has farther judged it proper, that a part of the several regiments and corps constituting the military peace establishment, shall be detailed and apportioned for the following named stations; and that the rest of the regiments and corps shall be disposed of as the Major Generals commanding divisions may hereafter direct.

In the division of the north—

For the posts and fortresses on the coast of New-England,

The regiment of light artillery, ten companies.

Of the corps of artillery, four companies. Total, 14.

For the harbour of New-York, and its dependencies, of the corps of artillery, four companies.

For fort Mifflin, and its dependencies, of the corps of artillery, two companies.

For fort M'Henry, and its dependencies, of the corps of artillery, two companies.

For Sacket's Harbour, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Plattsburgh, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Niagara, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For fort Washington, on the Potomack, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Detroit, and its dependencies, of infantry, ten companies; of riflemen, four companies. Total, 14.

In the division of the south—

For Norfolk harbour, and its dependencies, of the corps of artillery, three companies.

For forts Johnson and Hampden, N. C. of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Charleston harbour, and its dependencies, of the corps of artillery, four companies.

For Savannah, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Mobile, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Plaquemin, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For forts St. Charles, St. John and Petite Coquile, of the corps of artillery, three companies.

For Natchitoches, of the corps of artillery, one company; of riflemen, two companies. Total, 3 companies.

For St. Louis, and its dependencies, of infantry, ten companies; of riflemen, four companies. Total, 14 companies.

For Chefuncta, of infantry, ten companies.

For the vicinity of Augusta, Georgia, of infantry, ten companies.

And the President of the United States has further judged proper, that the non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates, of the several regiments and corps now in the service of the United States, whose term of service has not expired, shall be so arranged as to form and complete out of the same the non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates, consisting the military peace establishment, in the manner following, viz:

To form the regiment of light artillery, Brigadier-General Porter, there shall be mustered for selection, the light artillery proper, the 15th, 26th, 30th, 31st, 33d, 34th, and 45th regiments of infantry.

To form the corps of artillery, there shall be mustered for selection, the corps of artillery proper, the regiment of dragoons, the 41st, 42d, and 43d regiments of infantry.

To form the regiments of infantry in the division of the north, there shall be mustered—

For the 2d regiment of infantry, Colonel Brady, the 6th, 16th, 22d, 23d, and 32d regiments of infantry.

For the 3d regiment of infantry, Colonel John Miller, the 1st, 17th, 19th, 24th, 28th, and 39th regiments of infantry.

For the 5th regiment of infantry, Brigadier-General Miller, 4th, 9th, 13th, 21st, 40th, and 46th regiments of infantry.

For the 6th regiment of infantry, Colonel Atkinson, the 11th, 25th, 27th, 29th and 37th regiments of infantry.

To form the regiments of infantry and riflemen, in the division of the south—

For the 1st regiment of infantry, Brigadier-General Bissel, the 2d, 3d, 7th, and 44th regiments of infantry.

For the 4th regiment of infantry, Colonel King, the 12th, 14th, and 20th regiments of infantry.

For the 7th regiment of infantry, Colonel M'Donald, the 8th, 10th, 35th, and 38th regiments of infantry.

For the 8th regiment of infantry, Colonel Nicholas, the 5th, 18th, and 35th regiments of infantry.

For the rifle regiment, Brigadier-General Smith, the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th rifle regiments.

And the President of the United States has further judged proper, that in addition to the provision for a General Staff, which is specifically made by the act of Congress, certain offiers shall be detained, under the special authority given by the act, until circumstances will permit of their discharge, without material injury to the service: and that the following shall be the General Staff:

Two Major-Generals, with two Aids-de-Camp, each.

Four Brigadier-Generals, with one Aid-de-Camp, each.

An Adjutant and Inspector-General, and two Adjutant-Generals, to be provisionally retained.

Four Brigade Inspectors,

One Quarter-Master General and two Deputy Quarter-Masters General, to be provisionally retained.

Four Brigade Quarter-Masters.

An Apothecary-General and two Assistant Apothecaries, to be provisionally retained.

Five hospital Surgeons.

Fifteen hospital Surgeon's Mates.

Two garrison Surgeon's, to be provisionally retained.

A Paymaster of the army.

Two Deputy Paymasters General, and two Assistant Deputy Paymasters, to be provisionally retained.

The acts of Congress establishing the Ordnance Department, the office of Commisary-General of purchases, and the Military Academy, remain in force, as well as certain acts authorizing the appointment of Judge Advocates and Chaplains to the army.

The organization and arrangements of the Military Peace Establishment, thus made by the President of the United States, are published in general order for the information and government of the army.

By order of the Secretary of War,

D. PARKER,

Adjutant and Inspector-General.

ARMY REGISTER.

NAMES.	RANK.	DATE OF APPOINTMENT	BRE'T & FORMER COMMISSIONS.	REMARKS.
Jacob Brown,	Major-Gen.			Div. of north.
Andrew Jackson,	do.	24th Jan. 1814.		Div. of South.
Alexander Macomb,	Brig. Gen.	1st May, 24th January	11th Sept., 1814, Maj. Gen. br'vt.,	
Edmund P. Gaines,	do	9th March	15th Aug. 1814, Maj. Gen. br'vt.,	
Winfield Scott,	do	9th March	25th July, 1814, Maj. Gen. br'vt.,	
Eleazer W. Ripley,	do	15th April	25th July, 1814, Maj. Gen. br'vt.	
Daniel Parker, Adj. Inspector-General		22d Nov., 1814.	Brig. Gen. br'vt.	prov. retained.
Robert Butler, Adjutant-General		5th March.	Col. do.	Div. of south
Arthur P. Hayne, do.		12th April.	do.	Div. of north
Robert Swartwout, qr. master-gen'l		21st March 1813	Brig. Gen. do.	
S. Champlain, dep. qr. master general.		1st March.	Major do.	Div. of south
Samuel Brown, do.		26th March.	do.	Div. of north
Four brigade inspectors and four brigade qr. master, to be taken from the line.				

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

Decius Wadsworth,	Colonel	2d July, 1812	Colonel	brevet.
George Bomford,	Lieut. Colonel	18th June	Lt. Col.	do
John Morton,	Captain	11th Sept.	Captain	do
Abraham B. Woolley.	do	4th Dec.		do
John H. Margart,	do	31st Dec.		do
James Daliby,	do	5th Aug. 1813		do
Thomas L. Campbell,	do	5th Aug.		do
Edwin Tyler,	do	5th Aug.		do
R. D. Richardson,	do	5th Aug.		do
George Talcott, Jr.	do	5th Aug.		do
J. H. Rees,	do	16th June, 1814		do
William Wade,	1st Lieutenant	12th Mar. 1813	1st Lieut.	brevt.
Rufus L. Baker,	do	12th Mar.		do
William C. Lyman,	do	19th Apr.		do
George Larned,	do	19th Apr.		do
Nehemiah Baden,	do	6th Aug.		do
Christopher Keiser,	do	6th Aug.		do
Thomas L. Hawkins,	do	6th Aug.		do
James Baker,	do	6th Aug.		do
J. Livingston,	do	5th Mar.		do
James Wilson,	2d Lieutenant	26th Dec. 1814	2d Lieut.	brevt.
Ebenezer M'Donald,	do	do		do
R. C. Pomeroy,	do	do		do

Charles F. Morton,	do	do	do
Wm. F. Rigal,	3d Lieutenant	2d Mar. 1815	3d Lieut. brevt.
James Simonson,	do	do	do
John Hills,	do	do	do
Simon Willard,	do	do	do
John Symington,	do	do	do

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.		DATE OF APPOINTMENTS.	
Francis Le Baron,	Apothecary General	11th June, 1813.	Provisionally retained.
Christopher Backus,	Assistant Apothecary	12th August, 1814.	
James Cutbush,	do	do	
David C. Kerr,	Hospital Surgeon	30th April, 1812.	
Benjamin Waterhouse,	do	29th June, 1813.	
James C. Bronaugh,	do	15th April, 1814.	
Joseph Lovell,	do	30th June,	
Arnold Elzey,	do	17th May, 1815.	
James Stevenson,	Hospital Surgeon's Mate	27th May, 1812.	
J. B. Whiteridge,	do	30th March, 1813.	
Edward Purcell,	do	2d May,	
William W. Hazard,	do	4th May,	
William Jones,	do	2d July,	
Joseph Wallace,	do	15th July,	
William Williams,	do	1st August,	
William Stewart,	do	30th March, 1814.	
William Marshall,	do	30th March,	

Joseph Eaton,	do	15th April,	
Robert Archer,	do	13th May,	
Hugh F. Rose,	do	21st May,	
James Trimble,	do	17th July,	
Thomas Russell,	do	21st July,	
Donaldson Yates,	do	16th August,	
Foster Swift,	Garrison Surgeon	18th Feb. 1814.	Provisionally retained.
James H. M'Culloch,	do	17th July,	do.
John F. Heileman,	Garrison Surgeon's Mate	2d June, 1802.	do. Fort Mifflin.
Charles Slocum,	do	25th March, 1807.	do. Natchitoches.
Lemuel B. Clark,	do	4th January, 1808.	do. Norfolk.
William T. Davidson,	do	13th June, 1808.	do. Fort Stoddert.
Jonathan S. Cool,	do	8th Feb'y, 1811.	do. Fort Osage
Alexander Wolcott,	do	25th March, 1812.	do. New-York.
William Turner,	do	29th Sept. 1812.	do. New-London.
William M. Scott,	do	8th April, 1814.	do. Detroit.
W. C. Lane,	do	15th Sept.	do. Vincennes.
	do		do.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

Robert Brent, Paymaster of the army	1st July, 1808.	
Washington Lee, deputy do. general	1 th April, 1813.	Northern division.
Jonathan Bell, assistant dep. do. general	1st August, 1814.	Prov. retained.
Ambrose Whitlock, dep. pay gen.	17th May, 1815.	Southern division.
assistant dep. do.		Prov. retained.

PURCHASING DEPARTMENT.		
Callender Irvine, com. gen. of purchases	8th August, 1812.	
assist. com.		
storekeeper	- - - - - -	Prov. retained.
JUDGE ADVOCATES.		
James T. Dent,	19th July, 1813.	Southern division.
Henry Wheaton,	6th August,	Northern division.
CHAPLAINS.		
- - - - - -		
- - - - - -		
MILITARY ACADEMY.		
Sen. officer of eng's, superintendent		
Jared Mansfield, pro. nat. and exper. phil.	7th October, 1812.	
D. B. Douglass, assist. do do		
Andrew Ellicott, professor mathematicks	1st Sept. 1813.	
J. Wright, assistant do		
Alden Partridge, prof. art engineering	1st Sept. 1813.	
William Evelyth, assistant do		
Samuel Walsh, surgeon	9th August, 1813.	
Adam Empie, chaplain and prof. ethicks		
Claudius Beraud, teacher French language	3d January, 1815.	
C. E. Zoeller, teacher of drawing		
Pere Thomas, sword master.		

CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

NAMES AND RANK.	BREVETS & FORMER COMMISSIONS.
Colonel.	
Jos. G. Swift, 31 July, 1812	Brig. Gen. 19 Feb. 1814, brevet.
Lieutenant Colonel.	
Walker K. Armstead, 31st July, 1812	
Majors.	
Geo. Bomford, 6 July, 1812	Lieut. Col. 22d Dec. 1814, brevet.
Wm. M'Ree, 31 July, 1812	Ord. 18 June, 1812.
Captains.	
Chas. Gratiot, 23 Feb. 1808	Col. 15 Aug. 1812, brevet.
A. Partridge, 23 July, 1810	Professor mil. academy.
J. G. Totten, 31 July, 1812	Lieut. Col. 11 Sept. 1814, brevet.
Sam'l Babcock, 20 Sep. 1812	
Sylv. Thayer, 13 Oct. 1813	Maj. 20 Feb. 1814, brevet.
Wm. Cutbush, 17 Sep. 1814	
First Lieutenants.	
Ed. De Russey, 6 July, 1814	Captain 11 Sept. 1814, brevet.
Fred'k Lewis, 20 Sep. 1812	
Jas. Gasden, 17 March, 1813	
T. W. Maurice, 13 Oct. do.	
Hipolite Dumas, 20 Feb. '14	
D. B. Douglass, 17 Sep. do.	Capt. 17 Sept. 1814, brevt.
Second Lieutenants.	
Geo. Trescott, 16 Oct. 1813	1st Lt. 11 Sept. 1814, brevt
J. L. Smith, 16 do do	
Horace C. Story, 11 March, 1814	1st Lt. 17 Sept. 1814, brevt
John Wright, 30 do do	
S. H. Long, 12 Dec. 1814	
H'y Middleton 2 Mar. 1815	

REGIMENT OF LIGHT ARTILLERY.

Colonel.	
Moses Porter, 12 Mar. 1812	Brig. Gen. 10 Sept. 1813, brevet.
Lieutenant Colonel.	
J. R. Fenwick, 2 Dec. 1811	Col. staff and brevet, 18th March, 1813.
Majors.	
Abram Eustis 15 Mar. 1810	Lt. Col. 18 Sept. 1813 brev.

Captains.

A. M'Dowell, 1 April 1812
Nathan Towson, 6 July do — Lt. Col. brev. 15 Aug. 1814
Sam'l D. Harris, 3 do do — Major brevet 15 do do
Arthur W. Thornton, 20th Jan. 1813
Gabriel H. Manigault, 1st Aug. 1813 — Major staff 9 Sept do
Arms Irvine, 1 Oct. 1813
Fras. Stribling, 1 Nov. do
John S. Peyton, 15 Dec. do
Henry K. Craig, 23 do do
John R. Bell, 10 Oct. 1814 — Col staff 28 October do

First Lieutenants.

Wm. F. Hobart, 5 Ap. 1813 — Major staff 27 July do
Geo. W. Hight, 10 Aug. do — Major staff 17 do do
G. N. Morris, 23 Oct. do
J. H. Wilkins, 3 Dec. do
John Gates, Jr. 3 do do
Nels. Freeland, 21 Feb. 1814
Wm. Lyman, 10 June do
J. T. M'Kanney, 21 Ag. do
S M. Mackay, 10 Oct. do
Fred. Kinloch, 10 do do

Second Lieutenants.

G. E. Wells, 2 Oct. 1813
E. Lyon, 22d do do
S. Washburn, 13 Dec. do
H Stanton, 7 March, 1814 — Captain staff 12 July 1813
R. W. Field, 17 do do
P. Drane, 17 do do
W. Smith, 12 May do
H. F. Evans, 2 June do
R. F. Massie, 31 Aug. do
W. Wells, 10 Oct. do

Surgeon.

Lewis Dunham, 12 Dec. do

Surgeon's Mate.

W. H. Livingston, 26 Jy. do

CORPS OF ARTILLERY.

Lieutenant Colonels.				
G E Mitchell, 3 Mar	1813	Col brevet, May 15		1814
James House, 3 do	do			
Wm Lindsay, 12 do	do			
Wm Macrea, 19 April	do			
Majors.				
G Armistead, 3 March	do	Lt Col brevet, 12 Sept		do
Jas B Many, 5 May				
J Hindman, 26 June		Lt Col brevet, 15 Aug		do
W H Overton, 21 Fb	1814			
Captains.				
Charles Wollstonecraft, 15 March	1805	Major brevet, 15 Mar		1815
J B Walbach, 31 Jan	1806	Col staff, 6 August		1813
Wm Wilson, 3 May	1808	Major brevet, 11 Nov		do
E Humphreys, 9 Jan	1809			
Jas Reed 12 March	1812			
J B Crane, 6 July	do	Major brevet, 13 Nov		do
Roger Jones 6 do	do	Lt Col brevt, 17 Sept		1814
J H Boyle, 6 do	do	Major brevet, 5 May		do
A S Brooks, 6 do	do	Major brevet, 11 Sept		do
S B Archer 6 do	do	Major brevet, 27 April		1815
J B P'on, 6 do	do			
Th Biddle, jr 6 do	do	Major brevet, 15 Aug		1814
J T B Romayne, 6 do	do	Major staff, 11 Feb		1815
Wm O Allen, 6 do	do			
Th Murray, 10 Feb	1813			
Wm Gates, 3d March	do			
A C W Fanning, 13 do	do	Major brevet, 15 Aug		1814
G H Richards, 13 do	do			
I Roach, jr 13 April	do			
J F Heilman, 5 May	do			
Th Bennet, 20 June	do			
A W Odell, 20 do	do	Major brevet, 25 July		do
Rt G Hite, 26 do	do	Major staff, 6 Aug		1813
S Churchill, 15 Aug	do	Major staff, 29 do		do
J D Hawell, 15 do	do			
B K Pierce, 1 Oct	do			
John Biddle, 1 do	do			
G P Peters, 21 Feb	1814	Major staff, 29 Aug		do

H H Villard,	14 July	1814	
H J Blake,	1 Sept	do	
Nath'l N Hall	30 do	do	Major staff, 25 April 1814
M P Lomax	17 Nov	do	Major staff, 3 March do
First Lieutenants.			
Milo Mason,	20 Feb	1812	
C Van De Venter,	12 Mr	do	Major staff, 26 March do
J L Tracy,	6 July	do	
Wm M Reed,	do	do	
Harold Smyth,	do	do	Capt brevet, 11 Sept do
Wm I Cowan,	do	do	Major staff, 17 Oct do
John Fontane,	do	do	
L Brown,	do	do	
Luther Scott,	do	do	Capt brevet, 20 Feb 1815
R R Ruffin,	do	do	
J H Daring,	do	do	
J Erving, jr	16 Aug	do	Major staff, April 1811
A L Sands,	10 Feb	1813	
R A Zantzinger	13 Mr	1813	Capt brevet, 13 Aug 1814
T Randall,	13 do	do	Capt brevet, 1 Dec do
W R Duncan,	do	do	
Chester Root,	do	do	Capt brevet, 11 Sept do
J L Edwards,	28 do	do	
Gus Looms,	5 May	do	Capt staff, 19 April 1813
P D Spencer,	13 do	do	Major staff, 17 Oct 1814
J Mountford,	20 do	do	Capt brevet, 11 Sept do
F Whiting,	20 June	do	
Edwin Sharp,	26 do	do	
G Dearborn,	1 Oct	do	
Felix Ansart,	do	do	
Jacob Warley,	15 Dec	do	
S Spotts,	22 May	1814	
L Whiting,	14 June	do	
B B White,	29 July	do	
Lewis Morgan,	17 Nov	do	
W H Nicoll,	22 do	do	
John Ruffin,	6 Jan	1815	
Second Lieutenants.			
J W Kincaid,	6 July	1812	
Robert Groode,	do	do	
Francis O Byrd,	do	do	1st Lt brevet, 20 Feb 1815

J J Cromwell,	23 Nov	1812	1st Lt brevet, 11 Sept 1814
J W Lent, jr	12 Mar	1813	at. ord
Th Chrystie	18 do	do	Major staff, 18 March 1813
S Rockwell,	20 do	do	
C D Cooper,	16 April	do	
Rich Bache	17 do	do	1st Lt brevet, 17 April do
P I Nevill,	20 do	do	
M S Massey,	13 May	do	
F P Woolsey,	20 do	do	
Ch Anthony,	20 do	do	
W M'Clintock,	20 June	do	
L H Osgood,	do	do	
P Melendy,	29 do	do	
E Kirby,	31 July	do	
R M Kirby,	1 Oct	do	Capt brevet, 17 Sept 1814
H M Campbell,	12 do	do	do 25 July do
Robert Beall,	14 Nov	do	
W I Sever,	31 Dec	do	
I G Bostwick,	13 Feb	1814	
John A Dix,	8 March	do	
R Lyman,	11 do	do	
Wm B Howell,	17 do	do	
I L Gardiner,	28 do	do	
Jas C Pickett,	19 April	do	
T I Harrison,	do	do	
I Watmaugh	do	do	1st Lt brevet, 15 Aug do
C Newkirk,	do	do	
G W Gardiner,	1 May	do	
C S Merchant,	do	do	
Nath'l G Dana,	do	do	
John Monroe,	do	do	
J S Allanson,	do	do	
L G De Russy,	do	do	
Thomas Childs,	do	do	
Sam'l L Dana,	do	do	
Jac Schmucke,	do	do	1st Lt brevet, 25 July do
Thos V Earle,	do	do	
Charles Mellon,	do	do	
George H Britt,	do	do	at. ord
James Hall,	do	do	at. ord
John S Pierce,	do	do	

Allen Lowd, 1 May	1814	
G S Wilkins, 3 do	do	
James Scallan, 19 do	do	
P A Dennis, 20 do	do	
J Ripley, 1 June	do	
John Grayson, 2 do	do	
D Turner, 21 July	do	
Isaac E Craig do	do	
C M Thurston, do	do	
H W Fitshugh, do	do	
Jacob Davis, do	do	
T T Stephenson, do	do	at. ord
E Humphrey, do	do	
S Whetmore, do	do	
T B Guy, 22 do	do	
D S Andrews, do	do	
N G Wilkinson, do	do	
Joseph Buckley, do	do	at. ord
A C Towler, 30 Sept	do	
Robert Call, 3 Nov	do	
Third Lieutenants.		
R H Lee, 17 March	do	1st Lt brevet, 17 Sept 1814
Rice L Stuart 15 July	do	
W L Booth, 21 do	do	
T J Baird, do	do	
J Parkhurst, do	do	
R L Armstrong, do	do	
James Badolet, do	do	
G W Gardiner, do	do	
B S A Lowe, do	do	
Th R Broome, do	do	
Patrick Galt, 16 Sept	do	
Upton S Frazer, 1 Oct	do	
N G Pendleton, 22 Nov	do	
B H Rutledge, 12 Dec	do	
John R. Sloo, 2 Mar.	1815	
Hen. Griswold, do	do	
James Monroe do	do	
Robt. C. Brent, do	do	
Abr. Wendell, do	do	
G. A. Washington, do	do	

Robert J. Scott,	Mar 1815	
Alon Brewer,	do do	
F. N. Berrier,	do do	
George Cooper,	do do	
Henry Smith,	do do	
A. F. Cochrane,	do do	
M F Van De Venter,	do	
Milo Johnson,	do do	
Aaron G Cano,	do do	
Rt M Forsyth,	do do	
Tho W Lendrum,	do do	
Henry R Dulany	do do	

FIRST INFANTRY.

Colonel.		
Dan Bissel,	15 Aug 1812	Brig Gen brevet 9 March 1814
Lieutenant Colonel.		
Geo. Croghan,	21 Feb 1814	brevet 2 August 1813
Major.		
Tho S Jessup,	6 Ap. 1814	Col brevet 25 July 1814
Captains.		
Isaac L Barker,	5 Ap. 1813	
Wm O Butler,	5 do	
John Jones	29 July do	
James Davis,	29 do	
Hen. Chotard,	9 Oct. 1813	Maj Staff 17 Oct 1814
Wm. Laval,	15 Feb. 1814	
A Peychaud,	11 Mar. 1814	
Fred L Amelung,	do	
W Christian,	31 May do	
John Read,	15 July do	
First Lieutenants.		
S Farrow, jr	1 Aug. 1813	
Tho Daggett,	7 Sept do	
J C Kouns,	20 Feb 1814	
J P Thibault,	11 Mar do	
Wm Gibbs,	do	
J Tarrant,	15 April do	
A Donoho,	do do	
T Turner,	1 May do	
R K Call,	15 July do	
Guy Smith,	1 Sept do	

Second Lieutenants.	
George Watts, 1 Aug 1813	1st Lt. brevet 5 July 1814
Robert H Briggs, 1 do	
R L Coomb, 4 Aug. do	
R B Hyde, 18 Feb 1814	
G W Boyd 9 Mar. do	
W Christie 9 do do	
Chas Cooper, 1 May do	
Treuman Cross, 1 do	
S Huston, 20 do do	
T C Hindman, 20 do	
Surgeon.	
Edward Scull, 8 Apr 1814	
Surgeon's Mate.	
W S Madison, 12 Dec 1812	
Hen y Hield, 23 Arp 1814	
SECOND INFANTRY.	
Colonel.	
Hugh Brady, 6 July 1812	
Lieutenant Colonel.	
N Pinkney, 15 April 1814	Col staff Dec 1 1814
Major.	
H Leavenworth, 15 Aug. 1813	Col brvt 25 July 1814
Captain.	
John Sproul, 6 July 1812	Maj brvt 25 July 1814
S W Kearney, 1 Apr 1813	
P B Van Buren, 30 Apr do	
A P Spencer, 14 Mar 1814	
H Shell, 21 do do	
A R Thompson, 1 May do	
G D Smith, 30 June do	Maj brvt 25 July 1814
Richard Goodell, 9 July,	do do do
Wm J Worth, 19 Aug	
Henry Whiting, 1 Sept	
First Lieutenants.	
C J Nourse, 7 May 1812	Maj staff 14 Sept
W Browning, 15 Oct 1813	Capt brvt 13 Oct.
Wm Hoffman, 11 Nov	
B A Boynton, 25 do.	
O Ranson, 19 April 1814	

John Kirby, 19 May 1814	
James Young, 30 June	
Wm G Belknap, 19 Aug	
S B Briswold, 1 Sept	
Walter Bicker, jr 1 do.	
Second Lieutenants.	
N N Robinson, 12th May, 1813	
James Palmer, 20 Dec	1st Lieut brvt 5 Aug
John Wood, 1 May 1814	
Jos Hopkins, 2 do do	
R M Harrison, 30 June	
T Chittenden, 10 July	
Seth Johnson, 20 Aug	
Joshua Brant, 1 Oct	
John Clitz, 2 do	1st Lieut brvt 17 Sept
S V Wyck, 11 Feb 1815	
Surgeon.	
Franklin Bache.	
Surgeon's Mates.	
W W Southall, 20th July, 1813	
S Edmonds, 18 April 1814	
THIRD INFANTRY.	
Colonel.	
John Miller, 6 July 1812	Col staff 12 April 1814
Lieutenant Colonel.	
M Arbuckle, 9 March 1814	
Major.	
C K Gardiner, 26 June 1813	
Captains.	Col staff 12 April 1814
Wm Taylor, 6 July 1812	
Wm J Adair, do	
Robert Desha, 6 July 1813	Maj brvt 4 Aug
John T Chunn, do	do 15 do
Wm Whistler, 31 Dec	
Geo Stockton, 20 May 1813	
T L Butler, do	
H Bradley, 19 April 1814	
Lewis Bissel, 30 June	
W M'Donald, 11 Nov	Maj brvt 25 July.

First Lieutenants.

J Hackley, jr 13 Mar 1813
Th Mountjoy, do do
John Garland, 31 do
Reasin H Gist, 30 June
R Sturgus, 9 March 1814
Daniel Curtis, 15 April
Hen Conway, 19 do do
L Talliaferro, 30 June do
Yurley F Thomas, do
Collin M'Cloud, 4 Aug do

Second Lieutenants.

A Phillips, 20 ay 1813
Wm Baylor, 15 Aug
J B Clarke, 9 April 1814
Ed E Brooks, 1 May
Robert Davis, 30 June
Raimy G Saunders, 14 July
Cy Saunders, do
Jon Saunders, do
Gab J Floyd, 1 Oct
Charles Cisna, 21 do

Surgeons.

A. G. Goodlet, 10 Feb. 1812

Surgeon's Mates.

J B Hill, 6 July, 1812
R E Hall, March 1814

FOURTH INFANTRY.

Colonel.

Wm King, 21 Feb 1814 — Col staff 18 July 1813

Lieutenant Colonel.

D L Clinch, 4 Aug 1813

Major.

G M Brook, 1 May, 1814 — Col brevet 17 Sept 1814

Captains.

J Bankhead, 18 June 1808 — do staff 9 do 1813
Maj brevet 15 Aug

Enos Cutler, 3 Sept 1810 — Maj staff 18 March 1813
brevet 1 May 1814

ames Dinkin, 6 Feb 1811 — Maj brevet 15 May do

A Cummings, 1 Nov	1811	
T M Nelson, 6 July	1812	Maj brevet 19 July
John A Burd, do	do	do do 31 Oct
Th Sangster do	do	
A L Madison, do	do	
B Peyton, 16 April	1813	
R Gilder, 26 June	do	
First Lieutenants.		
F S Belton, 20 Jan	1813	Maj staff 18 Oct
John Beckett, 13 Mar	do	
W F Pendleton, 30 May	do	
W Nelson, 7 June	do	
Oth W Callis, 26 do	do	
J M'Gavock, jr 24 do	1814	
J H Gale, 29 do	do	
J M Glassell, 12 July	do	
W Merrick, 30 Sept	do	
E B Randolph, 31 Dec	do	1st Lt brevet 25 July
Second Lieutenants.		
H K Mullen, 13 May	1813	
F H Lissenhoff, 1 Aug	do	
C Comegys, jr Nov	do	
John Strother, 20 do	do	
F L Dale, 31 Jan	1814	
P Wager, 17 March	do	
J Shommo, 24 do	do	
C. Wright, 19 April	do	
J P Dieterich, 14 June	do	1st Lt brevet 5 Feb 1814
Pat O'Fling 11 Feb	1813	do do 17 Sept do
Surgeon.		
M C Buck, 2 July	1814	
Surgeon's Mates.		
W J Cocke, 15 April	do	
James Bates, 27 do	do	

FIFTH INFANTRY.

Colonel.		
J Miller, 9 March	1814	Brig Gen brvt 25 July 1814
Lieutenant Colonel.		
J L Smith, 12 March	do	
Major.		
J M'Neal, jr 15 Aug	do.	Col brevet do do

Captains.

J H Vose, 6 July	1812	Maj brevet 4 Aug 1814
S Burbank, 13 March	1813	do do 25 July do
Geo Bender, do May	do	
M Marston, 26 June	do	do do 15 Aug do
W L Foster, 15 Oct	do	
Peter Pelham, 28 Feb	1814	
J Fowl, jr 10 June,	do	
E Childs, 20 July	do	
David Perry, 1 Sept	do	
James Pratt, 30 do	do	

First Lieutenants.

H Whiting, 20 Aug	1811	
E Ripley, 30 April	1813	
I Plympton, 31 July	do	
D Chandler, 15 Oct	do	
J Cilly, 7 March	1814	Capt brevet 25 July do
J Ingersoll, 1 June	do	
Otis Fisher, 20 July	do	
J Gleason, 25 do	do	do do 15 do do
J W Holding, 31 do	do	do do 15 Aug do
B F Larned, 4 Aug	do	do do 25 do do

Second Lieutenants.

N Clark, 19 May	1813
S Keeler, 31 Jan	1814
S Robinson, 1 May	do
J Craig, 23 June,	do
G H Balding, 25 July	do
J K Jacobs, 1 Sept	do
G W Jacobs, do	do
A B Drake, 13 do	do
P R Green, 1 Oct	do
C Blake, 31 do	do

Surgeon.

S Day, 13 March	1813

Surgeon's Mates.

E L Allen, 21 July	do
J P Russell, 25 May	1814

SIXTH INFANTRY.

Colonel.

H Atkinson, 15 April	1814 Col staff 25 April 1813

Lieutenant Colonel.		
J Snelling, 21 Feb	1814	Col staff, 12 April 1814
Major.		
J E Wood, 13 April	181	Lt Col brvt, 11 Sept do
Captains.		
T Stockton, 10 Sept	1812	Maj brvt, 15 April do
W S Foster, 13 Mar	1813	Maj brvt 15 July do
J B Murdoch, 15 April	do	do do 25 do
John Bliss, 13 do	do	Capt staff 28 April 1813
B Watson, 15 August	do	Maj brvt 25 July 1814
D Ketchum, 30 Sept	do	do do do do
E White, 14 March	1814	
T S Seymour, 25 July	do	
D Crawford, 17 Sept	do	
N S Clarke, 1 Oct	do	Capt brvt do do
First Lieutenants.		
Wm Hale, 15 Aug	1813	
E Shayler, do do	do	
G M'Chain, 30 Sept	do	
F A Sawyer, 12 Dec	do	
J P Livingston 19 do	do	do do do do
S Tappan, 14 June	1814	
A Wetmore, 9 July	do	
Hen De Witt, 25 do	do	
T Staniford, 2 Sept	do	
D Wilcox, 2 Oct	do	
Second Lieutenants.		
T Patchin, 4 March	do	
S Holcomb, 1 May	do	
T Tupper, 2 do	do	
C B Campbell, do	do	
H Bedel, 15 June	do	
P Andrews, 2 July	do	
H Webster, 25 do	do	
Benj Fitch, do do	do	
Jacob Brown, 1 Sept	do	
Ezra Dean, 1 Oct	do	
Surgeon.		
T G Mower, 30 June	do	
Surgeon's Mates.		
C Loring, 20 May	1813	
W Sterne, 11 March	1814	

SEVENTH INFANTRY.

Colonel.		
J M'Donald, 17 Sept	1814	
Lieutenant Colonel.		
W R Boote, 13 Dec	1813	Col staff Aug 1813
Major.		
D Appling, 15 April	1814	Lt Col brvt 30 May 1814 and Col bvt 11 Sept do
Captains.		
J Machesney, 10 June	1809	Maj brvt 21 Mar do
R Whartonby 3 May	1810	Maj brvt 1 May do
Z Taylor, 30 Nov	do	Maj brvt 5 Sept 1812
W Chisholm 6 July	1812	
E B Duvall, 4 Aug	1813	
R H Bell, 15 do	do	
Geo Vashon, 29 Nov	do	
J Robertson, 21 Feb	1814	
E Montgomery, 1 May	do	
J S Allison, 25 June	do	
First Lieutenants.		
G Birch, 1 Nov	1811	
J H Mallory, 5 May	1813	
Wm Bee, jr 14 Aug	do	
Wm Irvine, do	do	
J J Clinch, 15 do	do	
John Hays 9 April	1814	
S W Prestman, 1 May	do	
T Blackstone, 15 do	do	
A Ross, 9 June	do	
J B Taylor, 1 Aug	do	
Second Lieutenants.		
G R Bridges, 24 Mar	1813	
G S Gray, 2 May	do	
J W Alliston, 30 June	do	
H L Oneale 11 July	do	
R H Goodwyn, 24 do	do	
George Brent, 1 Aug	do	
F E Hedges, 13 do	do	
J Leftwich do	do	
R W Scott, 1 Oct	do	
Lewis Lawshe, do	do	

Surgeon.

T Lawson, 21 May 1813

Surgeon's Mates

R C Walmsey 1 July 1813
Ashel Hall 19 Sept do

EIGHTH INFANTRY,

Colonel.

R C Nichols 4 Sept 1814

Lieutenant Colonel.

W A Trimble, 30 Nov do — Lt Col brvt 17 Sept 1814

Major.

W Lawrence, 19 April do — do do do 15 do do

Captains.

J Doran, 9 Nov 1811 — Maj brvt 28 June do
D Barker, 12 March 18·2 — do do 15 April do
W Youngs 6 July do — do do 11 Sept do
C Larrabee, 15 Sept do — do staff 9 Nov do
W Davenport, 28 do
W Foulk, 20 June 1813
M M Quackenbos, 7 Jan do

L Austin, 21 April, do — Maj brvt 5 July do
G H Grosvenor, do do
John Greene, 25 Sept, do

First Lieutenants.

D Riddle, 13 March 1813 — Maj brvt 17 Sept do
A Goodwyn, jr 13 May do
J Gulberton, 1 Oct do
C B Hopkins, 5 Sep 1814
Charles Fisler, 11 Nov do
D Frazer, 31 Dec do
Th Wright, 17 March do
Wm Ligon, 30 do do
John R Guy, 3 May do
Sam'l Brady, 1 Oct do — apt brevet, 4 July 1814

Second Lieutenants.

J B Stewart, 30 April 181.
Henry Brown, 30 Sept do
Luther Hand, do do
Thomas Hunt, 9 Mar 1814
Hector Burns, 1 April do — 1st Lt brevet do do

Floreat Meline, 30 May do
Nath Young, 2 June do
G R Horter, 15 do do
John Brady, 25 Sept do — 1st Lt brevet 5 Feb 1815
M Thomas, 17 Dec do

Surgeon.

P Woodbury, 30 Mar do

Surgeon's Mates.

W Beaumont, 2 Dec 1812
Clajon Reily, 22 Mar 1813

RIFLE REGIMENT.

Colonel.

Th A Smith, 6 July, 1812 — Brig Gen brev 24 Jan 1814

Lieutenant Colonel.

W S Hamilton, 21 Fb 1814

Major.

Talbot Chambers, 21 Fb do — Lt Col brevet, 17 Sept do

Captains.

Willoughby Morgan, 6 July 1812 — Major brevet, 26 June 1813
Joseph Selden, do do — Major brevet, 21 Feb 1814; Lt Col brev 1 May 1815
Wm Bradford, do do — Maj brevet, 20 Aug 1814
Jos Keane, 17 March 1814
Benj Birdsall, do do
Jno O'Fallan, do do — Maj brevt, 15 do do
H V Swearingen, 11 My do
Edmund Shipp, 26 do do
W L Dufphe, 12 Aug do
C A Trimble, 20 do do

First Lieutenants.

Louis Laval, 28 July 1812
J Calhoun, jr 24 Jan 1814
J H Ballard, 17 Mar do
E I Langham, do do
Lowellen Hickman, do do
Stoughton Gantt, do do
J M'Gunnegle, 28 Apr do
David B Stith, 1 Sept do
Sam'l V Hamilton, 17 do
Jno Heddelson, 30 do do

Second Lieutenants.

W Armstrong, 24 Jan do
W J Gordon, 17 March do
Th Griffith, do do
John Hollingsworth, 26 do
Bennet Riley, 15 Apr do
W N Bryan, 25 do do
W Markle, 29 do do
James S Gray, 11 May do
Chas L Harrison, 26 do
O W Crockett, 30 Sept do

Surgeon.

Lewis L Near, 17 Mar do

Surgeon's Mates.

Sam'l P Hugo, 12 Mar 1812
W H Henning, 20 Ap 1814

By order of the Secretary of War,

DANIEL PARKER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

Adjt and Insp Gen's Office,
May 17, 1815.

TREATY OF PEACE AND AMITY

BETWEEN HIS BRITANICK MAJESTY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

HIS Britanick Majesty and the United States of America, desirous of terminating the war which has unhappily subsisted between the two countries, and of restoring upon principles of perfect reciprocity, peace, friendship and good understanding between them, have, for that purpose, appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, that is to say: His Britanick Majesty, on his part, has appointed the right honourable James Lord Gambier, late admiral of the white, now admiral of the red squadron of his majesty's fleet, Henry Goulburn, Esq. a member of the Imperial Parliament, and Under Secretary of State, and William Adams, Esq Doctor of Civil Laws: And the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, has appointed John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russel, and Albert Gallatin, citizens of the United States, who, after a reciprocal communication of their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE THE FIRST.

There shall be a firm and universal Peace between his Britanick Majesty and the United States, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns and people, of every degree, without exception of places or persons. All hostilities, both by sea and land, shall cease as soon as this Treaty shall have been ratified by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned. All territory, places and possessions whatsoever, taken from either party by the other, during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction, or

carrying away any of the artillery or other publick property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property. And all archieves, records, deeds and papers, either of a publick nature, or belonging to private persons, which, in the course of the war, may have fallen into the hands of the officers of either party, shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong. Such of the Islands in the bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties, shall remain in possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, until the decision respecting the title to the said islands shall have been made in conformity with the fourth article of this treaty. No disposition made by this treaty, as to such possession of the islands and territories claimed by both parties, shall in any manner whatever, be construed to affect the right of either.

ARTICLE THE SECOND.

Immediately after the ratifications of this treaty by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned, orders shall be sent to the armies, squadrons, officers, subjects and citizens, of the two powers to cease from all hostilities. And to prevent all causes of complaint which might arise on account of the prizes which may be taken at sea after the said ratifications of this treaty, it is reciprocally agreed, that all vessels and effects which may be taken after the space of twelve days from the said ratifications, upon all parts of the coast of North America, from the latitude of twenty-two degrees north, to the latitude of fifty degrees north, and as far eastward in the Atlantick ocean, as the thirty-sixth degree of west longitude from the meridian of Greenwich, shall be restored on each side: That the time shall be thirty days in all other parts of the Atlantick ocean, north of the equinoctial line or equator, and the same time for the British and Irish channels, for the Gulf of Mexico and all parts

of the West Indies: Forty days for the North Seas, for the Baltick and for all parts of the Mediterranean: Sixty days for the Atlantick ocean south of the equator as far as the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope: Ninety days for every part of the world south of the equator: And one hundred and twenty days for all other parts of the world, without exception.

ARTICLE THE THIRD.

All prisoners of war taken on either side, as well by land as sea, shall be restored as soon as practicable after the ratifications of this treaty, as hereinafter mentioned, on their paying the debts which they may have contracted during their captivity. The two contracting parties respectively engage to discharge, in specie, the advances which may have been made by the other for the sustenance and maintenance of such prisoners.

ARTICLE THE FOURTH.

Whereas it was stipulated in the second article of the treaty of peace, of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, between his Britanick majesty and the United States of America, that the boundary of the United States should comprehend all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries, between Nova Scotia on the one point, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy, and the Atlantick ocean, excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of Nova Scotia; and whereas the several islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy, and the island of Grand Menan in the said Bay of Fundy, are claimed by the United States as being within their aforesaid boundaries, which said islands are claimed as belonging to his Britanick majesty, as having been at the time of, and previous to, the aforesaid treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, within the limits of the province of Nova Scotia. In order, therefore, finally to decide upon these claims, it is agreed that they

shall be referred to two Commissioners to be appointed in the following manner, viz: one commissioner shall be appointed by his Britanick majesty, and one by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the senate thereof, and the said two commissioners so appointed shall be sworn impartially to examine and decide upon the said claims according to such evidence as shall be laid before them on the part of his Britanick majesty and of the United States respectively. The said commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the province of New-Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall, by a declaration or report under their hands and seals, decide to which of the two contracting powers the several islands aforesaid do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three. And if the said commissioners shall agree in their decisions, both parties shall consider such decision as final and conclusive. It is farther agreed, that in the event of the two commissioners differing upon all or any of the matters so referred to them, or in the event of both or either of the said commissioners refusing, or declining, or wilfully omitting to act as such, they shall make jointly or separately, a report or reports as well to the government of his Britanick majesty as to that of the United States, stating in detail the points on which they differ, and the grounds on which their respective opinions have been formed, or the grounds upon which they or either of them, have so refused, declined, or omitted to act. And his Britanick majesty, and the government of the United States hereby agree to refer the report or reports of the said commissioners, to some friendly sovereign or state, to be then named for that purpose, and who shall be requested to decide on the differences which may be stated in the said report or reports, or upon the report of one commissioner, together with the grounds upon which the other commissioner shall have refused, declined, or omitted to act, as the case may be. And if the commissioner so refusing, declining or omitting to act, shall

also wilfully omit to state the grounds upon which he has so done, in such manner that the said statement may be referred to such friendly sovereign or state, together with the report of such other commissioner, then such sovereign or state shall decide *ex parte* upon the said report alone. And his Britanick majesty and the government of the United States engage to consider the decision of some friendly sovereign or state to be final and conclusive on all the matters so referred.

ARTICLE THE FIFTH.

Whereas neither that point of the high lands lying due north from the river St. Croix, and designated in the former treaty of peace between the two powers as the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, now the north-westermost head of Connecticut river, has yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line between the dominion of the two powers which extends from the source of the river St. Croix directly north to the abovementioned noth-west angle of Nova Scotia, thence along the said high lands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantick ocean to the north-westermost head of Connecticut river, thence down along the middle of that river to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude; thence by a line due west on said latitude until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguy, has not been surveyed; it is agreed, that for these several purposes, two commissioners shall be appointed, sworn and authorized, to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specified in the present article. The said commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the province of New-Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall have power to ascertain and determine the points abovementioned, in conformity with the provision of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, and shall cause the boundary aforesaid, from the source of the river St. Croix to the river Iroquois

or Cataraguy, to be surveyed and marked according to the said provisions. The said commissioners shall make a map of the said boundary, and annex to it a declaration under their hands and seals, certifying it to be a true map of the said boundary, and particularizing the latitude and longitude of the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, of the north-westermost head of Connecticut river, and of such other points of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such map and declaration as finally and conclusively fixing the said boundary. And in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or either of them, refusing or declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or state, shall be made, in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ARTICLE THE SIXTH.

Whereas by the former treaty of peace that portion of the boundary of the United States from the point where the forty-fifth degree of north latitude strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguy, to the lake Superiour, was declared to be "along the middle of said river into lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and lake Erie, thence along the middle of said communication into lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water communication into lake Huron, thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and lake Superiour." And whereas doubts have arisen what was the middle of said river, lakes and water communications, and whether certain islands lying in the same were within the dominions of his Britanick majesty or of the United States. In order, therefore, finally to decide these doubts, they shall be referred to two commissioners, to be appointed, sworn and authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specified in this

present article. The said commissioners shall meet, in the first instance, at Albany, in the state of New-York, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall, by a report or declaration, under their hands and seals, designate the boundary through the said rivers, lakes and water communications, and decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands lying within the said river, lakes and water communications, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or either of them, refusing, declining or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations or statements, shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or state shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ARTICLE THE SEVENTH.

It is farther agreed that the said two last mentioned commissioners, after they shall have executed the duties assigned them in the preceding article, shall be, and they are hereby authorized, upon their oaths impartially to fix and determine, according to the true intent of the said treaty of peace, of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, that part of the boundary between the dominions of the two powers, which extends from the water communication between lake Huron and lake Superiour, to the most north-western point of the lake of the Woods, to decide to which of the two parties the several islands lying in the lakes, water communications and rivers, forming the said boundary, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace, of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three; and to cause such parts of the said boundary, as require it, to be surveyed and marked. The said commissioners shall, by a report or declaration under

their hands and seals, designate the boundary aforesaid, state their decision on the points thus referred to them, and particularize the latitude and longitude of the most north-westermost point of the lake of the Woods, and of such other part of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And, in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or either of them refusing, or declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements, shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or state, shall be made in all respects, as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ARTICLE THE EIGHTH.

The several boards of two commissioners mentioned in the four preceding articles, shall respectively have power to appoint a secretary, and to employ such surveyors or other persons as they shall judge necessary. Duplicates of all their respective reports, declarations, statements and decisions, and of their accounts, and of the journal of their proceedings shall be delivered by them to the agents of his Britanick majesty, and to the agents of the United States, who may be respectively appointed and authorized to manage the business on behalf of their respective governments. The said commissioners shall be paid in such manner as shall be agreed between the two contracting parties, such agreement being to be settled at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. And all other expenses attending the said commissioners shall be defrayed equally by the two parties. And in the case of death, sickness, resignation or necessary absence, the place of every such commissioner respectively shall be supplied in the same manner as such commissioner was first appointed, and the new commissioner shall take the same oath or affirmation, and do the same duties. It is farther agreed between the two contracting parties, that in case any of the islands mentioned in any of the pre-

ceding articles, which were in possession of one of the parties prior to the commencement of the present war between the two countries, should, by the decision of any of the boards of commissioners aforesaid, or of the sovereign or state so referred to, as in the four next preceding articles contained, fall within the dominions of the other party, all grants of land made previous to the commencement of the present war by the party having had such possession, shall be valid as if such island or islands, had by such decision or decisions, been adjudged to be within the dominions of the party having such possession.

ARTICLE THE NINTH.

The United States of America engage to put an end immediately after the ratification of the present treaty to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians, with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification; and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: *Provided always*, that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities, against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly. And his Britanick majesty engages, on his part, to put an end immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom he may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations respectively, all the possessions, rights and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to, in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: *Provided always*, that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against his Britanick majesty, and his subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

ARTICLE THE TENTH.

Whereas, the traffick in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavours to accomplish so desirable an object.

ARTICLE THE ELEVENTH.

This treaty, when the same shall have been ratified on both sides, without alteration by either of the contracting parties, and the ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, in the space of four months from this day, or sooner if practicable.

In faith whereof, we the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty, and have thereunto affixed our seals.

Done, in triplicate, at Ghent, the twenty-fourth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen.

(L. S.) GAMBIER,
(L. S.) HENRY GOULBURN,
(L. S.) WILLIAM ADAMS,
(L. S.) JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
(L. S.) JAMES A. BAYRD,
(L. S.) HENRY CLAY,
(L. S.) JONATHAN RUSSEL,
(L. S.) ALBERT GALLATIN.

Now, therefore, to the end, that the said Treaty of Peace and Amity may be observed with good faith, on the part of the United States, I, James Madison, President as aforesaid, have caused the premises to be made publick; and do hereby enjoin all persons bearing offices, civil or military, within the United States. and all other citizens or inhabitants thereof, or being within the same, faithfully to observe and fulfil the said Treaty and every clause and article thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the (*Seal.*) of the United States to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with my hand.

Done at the City of Washington, this eighteenth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifteen, and of the sovereignty and independence of the United States the thirty-ninth.

JAMES MADISON.

By the President,
JAMES MONROE,
Acting Secretary of State.

A TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP

WAS ALSO FORMED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE TRIBES OF INDIANS CALLED THE WYANDOTS, DELAWARES, SENECAS, AND MIAMIES.

The following are the articles of the Treaty which was entered into by both parties:

ARTICLE THE FIRST.

The United States and the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanœse, and Senecas, give peace to the Miamie nation of Indians, formerly designated as the Miamie Eel River and Weea tribes; they extend this indulgence also to the bands of the Putawatimies, which adhere to the Grand Sachem Tobinipee, and to the Chief Onoxa, the Ottowas of Blanchard's Creek, who have attached themselves to the Shawanœse tribe, and to such of the said tribe as adhere to the Chief called Wing, in the neighbourhood of Detroit, and to the Kickapoos, under the direction of the Chiefs who sign this Treaty.

ARTICLE THE SECOND.

The Tribes and Bands abovementioned, engage to give their aid to the United States in prosecuting the war against Great Britain, and such of the Indian tribes as still continue hostile; and to make no peace with either without the consent of the United States. The assistance herein stipulated for, is to consist of such a

number of their warriours from each tribe, as the President of the United States, or any officer having his authority therefor, may require.

ARTICLE THE THIRD.

The Wyandot tribe, and the Senecas of the Sandusky and Stoney Creek, the Delaware and Shawanœse tribes, who have preserved their fidelity to the United States throughout the war, again acknowledge themselves under the protection of the said States, and of no other power whatever; and agree to aid the United States, in the manner stipulated for in the former article, and to make no peace but with the consent of the said States.

ARTICLE THE FOURTH.

In the event of a faithful performance of the conditions of this Treaty, the United States will confirm and establish all the boundaries between their lands and those of the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanœse, and Miamies, as they existed previously to the commencement of the war.

ALGERINE WAR.

THE Dey of Algiers took advantage of the war between England and the United States, as a convenient opportunity to attack the trade, and to capture the citizens of the latter power. On the 23d of February, 1815, the following confidential Message from the President of the United States, was delivered to both Houses of Congress:—

TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES.

Congress will have seen, by the communication from the Consul General of the United States at Algiers, laid before them on the 17th November, 1812, the hostile proceedings of the Dey against that functionary. These have been followed by acts of more overt and direct warfare against the citizens of the United States trading in the Mediterranean, some of whom are still detained in captivity, notwithstanding the attempts which have been made to ransom them, and are treated with the rigour usual on the coast of Barbary.

The considerations which rendered it unnecessary and unimportant to commence hostile operations on the part of the United States, being now terminated by peace with Great Britain, which opens the prospect of an active and valuable trade of their citizens within the range of the Algerine cruisers, I recommend to Congress the expediency of an act declaring the existence of a state of war between the United States and the Dey of Algiers; and of such provisions as may be requisite for a vigourous prosecution of it to a successful issue.

JAMES MADISON.

Washington, Feb. 23, 1815.

A law of Congress was, after the usual forms, passed, empowering the President to take measures for the pro-

tection of the commerce and seamen of the United States; and also to employ the publick armed vessels, and to commission private armed vessels, to act offensively against the vessels, goods, effects, and subjects of the Dey of Algiers.

This measure was not adopted until after the most satisfactory assurances of the hostility of the Dey, and that he had actually put an end, by his unprovoked aggressions, to the treaty subsisting between him and the United States. In July, 1812, the Dey extorted from the American consul general, a large sum of money, in lieu of a quantity of military stores, which he refused to accept, falsely alledging that they were not equal in quality or quantity to those stipulated by the existing treaty; and then compelled the consul and citizens of the United States to quit his dominions. On the 25th August following, the American brig Edwin, of Salem, was taken by an Algerine corsair, and carried into Algiers, as a prize. Mr. Pollard, of Norfolk, being found on board a Spanish vessel, was also detained as a citizen of the United States. Captain Smith, the master of the Edwin, and Mr. Pollard, were not confined to hard labour; but the rest of the captains, with the exception of two of them, whose release has been effected under circumstances not indicating any change of hostile temper on the part of the Dey, were subjected to the well known horrours of Algerine slavery. An effort of the United States' government, to effect the release of these citizens, by treaty, and the payment of a large sum of money, had failed.

There never was a war commenced with a greater share of general approbation; and it remained a wonder, that *one* publick journal (the Connecticut Mirror) should condemn a measure which had for its object the releasement from slavery of eleven American citizens, the punishment of barbarians, justly detested by the civilized world; and the putting into glorious practice, the popular sentiment, "millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute."

A private letter from Lisbon, dated 2d May, 1815, stated, on the authority of advices from Cadiz, that the

Algerine admiral had put to sea, with a fleet consisting of four frigates, six corvettes, two brigs, one zebeck, one schooner, one galley, forty gun boats, and eleven bombards ; in all, 66 vessels, mounting 463 guns, and having on board 4,745 men ; the supposed object was to cruise for American vessels.

The force destined by the United States, to punish the enemy, was to consist of the Independence, 74 ; Guerriere, 44 ; Macedonian, 38 ; Congress and Constellation, 36 ; Erie, Ontario and Epervier, 18 ; Chippeway, 16 ; Flambeau and Spark, 12 ; Spitfire and Torch, 10 ; and Lynx, (tender) one long 24 ; in all, 44 vessels, carrying 400 guns. Some immaterial alteration was afterwards made in this arrangement.

On the 18th May, 1815, the United States' squadron, destined for the Mediterranean, sailed from New-York. It consisted of the frigates Guerriere, [Com. Decatur's flag ship] Captain Lewis; Macedonian, Captain Jones ; Constellation, Captain Gordon ; sloop of war Ontario, Captain Elliot ; brigs Epervier, Captain Downs ; Fire Fly, Rogers ; Flambeau, Nicholson ; Spark, Gamble ; schooners Spitfire, Dallas and Torch, Chauncey.

This squadron was followed by that under command of Commodore Bainbridge, consisting of the Independence, 74 ; sloop of war Erie, 18 ; brig Chippeway, 16 ; and schooner Lynx.

The United States' brigs Boxer, Saranac and Enterprise, sailed in August, for the Medeterranean. The brig Fire-Fly had sailed some time previous for the same destination, but was compelled to return to repair damages sustained in a gale. The Ontario, and some of the light vessels arrived at Gibralter on the 13th June, and Commodore Decatur, with the rest of the squadron, on the 14th ; and, on the evening of that day, all the vessels proceeded to their destination.

The following letters will explain some of the proceedings in the Mediterranean.

Copy of a letter from the American Consul at Alicante, to the Secretary of State, dated,

Alicante, June 21, 1815.

SIR—I have the honour to inform you, that, by a let-

ter this moment received from my vice-consul, Nicholas Briale, at Carthagena, I learn that the first division of our squadron, under Commodore Decatur, had appeared off that port, and sent in an Algerine frigate of 44 guns and 500 men, captured off Cape de Gatt, after a sharp engagement, during which the commander of the Algerine was killed. Our loss consisted of four men. The Commodore had sent in a schooner for refreshment, and other necessaries, with which she immediately sailed for the fleet. The prize must perform ten days quarantine. I shall set off within two hours for that place, in order to make farther provision for the fleet, if necessary, and render every other service in my power; from thence I shall have the honour of addressing you, and advise what farther may occur.

With sentiments of the highest respect, I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

ROBERT MONTGOMERY.

To the honourable the Secretary of State.

Copy of a letter from the American Consul at Cadiz, to the Secretary of State, dated

Consulate of the United States,
Cadiz, June 27, 1815.

SIR—I have much pleasure in referring you to the subjoined statement, for the interesting and important information it contains, which I doubt not, in a great part, may be relied on. The informant adds, that about 400 prisoners had been landed from the prize frigate, and that but few had been saved from the brig. The wind being now from the S. W. makes it probable that the particulars of this action from the Commodore, will not come to hand for some days.

With much respect, I have the honour to be, &c.

RICH'D. S. HACKLEY.

Hon. James Monroe, Secretary of State.

A letter, of which the following is a copy, announced the arrival of the American squadron at Gibralter, after a passage of 25 days.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Decatur to the Secretary of the Navy, dated

United States' ship Guerriere,
Off Gibraltar, June 15, 1815.

SIR—I have the honour to inform you of our arrival off this place on the 15th, after a passage of twenty-five days, having previously communicated with Cadiz and Tangiers. The Spitfire, Torch and Firefly, separated from the squadron during a gale of wind on the 26th ult. and the Ontario on the 31st.

I am happy to find they have, with the exception of the Firefly, all arrived; the latter vessel I fear may have lost her spars, and have returned to the United States. From all the information I can collect, I feel assured that the Algerines have returned into the Mediterranean. The vessels that had separated from us, are now joining, and I shall proceed in search of the enemy forthwith.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, &c.
STEPHEN DECATUR.

The Commodore lost no time in the prosecution of his object; scarcely arrived in the Mediterranean, he commenced to pay *tribute* to the barbarians, as will be best explained by his letter to the Secretary of the Navy, of which the following is a copy:

Extract of a letter from Commodore Decatur, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated

United States' ship Guerriere,
Off Carthagena, June 19, 1815.

I have the honour to inform you, that on the 17th inst. off Cape de Gatt, the squadron fell in with and captured an Algerine frigate of 46 guns, and between 4 and 500 men, commanded by Rais Hammida, who bore the title of Admiral; she struck her flag after a running fight of 25 minutes.

The Admiral was killed at the commencement of the action. After the Guerriere (who from her favourable position was enabled to bring the enemy to close action) had fired two broadsides, the enemy, with the excep-

tion of a few musketeers, ran below. The Guerriere had four men wounded by musket shot, which is the only injury done by the enemy in this affair.

We have 406 prisoners, including the wounded. The prisoners state that about thirty were killed and thrown overboard.

Their squadron is said to be cruising in our vicinity; five days ago they were off this place; unless I obtain some farther intelligence of them by to-morrow, I shall proceed to the port of Algiers, in the hopes to intercept their return. For the present, I have determined to send the prize into Carthagena.

On the 20th June, the Commodore communicated a second victory, in a letter, in the following words:

Copy of a letter from Commodore Decatur, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated

United States' ship Guerriere,
Off Cape Palos, June 20, 1815.

SIR—I have the honour to inform you, that on the 19th inst. off cape Palos, the squadron under my command captured an Algerine brig of 22 guns, and 180 men. After a chase of three hours, she ran into shoal water, where I did not think it advisable to follow with our large ships, but despatched the Epervier, Spark, Torch and Spitfire, to whom she surrendered after a short resistance. Twenty-three men were found dead on board. We received from her eighty prisoners, the residue of the crew having left her in boats. Many of them must have been killed by the fire of our vessels, and one of the boats was sunk. None of our vessels sustained any damage, nor was there a man killed or wounded. This brig is larger than the Epervier, was built in Algiers, five years ago, by a Spanish constructor, the same who built the frigate captured on the 17th inst. and is perfectly sound.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, &c.
STEPHEN DECATUR.

Commodore Bainbridge arrived at Carthagena early

in August, with the second American squadron, whence he proceeded to Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis, in order to make a display of his force, the respectable appearance of which could not fail to make a deep, useful, and it may be hoped, a lasting impression. Having performed this service, the Commodore sailed to Malaga, and thence to Gibraltar, where he stopped some time, and reciprocated compliments with the British Commander-in-Chief, thence the squadron sailed for the United States, and arrived at Newport the 15th November.

Commodore Bainbridge was joined while at Malaga by all Commodore Decatur's squadron except his own ship. It was as gratifying to the American, as it was probably mortifying to the Englishman, to see such a fleet in a British port, and that so soon after the termination of a war which was to have annihilated the "Lillipution Navy."

On the arrival of the fleet at Gibraltar, an understanding was had between Commodore Bainbridge and the British commander, that a salute of fifteen guns would be fired from the squadron, and a like number returned from the fort; which was accordingly done. This circumstance is material only as far as it goes to prove the distinguished respect shown to the American flag; a respect for the proud fruit of determined valour and consummate prudence.

The situation in which the American character was about to be placed, was truly envious. A few months after causing the greatest naval power in Europe to haul down its proud flag, the Americans were destined, by aid of the ships captured from England, to speak thunder to those piratical monarchs of Africa, to whom that very England was in the habit of paying tribute. It remained for America—infant America, the country of Washington and Franklin, to break up a system which was, if possible, more disgraceful to the civilized nations who submitted to it, than to the barbarous states who imposed it. But America, by the use she made of victory, has gained for herself an honour, and been raised to a pinnacle of glory to which no victory, however splendid, could have raised her. The favourite maxim

of the nation was and is—"*Millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute.*" True to this policy, she made it a *sine qua non* of peace, and this being concluded, the humbled enemy was permitted to take back those ships which were to remain for ever innocent, as respected the great western nation. Which of the haughty masters of enslaved Europe has ever given such proof of magnanimity or of moderation, in the midst of victory so complete?

Commodore Decatur arrived before Algiers on the 29th June, and hoisted a flag of truce on board the Guerriere, with the Swedish flag at the main. A boat came off with Mr. Norderling, consul of Sweden, and the captain of the port, to whom the capture of the frigate and brig was communicated, and to whom Commodore Decatur and William Thaler, Esq. acting as commissioners to negotiate a peace, delivered a letter for the Dey, from the President of the United States; and also a note from themselves, informing him that they were invested with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace.

The captain of the port then requested that hostilities should cease preceding the negotiation, and that persons might be sent ashore to treat. Both propositions were rejected, the American commissioners declaring that the negotiations must be carried on, on board the fleet; and that hostilities as respected vessels, should not cease. On the following day, the Swedish consul and the captain of the port came on board with full powers to negotiate. The American commissioners produced the model of a treaty which they declared would not be departed from in substance. Every attempt on the part of Algiers to obtain a modification of it, proved fruitless; even the restoration of the captured vessels was positively refused. Upon consideration, however, the American commissioners resolved to restore the captured vessels as a *favour*, and not as matter of treaty, giving the Algerine to understand, that even this would depend on the signing of the treaty as presented. The Algerine captain then proposed a truce, to deliberate on the proposed terms; the reply was, "not a minute; if

your squadron appears in sight before the treaty is actually signed by the Dey, and the prisoners sent off, ours will capture them!" It was finally agreed that hostilities should cease when the Algerine boat should be perceived coming off with a white flag hoisted, the Swedish consul pledging his word of honour not to hoist it unless the treaty was signed, and the prisoners in the boat. The Swedish consul and Algerine captain returned on shore, and although the distance was full five miles, they came back within three hours with the treaty signed, and having with them the prisoners who were to be released from captivity by the terms of the treaty. . . . .

By the terms of this treaty, the Dey has agreed, that "no tribute, either as biennial presents, or under any form or name whatever, shall ever be required by the Dey and regency of Algiers, from the United States of America."

That the Dey shall deliver up to the American squadron "all the American citizens now in their possession, amounting to ten, more or less"

"That should a vessel of either of the contracting parties be cast on shore within the territories of the other, all proper assistance should be given to the crew—*no pillage shall be allowed.*"

"That if any Christian slaves should make their escape, and go on board any ship of war of the United States that may be before the city of Algiers, they shall not be required back again, nor shall any payment be required for the said Christians."

"In case of any dispute arising from the violation of any of the articles of this treaty, no appeal shall be made to arms, nor shall war be declared on any pretext whatever; but if the consul residing at the place where the dispute shall happen, shall not be able to settle the same, the government of that country shall state their grievance in writing, and transmit the same to the government of the other, and the period of three months shall be allowed for answers to be returned, during which time no hostility shall be permitted by either party; and in case the grievances are not redressed, and a war

should be the event, the consuls and citizens and subjects of both parties respectively, shall be permitted to embark with their effects unmolested, on board of what vessel or vessels they shall think proper, reasonable time being allowed for that purpose."

There were also a number of other articles of a similar nature, establishing a treaty of amity and equality between the two nations.

NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES.

IT will, perhaps, be interesting to the publick to know how the lilliputian navy stood at the end of the war, after combating the overgrown naval power of Britain, which was to blow it out of the water. The following is the list of American ships of war not including those now building. Those vessels whose names are marked (*) are such as remained of the naval force after the war: those marked (§) are lately finished—those marked in *italick* are such as were captured from the British during the war.

Names of Vessels.	*Rates.*
Ship Independence	74
Washington	74
Franklin	74
New-Orleans §	74
Chippeway §	74
Guerriere	44
United States*	44
Java	44
Constitution*	44
Plattsburgh §	44
Superiour	44
Constellation*	36
Congress*	36
Macedonian	36
Mohawk	32
Confiance	32
Cyane	28
Saratoga	24
John Adams	24
General Pike	24
Madison	20
Alert	20
Hornet*	18
Wasp	18
Peacock	18
Ontario	18
Erie	18
Louisiana*	18
Brig Jefferson	18
Jones	18
Epervier	18
Niagara	18
Lawrence	18
Detroit	18
Eagle	18
Sylph	16
Chippeway	16
Queen Charlotte	16
Saranack	16
Linnet	16
Boxer	16
Troup	16
Oneida	14
Enterprize*	14
Flambeau	12
Firefly	12
Spark	12
Hunter	10
Prometheus	9
Ghent	5
Caledonia	3
Etna bomb	
Schr. Ticonderoga	17
Nonsuch	14
Spitfire	11
Torch	10
Lady Prevost	10
Tom Bowline	9
Alligator	9
Roanoake	7
Firebrand	7
Surprise	7

Names of Vessels.	*Rates.*
Conquest	8
Hornet	5
Lynx	5
Fair American	4
Helen	4
Despatch	3
Asp	3
Porcupine	3
Lady of the Lake	3
Pert	3
Gov. Tompkins	2
Ranger	1
Ontario	1
Amelia	1
Asp	2
Raven	1
Sloop President	12
Finch	11
Chubb	11

Names of Vessels.	*Rates.*
Preble	7
Montgomery	6
Buffalo	5
Camel	5
Tickler	2
Galley Allen	2
Burrows	2
Boxer	2
Nettle	2
Viper	2
Centipede	2
Ludlow	1
Wilmer	1
Alwyn	1
Ballard	1
Ketch Spitfire	
Vesuvius*	
Vengeance	

Barges from No. 1 to 15, inclusive, on Lake Ontario, mounting each ——— guns, and now at Sacket's Harbour.

The old gun-boats have been chiefly sold

It would be a curious question in political arithmetick, to determine what number of American ships and their rates, would be sufficient to destroy the British navy, taking the naval events of the late war as a scale by which to calculate; and how long it would take to provide the necessary number of vessels, taking the increase of the navy, during the war, as a ratio.

LIST OF AMERICAN PRIZES,

Which have arrived, or been satisfactorily accounted for, with the name of the Privateers, &c. and the number captured by each vessel, during the war.

FROM NILES' REGISTER.

Abællino of Boston	10	Atlas of Philadelphia	2
U. S. ship Adams	10	Avon of Boston	2
Boat Alert, of Burlington, L. C.	1	Baltimore of Baltimore	2
Alexander of Salem	3	Bellona of Philadelphia	2
Alfred of Salem	5	U. S. Barges	5
Amelia of Bath	1	Black Joke of N. Y.	2
Amelia of Baltimore	21	Blakely of Boston	3
America of Salem	34	Boats from Buffalo	3
Anacondia of New-York	2	Brutus of Boston	9
Argo of Baltimore	1	Buskskin of Salem	4
U. S. brig Argus	24	Bunkerhill of N. Y.	6
Argus of Boston	4	Cadet of Salem	2

Caroline of Baltimore	29	Harpy of Baltimore	13
Catharine of Boston	1	Harrison of do.	8
Champlain Privateer	1	Hawk of Washington, N. C.	1
Charles Stewart of Boston	1	Hazard	1
Chasseur of Baltimore	27	Henry Guilder of New-York	1
Chauncey's squadron on L. O.	22	Herald of do.	3
U. S. frigate Chesapeake	4	Hero of do.	5
Comet of Baltimore	29	Hero of Newbern	2
U. S. frigate Congress	4	Hero of Stonington	1
U. S. frigate Constitution	12	High Flyer of Baltimore	7
Custom House Barge	1	Holkar of New-York	5
Dart of Portland	6	Boat Holkar	1
Dash of Portland	9	Hope	1
David Porter of N. Y.	6	U. S. sloop of war Hornet	4
David Porter of Boston	8	Hunter	1
Decatur of Newburyport	6	Ida of Baltimore	1
Decatur of Charleston	11	Ida of Boston	1
Delisle of Baltimore	2	Industry of Lynn	3
Diamond of Baltimore	1	Industry of Marblehead	1
Diomede of Salem	1	Industry of Salem	3
Divided we fall of N. Y.	16	Ino of Boston	2
Dolphin of Baltimore	7	Invincible of New-York	5
Dolphin of Salem	17	Invincible of Salem	4
Dromo of Boston	1	Jack's Favourite of New-York	6
Eagle of Charleston	3	Jacob Jones of Boston	3
Eliza	1	James Monroe	5
U. S. brig Enterprise	5	Jefferson of Salem	6
U. S. frigate Essex	12	Joel Barlow	2
Essex Junior	3	Jonquil of New-York	5
Expedition of Baltimore	4	John of Salem	12
Fair Trader of Salem	7	John and George	1
Fairy of Baltimore	2	Kemp of Baltimore	16
Fame of Salem	10	Lady Madison of Wilmington	1
Fame of Thomastown	1	On Lake Superiour	2
Flirt of N. Y.	1	On Lake Huron	3
Fly	2	On Lake Champlain	8
Fox of Salem	4	Lark	1
Fox of Baltimore	2	Lawrence of Baltimore	14
Fox of Portsmouth	28	Leach of Salem	2
Franklin of N. Y.	9	Leader of Providence R. I.	1
U. S. sloop of war Frolick	1	Leander Providence	1
Frolick of Salem	12	Leo of Baltimore	14
Full blooded Yankee	1	Leo of Boston	8
Galloway of N. Y.	1	Liberty of Baltimore	7
Gen. Armstrong of do.	18	Little George of Boston	1
Gen. Stark of Salem	4	Letter of Marque, of Wilming-	
Gen. Putnam of Salem	1	ton, N. C.	2
Globe of Baltimore	7	Lovely Cordelia of Charleston	20
Gossamer of Boston	1	Lovely Lass of Charleston	1
Gov. Tompkins of New-York	22	Lyon of Marblehead	4
Gov. M'Kean of Philadelphia	3	Macedonian of Baltimore	1
Gov. Plumer of Portsmouth	3	Macedonian of Boston	6
Grampus of Baltimore	7	Macedonian of Portsmouth	9
Grand Turk of Salem	21	Madison of Salem	7
Growler	4	Marengo of New-York	8
U. S. Gun-boats	20	Mamouth of Baltimore	28

M'Donough of R. I.	2
M'Donough of Boston	7
Mars of Norfolk	3
Mars of New-York	4
Mars of New-London	2
Mary Ann of Charleston	5
Matilda of Philadelphia	1
Midas of Baltimore	10
On Mobile Bay	2
Morgiana of New-York	6
Montgomery of Salem	6
Nancy	1
Ned of Baltimore	1
Nonpariel of Charleston	1
Nonsuch of Baltimore	4
U. S. schooner Nonsuch	1
Orders in Council of New-York	5
Orlando of Gloucester	3
Patriot of New-York	9
Paul Jones of do.	11
Perry of Baltimore	24
Com. Perry's squadron on L. E.	9
U. S. sloop of war Peacock	15
Patapsco of Baltimore	3
Pike of do.	13
Pilot of do	3
Polly of Salem	7
Portsmouth of Portsmouth N. H.	9
Poor Sailor of Charleston	1
Prince of Neufchatel	35
Rambler of Bristol	2
Rambler of Boston	5
Ranger of do.	3
Rapid of do.	4
Rapid of Charleston	4
U. S. brig Rattlesnake	4
Rattlesnake of Philadelphia	25
Regulator	1
Reindeer of Boston	6
Resolution of do.	1
Retaliatian of New-York	1
Revenge of Baltimore	9
Revenge of Norfolk	2
Revenge of Philadelphia	3
Revenge of Salem	5
Revenue Cutters	5
Roger of Norfolk	8
Roger of Baltimore	11
Com Rodgers' squadron	19
Rosamond of New-York	3
Rossie of Baltimore	14
Rover of New-York	1
Row-boat privateer	2
Sabine of Baltimore	5
At Sandy Creek by riflemen	5
Sarah Ann of Baltimore	1
Saranack of do	2
Saratoga of New-York	19
Scourge of Baltimore	29
Saucy Jack of Charleston	27
Shark of New-York	1
Sine-qua-non of Boston	1
Scorpion of Salem	2
Siro of Baltimore	1
Snap Dragon of Newbern N. C.	23
Snow Bird of Salem	2
Sparrow of Baltimore	2
Spark of New-York	3
Spy of New-Orleans	1
Surprise of Baltimore	36
Boat Surprise and boat Swiftsure	2
Spencer of Philadelphia	1
Squando of Portsmouth N. H.	1
U. S. brig Syren	2
Syren of Baltimore	7
On the St. Lawrence	8
Teazer of New-York	13
Terrible (boat)	5
Thomas of Portsmouth	5
Thorn of Marblehead	1
Thrasher	1
Timothy Pickering	1
Tom of Baltimore	4
True-blooded Yankee	27
Two Brothers of New-Orleans	1
Two Friends of Mass.	1
Tuckahoe of Baltimore	2
U. S. frigate United States	1
Ultor of Baltimore	19
United We Stand of New-York	1
Upton (a prize ship)	1
Viper of New-York	3
Viper of Salem	1
Warriour of New-York	9
U. S. ship of war Wasp	16
Wasp of Baltimore	2
Wasp of Philadelphia	2
Wasp of Salem	1
Washington of Portland	1
Waterwich of Bristol	1
Whig of Baltimore	14
Wiley Raynard of Boston	4
Whale boat	1
Yankee of Bristol R. I.	38
Yankee (smack)	2
Yorktown of New-York	5
York of Baltimore	10
Young Eagle of New-York	2
Young Teazer of do.	6
Young Wasp of Philadelphia	11
Sundry vessels names not ascertained	16
Total,	1634

ARTICLES OF WAR.

AN ACT

For establishing Rules and Articles for the Government of the Armies of the United States.

Sec. 1. BE it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after the passing of this act, the following shall be the rules and articles by which the armies of the United States shall be governed.

ART. 1. Every officer now in the army of the United States, shall, in six months from the passing of this act, and every officer who shall hereafter be appointed, shall, before he enters on the duties of his office, subscribe these rules and regulations.

ART. 2. It is earnestly recommended to all officers and soldiers diligently to attend divine service; and all officers who shall behave indecently, or irreverently at any place of divine worship, shall, if commissioned officers, be brought before a general court martial, there to be publickly and severely reprimanded by the President; if non-commissioned officers or soldiers, every person so offending shall, for his first offence, forfeit one sixth of a dollar, to be deducted out of his next pay; for the second offence, he shall not only forfeit a like sum, but be confined twenty-four hours; and for every like offence shall suffer and pay in like manner; which money, so forfeited, shall be applied by the captain or senior officer of the troop or company, to the use of the sick soldiers of the company or troop to which the offender belongs.

ART. 3. Any non-commissioned officer or soldier who shall use any profane oath or execration, shall incur the penalties expressed in the foregoing article; and a commissioned officer shall forfeit and pay for each and every such offence, one dollar, to be applied as in the preceding article.

ART. 4. Every chaplain commissioned in the army or armies of the United States, who shall absent himself from the duties assigned him (except in cases of sickness or leave of absence) shall, on conviction thereof before a court martial, be fined not exceeding one month's pay, besides the loss of his pay during his absence; or to be discharged, as the said court martial shall judge proper.

ART. 5. Any officer or soldier who shall use contemptuous or disrespectful words against the President of the United States, against the Vice-President thereof, against the Congress of the United States, or against the chief magistrate or legislature of any of the United States in which he may be quartered, if a commissioned officer, shall be cashiered, or otherwise punished as a court martial shall direct; if a non-commissioned officer or soldier, he shall suffer such punishment as shall be inflicted on him by the sentence of a court martial.

ART. 6. Any officer or soldier who shall behave himself with contempt or disrespect towards his commanding officer, shall be punished according to the nature of his offence, by the judgement of a court martial.

ART. 7. Any officer or soldier who shall begin, excite, cause or join in any mutiny or sedition in any troop or company in the service of the United States, or in any party, post, detachment or guard, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as by a court martial shall be inflicted.

ART. 8. Any officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier, who, being present at any mutiny or sedition, does not use his utmost endeavours to suppress the same, or coming to the knowledge of any intended mutiny, does not without delay give information thereof to his commanding officer, shall be punished by the sentence of a court martial with death or otherwise, according to the nature of his offence.

ART. 9. Any officer or soldier who shall strike his superiour officer, or draw or lift up any weapon, or offer any violence against him, being in the execution of his office, on any pretence whatsoever, or shall disobey any lawful command of his superiour officer, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall, according to

the nature of his offence, be inflicted upon him by the sentence of a court martial.

ART. 10. Every non-commissioned officer or soldier, who shall enlist himself in the service of the United States, shall, at the time of his so enlisting, or within six days afterwards, have the articles for the government of the armies of the United States, read to him; and shall, by the officer who enlisted him, or by the commanding officer of the troop or company into which he was enlisted, be taken before the next justice of the peace, or chief magistrate of any city or town corporate, not being an officer of the army, or where recourse cannot be had to the civil magistrate, before the judge advocate, and in his presence, shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I, A. B. do solemnly swear or affirm, (as the case may be) that I will bear true allegiance to the United States of America, and that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies, or opposers, whatsoever, and observe and obey the orders of the President of the United States, and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States." Which justice, magistrate or judge advocate is to give the officer a certificate, signifying that the man enlisted, did take the said oath or affirmation.

ART. 11. After a non-commissioned officer or soldier shall have been duly enlisted and sworn, he shall not be dismissed the service without a discharge in writing; and no discharge granted to him shall be sufficient, which is not signed by a field officer of the regiment to which he belongs, or commanding officer, where no field officer of the regiment is present; and no discharge shall be given to a non-commissioned officer or soldier, before his term of service has expired, but by order of the President, the Secretary of War, the commanding officer of a department, or the sentence of a general court martial; nor shall a commissioned officer be discharged the service, but by order of the President of the United States, or by sentence of a general court martial.

ART. 12. Every Colonel, or other officer commanding a regiment, troop or company, and actually quartered

with it, may give furloughs to non-commissioned officers or soldiers, in such numbers, and for so long a time as he shall judge to be most consistent with the good of the service; and a Captain or other inferiour officer commanding a troop or company, or in any garrison, fort or barrack of the United States, (his field officer being absent) may give furloughs to non-commissioned officers or soldiers, for a time not exceeding twenty days in six months, but not to more than two persons to be absent at the same time, excepting some extraordinary occasion should require it.

ART. 13. At every muster, the commanding officer of each regiment, troop or company there present, shall give to the commissary of musters, or other officer who musters the said regiment, troop or company, certificates signed by himself, signifying how long such officers, as shall not appear at the said muster, have been absent, and the reason of their absence. In like manner the commanding officer of every troop, or company, shall give certificates, signifying the reasons of the absence of the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, which reasons, and time of absence, shall be inserted in the muster rolls opposite the name of the respective absent officers and soldiers. The certificates shall, together with the muster rolls, be remitted by the commissary of musters, or other officer mustering, to the department of war, as speedily as the distance of the place will admit.

ART. 14. Every officer who shall be convicted, before a general court martial, of having signed a false certificate, relating to the absence of either officer or private soldier, or relative to his or their pay, shall be cashiered.

ART. 15. Every officer who shall knowingly make a false muster of man or horse, and every officer or commissary of musters, who shall willingly sign, direct or allow the signing of muster rolls, wherein such false muster is contained, shall, upon proof made thereof by two witnesses, before a general court martial, be cashiered, and shall be thereby utterly disabled to have or hold any office or employment in the service of the United States.

ART. 16. Any commissary of musters or other officer,

who shall be convicted of having taken money or other thing, by way of gratification, on the mustering any regiment, troop or company, or on signing muster rolls, shall be displaced from his office, and shall be thereby utterly disabled to have or hold any office or employment in the service of the United States.

ART. 17. Any officer who shall presume to muster a person as a soldier, who is not a soldier, shall be deemed guilty of having made a false muster, and shall suffer accordingly.

ART. 18. Every officer who shall knowingly make a false return to the department of war, or to any of his superiour officers, authorized to call for such returns, of the state of the regiment, troop, or company or garrison under his command; or of the arms, ammunition, clothing or other stores thereunto belonging, shall on conviction thereof before a court martial, be cashiered.

ART. 19. The commanding officer of every regiment, troop or independent company, or garrison of the United States, shall, in the beginning of every month, remit through the proper channels, to the department of war, an exact return of the regiment, troop, independent company or garrison, under his command, specifying the names of officers then absent from their posts, and the reasons for, and the time of their absence. And any officer who shall be convicted of having, through neglect or design, omitted sending such returns, shall be punished according to the nature of his crime, by the judgement of a general court martial.

ART. 20. All officers and soldiers, who have received pay, or have been duly enlisted in the service of the United States, and shall be convicted of having deserted the same, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as by sentence of a court martial shall be inflicted.

ART. 21. Any non-commissioned officer or soldier, who shall, without leave from his commanding officer, absent himself from his troop, company or detachment, shall, upon being convicted thereof, be punished according to the nature of his offence, at the discretion of a court martial.

ART. 22. No non-commissioned officer or soldier shall enlist himself in any other regiment, troop or company,

without a regular discharge from the regiment, troop or company in which he last served, on the penalty of being reputed a deserter, and suffering accordingly. And in case any officer shall knowingly receive and entertain such non-commissioned officer or soldier, or shall not, after his being discovered to be a deserter, immediately confine him, and give notice thereof to the corps in which he last served, the said officer shall by a court martial be cashiered.

ART. 23. Any officer or soldier, who shall be convicted of having advised or persuaded any other officer or soldier to desert the service of the United States, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be inflicted upon him by the sentence of a court martial.

ART. 24. No officer or soldier shall use any reproachful or provoking speeches or gestures to another, upon pain, if an officer, of being put in arrest; if a soldier, confined, and of asking pardon of the party offended, in the presence of his commanding officer.

ART. 25. No officer or soldier shall send a challenge to another officer or soldier, to fight a duel, or accept a challenge, if sent, upon pain, if a commissioned officer, of being cashiered; if a non-commissioned officer or soldier, of suffering corporal punishment at the discretion of a court martial.

ART. 26. If any commissioned or non-commissioned officer commanding a guard, shall knowingly or willingly suffer any person whatsoever to go forth to fight a duel, he shall be punished as a challenger; and all seconds, promoters and carriers of challenges, in order to duels, shall be deemed principals, and be punished accordingly. And it shall be the duty of every officer commanding an army, regiment, company, post or detachment, who is knowing to a challenge being given, or accepted, by any officer, non-commissioned or soldier under his command, or has reason to believe the same to be the case, immediately to arrest and bring to trial such offenders.

ART. 27. All officers, of what condition soever, have power to part and quell all quarrels, frays and disorders, though the persons concerned should belong to another regiment troop or company; and either to order officers into arrest, or non-commissioned officers or soldiers into

confinement, until their proper superiour officers shall be acquainted therewith; and whosoever shall refuse to obey such officer, (though of an inferiour rank) or shall draw his sword upon him, shall be punished at the discretion of a general court martial.

ART. 28. Any officer or soldier who shall upbraid another for refusing a challenge, shall himself be punished as a challenger; and all officers and soldiers are hereby discharged from any disgrace or opinion of disadvantage, which might arise from their having refused to accept of challenges, as they will only have acted in obedience to the laws, and done their duty as good soldiers, who subject themselves to discipline.

ART 29. No suttler shall be permitted to sell any kind of liquors or victuals, or to keep their houses or shops open for the entertainment of soldiers, after nine at night, or before the beating of the reveilles, or upon Sundays, during divine service or sermon, on the penalty of being dismissed from all future suttling.

ART. 30. All officers commanding in the field, forts, barracks or garrisons of the United States, are hereby required to see that the persons permitted to suttle, shall supply the soldiers with good and wholesome provisions, or other articles, at a reasonable price, as they shall be answerable for their neglect.

ART. 31. No officer commanding in any of the garrisons, forts or barracks of the United States, shall exact exorbitant prices for houses or stalls let out to suttlers, or connive at the like exactions in others; nor by his own authority, and for his private advantage, lay any duty or imposition upon, or be interested in the sale of any vituals, liquors or other necessaries of life, brought into the garrison, fort or barracks, for the use of the soldiers, on the penalty of being discharged from the service.

ART. 32. Every officer commanding in quarters, garrisons, or on the march, shall keep good order, and to the utmost of his power, redress all abuses or disorders, which may be committed by any officer or soldier under his command; if upon complaint made to him of officers or soldiers beating, or otherwise ill treating any person, of disturbing fairs or markets, or of committing any kinds of riots, to the disquieting of the citizens of

the United States, he, the said commander, who shall refuse or omit to see justice done to the offender or offenders, and reparation made to the party or parties injured, as far as the offender's pay shall enable him or them, shall upon proof thereof, be cashiered or punished, as a general court martial shall direct.

ART. 33. When any comissioned officer or soldier, shall be accused of a capital crime, or of having used violence, or committed any offence against the persons or property of any citizen of any of the United States, such as is punishable by the known laws of the land, the commanding officer, and officers of every regiment, troop, or company, to which the person or persons, so accused, shall belong, are hereby required, upon application duly made by, or in behalf of the party or parties injured, to use their utmost endeavours to deliver over such accused person, or persons, to the civil Magistrate, and likewise to be aiding and assisting to the officers of justice in apprehending and securing the person or persons so accused, in order to bring him or them to trial. If any commanding officer or officers, shall wilfully neglect, or shall refuse, upon the application aforesaid, to deliver over such accused person or persons, to the civil magistrates, or to be aiding and assisting to the officers of justice in apprehending such person or persons, the officer or officers, so offending, shall be cashiered.

ART 34. If any officer shall think himself wronged by his colonel, or the commanding officer of the regiment, and shall, upon due application being made to him be refused redress, he may complain to the General, commanding in the state or territory where such regiment shall be stationed, in order to obtain justice; who is hereby required to examine into the said complaint, and take proper measures for redressing the wrong complained of, and transmit as soon as possible, to the department of war, a true state of such complaint, with the proceedings had thereon.

ART. 35. If any inferiour officer or soldier, shall think himself wronged by his Captain, or other officers, he is to complain thereof to the commanding officer of the regiment, who is hereby required to summon a regimen-

tial court martial, for the doing justice to the complainant; from which regimental court martial, either party may, if he thinks himself still aggrieved, appeal to a general court martial. But if, upon a second hearing, the appeal shall appear vexatious and groundless, the person so appealing, shall be punished at the discretion of the said court martial.

ART. 36. Any commissioned officer, store keeper, or commisary, who shall be convicted at a general court martial, of having sold, without a proper order for that purpose, embezzled, misapplied, or wilfully, or through neglect, suffered any of the provisions, forage, arms, clothing, ammunition, or other military stores belonging to the United States, to be spoiled, or damaged, shall, at his own expense, make good the loss or damage, and shall, moreover, forfeit all his pay, and be dismissed from the service.

ART. 37. Any non-commissioned officer or soldier, who shall be convicted, at a regimental court martial, of having sold, or designedly, or through neglect, wasted the ammunition delivered out to him, to be employed in the service of the United States, shall be punished by the discretion of such court.

ART. 38. Every non-commissioned officer or soldier, who shall be convicted before a court martial, of having sold, lost, or spoiled through neglect, his horse, arms, clothes, or accoutrements, shall be put under such weekly stoppages, not exceeding the half of his pay, as such court martial shall judge sufficient, for repairing the loss or damage; and shall suffer confinment, or such other corporal punishment as his crime shall deserve.

ART. 39. Every officer, who shall be convicted before a court martial, of having embezzled, or misapplied any money with which he may have been entrusted, for the payment of the men under his command, or for enlisting men into the service, or for other purposes, if a commissioned officer, shall be cashiered and compelled to refund the money; if a non-commissioned officer, shall be reduced to the ranks, be put under stoppages until the money be made good, and suffer such corporal punishment as such court martial shall direct.

ART. 40. Every Captain of a troop or company, is

charged with the arms, accoutrements, ammunition, clothing or other warlike stores belonging to the troop or company under his command, which he is to be accountable for to his colonel, in case of their being lost, spoiled, or damaged, not by unavoidable accidents, or on actual service.

Art. 41. All non-commissioned officers and soldiers, who shall be found one mile from the camp, without leave, in writing, from their commanding officer, shall suffer such punishment as shall be inflicted upon them by the sentence of a court martial.

Art. 42. No officer or soldier shall lie out of his quarters, garrison, or camp, without leave from his superiour officer, upon penalty of being punished according to the sentence of a court martial.

Art. 43. Every non-commissioned officer and soldier shall retire to his quarters or tent, at the beating of the retreat; in default of which he shall be punished according to the nature of his offence.

Art. 44. No officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier, shall fail in repairing, at the time fixed, to the place of parade, of exercise or other rendezvous, appointed by his commanding officer, if not prevented by sickness, or some other evident necessity, or shall go from the said place of rendezvous, without leave from his commanding officer, before he shall be regularly dismissed or relieved, on the penalty of being punished according to the nature of his offence by the sentence of a court martial.

Art. 45. Any commissioned officer, who shall be found drunk on his guard, party, or other duty, shall be cashiered. Any non-commissioned officer or soldier so offending, shall suffer such corporal punishment as shall be inflicted by the sentence of a court martial.

Art. 46. Any sentinel who shall be found sleeping upon his post, or shall leave it before he shall be regularly relieved, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be inflicted by the sentence of a court martial.

Art. 47. No soldier belonging to any regiment, troop, or company, shall hire another to do his duty for him, or be excused from duty, but in cases of sickness, disability,

or leave of absence ; and every such soldier, found guilty of hiring his duty, as also the party so hired to do another's duty, shall be punished at the discretion of a regimental court martial.

Art. 48. And every non-commissioned officer conniving at such hiring of duty aforesaid, shall be reduced ; and every commissioned officer knowing and allowing such ill practices in the service, shall be punished by the judgememt of a general court martial.

Art. 49. Any officer belonging to the service of the United States, who, by discharging of fire arms, drawing of swords, beating of drums, or by any other means whatsoever, shall occasion false alarms, in camp, garrison, or quarters, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a general court martial.

Art. 50. Any officer or soldier, who shall, without urgent necessity, or without the leave of his superiour officer, quit his guard, platoon, or division, shall be punished according to the nature of his offence, by the sentence of a court martial.

Art. 51. No officer or soldier shall do violence to any person who brings provisions or other necessaries to the camp, garrison, or quarters, of the forces of the United States, employed in any parts out of the said States, upon pain of death, or such other punishment as a court martial shall direct.

Art. 52. Any officer or soldier, who shall misbehave himself before the enemy, run away, or shamefully abandon any fort, post, or guard, which he or they may be commanded to defend, or speak words inducing others to do the like ; or shall cast away his arms and ammunition, or who shall quit his post or colours to plunder and pillage ; every such offender being duly convicted thereof, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a general court martial.

Art. 53. Any person belonging to the armies of the United States, who shall make known the watch-word to any person who is not entitled to receive it, according to the rules and discipline of war, or shall presume to give a parole or watch-word, different from what he

received, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a general court martial.

Art. 54. All officers and soldiers are to behave themselves orderly in quarters, and on their march; and whosoever shall commit any waste, or spoil, either in walks of trees, parks, warrens, fish ponds, houses or gardens, cornfields, enclosures or meadows, or shall maliciously destroy any property whatsoever, belonging to the inhabitants of the United States, unless by order of the then commander in chief of the armies of the said States, shall (besides such penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished according to the nature and degree of offence, by the judgement of a regimental or general court martial.

Art. 55. Whosoever, belonging to the armies of the United States, employed in foreign parts, shall force a safeguard, shall suffer death.

Art. 56. Whosoever shall relieve the enemy with money, victuals or ammunition, or shall knowingly harbour or protect an enemy, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court martial.

Art. 57. Whosoever shall be convicted of holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court martial.

Art. 58. All publick stores taken in the enemy's camp, towns, forts or magazines, whether of artillery, ammunition, clothing, forage or provisions, shall be secured for the service of the United States; for the neglect of which, the commanding officer is to be answerable.

Art. 59. If any commander of any garrison, fortress or post, shall be compelled, by the officers and soldiers under his command, to give up to the enemy, or to abandon it; the commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers or soldiers, who shall be convicted of having so offended, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be inflicted upon them by the sentence of a court martial.

ART. 60. All suttlers and retainers to the camp, and all persons whatsoever, serving with the armies of the United States, in the field, though not enlisted soldiers, are to be subject to orders, according to the rules and discipline of war.

ART. 61. Officers having brevets, or commissions, of a prior date to those of the regiment in which they serve, may take place in courts martial and on detachments, when composed of different corps, according to the ranks given them in their brevets, or dates of their former commissions; but in the regiment, troop or company, to which such officers belong, they shall do duty, and take rank, both in courts martial and on detachments, which shall be composed only of their own corps, according to the commissions by which they are mustered in the said corps.

ART. 62. If upon marches, guards, or in quarters, different corps of the army shall happen to join, or do duty together, the officer highest in rank of the line of the army, marine corps or militia, by commission there, on duty, or in quarters, shall command the whole, and give orders for what is needful to the service, unless otherwise specially directed by the President of the United States, according to the nature of the case.

ART. 63. The functions of the engineers being generally confined to the most elevated branch of military science, they are not to assume, nor are they subject to be ordered on any duty beyond the line of their immediate profession, except by the special order of the President of the United States; but they are to receive every mark of respect, to which their rank in the army may entitle them respectively, and are liable to be transferred, at the discretion of the President, from one corps to another, regard being paid to rank.

ART. 64. General courts martial may consist of any number of commissioned officers from five to thirteen inclusively, but they shall not consist of less than thirteen, where that number can be convened without manifest injury to the service.

ART. 65. Any general officer commanding an army, or Colonel commanding a separate department, may appoint general courts martial whenever necessary. But

no sentence of a court martial shall be carried into execution until after the whole proceedings shall have been laid before the officer ordering the same, or the officer commanding the troops for the time being; neither shall any sentence of a general court martial, in time of peace, extending to the loss of life, or the dismission of a commissioned officer, or which shall, either in time of peace or war, respecting a general officer, be carried into execution, until after the whole proceedings shall have been transmitted to the Secretary of War, to be laid before the President of the United States, for his confirmation or disapproval and orders in the case. All other sentences may be confirmed and executed by the officer ordering the court to assemble, or the commanding officer for the time being, as the case may be.

ART. 66. Every officer commanding a regiment, or corps, may appoint, for his own regiment or corps, courts martial, to consist of three commissioned officers, for the trial and punishment of offences not capital, and decide upon their sentences. For the same purpose all officers, commanding any of the garrisons, forts, barracks or other places where the troops consist of different corps, may assemble courts martial, to consist of three commissioned officers, and decide upon their sentences.

ART. 67. No garrison or regimental court martial shall have the power to try capital cases, or commissioned officers; neither shall they inflict a fine exceeding one month's pay, nor imprison, nor put to hard labour, any non-commissioned officer or soldier, for a longer time than one month.

ART. 68. Whenever it may be found convenient and necessary to the publick service, the officers of the marine shall be associated with the officers of the land forces, for the purpose of holding courts martial and trying offenders belonging to either; and in such cases the orders of the senior officers of either corps who may be present and duly authorized, shall be received and obeyed.

ART. 69. The judge advocate or some person deputed by him, or by the general, or officer commanding the army, detachment or garrison, shall prosecute in the name of the name of the United States, but shall so far

consider himself as counsel for the prisoner, after the said prisoner shall have made his plea, as to object to any leading question to any of the witnesses, or any question to the prisoner, the answer to which might tend to criminate himself; and administer to each member of the court, before they proceed upon any trial, the following oath, which shall also be taken by all members of the regimental and garrison courts martial.

"You, A. B. do swear, that you will well and truly try and determine, according to evidence, the matter now before you, between the United States of America and the prisoner to be tried, and that you will duly administer justice, according to the provisions of 'an act establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States,' without partiality, favour or affection; and if any doubt shall arise, not explained by said articles, according to your conscience, the best of your understanding and the custom of war, in like cases; and you do further swear, that you will not divulge the sentence of the court until it shall be published by the proper authority; neither will you disclose or discover the vote or opinion of any particular member of the court martial; unless required to give evidence thereof as a witness, by a court of justice, in a due course of law. *So help you God.*"

And as soon as the said oath shall have been administered to the respective members, the president of the court shall administer to the judge advocate, or person officiating as such, an oath in the following words:

"You, A. B. do swear, that you will not disclose or discover the vote or opinion of any particular member of the court martial, unless required to give evidence thereof as a witness, by a court of justice, in due course of law. Nor divulge the sentence of the court to any but the proper authority, until it shall be duly disclosed by the same. *So help you God.*"

ART. 70. When any prisoner arraigned before a general court martial shall, from obstinate and deliberate design, stand mute or answer foreign to the purpose, the court may proceed to trial and judgement as if the prisoner had regularly pleaded not guilty.

ART. 71. When a member shall be challenged by a

prisoner, he must state his cause of challenge, of which the court shall, after due deliberation, determine the relevancy or validity, and decide accordingly; and no challenge to more than one member at a time shall be received by the court.

ART. 72. All the members of a court martial are to behave with decency and calmness; and in giving their votes, are to begin with the youngest in commission.

ART. 73. All persons who give evidence before a court martial, are to be examined on oath or affirmation in the following form:

"You swear, or affirm, (as the case may be) the evidence you shall give in the cause now in hearing, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. *So help you God.*"

ART. 74. On the trials of cases not capital, before courts martial, the deposition of witnesses not in the line or staff of the army, may be taken before some justice of the peace, and read in evidence; provided, the prosecutor and person accused are present at the taking the same, or are duly notified thereof.

ART. 75. No officer shall be tried but by a general court martial, nor by officers of inferiour rank, if it can be avoided. Nor shall any proceedings or trials be carried on excepting between the hours of eight in the morning and three in the afternoon, excepting in cases which, in the opinion of the officer appointing the court martial, require immediate example.

ART. 76. No person whatsoever shall use any menacing words, signs or gestures, in presence of a court martial, or shall cause any disorder or riot, or disturb their proceedings, on the penalty of being punished at the discretion of the said court martial.

ART. 77. Whenever any officer shall be charged with a crime, he shall be arrested and confined in his barracks, quarters or tent, and deprived of his sword, by the commanding officer. And any officer who shall leave his confinement before he shall be set at liberty by his commanding officer, or by a superiour officer, shall be cashiered.

ART. 78. Non-commissioned officers and soldiers, charged with crimes, shall be confined until tried by a court martial, or released by proper authority.

Art. 79. No officer or soldier who shall be put in arrest, shall continue in confinment more than eight days, or until such time as a court martial can be assembled.

Art. 80. No officer commanding a guard, or provost martial, shall refuse to receive or keep any prisoner committed to his charge by an officer belonging to the forces of the United States; provided the officer committing shall, at the same time, deliver an account in writing, signed by himself, of the crime with which the said prisoner is charged

Art. 81. No officer commanding a guard, or provost martial, shall presume to release any person committed to his charge, without proper authority for so doing, nor shall he suffer any person to escape, on the penalty of being punished for it by the sentence of a court martial.

Art. 82. Every officer or provost martial, to whose charge prisoners shall be committed, shall within twenty-four hours after such commitment, or as soon as he shall be relieved from his guard, make report in writing, to the commanding officer, of their names, their crimes, and the names of the officers who committed them, on the penalty of being punished for disobedience or neglect, at the discretion of the court martial.

Art. 83. Any commissioned officer convicted before a general court martial of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, shall be dismissed the service.

Art. 84. In cases where a court martial may think it proper to sentence a commissioned officer to be suspended from command, they shall have power also to suspend his pay and emoluments from the same time according to the nature and heinousness of the offence.

Art. 85. In all cases where a commissioned officer is cashiered for cowardice or fraud, it shall be added in the sentence, that the crime, name, and place of abode, and punishment of the delinquent, be published in the newspapers, in and about the camp, and of the particular State from which the offender came, or where he usually resides, after which it shall be deemed scandalous for an officer to associate with him.

Art. 86. The commanding officer of any post or de-

tachment, in which there shall not be a number of officers adequate to form a general court martial, shall in cases which require the cognizance of such a court, report to the commanding officer of the department, who shall order a court to be assembled at the nearest post or detachment, and the party accused with necessary witnesses, to be transported to the place where the said court shall be assembled.

ART. 87. No person shall be sentenced to suffer death but by the concurrence of two thirds of a general court martial, nor except in the cases herein expressly mentioned; nor shall more than fifty lashes* be inflicted on any offender, at the discretion of a court martial; and no officer, non-commissioned officer, soldier, or follower of the army, shall be tried a second time for the same offence.

ART. 88. No person shall be liable to be tried and punished by a general court martial for any offence which shall appear to have been committed more than two years before the issuing of the order for such trial, unless the person by reason of having absented himself, or some other manifest impediment, shall not have been amenable to justice within that period.

ART. 89. Every officer authorized to order a general court martial, shall have power to pardon or mitigate any punishment ordered by such court, except the sentence of death, or of cashiering an officer; which, in the cases where he has authority, (by article 65) to carry them into execution, he may suspend until the pleasure of the President of the United States can be known; which suspension, together with copies of the proceedings of the court martial, the said officer shall immediately transmit to the President for his determination. And the Colonel or commanding officer of the regiment or garrison, where any regimental or garrison court martial shall be held, may pardon or mitigate any punishment ordered by such court to be inflicted.

ART. 90. Every Judge Advocate, or person officiating as such, at any general court martial, shall transmit, with

*Punishment by stripes or lashes not allowed—see act Congress May 16, 1812.

as much expedition as the opportunity of time and distance of place can admit, the original proceedings and sentence of such court martial, to the Secretary of War, which said original proceedings and sentence shall be carefully kept and preserved in the office of the said Secretary, to the end that the persons entitled thereto may be enabled, upon application to the said office, to obtain copies thereof.

The party tried by any general court martial, shall upon demand thereof made by himself, or by any person or persons in his behalf, be entitled to a copy of the sentence and proceedings of such court martial.

Art. 91. In cases where the General or commanding officer may order a court of inquiry to examine into the nature of any transaction, accusation or imputation against any officer or soldier, the said court shall consist of one or more officers, not exceeding three, and a Judge Advocate, or other suitable person as a recorder, to reduce the proceedings and evidence to writing, all of whom shall be sworn to the faithful performance of their duty. This court shall have the same power to summon witnesses as a court martial, and to examine them on oath. But they shall not give their opinion on the merits of the case, excepting they shall be thereto specially required. The parties accused shall also be permitted to cross examine, and interrogate the witnesses, so as to investigate fully the circumstances in question.

Art. 92. The proceedings of a court of inquiry must be authenticated by the signature of the Recorder and the President, and delivered to the commanding officer; and the said proceedings may be admitted as evidence by a court martial, in cases not capital, or extending to the dismission of an officer, provided that the circumstances are such, that oral testimony cannot be obtained. But as courts of inquiry may be perverted to dishonourable purposes, and may be considered as engines of destruction to military merit, in the hands of weak and envious commandants, they are hereby prohibited, unless directed by the President of the United States, or demanded by the accused.

Art. 93. The Judge Advocate, or Recorder shall administer to the members the following oath:

"You shall, will, and truly examine and inquire, according to your evidence, into the matter now before you without partiality, favour, affection, prejudice, or hope of reward. *So help you God.*"

After which the President shall administer to the Judge Advocate, or Recorder, the following oath:

"You, A. B. do swear, that you will, according to your best abilities, accurately and impartially record the proceedings of the court, and the evidence to be given in the case in hearing. *So help you God.*"

The witnesses shall take the same oath as witnesses sworn before a court martial.

ART. 94. When any commissioned officer shall die or be killed in the service of the United States, the Major of the regiment, or the officer doing the Major's duty in his absence, or in any post or garrison, the second officer in command, or the assistant military agent, shall immediately secure all his effects or equippage then in camp or quarters, and shall make an inventory thereof, and forthwith transmit the same to the office of the Department of War, to the end, that his executors or administrators may receive the same.

ART. 95. When any non-commissioned officer, or soldier, shall die or be killed in the service of the United States, the then commanding officer of the troop, or company, shall, in the presence of two other commissioned officers, take an account of what effects he died possessed of, above his arms and accoutrements, and transmit the same to the office of the department of war; which said effects are to be accounted for, and paid to the representatives of such deceased non-commissioned officer, or soldier. And in case any of the officers, so authorized to take care of the effects of deceased officers and soldiers, should before they have accounted to their representatives for the same, have occasion to leave the regiment or post, by preferment or otherwise, they shall, before they be permitted to quit the same, deposit in the hands of the commanding officer, or of the assistant military agent, all the effects of such deceased non-commissioned officers and soldiers, in order that the same may be secured for, and paid to their respective representatives.

ART. 96. All officers, conductors, gunners, matrosses, drivers or other persons whatsoever, receiving pay or hire, in the service of the artillery or corps of engineers of the United States, shall be governed by the aforesaid rules and articles, and shall be subject to be tried by courts martial, in like manner with the officers and soldiers of the other troops in the service of the United States.

ART. 97. The officers and soldiers of any troops, whether militia or others, being mustered and in pay of the United States, shall, at all times and in all places, when joined, or acting in conjunction with the regular forces of the United States, be governed by these rules and articles of war, and shall be subject to be tried by courts martial in like manner with the officers and soldiers in the regular forces, save only, that such courts martial shall be composed entirely of militia officers.

ART. 98. All officers, serving by commission from the authority of any particular State, shall, on all detachments, courts martial or other duty, wherein they may be employed in conjunction with the regular forces of the United States, take rank next after all officers of the like grade in said regular forces, notwithstanding the commissions of such militia or State officers may be elder than the commissions of the officers of the regular forces of the United States.

ART. 99. All crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not mentioned in the foregoing articles of war, are to be taken cognizance of by a general or regimental court martial, according to the nature and degree of the offence, and be punished at their discretion.

ART. 100. The President of the United States, shall have power to prescribe the uniform of the army.

ART. 101. The foregoing articles are to be read and published once in every six months, to every garrison, regiment, troop or company, mustered or to be mustered in the service of the United States, and are to be duly observed and obeyed, by all officers and soldiers who are or shall be in said service.

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That in time of

war, all persons not citizens of, or owing allegiance to the United States of America, who shall be found lurking as spies, in or about the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States, or any of them, shall suffer death, according to the law and usage of nations, by sentence of a general court martial.

Sec. 3. *And be it further enacted*, That the rules and regulations, by which the armies of the United States have heretofore been governed, and the resolves of Congress thereunto annexed, and respecting the same, shall, henceforth, be void and of no effect, except so far as may relate to any transactions under them, prior to the promulgation of this act, at the several posts and garrisons respectively, occupied by any part of the army of the United States.

NATHL. MACON.
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
S. SMITH,
President of the Senate, pro tem.

April 10, 1806.
Approved, TH. JEFFERSON.

REGULATIONS

Of the War Department, to be observed in the allowance of barracks or quarters to the officers of the army.

To a Major General, four rooms and a kitchen.

To a Brigadier General, three rooms and a kitchen.

To an Aid-de-Camp, one room.

To the Adjutant General and Inspector General, each three rooms and a kitchen.

To the Quarter Master General, three rooms and a kitchen; and for his officers and clerks, two rooms.

To each field officer, two rooms and a kitchen.

To a hospital Surgeon, the same

To the Adjutant and Inspector, in addition to his allowance as a field officer, one room.

To each Captain, one room; when commanding a separate post, in addition, a kitchen.

To a Surgeon, one room.

To two subalterns, one room.

To a Surgeon's Mate, the same as a subaltern.

To a subaltern, when commanding a separate post, in addition, a kitchen.

To every mess of eight officers, one room and a kitchen.

The officer highest in rank, to have the first choice of quarters.

The foregoing regulations to apply respectively to all corps, of whatever denomination, belonging to the army of the United States.

The following rates are to govern in the allowances to officers for the transportation of their baggage, when ordered on distant commands:

To a Major General, at $2 per 100 lbs. per 100 miles.	1250 lbs.
To a Brigadier General, Adjutant General, Inspector General, or Quarter Master General,	1000

To a Colonel,	750 lbs.
To a hospital Surgeon,	750
To a Lieutenant Colonel,	600
To a Major,	500
To a Captain,	400
To a Surgeon,	400
To a subaltern,	300
To a Surgeon's Mate,	300
To a Cadet,	200

The most direct post-route will regulate the distance, for the amount of transportation, whether performed by land or water, unless publick transportation is furnished.

To every officer ordered on general courts martial, or temporary commands, or on other duties on the sea-board or in the Atlantick States, there will be allowed him, if he so elect, in lieu of the transportation of his baggage, his stage hire. It must be understood that no delay is to be made on the road. Either receipts from the stage offices, or certificates on honour of the performance of the duty, must be produced.

A further allowance to officers ordered on general courts martial and temporary command, or other duty, of one dollar and twenty-five cents per day to officers who are not entitled to forage, and one dollar per day to such as shall be entitled to forage, agreeably to the twenty-second section of the act fixing the military peace establishment. As a voucher for the number of days an officer did sit on a general court martial, he must produce the certificate of the president, or judge advocate of the court.

Ordinance regulating and ascertaining the quantities of stationary which each officer serving in the army of the United States shall be entitled to receive annually.

To every officer commanding a separate post, the garrison of which shall consist of no more than two companies, twelve quires of writing paper, and one blank book of one quire of paper.

To every officer commanding a separate post, the garrison of which shall consist of more than two, and not more than five companies, twenty four quires of paper, and a blank book containing two quires of paper.

To a Major General, thirty-six quires of paper, and three blank books, each of three quires.

To a Brigadier General, twenty-four quires of paper, and two blank books, each of three quires.

To the Quarter Master General, Adjutant General, Inspector General and Adjutant Inspector of the army, each, the stationary necessary in their respective departments.

To a Colonel, eighteen quires of paper, and a blank book of three quires.

To a Lieutenant Colonel, twelve quires of paper, and a blank book of two quires.

For the use of every military company, whether in garrison or otherwise, twelve quires of paper, and a blank book containing two quires of paper.

For the use of every other commissioned officer in the army of the United States, two quires of letter paper, with a proportionate allowance of ink, quills and wafers.

For the use of the Assistant Military Agent or Quarter Master, at every separate post, one blank book containing two quires of paper.

For the use of every officer and garrison, a proportion of other stationary, at the rate of a dozen quills and as many wafers to each quire of paper; and a paper of ink-powder to each six quires.

Regulations respecting extra pay and allowance to soldiers when ordered on constant labour for a term not less than ten days.

The non-commissioned officers and privates, who may be drawn as artificers to work constantly on fortifications, bridges, barracks, roads or other publick works, for a term not less than ten days, Sundays excepted, shall be allowed, for each day's actual labour, fourteen cents and one gill of spirits each, in addition to their pay and rations.

Other non-commissioned officers and privates, not artificers, who shall be drawn for constant labour on fortifications, roads, bridges, barracks or other publick works, for a term not less than ten days, Sundays excepted, shall be allowed for each day's actual labour,

ten cents and one gill of spirits each, in addition to their pay and rations.

It shall be the duty of the officer commanding any such working party, to have a regular account kept, under his inspection, of every day's work performed by each non-commissioned officer or private; and to transmit or deliver, monthly, a fair copy thereof to the military or assistant military agent of the district or post in which the labour may be performed; which military or assistant military agent will pay, from the money in his hands, or will draw the money on the said abstracts, and pay the non-commissioned officers and privates conformably herewith.

It is to be understood, that the extra daily pay and allowance is only to be given for actual days' work, and not to be granted when from sickness or other causes, the work shall not actually be performed.

Rules adopted by the President of the United States, respecting Promotions in the army.

Promotions in the army of the United States shall hereafter be made agreeably to the regulations in force previous to those of the 3d of September, 1799, which were promulgated in general orders, dated 9th of that month.

Promotions to the rank of Captain shall be made regimentally; and to the rank of Colonel, in the lines of artillery and infantry, respectively; the three different establishments being kept distinct.

The officer next in rank will, on the happening of a vacancy, be considered, in ordinary cases, as the proper person to fill the same; but this rule may be subject to exceptions in extraordinary cases.

The above rules for promotions in the infantry and artillery, are applicable to the cavalry and riflemen.

No officer will consider himself as filling a vacancy, until he receives notice thereof through the department of war.

THE END.